393 N.W.2d 183 (1986) David Joseph EGGERSGLUSS, Petitioner, Respondent, v. COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC SAFETY, Petitioner, Appellant. No. C4-86-46. Supreme Court of Minnesota. September 19, 1986. *184 Hubert H. Humphrey, III, Joel A. Watne, Lawrence Schultz, St. Paul, for appellant. Robert G. Davis, Jr., Minneapolis, for respondent. Considered and decided by the court en banc without oral argument. AMDAHL, Chief Justice. We granted the petition of the Commissioner of Public Safety for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals reversing a decision of the trial court which sustained the revocation of the driver's license of David Joseph Eggersgluss under the implied consent law, Minn. Stat. § 169.123, subd. 2 (Supp.1985), for driving with a blood alcohol level of .10 or more. The Court of Appeals, in a 4-3 decision, ruled that the arresting officer did not have probable cause to believe that Eggersgluss was under the influence at the time of the accident, which occurred approximately 2½ to 3 hours before the officer learned of the accident and made the observations that he believed gave him probable cause to arrest Eggersgluss. Eggersgluss v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 387 N.W.2d 892 (Minn.App.1986). Reversing the Court of Appeals, we hold that the arresting officer did have probable cause and we therefore reinstate the judgment of the trial court. At 6:55 a.m. on September 22, 1985, Buffalo Police Officer David Schwarze was told that the department had received a call, apparently anonymous, reporting a car rollover. He immediately drove to the scene, where he found the car on its top. It had obviously jumped the curb after failing to make a turn, then rolled over after going onto an embankment which has a 45° slope. As he was viewing the car, he saw defendant and another man walking towards him from a nearby residential area. Defendant identified himself as the driver of the car and said that the accident had happened about 3 hours earlier. Schwarze asked defendant if he had been drinking, and defendant said no. However, when Schwarze talked alone with the other man, who had been the passenger, the man said that they had been at a reception and had been drinking. This man said that defendant had lost control of the car while *185 returning from the reception. The officer again spoke with defendant and again asked him if he had been drinking, and defendant again said no. However, it was obvious to the officer that defendant was not being truthful, because defendant's breath smelled of alcohol, his face was flushed and his eyes were watery. Concluding that he had probable cause to believe that defendant had been under the influence of alcohol at the time the accident occurred, the officer arrested defendant. Defendant submitted to breath testing, which showed a present blood alcohol level of .11. The officer had no way of knowing for sure when the accident occurred. It may well have occurred more recently than defendant and his passenger said, but they said that it occurred 3 hours earlier. In any event, the officer clearly had probable cause to believe that defendant had been driving at the time of the accident, and that defendant was presently under the influence of alcohol. The only issue is whether he had probable cause to believe that defendant was under the influence of alcohol at the time of the accident. The Court of Appeals concluded that the officer's testimony was insufficient to establish probable cause to believe that defendant was under the influence of alcohol at the time of the accident. The court reasoned that it should have been apparent to the officer that there was a serious question whether the defendant's apparent intoxication was the result of drinking that occurred before the accident or drinking following the accident. The court stated that under the circumstances, the officer should have asked defendant and the other man whether defendant had anything to drink after the accident. The dissent argued that the officer had a sufficient basis for believing that defendant was under the influence of alcohol at the time of the accident. The dissent argued that in view of defendant's lying about having consumed alcohol, it would have been fruitless for the officer to ask defendant if he had been drinking since the accident. The dissent argued further that if the defendant had consumed alcohol after the incident, presumably defendant or his passenger would have said so. We agree with the dissent that the officer had probable cause to believe that defendant was under the influence at the time of the accident. Highly relevant is the fact that the passenger, whom the officer was entitled to believe, said they had been drinking at the reception and that the accident occurred afterward. The fact that it was a one-car rollover occurring at 4:30 a.m. is also relevant. The turn in the road apparently was a simple turn that defendant should have been able to negotiate. The fact that he did not bears on the determination of whether he was under the influence at the time. Further, normally a person who is involved in a one-car rollover in the middle of the night who has been drinking beforehand, as defendant had, does not go someplace else and drink more. Finally, it is significant that the officer asked defendant and his passenger a general question as to whether they had been drinking. Defendant obviously was not being truthful in his response, and his lack of truthfulness showed a consciousness of guilt. The majority opinion puts too much importance on the commissioner's inability to prove a negative, specifically, that defendant did not drink after the accident. Even if the officer had specifically asked this, defendant could have lied just as he apparently did when asked generally if he had been drinking. In any event, by asking defendant and the passenger generally if they had been drinking, the officer gave them an opportunity to give him their version of what happened. Presumably, if the drinking had occurred after the accident, they would have said so since that fact obviously would have helped defendant. They did not say so. Looking at the totality of the circumstances, as we must, we conclude that the arresting officer had probable cause to arrest defendant for driving while under the influence at the time of the accident. *186 Reversed and judgment of the trial court reinstated. WAHL, Justice (dissenting). I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals for the reason there stated, that the police officer's testimony was insufficient to establish probable cause to arrest for DWI because it did not demonstrate any connection between intoxication and earlier driving.

