Minn. Stat. § 169.121

State v. Rosenbush · 2019 2 citations [Dissent]

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Johnson v. Comm'r Safety · 2018 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Axelberg v. Commissioner of Public Safety · 2014 2 citations [Dissent]

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

State v. Netland · 2009 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Fedziuk v. Commissioner of Public Safety · 2005 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Larivee · 2003 8 citations

+ 8 more citations in this opinion.

State v. Busse · 2002 16 citations

+ 16 more citations in this opinion.

State v. Myers · 2001 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State, Lake Minnetonka Conservation District v. Horner · 2000 5 citations

+ 5 more citations in this opinion.

Knapp v. Commissioner of Public Safety · 2000 3 citations

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

State v. Wolf · 2000 1 citation

On the eve of the January 1998 trial date, Wolf waived his right to a jury trial and submitted this case to the court on stipulated facts in accordance with our decision in State v. Lothenbach, 296 N.W.2d 854, 858 (Minn.1980). At the trial, the court admitted the stipulated facts consisting of 14 pages and included the tab complaint, the trooper’s field report, intoxification field report, Intoxilyzer test and maintenance records, and a copy of Wolfs implied consent advisory, order of revocation and prior conviction. The court also noted that if a jury trial had been held that the jury would have been drawn from residents of Stearns County. Following trial, the court issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law and order. In its findings, the court noted that Wolf admitted driving the vehicle, that he failed the field sobriety tests and that his blood alcohol concentration was 0.14. The court also found that Wolf had one prior conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol. Based on these findings, the court found Wolf guilty of violating Minn. Stat. § 169.121, subd. 1(a),(d),(e) and subd. 3(c) (1998).

State v. Britton · 2000 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

State v. Hage · 1999 6 citations

+ 6 more citations in this opinion.

Baker v. State · 1999 3 citations

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

State v. Erickson · 1999 4 citations

+ 4 more citations in this opinion.

State v. Lucas · 1999 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Shane v. Commissioner of Public Safety · 1998 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Lee · 1998 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Hedglin v. City of Willmar · 1998 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Stone · 1997 4 citations

+ 4 more citations in this opinion.

State v. Paul · 1996 8 citations

+ 8 more citations in this opinion.

State v. Hanson · 1996 5 citations

+ 5 more citations in this opinion.

State v. Auchampach · 1995 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

State v. Pettee · 1995 2 citations [Dissent]

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

State v. Horning · 1995 24 citations

OPINION GARDEBRING, Justice. Appellant Douglas Horning was convicted of driving with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169.121, subd. 1(d) (1992). The issue on appeal is whether, in a prosecution for driving with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more, the trial court erred in excluding evidence regarding Horning’s “lack of impairment” prior to the administration of the Intoxilyzer test. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court, holding that the exclusion of lack of impairment evidence was not an abuse of discretion. We affirm because such evidence is not relevant to a crime based solely on blood alcohol content. Horning’s conviction arises out of a motor vehicle accident occurring on March 5, 1992 in Stearns County. On that evening, Horn-ing left his home in St. Paul at approximately 6:00 p.m. to drive to Alexandria, Minnesota. He testified he stopped in Champlin, Minnesota where he drank one “screwdriver” before leaving at 7:30 p.m. Shortly before 9:00 *297p.m., Horning was involved in a collision with a semi-truck while driving on Interstate 94 near Melrose, Minnesota. Although Horning believed that he was struck from behind by another automobile, the cause of the accident is unclear.1 The testimony at trial was conflicting as to the events immediately following the collision. According to Horning, he was approached by the driver of the truck that collided with Horning’s car, and they talked briefly about the condition of the car. Then, while the truck driver walked back to his truck to see if someone had called for the state patrol, an unidentified passerby approached Horning and offered him a brown paper bag with one 40-ounce bottle of malt liquor and “four or five other assorted beers.” Horning testified that over the next ten minutes he drank the bottle of malt liquor and two or three cans of beer from the bag, and when the truck driver returned, “threw the bag into the ditch, like behind the car.” In contrast to Horning’s testimony, the truck driver testified that he and Horning waited in the cab of his truck for the state patrol to arrive and that from the time he first spoke with Horning, Horning was never out of his sight. He further testified that Horning drank one cup of coffee after the accident, but he did not observe Horning drinking anything else. A state patrol trooper arrived approximately 40 minutes after the accident. After preparing an accident report, the trooper drove Horning to Melrose where Horning’s car had been towed and then to Sauk Centre where he was to be picked up and taken to Alexandria. Before Horning exited the trooper’s car at Sauk Centre, the trooper administered a portable breath test which after 20 seconds indicated “fail.” The trooper then took Horning to the police station in Sauk Centre where he administered an In-toxilyzer test. In regard to Horning’s Intoxilyzer test, the trooper testified that he is a certified Intoxi-lyzer operator, he operated the Intoxilyzer properly, and he waited the requisite observation time before starting the test. Horn-ing’s reported value at 11:18 p.m. was a blood alcohol concentration of 0.15. The trooper further testified that he interviewed Horning immediately following the Intoxilyzer test and recorded his responses on a standard interview form. According to the trooper, Horning answered “no” when asked whether he had anything to drink since the accident, and stated “Nyquil and cough medicine” when asked whether he had consumed alcohol other than at Champlin within the previous 24 hours.2 In addition, the state called an expert witness who testified that, based on his observation of the test record and the maintenance records, the Intoxilyzer instrument used to test Horning was in proper functioning order and provided an accurate and reliable record of the blood alcohol concentration level in Horning’s breath. The expert also estimated Horning’s blood alcohol concentration level at the time of the accident by taking the 11:18 p.m. result of 0.15 and extrapolating back to 9:00 p.m. by applying an average elimination rate of 0.016 alcohol concentration per hour. Based on this extrapolation method, the expert estimated Horning had a 0.188 to 0.193 blood alcohol concentration at approximately 9:00 p.m. After hearing the testimony of the state’s fact witnesses, the trial court granted the state’s motion in limine to limit testimony to evidence relating to Horning’s blood alcohol concentration and to exclude any evidence regarding whether Horning appeared to be under the influence of alcohol. Specifically, Horning sought to introduce evidence showing his conduct at the time of the accident was inconsistent with the Intoxilyzer test