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Olson v. Commissioner of Public Safety · 1985 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Nyflot v. Commissioner of Public Safety · 1985 18 citations

+ 18 more citations in this opinion.

Tyler v. Commissioner of Public Safety · 1985 4 citations

+ 4 more citations in this opinion.

Melby v. Commissioner of Public Safety · 1985 4 citations

The Commissioner of Public Safety (Commissioner) revoked the driving privileges of the Respondent Melby under Minn. Stat. § 169.123 (1984), the Implied Consent Statute, for operating a snowmobile at a time when he had a blood alcohol concentration in excess of .10. The Dakota County Court rescinded the revocation by holding the snowmobile, at the time of the arrest, was not operated on a street or highway. On appeal, the Commissioner contended that the Implied Consent Statute applies to mo *528 tor vehicles operated anywhere in the state. Alternatively, he contended that respondent operated the snowmobile on a street or highway. The Court of Appeals rejected the Commissioner’s first contention, but affirmed the trial court’s determination. 1

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Barlow v. Commissioner of Public Safety · 1985 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

State v. Hanson · 1984 4 citations

+ 4 more citations in this opinion.

Quimby v. State, Department of Public Safety · 1984 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

State, Department of Public Safety v. Petersen · 1984 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Johnson v. State, Department of Public Safety · 1984 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Johnson v. State, Department of Public Safety · 1984 3 citations

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

Westergren v. Commissioner of Public Safety · 1984 3 citations

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

Goblisch v. Commissioner of Public Safety · 1984 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Updegraff v. Commissioner of Public Safety · 1984 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Speak · 1983 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Gross · 1983 1 citation

1(a). The first issue is whether the evidence of the test result should be suppressed because the police failed to give defendant a Miranda warning before they advised him of the provisions of the implied consent law and administered the breath test. In Prideaux v. State, 310 Minn. 405, 247 N.W.2d 385 (1976), we interpreted Minn. Stat. § 481.10 (1982) as giving a person a limited right to consult with counsel before deciding whether to submit to blood alcohol testing under the implied consent law. Minn. Stat. § 169.123, subd. 2(b)(3) (1982), provides that police must advise a person of this right as part of the standard implied consent advisory. However, we have never held that police must give a Miranda warning to a person before they give an implied consent advisory. Indeed, our decision in State v. Beckey, 291 Minn. 483, 192 N.W.2d 441 (1971), counsels against this. In any event, the issue is now settled because in South Dakota v. Neville, - U.S. -, 103 S.Ct. 916, 923 n. 15, 74 L.Ed.2d 748 (1983), 1 the United States Supreme Court stated:

Heddan v. Dirkswager · 1983 55 citations

+ 55 more citations in this opinion.

Willems v. Commissioner of Public Safety · 1983 5 citations

+ 5 more citations in this opinion.