result of 0.15 and with the extrapolated estimate of 0.188 to 0.193 blood alcohol concentration. Horning also sought to question the *298state’s expert witness about the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension Intoxilyzer training manual, which indicates a person with an alcohol concentration of 0.18 would show clinical signs of intoxication. Moreover, although he was permitted to assert the affirmative defense of post-driving consumption of alcohol, Horning wanted to offer lack of impairment evidence to support this defense. As a result of the court’s ruling, Horning was prevented from introducing this evidence. Although Horning initially was charged with one count of driving under the influence of alcohol and one count of driving with an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more, the state dismissed the former charge and added one count of having an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more as measured within two hours of driving. Horning was convicted of driving with an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more and acquitted of the charge of having an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more as measured within two hours of driving. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction, finding that, because lack of impairment evidence is irrelevant to a charge of driving with an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more, the exclusion of such evidence was not an abuse of discretion. On appeal, Horning urges this court to find that the trial court improperly excluded relevant, circumstantial evidence when it granted the state’s motion to exclude lack of impairment evidence. Rulings involving the relevancy of evidence are generally left to the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Ture, 353 N.W.2d 502, 515 (Minn.1984). The party claiming error has the burden of showing both the error and the resulting prejudice. State v. Loebach, 310 N.W.2d 58, 64 (Minn.1981). The basic requisite for the admissibility of any evidence is that it be competent and relevant. See Minn.R.Evid. 402. The threshold determination of relevance turns on whether the evidence logically or reasonably tends to prove or disprove a material fact in issue, or tends to make such a fact more or less probable, or affords the basis for or supports a reasonable inference or presumption regarding the existence of a material fact. Minn.R.Evid. 401, committee comment. Looking at the definition of the crime at issue here, it seems clear that lack of impairment evidence is not relevant to the proof or disproof of a violation of Minn. Stat. § 169.121, subd. 1(d): Subd. 1. Crime. It is a crime for any person to drive, operate, or be in physical control of any motor vehicle within this state: [[Image here]] (d) when the person’s alcohol concentration is 0.10 or more; [[Image here]] In order for the state to sustain a conviction under subd. 1(d) there must be proof beyond a reasonable doubt of only two facts: that the defendant was operating a vehicle within this state and that at that time his/her alcohol concentration was .10 or more. Thus, proof of a violation of subd. 1(d) involves a narrowly focused inquiry directed solely to a determination of whether a defendant had a .10 or greater blood alcohol level at the time of driving. The only evidence relevant to this inquiry is related to: (1) whether the defendant was driving, a matter not contested in this case, and (2) the chemical testing which determines blood alcohol concentrations. In the face of information that a defendant did not weave when he drove, that he did not slur his speech, that he did not walk unsteadily, one might ask: so what? While that information might help a factfinder determine whether a defendant was guilty of the crime of driving under the influence, a violation of Minn. Stat. § 169.121, subd. 1(a) (1994), it has no bearing on the critical question here — what was appellant’s blood chemistry? 3 Whether appellant’s consumption of alcohol visibly impaired his driving is not at issue. Lack of impairment evidence does not logically or reasonably tend to prove or disprove appellant’s blood alcohol level, nor does *299it tend to make such a fact more or less probable, nor does it afford a basis for a reasonable inference or presumption regarding whether his blood alcohol level was .10 or greater. As a result, evidence of appellant’s lack of impairment is simply not relevant to a subd. 1(d) charge.4 Our concern is not that the lack of impairment evidence is unreliable. It is true that we have previously noted the limited value of visible evidence of intoxication. In State v. Graham, we said, “[although he can walk straight, although he may attend to his business, and may not give any outward and visible signs to the casual observer that he is drunk,” a person may still be under the influence. 176 Minn. 164, 168, 222 N.W. 909, 911 (1929). This is precisely why the legislature chose to create a “drunk driving” violation which does not depend on the outward manifestations of intoxication. Here, the reliability of the lack of impairment evidence is not at issue, only its relevance to the task at hand, determining a specific parameter of blood chemistry. Furthermore, we believe that the powerful public policy statement of our drunk driving laws militates against admission of lack of impairment evidence in prosecutions for violation of the blood alcohol limitation.5 The overall statutory scheme involving drunk driving which the legislature has crafted carefully over a period of years includes a number of separately defined crimes. Under this scheme, drunk drivers may be prosecuted for a number of specific illegal acts, including: (1) operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, under Minn. Stat. § 169.121, subd. 1(a); (2) operating a vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more, under Minn. Stat. § 169.121, subd. 1(d), which is at issue here, and (3) operating a vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.10 measured within two hours of the time of driving, under Minn. Stat. § 169.121, subd. 1(e) (1994). Each of these specifically enumerated crimes, which was enacted into law at a different time, is directed at impaired driving or driving ability, evidenced in different ways. If the crime described in subd. 1(a)— driving while under the influence of alcohol— defined all risky behavior, there would be no need for the other provisions; but it does not, and there is a need for them, simply because not all drunk drivers manifest impairment visible to the arresting officer. Finally, this court has specifically recognized that laws prohibiting a person from driving a motor vehicle while intoxicated are remedial statutes, and are to be “liberally interpreted in favor of the public interest and against the private interests of the drivers involved.” State, Dept. of Public Safety v. Juncewski, 308 N.W.2d 316, 319 (Minn.1981). We have said that the legislature has demonstrated its intent to have this statute cover “the broadest possible range of conduct” and to be given “the broadest possible effect.” Id. Indeed, by creating both an offense of driving under the influence of alcohol, subd. 1(a), and an offense of driving with an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more, the statute *300reflects an intent to create as effective and encompassing a remedy as possible to eradicate drunk driving from our streets and highways. To allow the admission of lack of impairment evidence on a charge of driving with an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more would undermine that broad and encompassing remedy which the legislature has mandated. We conclude that there was no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to exclude the lack of impairment evidence, and the decision of the court of appeals is affirmed.

OPINION GARDEBRING, Justice. Appellant Douglas Horning was convicted of driving with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169.121, subd. 1(d) (1992). The issue on appeal is whether, in a prosecution for driving with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more, the trial court erred in excluding evidence regarding Horning’s “lack of impairment” prior to the administration of the Intoxilyzer test. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court, holding that the exclusion of lack of impairment evidence was not an abuse of discretion. We affirm because such evidence is not relevant to a crime based solely on blood alcohol content. Horning’s conviction arises out of a motor vehicle accident occurring on March 5, 1992 in Stearns County. On that evening, Horn-ing left his home in St. Paul at approximately 6:00 p.m. to drive to Alexandria, Minnesota. He testified he stopped in Champlin, Minnesota where he drank one “screwdriver” before leaving at 7:30 p.m. Shortly before 9:00 *297p.m., Horning was involved in a collision with a semi-truck while driving on Interstate 94 near Melrose, Minnesota. Although Horning believed that he was struck from behind by another automobile, the cause of the accident is unclear.1 The testimony at trial was conflicting as to the events immediately following the collision. According to Horning, he was approached by the driver of the truck that collided with Horning’s car, and they talked briefly about the condition of the car. Then, while the truck driver walked back to his truck to see if someone had called for the state patrol, an unidentified passerby approached Horning and offered him a brown paper bag with one 40-ounce bottle of malt liquor and “four or five other assorted beers.” Horning testified that over the next ten minutes he drank the bottle of malt liquor and two or three cans of beer from the bag, and when the truck driver returned, “threw the bag into the ditch, like behind the car.” In contrast to Horning’s testimony, the truck driver testified that he and Horning waited in the cab of his truck for the state patrol to arrive and that from the time he first spoke with Horning, Horning was never out of his sight. He further testified that Horning drank one cup of coffee after the accident, but he did not observe Horning drinking anything else. A state patrol trooper arrived approximately 40 minutes after the accident. After preparing an accident report, the trooper drove Horning to Melrose where Horning’s car had been towed and then to Sauk Centre where he was to be picked up and taken to Alexandria. Before Horning exited the trooper’s car at Sauk Centre, the trooper administered a portable breath test which after 20 seconds indicated “fail.” The trooper then took Horning to the police station in Sauk Centre where he administered an In-toxilyzer test. In regard to Horning’s Intoxilyzer test, the trooper testified that he is a certified Intoxi-lyzer operator, he operated the Intoxilyzer properly, and he waited the requisite observation time before starting the test. Horn-ing’s reported value at 11:18 p.m. was a blood alcohol concentration of 0.15. The trooper further testified that he interviewed Horning immediately following the Intoxilyzer test and recorded his responses on a standard interview form. According to the trooper, Horning answered “no” when asked whether he had anything to drink since the accident, and stated “Nyquil and cough medicine” when asked whether he had consumed alcohol other than at Champlin within the previous 24 hours.2 In addition, the state called an expert witness who testified that, based on his observation of the test record and the maintenance records, the Intoxilyzer instrument used to test Horning was in proper functioning order and provided an accurate and reliable record of the blood alcohol concentration level in Horning’s breath. The expert also estimated Horning’s blood alcohol concentration level at the time of the accident by taking the 11:18 p.m. result of 0.15 and extrapolating back to 9:00 p.m. by applying an average elimination rate of 0.016 alcohol concentration per hour. Based on this extrapolation method, the expert estimated Horning had a 0.188 to 0.193 blood alcohol concentration at approximately 9:00 p.m. After hearing the testimony of the state’s fact witnesses, the trial court granted the state’s motion in limine to limit testimony to evidence relating to Horning’s blood alcohol concentration and to exclude any evidence regarding whether Horning appeared to be under the influence of alcohol. Specifically, Horning sought to introduce evidence showing his conduct at the time of the accident was inconsistent with the Intoxilyzer test result of 0.15 and with the extrapolated estimate of 0.188 to 0.193 blood alcohol concentration. Horning also sought to question the *298state’s expert witness about the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension Intoxilyzer training manual, which indicates a person with an alcohol concentration of 0.18 would show clinical signs of intoxication. Moreover, although he was permitted to assert the affirmative defense of post-driving consumption of alcohol, Horning wanted to offer lack of impairment evidence to support this defense. As a result of the court’s ruling, Horning was prevented from introducing this evidence. Although Horning initially was charged with one count of driving under the influence of alcohol and one count of driving with an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more, the state dismissed the former charge and added one count of having an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more as measured within two hours of driving. Horning was convicted of driving with an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more and acquitted of the charge of having an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more as measured within two hours of driving. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction, finding that, because lack of impairment evidence is irrelevant to a charge of driving with an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more, the exclusion of such evidence was not an abuse of discretion. On appeal, Horning urges this court to find that the trial court improperly excluded relevant, circumstantial evidence when it granted the state’s motion to exclude lack of impairment evidence. Rulings involving the relevancy of evidence are generally left to the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Ture, 353 N.W.2d 502, 515 (Minn.1984). The party claiming error has the burden of showing both the error and the resulting prejudice. State v. Loebach, 310 N.W.2d 58, 64 (Minn.1981). The basic requisite for the admissibility of any evidence is that it be competent and relevant. See Minn.R.Evid. 402. The threshold determination of relevance turns on whether the evidence logically or reasonably tends to prove or disprove a material fact in issue, or tends to make such a fact more or less probable, or affords the basis for or supports a reasonable inference or presumption regarding the existence of a material fact. Minn.R.Evid. 401, committee comment. Looking at the definition of the crime at issue here, it seems clear that lack of impairment evidence is not relevant to the proof or disproof of a violation of Minn. Stat. § 169.121, subd. 1(d): Subd. 1. Crime. It is a crime for any person to drive, operate, or be in physical control of any motor vehicle within this state: [[Image here]] (d) when the person’s alcohol concentration is 0.10 or more; [[Image here]] In order for the state to sustain a conviction under subd. 1(d) there must be proof beyond a reasonable doubt of only two facts: that the defendant was operating a vehicle within this state and that at that time his/her alcohol concentration was .10 or more. Thus, proof of a violation of subd. 1(d) involves a narrowly focused inquiry directed solely to a determination of whether a defendant had a .10 or greater blood alcohol level at the time of driving. The only evidence relevant to this inquiry is related to: (1) whether the defendant was driving, a matter not contested in this case, and (2) the chemical testing which determines blood alcohol concentrations. In the face of information that a defendant did not weave when he drove, that he did not slur his speech, that he did not walk unsteadily, one might ask: so what? While that information might help a factfinder determine whether a defendant was guilty of the crime of driving under the influence, a violation of Minn. Stat. § 169.121, subd. 1(a) (1994), it has no bearing on the critical question here — what was appellant’s blood chemistry? 3 Whether appellant’s consumption of alcohol visibly impaired his driving is not at issue. Lack of impairment evidence does not logically or reasonably tend to prove or disprove appellant’s blood alcohol level, nor does *299it tend to make such a fact more or less probable, nor does it afford a basis for a reasonable inference or presumption regarding whether his blood alcohol level was .10 or greater. As a result, evidence of appellant’s lack of impairment is simply not relevant to a subd. 1(d) charge.4 Our concern is not that the lack of impairment evidence is unreliable. It is true that we have previously noted the limited value of visible evidence of intoxication. In State v. Graham, we said, “[although he can walk straight, although he may attend to his business, and may not give any outward and visible signs to the casual observer that he is drunk,” a person may still be under the influence. 176 Minn. 164, 168, 222 N.W. 909, 911 (1929). This is precisely why the legislature chose to create a “drunk driving” violation which does not depend on the outward manifestations of intoxication. Here, the reliability of the lack of impairment evidence is not at issue, only its relevance to the task at hand, determining a specific parameter of blood chemistry. Furthermore, we believe that the powerful public policy statement of our drunk driving laws militates against admission of lack of impairment evidence in prosecutions for violation of the blood alcohol limitation.5 The overall statutory scheme involving drunk driving which the legislature has crafted carefully over a period of years includes a number of separately defined crimes. Under this scheme, drunk drivers may be prosecuted for a number of specific illegal acts, including: (1) operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, under Minn. Stat. § 169.121, subd. 1(a); (2) operating a vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more, under Minn. Stat. § 169.121, subd. 1(d), which is at issue here, and (3) operating a vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.10 measured within two hours of the time of driving, under Minn. Stat. § 169.121, subd. 1(e) (1994). Each of these specifically enumerated crimes, which was enacted into law at a different time, is directed at impaired driving or driving ability, evidenced in different ways. If the crime described in subd. 1(a)— driving while under the influence of alcohol— defined all risky behavior, there would be no need for the other provisions; but it does not, and there is a need for them, simply because not all drunk drivers manifest impairment visible to the arresting officer. Finally, this court has specifically recognized that laws prohibiting a person from driving a motor vehicle while intoxicated are remedial statutes, and are to be “liberally interpreted in favor of the public interest and against the private interests of the drivers involved.” State, Dept. of Public Safety v. Juncewski, 308 N.W.2d 316, 319 (Minn.1981). We have said that the legislature has demonstrated its intent to have this statute cover “the broadest possible range of conduct” and to be given “the broadest possible effect.” Id. Indeed, by creating both an offense of driving under the influence of alcohol, subd. 1(a), and an offense of driving with an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more, the statute *300reflects an intent to create as effective and encompassing a remedy as possible to eradicate drunk driving from our streets and highways. To allow the admission of lack of impairment evidence on a charge of driving with an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more would undermine that broad and encompassing remedy which the legislature has mandated. We conclude that there was no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to exclude the lack of impairment evidence, and the decision of the court of appeals is affirmed.