State v. Willis · 1983 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State, Department of Public Safety v. Rice · 1982 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

State, Department of Public Safety v. Habisch · 1981 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

State, Department of Public Safety v. Juncewski · 1981 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Winchester v. Commissioner of Public Safety · 1981 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Marben v. State, Department of Public Safety · 1980 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Abe · 1980 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Novak v. Kirby · 1979 4 citations

287 N.W.2d 621 (1979) Edward G. NOVAK, Acting Commissioner of Public Safety, State of Minnesota, Petitioner, v. The Honorable John J. KIRBY, Judge of the Municipal Court of Ramsey County, Respondent. No. 49903. Supreme Court of Minnesota. December 14, 1979. Rehearing Denied January 14, 1980. Warren Spannaus, Atty. Gen., Eric B. Schultz, Deputy Atty. Gen., Frederick S. Suhler, Jr., Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, for petitioner. Karen C. Shimon, St. Paul, for respondent. Heard, considered and decided by the court en banc. SHERAN, Chief Justice. This appeal, involving a petition for writ of prohibition, arises from the revocation of a driver's license by the Acting Commissioner of Public Safety in contravention of an order of the Ramsey County Municipal Court. We deny the petition for prohibition and find within the municipal court the authority to stay the revocation of drivers licenses pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 169.121, subd. 5 (1978). On February 2, 1979, the Administrator of the Ramsey County Municipal Court forwarded a certificate of conviction[1] to petitioner *622 Edward G. Novak, Acting Commissioner of Public Safety (Commissioner), reporting the guilty plea of defendant to driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.[2] Because defendant had been convicted under the same statute six months earlier, municipal court Judge John J. Kirby (respondent) sentenced him to a $300 fine, 25 days imprisonment, and revoked his driver's license for 90 days, as provided by Minn. Stat. § 169.121, subd. 4 (1978).[3] In addition to the certificate of conviction, Judge Kirby forwarded a letter to the Commissioner stating that in view of the results of an alcohol assessment report[4] the municipal court, exercising the discretion afforded by Minn. Stat. § 169.121, subd. 5 (1978),[5] had stayed execution of defendant's sentence. Despite this letter from Judge Kirby, the Commissioner, acting pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 171.17 (1978),[6] revoked the defendant's driver's license on February 12, 1979. Defendant contested the revocation of his driver's license by filing a notice of motion and motion with the municipal court. Accordingly, Judge Kirby served upon the Commissioner an order to show cause as to why defendant's prayer for relief should not be granted. Finding the Commissioner's subsequent response unsatisfactory, Judge Kirby ordered the Commissioner either to withdraw defendant's notice of revocation or to appear personally before the court to show why he should not be held in *623 contempt. The Commissioner thereupon filed for a writ of prohibition to stay proceedings in the Ramsey County Municipal Court. Under Minn. Stat. 169.121, subd. 5 (1978), the municipal court may stay the imposition or execution of any sentence resulting from a conviction for driving while under the influence of alcohol. The Commissioner, however, believing that license revocation authorized under § 171.16 is an administrative sanction, argues that the stay provision only applies to the criminal penalties of fine and imprisonment. Nevertheless, the Commissioner agrees that if that provision does empower the municipal court to stay the revocation of a license, then his action in contravention of Judge Kirby's disposition was ill-advised. Likewise, the attorney for the offending driver acknowledges that the municipal court would have no authority to order a stay of revocation of license if the legislature did not so intend. The question, then, becomes entirely one of ascertaining legislative intent. In the past, this court recognized that penalties from motor vehicle violations were both criminal and administrative, the Commissioner of Public Safety having authority over the latter. See e. g., Martinka v. Hoffmann, 214 Minn. 346, 9 N.W.2d 13 (1943); State v. Moseng, 254 Minn. 263, 95 N.W.2d 6 (1959). Yet even construing the statute in a light most favorable to appellant, the Commissioner never had exclusive authority, since subdivision 4 empowers the judge to increase the period for license revocation beyond the 90-day statutory minimum. In 1969, the legislature amended chapter 169 by conferring upon the court the right to stay the imposition or execution of sentences.