OPINION GARDEBRING, Justice. Appellant Douglas Horning was convicted of driving with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169.121, subd. 1(d) (1992). The issue on appeal is whether, in a prosecution for driving with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more, the trial court erred in excluding evidence regarding Horning’s “lack of impairment” prior to the administration of the Intoxilyzer test. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court, holding that the exclusion of lack of impairment evidence was not an abuse of discretion. We affirm because such evidence is not relevant to a crime based solely on blood alcohol content. Horning’s conviction arises out of a motor vehicle accident occurring on March 5, 1992 in Stearns County. On that evening, Horn-ing left his home in St. Paul at approximately 6:00 p.m. to drive to Alexandria, Minnesota. He testified he stopped in Champlin, Minnesota where he drank one “screwdriver” before leaving at 7:30 p.m. Shortly before 9:00 *297p.m., Horning was involved in a collision with a semi-truck while driving on Interstate 94 near Melrose, Minnesota. Although Horning believed that he was struck from behind by another automobile, the cause of the accident is unclear.1 The testimony at trial was conflicting as to the events immediately following the collision. According to Horning, he was approached by the driver of the truck that collided with Horning’s car, and they talked briefly about the condition of the car. Then, while the truck driver walked back to his truck to see if someone had called for the state patrol, an unidentified passerby approached Horning and offered him a brown paper bag with one 40-ounce bottle of malt liquor and “four or five other assorted beers.” Horning testified that over the next ten minutes he drank the bottle of malt liquor and two or three cans of beer from the bag, and when the truck driver returned, “threw the bag into the ditch, like behind the car.” In contrast to Horning’s testimony, the truck driver testified that he and Horning waited in the cab of his truck for the state patrol to arrive and that from the time he first spoke with Horning, Horning was never out of his sight. He further testified that Horning drank one cup of coffee after the accident, but he did not observe Horning drinking anything else. A state patrol trooper arrived approximately 40 minutes after the accident. After preparing an accident report, the trooper drove Horning to Melrose where Horning’s car had been towed and then to Sauk Centre where he was to be picked up and taken to Alexandria. Before Horning exited the trooper’s car at Sauk Centre, the trooper administered a portable breath test which after 20 seconds indicated “fail.” The trooper then took Horning to the police station in Sauk Centre where he administered an In-toxilyzer test. In regard to Horning’s Intoxilyzer test, the trooper testified that he is a certified Intoxi-lyzer operator, he operated the Intoxilyzer properly, and he waited the requisite observation time before starting the test. Horn-ing’s reported value at 11:18 p.m. was a blood alcohol concentration of 0.15. The trooper further testified that he interviewed Horning immediately following the Intoxilyzer test and recorded his responses on a standard interview form. According to the trooper, Horning answered “no” when asked whether he had anything to drink since the accident, and stated “Nyquil and cough medicine” when asked whether he had consumed alcohol other than at Champlin within the previous 24 hours.2 In addition, the state called an expert witness who testified that, based on his observation of the test record and the maintenance records, the Intoxilyzer instrument used to test Horning was in proper functioning order and provided an accurate and reliable record of the blood alcohol concentration level in Horning’s breath. The expert also estimated Horning’s blood alcohol concentration level at the time of the accident by taking the 11:18 p.m. result of 0.15 and extrapolating back to 9:00 p.m. by applying an average elimination rate of 0.016 alcohol concentration per hour. Based on this extrapolation method, the expert estimated Horning had a 0.188 to 0.193 blood alcohol concentration at approximately 9:00 p.m. After hearing the testimony of the state’s fact witnesses, the trial court granted the state’s motion in limine to limit testimony to evidence relating to Horning’s blood alcohol concentration and to exclude any evidence regarding whether Horning appeared to be under the influence of alcohol. Specifically, Horning sought to introduce evidence showing his conduct at the time of the accident was inconsistent with the Intoxilyzer test result of 0.15 and with the extrapolated estimate of 0.188 to 0.193 blood alcohol concentration. Horning also sought to question the *298state’s expert witness about the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension Intoxilyzer training manual, which indicates a person with an alcohol concentration of 0.18 would show clinical signs of intoxication. Moreover, although he was permitted to assert the affirmative defense of post-driving consumption of alcohol, Horning wanted to offer lack of impairment evidence to support this defense. As a result of the court’s ruling, Horning was prevented from introducing this evidence. Although Horning initially was charged with one count of driving under the influence of alcohol and one count of driving with an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more, the state dismissed the former charge and added one count of having an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more as measured within two hours of driving. Horning was convicted of driving with an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more and acquitted of the charge of having an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more as measured within two hours of driving. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction, finding that, because lack of impairment evidence is irrelevant to a charge of driving with an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more, the exclusion of such evidence was not an abuse of discretion. On appeal, Horning urges this court to find that the trial court improperly excluded relevant, circumstantial evidence when it granted the state’s motion to exclude lack of impairment evidence. Rulings involving the relevancy of evidence are generally left to the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Ture, 353 N.W.2d 502, 515 (Minn.1984). The party claiming error has the burden of showing both the error and the resulting prejudice. State v. Loebach, 310 N.W.2d 58, 64 (Minn.1981). The basic requisite for the admissibility of any evidence is that it be competent and relevant. See Minn.R.Evid. 402. The threshold determination of relevance turns on whether the evidence logically or reasonably tends to prove or disprove a material fact in issue, or tends to make such a fact more or less probable, or affords the basis for or supports a reasonable inference or presumption regarding the existence of a material fact. Minn.R.Evid. 401, committee comment. Looking at the definition of the crime at issue here, it seems clear that lack of impairment evidence is not relevant to the proof or disproof of a violation of Minn. Stat. § 169.121, subd. 1(d): Subd. 1. Crime. It is a crime for any person to drive, operate, or be in physical control of any motor vehicle within this state: [[Image here]] (d) when the person’s alcohol concentration is 0.10 or more; [[Image here]] In order for the state to sustain a conviction under subd. 1(d) there must be proof beyond a reasonable doubt of only two facts: that the defendant was operating a vehicle within this state and that at that time his/her alcohol concentration was .10 or more. Thus, proof of a violation of subd. 1(d) involves a narrowly focused inquiry directed solely to a determination of whether a defendant had a .10 or greater blood alcohol level at the time of driving. The only evidence relevant to this inquiry is related to: (1) whether the defendant was driving, a matter not contested in this case, and (2) the chemical testing which determines blood alcohol concentrations. In the face of information that a defendant did not weave when he drove, that he did not slur his speech, that he did not walk unsteadily, one might ask: so what? While that information might help a factfinder determine whether a defendant was guilty of the crime of driving under the influence, a violation of Minn. Stat. § 169.121, subd. 1(a) (1994), it has no bearing on the critical question here — what was appellant’s blood chemistry? 3 Whether appellant’s consumption of alcohol visibly impaired his driving is not at issue. Lack of impairment evidence does not logically or reasonably tend to prove or disprove appellant’s blood alcohol level, nor does *299it tend to make such a fact more or less probable, nor does it afford a basis for a reasonable inference or presumption regarding whether his blood alcohol level was .10 or greater. As a result, evidence of appellant’s lack of impairment is simply not relevant to a subd. 1(d) charge.4 Our concern is not that the lack of impairment evidence is unreliable. It is true that we have previously noted the limited value of visible evidence of intoxication. In State v. Graham, we said, “[although he can walk straight, although he may attend to his business, and may not give any outward and visible signs to the casual observer that he is drunk,” a person may still be under the influence. 176 Minn. 164, 168, 222 N.W. 909, 911 (1929). This is precisely why the legislature chose to create a “drunk driving” violation which does not depend on the outward manifestations of intoxication. Here, the reliability of the lack of impairment evidence is not at issue, only its relevance to the task at hand, determining a specific parameter of blood chemistry. Furthermore, we believe that the powerful public policy statement of our drunk driving laws militates against admission of lack of impairment evidence in prosecutions for violation of the blood alcohol limitation.5 The overall statutory scheme involving drunk driving which the legislature has crafted carefully over a period of years includes a number of separately defined crimes. Under this scheme, drunk drivers may be prosecuted for a number of specific illegal acts, including: (1) operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, under Minn. Stat. § 169.121, subd. 1(a); (2) operating a vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more, under Minn. Stat. § 169.121, subd. 1(d), which is at issue here, and (3) operating a vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.10 measured within two hours of the time of driving, under Minn. Stat. § 169.121, subd. 1(e) (1994). Each of these specifically enumerated crimes, which was enacted into law at a different time, is directed at impaired driving or driving ability, evidenced in different ways. If the crime described in subd. 1(a)— driving while under the influence of alcohol— defined all risky behavior, there would be no need for the other provisions; but it does not, and there is a need for them, simply because not all drunk drivers manifest impairment visible to the arresting officer. Finally, this court has specifically recognized that laws prohibiting a person from driving a motor vehicle while intoxicated are remedial statutes, and are to be “liberally interpreted in favor of the public interest and against the private interests of the drivers involved.” State, Dept. of Public Safety v. Juncewski, 308 N.W.2d 316, 319 (Minn.1981). We have said that the legislature has demonstrated its intent to have this statute cover “the broadest possible range of conduct” and to be given “the broadest possible effect.” Id. Indeed, by creating both an offense of driving under the influence of alcohol, subd. 1(a), and an offense of driving with an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more, the statute *300reflects an intent to create as effective and encompassing a remedy as possible to eradicate drunk driving from our streets and highways. To allow the admission of lack of impairment evidence on a charge of driving with an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more would undermine that broad and encompassing remedy which the legislature has mandated. We conclude that there was no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to exclude the lack of impairment evidence, and the decision of the court of appeals is affirmed.

+ 21 more citations in this opinion.

State v. White · 1993 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Commissioner of Public Safety v. Campbell · 1992 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Othoudt · 1992 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Starfield · 1992 4 citations

+ 4 more citations in this opinion.

Markel v. City of Circle Pines · 1992 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Friedman v. Commissioner of Public Safety · 1991 4 citations

+ 4 more citations in this opinion.

State v. Rasinski · 1991 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

McDonnell v. Commissioner of Public Safety · 1991 18 citations

+ 18 more citations in this opinion.

State v. Fussy · 1991 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Piotrowski v. Commissioner of Public Safety · 1990 4 citations

+ 4 more citations in this opinion.

State v. Torgerson · 1990 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Wold v. State · 1988 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Storvick · 1988 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Young v. Commissioner of Public Safety · 1988 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Parker · 1988 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Kasper · 1987 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Edmison · 1985 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Nyflot v. Commissioner of Public Safety · 1985 4 citations

+ 4 more citations in this opinion.

Tyler v. Commissioner of Public Safety · 1985 4 citations

+ 4 more citations in this opinion.

Melby v. Commissioner of Public Safety · 1985 2 citations

(1) We affirm the holding of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals that for Minn. Stat. § 169.123 (1984) to apply, the snowmobile must be operated on a street or highway. Both Minn. Stat. §§ 169.121 and 169.123 (1984) are remedial statutes to be broadly construed in favor of the public interest in removing inebriated drivers from our streets and highways. See Heddan v. Dirkswager, 336 N.W.2d 54 (Minn.1983); State Department of Public Safety v. Juncewski, 308 N.W.2d 316 (Minn.1981). No dispute exists that a snowmobile is a “device * * * upon, or by which any person * * * may be transported ⅜ * * upon a highway.” Since it is self-propelled, it is both a “vehicle” under Minn. Stat. § 169.01, subd. 2. (1984), and a “motor vehicle” under Minn. Stat. § 169.01, subd. 3 (1984). Finally, application of Minn. Stat. § 169.123 is not restricted to conduct for which a driver’s license is required, Schaf *529

(1) We affirm the holding of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals that for Minn. Stat. § 169.123 (1984) to apply, the snowmobile must be operated on a street or highway. Both Minn. Stat. §§ 169.121 and 169.123 (1984) are remedial statutes to be broadly construed in favor of the public interest in removing inebriated drivers from our streets and highways. See Heddan v. Dirkswager, 336 N.W.2d 54 (Minn.1983); State Department of Public Safety v. Juncewski, 308 N.W.2d 316 (Minn.1981). No dispute exists that a snowmobile is a “device * * * upon, or by which any person * * * may be transported ⅜ * * upon a highway.” Since it is self-propelled, it is both a “vehicle” under Minn. Stat. § 169.01, subd. 2. (1984), and a “motor vehicle” under Minn. Stat. § 169.01, subd. 3 (1984). Finally, application of Minn. Stat. § 169.123 is not restricted to conduct for which a driver’s license is required, Schaf *529

State v. Herem · 1985 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Hanson · 1984 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Berkelman · 1984 8 citations

+ 8 more citations in this opinion.

Windschitl v. Commissioner of Public Safety · 1984 3 citations

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

Complaint Concerning Kirby · 1984 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

State v. Lala · 1984 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Goblisch v. Commissioner of Public Safety · 1984 3 citations

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

State v. Faber · 1984 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Simon · 1983 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Motl · 1983 4 citations

+ 4 more citations in this opinion.

State v. Kvam · 1983 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Leonard · 1983 3 citations

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

Heddan v. Dirkswager · 1983 4 citations

+ 4 more citations in this opinion.

State v. Willis · 1983 20 citations

+ 20 more citations in this opinion.

State v. Nordstrom · 1983 8 citations

The legislature, in 1982, enacted certain amendments to the DWI statute, Minn. Stat. § 169.121 (1982), which authorize the arrest of DWI suspects on probable cause and convert misdemeanor DWI offenses to gross misdemeanor DWI offenses in certain cases. 1 In this case, defendant having challenged those provisions, the Olmsted County District Court has certified to this court two questions as follows:

The legislature, in 1982, enacted certain amendments to the DWI statute, Minn. Stat. § 169.121 (1982), which authorize the arrest of DWI suspects on probable cause and convert misdemeanor DWI offenses to gross misdemeanor DWI offenses in certain cases. 1 In this case, defendant having challenged those provisions, the Olmsted County District Court has certified to this court two questions as follows:

The legislature, in 1982, enacted certain amendments to the DWI statute, Minn. Stat. § 169.121 (1982), which authorize the arrest of DWI suspects on probable cause and convert misdemeanor DWI offenses to gross misdemeanor DWI offenses in certain cases. 1 In this case, defendant having challenged those provisions, the Olmsted County District Court has certified to this court two questions as follows:

+ 5 more citations in this opinion.

Greenlee v. State · 1983 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Keith · 1982 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

State, Department of Public Safety v. Rice · 1982 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

State, Department of Public Safety v. Juncewski · 1981 10 citations

+ 10 more citations in this opinion.

Anderson v. STATE, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION · 1981 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Manthey v. Charles E. Bernick, Inc. · 1981 4 citations

+ 4 more citations in this opinion.

State v. Pieschke · 1980 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Aguirre · 1980 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Marben v. State, Department of Public Safety · 1980 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Tuseth v. Thoreson, Inc. · 1979 1 citation

There was no error. Minn. Stat. ch. 169 (1978) assigns an evidentiary significance to blood alcohol test results of 0.10 or greater. Minn. Stat. § 169.121, subd. 1(d) (1978) provides that it is unlawful to operate a motor vehicle “[w]hen the person’s alcohol concentration is 0.Í0 or more.” Minn. Stat. § 169.-96 (1978) then provides that any violation of chapter 169 constitutes prima facie evidence of negligence. 1 The admission of the 0.20 percent result of the blood analysis, therefore, was relevant, indeed necessary, to' establish a violation of § 169.121, subd. 1(d), and to thereby obtain the benefit of the prima facie evidence provision of § 169.96. No expert interpretation is necessary for the admission of a test result of 0.10 or greater. The admission of such evidence and the instructions with regard thereto are sanctioned by statute and were wholly proper.