[7] 1969 Minn.Laws ch. 744, § 1. Sensing that the enactment of the stay provision signalled a legislative desire to alter the jurisdictional balance between court and commissioner, we observed in 1975 that license revocation "is automatically imposed as a criminal penalty upon conviction of a § 169.121 violation. It is triggered by the outcome of the criminal proceeding and is imposed through the judicial system." State, Dep't of Public Safety v. Mulvihill, 303 Minn. 361, 368, 227 N.W.2d 813, 817-18 (1975). We agree that Mulvihill authorizes the trial courts to stay the revocation of drivers licenses. Because the legislature has not since amended the statute in a manner inconsistent with Mulvihill, we assume under the axioms of judicial construction that the legislature approved of Mulvihill's imprimatur. Roos v. City of Mankato, 199 Minn. 284, 271 N.W. 582 (1937). We thus determine inescapably that the legislature authorized the courts to stay the revocation of licenses as a means of encouraging treatment for alcoholism. We are aware of no amendments to the applicable law enacted since Mulvihill which would impact on its holding as it bears on the ascertainment of legislative intent. To the contrary, in 1976 the legislature enacted Minn. Stat. § 169.126 which requires the courts to obtain and give due consideration to alcohol problem assessments of defendants convicted under § 169.121. 1976 Minn. Laws ch. 298, § 4. The enactment of the alcohol problem assessment provision supports our view that the legislature granted the courts additional authority to assume a more treatment-oriented posture. The legislature has paramount authority to deal with the revocation of drivers licenses to the exclusion of the Commissioner of Public Safety. We therefore suggest that *624 doubts as to the correctness of our interpretation may be resolved by submitting the question to the legislature in its forthcoming session. Because we are confident that the Commissioner will accede to this interpretation and that the concerns of the trial court will be satisfied by this resolution, the application for writ of prohibition shall be dismissed. OTIS, Justice (dissenting). The majority opinion relies on our holding in State, Dep't of Public Safety v. Mulvihill, 303 Minn. 361, 368, 227 N.W.2d 813, 817-18 (1975) for the proposition that trial courts have discretion to revoke or not to revoke the driver's license of a defendant convicted of driving while under the influence of alcohol. The majority notes that the legislature has not amended the statute in a manner inconsistent with the Mulvihill decision written in March of 1975. I respectfully disagree on both grounds. All that Mulvihill held was that the Commissioner of Public Safety was justified in revoking the license of three drivers who refused to submit to chemical tests as provided by Minn. Stat. § 169.123, subd. 4 (1974). In observing by way of dictum that revocation under Minn. Stat. § 169.121, subd. 3 (1974) is "triggered by the outcome of [a] criminal proceeding," we stated that under § 169.121 a license revocation "is automatically imposed as a criminal penalty upon conviction" (emphasis altered). We did not say that the court had discretion to revoke or not revoke but stated that revocation is mandatory. Nor can I agree that the legislature has not amended the statute in a manner inconsistent with what the majority reads into Mulvihill. In April 1976 by adopting 1976 Minn.Laws ch. 341, § 1, the legislature amended Minn. Stat. § 169.121, subd. 3 (1976), by adding this language (emphasis added): Any person whose license has been revoked pursuant to section 169.123 is not subject to the mandatory revocation provisions of this subdivision. As to licenses revoked under Minn. Stat. § 169.123 (1974) with which our court was dealing in Mulvihill, the legislature, by this amendment, acquiesced in Mulvihill with respect to the implied consent law. However, as to revocation for convictions under Minn. Stat. § 169.121 (1978), the amendment expressly states that revocation is "mandatory." A second significant amendment occurred in April 1978 when the legislature adopted 1978 Minn.Laws ch. 727, § 2. That amendment introduced this language as Minn. Stat. § 169.121, subd. 7 (1978) (emphasis added):

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

State, Department of Public Safety v. Wiehle · 1979 4 citations

+ 4 more citations in this opinion.

Minnesota Court of Appeals

Thushari Rangika Alahapperuma v. Commissioner of Public Safety · 2024 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Anderson · 2019 3 citations

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

State v. Wood · 2019 5 citations

+ 5 more citations in this opinion.