Novak v. Kirby · 1979 26 citations

287 N.W.2d 621 (1979) Edward G. NOVAK, Acting Commissioner of Public Safety, State of Minnesota, Petitioner, v. The Honorable John J. KIRBY, Judge of the Municipal Court of Ramsey County, Respondent. No. 49903. Supreme Court of Minnesota. December 14, 1979. Rehearing Denied January 14, 1980. Warren Spannaus, Atty. Gen., Eric B. Schultz, Deputy Atty. Gen., Frederick S. Suhler, Jr., Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, for petitioner. Karen C. Shimon, St. Paul, for respondent. Heard, considered and decided by the court en banc. SHERAN, Chief Justice. This appeal, involving a petition for writ of prohibition, arises from the revocation of a driver's license by the Acting Commissioner of Public Safety in contravention of an order of the Ramsey County Municipal Court. We deny the petition for prohibition and find within the municipal court the authority to stay the revocation of drivers licenses pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 169.121, subd. 5 (1978). On February 2, 1979, the Administrator of the Ramsey County Municipal Court forwarded a certificate of conviction[1] to petitioner *622 Edward G. Novak, Acting Commissioner of Public Safety (Commissioner), reporting the guilty plea of defendant to driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.[2] Because defendant had been convicted under the same statute six months earlier, municipal court Judge John J. Kirby (respondent) sentenced him to a $300 fine, 25 days imprisonment, and revoked his driver's license for 90 days, as provided by Minn. Stat. § 169.121, subd. 4 (1978).[3] In addition to the certificate of conviction, Judge Kirby forwarded a letter to the Commissioner stating that in view of the results of an alcohol assessment report[4] the municipal court, exercising the discretion afforded by Minn. Stat. § 169.121, subd. 5 (1978),[5] had stayed execution of defendant's sentence. Despite this letter from Judge Kirby, the Commissioner, acting pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 171.17 (1978),[6] revoked the defendant's driver's license on February 12, 1979. Defendant contested the revocation of his driver's license by filing a notice of motion and motion with the municipal court. Accordingly, Judge Kirby served upon the Commissioner an order to show cause as to why defendant's prayer for relief should not be granted. Finding the Commissioner's subsequent response unsatisfactory, Judge Kirby ordered the Commissioner either to withdraw defendant's notice of revocation or to appear personally before the court to show why he should not be held in *623 contempt. The Commissioner thereupon filed for a writ of prohibition to stay proceedings in the Ramsey County Municipal Court. Under Minn. Stat. 169.121, subd. 5 (1978), the municipal court may stay the imposition or execution of any sentence resulting from a conviction for driving while under the influence of alcohol. The Commissioner, however, believing that license revocation authorized under § 171.16 is an administrative sanction, argues that the stay provision only applies to the criminal penalties of fine and imprisonment. Nevertheless, the Commissioner agrees that if that provision does empower the municipal court to stay the revocation of a license, then his action in contravention of Judge Kirby's disposition was ill-advised. Likewise, the attorney for the offending driver acknowledges that the municipal court would have no authority to order a stay of revocation of license if the legislature did not so intend. The question, then, becomes entirely one of ascertaining legislative intent. In the past, this court recognized that penalties from motor vehicle violations were both criminal and administrative, the Commissioner of Public Safety having authority over the latter. See e. g., Martinka v. Hoffmann, 214 Minn. 346, 9 N.W.2d 13 (1943); State v. Moseng, 254 Minn. 263, 95 N.W.2d 6 (1959). Yet even construing the statute in a light most favorable to appellant, the Commissioner never had exclusive authority, since subdivision 4 empowers the judge to increase the period for license revocation beyond the 90-day statutory minimum. In 1969, the legislature amended chapter 169 by conferring upon the court the right to stay the imposition or execution of sentences.[7] 1969 Minn.Laws ch. 744, § 1. Sensing that the enactment of the stay provision signalled a legislative desire to alter the jurisdictional balance between court and commissioner, we observed in 1975 that license revocation "is automatically imposed as a criminal penalty upon conviction of a § 169.121 violation. It is triggered by the outcome of the criminal proceeding and is imposed through the judicial system." State, Dep't of Public Safety v. Mulvihill, 303 Minn. 361, 368, 227 N.W.2d 813, 817-18 (1975). We agree that Mulvihill authorizes the trial courts to stay the revocation of drivers licenses. Because the legislature has not since amended the statute in a manner inconsistent with Mulvihill, we assume under the axioms of judicial construction that the legislature approved of Mulvihill's imprimatur. Roos v. City of Mankato, 199 Minn. 284, 271 N.W. 582 (1937). We thus determine inescapably that the legislature authorized the courts to stay the revocation of licenses as a means of encouraging treatment for alcoholism. We are aware of no amendments to the applicable law enacted since Mulvihill which would impact on its holding as it bears on the ascertainment of legislative intent. To the contrary, in 1976 the legislature enacted Minn. Stat. § 169.126 which requires the courts to obtain and give due consideration to alcohol problem assessments of defendants convicted under § 169.121. 1976 Minn. Laws ch. 298, § 4. The enactment of the alcohol problem assessment provision supports our view that the legislature granted the courts additional authority to assume a more treatment-oriented posture. The legislature has paramount authority to deal with the revocation of drivers licenses to the exclusion of the Commissioner of Public Safety. We therefore suggest that *624 doubts as to the correctness of our interpretation may be resolved by submitting the question to the legislature in its forthcoming session. Because we are confident that the Commissioner will accede to this interpretation and that the concerns of the trial court will be satisfied by this resolution, the application for writ of prohibition shall be dismissed. OTIS, Justice (dissenting). The majority opinion relies on our holding in State, Dep't of Public Safety v. Mulvihill, 303 Minn. 361, 368, 227 N.W.2d 813, 817-18 (1975) for the proposition that trial courts have discretion to revoke or not to revoke the driver's license of a defendant convicted of driving while under the influence of alcohol. The majority notes that the legislature has not amended the statute in a manner inconsistent with the Mulvihill decision written in March of 1975. I respectfully disagree on both grounds. All that Mulvihill held was that the Commissioner of Public Safety was justified in revoking the license of three drivers who refused to submit to chemical tests as provided by Minn. Stat. § 169.123, subd. 4 (1974). In observing by way of dictum that revocation under Minn. Stat. § 169.121, subd. 3 (1974) is "triggered by the outcome of [a] criminal proceeding," we stated that under § 169.121 a license revocation "is automatically imposed as a criminal penalty upon conviction" (emphasis altered). We did not say that the court had discretion to revoke or not revoke but stated that revocation is mandatory. Nor can I agree that the legislature has not amended the statute in a manner inconsistent with what the majority reads into Mulvihill. In April 1976 by adopting 1976 Minn.Laws ch. 341, § 1, the legislature amended Minn. Stat. § 169.121, subd. 3 (1976), by adding this language (emphasis added): Any person whose license has been revoked pursuant to section 169.123 is not subject to the mandatory revocation provisions of this subdivision. As to licenses revoked under Minn. Stat. § 169.123 (1974) with which our court was dealing in Mulvihill, the legislature, by this amendment, acquiesced in Mulvihill with respect to the implied consent law. However, as to revocation for convictions under Minn. Stat. § 169.121 (1978), the amendment expressly states that revocation is "mandatory." A second significant amendment occurred in April 1978 when the legislature adopted 1978 Minn.Laws ch. 727, § 2. That amendment introduced this language as Minn. Stat. § 169.121, subd. 7 (1978) (emphasis added):

287 N.W.2d 621 (1979) Edward G. NOVAK, Acting Commissioner of Public Safety, State of Minnesota, Petitioner, v. The Honorable John J. KIRBY, Judge of the Municipal Court of Ramsey County, Respondent. No. 49903. Supreme Court of Minnesota. December 14, 1979. Rehearing Denied January 14, 1980. Warren Spannaus, Atty. Gen., Eric B. Schultz, Deputy Atty. Gen., Frederick S. Suhler, Jr., Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, for petitioner. Karen C. Shimon, St. Paul, for respondent. Heard, considered and decided by the court en banc. SHERAN, Chief Justice. This appeal, involving a petition for writ of prohibition, arises from the revocation of a driver's license by the Acting Commissioner of Public Safety in contravention of an order of the Ramsey County Municipal Court. We deny the petition for prohibition and find within the municipal court the authority to stay the revocation of drivers licenses pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 169.121, subd. 5 (1978). On February 2, 1979, the Administrator of the Ramsey County Municipal Court forwarded a certificate of conviction[1] to petitioner *622 Edward G. Novak, Acting Commissioner of Public Safety (Commissioner), reporting the guilty plea of defendant to driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.[2] Because defendant had been convicted under the same statute six months earlier, municipal court Judge John J. Kirby (respondent) sentenced him to a $300 fine, 25 days imprisonment, and revoked his driver's license for 90 days, as provided by Minn. Stat. § 169.121, subd. 4 (1978).[3] In addition to the certificate of conviction, Judge Kirby forwarded a letter to the Commissioner stating that in view of the results of an alcohol assessment report[4] the municipal court, exercising the discretion afforded by Minn. Stat. § 169.121, subd. 5 (1978),[5] had stayed execution of defendant's sentence. Despite this letter from Judge Kirby, the Commissioner, acting pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 171.17 (1978),[6] revoked the defendant's driver's license on February 12, 1979. Defendant contested the revocation of his driver's license by filing a notice of motion and motion with the municipal court. Accordingly, Judge Kirby served upon the Commissioner an order to show cause as to why defendant's prayer for relief should not be granted. Finding the Commissioner's subsequent response unsatisfactory, Judge Kirby ordered the Commissioner either to withdraw defendant's notice of revocation or to appear personally before the court to show why he should not be held in *623 contempt. The Commissioner thereupon filed for a writ of prohibition to stay proceedings in the Ramsey County Municipal Court. Under Minn. Stat. 169.121, subd. 5 (1978), the municipal court may stay the imposition or execution of any sentence resulting from a conviction for driving while under the influence of alcohol. The Commissioner, however, believing that license revocation authorized under § 171.16 is an administrative sanction, argues that the stay provision only applies to the criminal penalties of fine and imprisonment. Nevertheless, the Commissioner agrees that if that provision does empower the municipal court to stay the revocation of a license, then his action in contravention of Judge Kirby's disposition was ill-advised. Likewise, the attorney for the offending driver acknowledges that the municipal court would have no authority to order a stay of revocation of license if the legislature did not so intend. The question, then, becomes entirely one of ascertaining legislative intent. In the past, this court recognized that penalties from motor vehicle violations were both criminal and administrative, the Commissioner of Public Safety having authority over the latter. See e. g., Martinka v. Hoffmann, 214 Minn. 346, 9 N.W.2d 13 (1943); State v. Moseng, 254 Minn. 263, 95 N.W.2d 6 (1959). Yet even construing the statute in a light most favorable to appellant, the Commissioner never had exclusive authority, since subdivision 4 empowers the judge to increase the period for license revocation beyond the 90-day statutory minimum. In 1969, the legislature amended chapter 169 by conferring upon the court the right to stay the imposition or execution of sentences.[7] 1969 Minn.Laws ch. 744, § 1. Sensing that the enactment of the stay provision signalled a legislative desire to alter the jurisdictional balance between court and commissioner, we observed in 1975 that license revocation "is automatically imposed as a criminal penalty upon conviction of a § 169.121 violation. It is triggered by the outcome of the criminal proceeding and is imposed through the judicial system." State, Dep't of Public Safety v. Mulvihill, 303 Minn. 361, 368, 227 N.W.2d 813, 817-18 (1975). We agree that Mulvihill authorizes the trial courts to stay the revocation of drivers licenses. Because the legislature has not since amended the statute in a manner inconsistent with Mulvihill, we assume under the axioms of judicial construction that the legislature approved of Mulvihill's imprimatur. Roos v. City of Mankato, 199 Minn. 284, 271 N.W. 582 (1937). We thus determine inescapably that the legislature authorized the courts to stay the revocation of licenses as a means of encouraging treatment for alcoholism. We are aware of no amendments to the applicable law enacted since Mulvihill which would impact on its holding as it bears on the ascertainment of legislative intent. To the contrary, in 1976 the legislature enacted Minn. Stat. § 169.126 which requires the courts to obtain and give due consideration to alcohol problem assessments of defendants convicted under § 169.121. 1976 Minn. Laws ch. 298, § 4. The enactment of the alcohol problem assessment provision supports our view that the legislature granted the courts additional authority to assume a more treatment-oriented posture. The legislature has paramount authority to deal with the revocation of drivers licenses to the exclusion of the Commissioner of Public Safety. We therefore suggest that *624 doubts as to the correctness of our interpretation may be resolved by submitting the question to the legislature in its forthcoming session. Because we are confident that the Commissioner will accede to this interpretation and that the concerns of the trial court will be satisfied by this resolution, the application for writ of prohibition shall be dismissed. OTIS, Justice (dissenting). The majority opinion relies on our holding in State, Dep't of Public Safety v. Mulvihill, 303 Minn. 361, 368, 227 N.W.2d 813, 817-18 (1975) for the proposition that trial courts have discretion to revoke or not to revoke the driver's license of a defendant convicted of driving while under the influence of alcohol. The majority notes that the legislature has not amended the statute in a manner inconsistent with the Mulvihill decision written in March of 1975. I respectfully disagree on both grounds. All that Mulvihill held was that the Commissioner of Public Safety was justified in revoking the license of three drivers who refused to submit to chemical tests as provided by Minn. Stat. § 169.123, subd. 4 (1974). In observing by way of dictum that revocation under Minn. Stat. § 169.121, subd. 3 (1974) is "triggered by the outcome of [a] criminal proceeding," we stated that under § 169.121 a license revocation "is automatically imposed as a criminal penalty upon conviction" (emphasis altered). We did not say that the court had discretion to revoke or not revoke but stated that revocation is mandatory. Nor can I agree that the legislature has not amended the statute in a manner inconsistent with what the majority reads into Mulvihill. In April 1976 by adopting 1976 Minn.Laws ch. 341, § 1, the legislature amended Minn. Stat. § 169.121, subd. 3 (1976), by adding this language (emphasis added): Any person whose license has been revoked pursuant to section 169.123 is not subject to the mandatory revocation provisions of this subdivision. As to licenses revoked under Minn. Stat. § 169.123 (1974) with which our court was dealing in Mulvihill, the legislature, by this amendment, acquiesced in Mulvihill with respect to the implied consent law. However, as to revocation for convictions under Minn. Stat. § 169.121 (1978), the amendment expressly states that revocation is "mandatory." A second significant amendment occurred in April 1978 when the legislature adopted 1978 Minn.Laws ch. 727, § 2. That amendment introduced this language as Minn. Stat. § 169.121, subd. 7 (1978) (emphasis added):

287 N.W.2d 621 (1979) Edward G. NOVAK, Acting Commissioner of Public Safety, State of Minnesota, Petitioner, v. The Honorable John J. KIRBY, Judge of the Municipal Court of Ramsey County, Respondent. No. 49903. Supreme Court of Minnesota. December 14, 1979. Rehearing Denied January 14, 1980. Warren Spannaus, Atty. Gen., Eric B. Schultz, Deputy Atty. Gen., Frederick S. Suhler, Jr., Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, for petitioner. Karen C. Shimon, St. Paul, for respondent. Heard, considered and decided by the court en banc. SHERAN, Chief Justice. This appeal, involving a petition for writ of prohibition, arises from the revocation of a driver's license by the Acting Commissioner of Public Safety in contravention of an order of the Ramsey County Municipal Court. We deny the petition for prohibition and find within the municipal court the authority to stay the revocation of drivers licenses pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 169.121, subd. 5 (1978). On February 2, 1979, the Administrator of the Ramsey County Municipal Court forwarded a certificate of conviction[1] to petitioner *622 Edward G. Novak, Acting Commissioner of Public Safety (Commissioner), reporting the guilty plea of defendant to driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.[2] Because defendant had been convicted under the same statute six months earlier, municipal court Judge John J. Kirby (respondent) sentenced him to a $300 fine, 25 days imprisonment, and revoked his driver's license for 90 days, as provided by Minn. Stat. § 169.121, subd. 4 (1978).[3] In addition to the certificate of conviction, Judge Kirby forwarded a letter to the Commissioner stating that in view of the results of an alcohol assessment report[4] the municipal court, exercising the discretion afforded by Minn. Stat. § 169.121, subd. 5 (1978),[5] had stayed execution of defendant's sentence. Despite this letter from Judge Kirby, the Commissioner, acting pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 171.17 (1978),[6] revoked the defendant's driver's license on February 12, 1979. Defendant contested the revocation of his driver's license by filing a notice of motion and motion with the municipal court. Accordingly, Judge Kirby served upon the Commissioner an order to show cause as to why defendant's prayer for relief should not be granted. Finding the Commissioner's subsequent response unsatisfactory, Judge Kirby ordered the Commissioner either to withdraw defendant's notice of revocation or to appear personally before the court to show why he should not be held in *623 contempt. The Commissioner thereupon filed for a writ of prohibition to stay proceedings in the Ramsey County Municipal Court. Under Minn. Stat. 169.121, subd. 5 (1978), the municipal court may stay the imposition or execution of any sentence resulting from a conviction for driving while under the influence of alcohol. The Commissioner, however, believing that license revocation authorized under § 171.16 is an administrative sanction, argues that the stay provision only applies to the criminal penalties of fine and imprisonment. Nevertheless, the Commissioner agrees that if that provision does empower the municipal court to stay the revocation of a license, then his action in contravention of Judge Kirby's disposition was ill-advised. Likewise, the attorney for the offending driver acknowledges that the municipal court would have no authority to order a stay of revocation of license if the legislature did not so intend. The question, then, becomes entirely one of ascertaining legislative intent. In the past, this court recognized that penalties from motor vehicle violations were both criminal and administrative, the Commissioner of Public Safety having authority over the latter. See e. g., Martinka v. Hoffmann, 214 Minn. 346, 9 N.W.2d 13 (1943); State v. Moseng, 254 Minn. 263, 95 N.W.2d 6 (1959). Yet even construing the statute in a light most favorable to appellant, the Commissioner never had exclusive authority, since subdivision 4 empowers the judge to increase the period for license revocation beyond the 90-day statutory minimum. In 1969, the legislature amended chapter 169 by conferring upon the court the right to stay the imposition or execution of sentences.[7] 1969 Minn.Laws ch. 744, § 1. Sensing that the enactment of the stay provision signalled a legislative desire to alter the jurisdictional balance between court and commissioner, we observed in 1975 that license revocation "is automatically imposed as a criminal penalty upon conviction of a § 169.121 violation. It is triggered by the outcome of the criminal proceeding and is imposed through the judicial system." State, Dep't of Public Safety v. Mulvihill, 303 Minn. 361, 368, 227 N.W.2d 813, 817-18 (1975). We agree that Mulvihill authorizes the trial courts to stay the revocation of drivers licenses. Because the legislature has not since amended the statute in a manner inconsistent with Mulvihill, we assume under the axioms of judicial construction that the legislature approved of Mulvihill's imprimatur. Roos v. City of Mankato, 199 Minn. 284, 271 N.W. 582 (1937). We thus determine inescapably that the legislature authorized the courts to stay the revocation of licenses as a means of encouraging treatment for alcoholism. We are aware of no amendments to the applicable law enacted since Mulvihill which would impact on its holding as it bears on the ascertainment of legislative intent. To the contrary, in 1976 the legislature enacted Minn. Stat. § 169.126 which requires the courts to obtain and give due consideration to alcohol problem assessments of defendants convicted under § 169.121. 1976 Minn. Laws ch. 298, § 4. The enactment of the alcohol problem assessment provision supports our view that the legislature granted the courts additional authority to assume a more treatment-oriented posture. The legislature has paramount authority to deal with the revocation of drivers licenses to the exclusion of the Commissioner of Public Safety. We therefore suggest that *624 doubts as to the correctness of our interpretation may be resolved by submitting the question to the legislature in its forthcoming session. Because we are confident that the Commissioner will accede to this interpretation and that the concerns of the trial court will be satisfied by this resolution, the application for writ of prohibition shall be dismissed. OTIS, Justice (dissenting). The majority opinion relies on our holding in State, Dep't of Public Safety v. Mulvihill, 303 Minn. 361, 368, 227 N.W.2d 813, 817-18 (1975) for the proposition that trial courts have discretion to revoke or not to revoke the driver's license of a defendant convicted of driving while under the influence of alcohol. The majority notes that the legislature has not amended the statute in a manner inconsistent with the Mulvihill decision written in March of 1975. I respectfully disagree on both grounds. All that Mulvihill held was that the Commissioner of Public Safety was justified in revoking the license of three drivers who refused to submit to chemical tests as provided by Minn. Stat. § 169.123, subd. 4 (1974). In observing by way of dictum that revocation under Minn. Stat. § 169.121, subd. 3 (1974) is "triggered by the outcome of [a] criminal proceeding," we stated that under § 169.121 a license revocation "is automatically imposed as a criminal penalty upon conviction" (emphasis altered). We did not say that the court had discretion to revoke or not revoke but stated that revocation is mandatory. Nor can I agree that the legislature has not amended the statute in a manner inconsistent with what the majority reads into Mulvihill. In April 1976 by adopting 1976 Minn.Laws ch. 341, § 1, the legislature amended Minn. Stat. § 169.121, subd. 3 (1976), by adding this language (emphasis added): Any person whose license has been revoked pursuant to section 169.123 is not subject to the mandatory revocation provisions of this subdivision. As to licenses revoked under Minn. Stat. § 169.123 (1974) with which our court was dealing in Mulvihill, the legislature, by this amendment, acquiesced in Mulvihill with respect to the implied consent law. However, as to revocation for convictions under Minn. Stat. § 169.121 (1978), the amendment expressly states that revocation is "mandatory." A second significant amendment occurred in April 1978 when the legislature adopted 1978 Minn.Laws ch. 727, § 2. That amendment introduced this language as Minn. Stat. § 169.121, subd. 7 (1978) (emphasis added):

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court held that Minn. Stat. § 169.121, subd. 3(e)(2) (1996) was not unconstitutional. Id. at 304-05. The Dumas

court held that Minn. Stat. § 169.121, subd. 3(e)(2) (1996) was not unconstitutional. Id. at 304-05. The Dumas

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