Mortenson v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety · 2018 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Mike · 2018 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Willits v. Commissioner of Public Safety · 2017 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Hugh Herman Hansen v. Commissioner of Public Safety · 2016 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Ryan Paul Jirik v. Commissioner of Public Safety · 2016 1 citation

testing. Id. (citing Minn. Stat. § 169.123, subd. 2(b)(2) (1990)). The supreme court

Tyler Lee Johnson v. Commissioner of Public Safety · 2016 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

State of Minnesota v. James Robert Stepke · 2016 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Nelson v. Commissioner of Public Safety · 2010 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Riehm v. Commissioner of Public Safety · 2008 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

State v. Ouellette · 2007 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Bendorf v. Commissioner of Public Safety · 2006 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Kramer v. Commissioner of Public Safety · 2005 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Jones v. Commissioner of Public Safety · 2003 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Collins · 2003 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Larivee · 2002 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Henning · 2002 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Pearson · 2001 5 citations

+ 5 more citations in this opinion.

City of Golden Valley v. One 1998 Pontiac Grand Prix, Vin 1g2wp521wf309530, Pennsylvania License Plate P520111 · 2000 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Busch v. Commissioner of Public Safety · 2000 5 citations

+ 5 more citations in this opinion.

Groe v. Commissioner of Public Safety · 2000 3 citations

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

Bortnem v. Commissioner of Public Safety · 2000 11 citations

+ 11 more citations in this opinion.

Nordvick v. Commissioner of Public Safety · 2000 3 citations

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

Cosky v. Commissioner of Public Safety · 1999 8 citations

+ 8 more citations in this opinion.

State v. Rader · 1999 4 citations

+ 4 more citations in this opinion.

Genung v. Commissioner of Public Safety · 1999 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Berge v. Commissioner of Public Safety · 1999 16 citations

OPINION LANSING, Judge. The district court determined the Commissioner of Public Safety's office complied with the mandatory discovery provisions of Minn. Stat. § 169.123, subd. 5c(d) (Supp.1997), when it informed Kent Orrin Berge in writing that the documents were available for inspection, or that they would be copied and mailed upon receipt of reasonable copying costs. We affirm.

+ 13 more citations in this opinion.

Hamilton v. Commissioner of Public Safety · 1999 6 citations

+ 6 more citations in this opinion.

State v. Dumas · 1998 3 citations

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

Linde v. Commissioner of Public Safety · 1998 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Madison v. Commissioner of Public Safety · 1998 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Brooks v. Commissioner of Public Safety · 1998 6 citations

+ 6 more citations in this opinion.

State v. Zornes · 1998 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Lee · 1998 7 citations

+ 7 more citations in this opinion.

Weierke v. Commissioner of Public Safety · 1998 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Moe v. Commissioner of Public Safety · 1998 4 citations

+ 4 more citations in this opinion.

Garcia v. Commissioner of Public Safety · 1997 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Bond v. Commissioner of Public Safety · 1997 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Thompson v. Commissioner of Public Safety · 1997 5 citations

+ 5 more citations in this opinion.

Duff v. Commissioner of Public Safety · 1997 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

State v. Shifflet · 1996 21 citations

+ 21 more citations in this opinion.

Bray v. Commissioner of Public Safety · 1996 1 citation

Appellant’s analogy of California statutes relating to bingo to Minnesota statutes relating to driving while intoxicated is unpersuasive for several reasons. First, the conduct for which appellant’s license was revoked was not driving per se but failing an alcohol concentration test administered pursuant to the implied consent law shortly after she had been driving. See Minn. Stat. § 169.123, subd. 4 (1994). Minnesota does not seek merely to regulate driving while intoxicated: it categorically prohibits such driving. Second, there is no federal or tribal interest to be advanced by permitting tribal members to drive on reservations while intoxicated, nor is such an interest defeated by permitting the state to revoke the licenses of tribal members who fail the alcohol concentration test. Third, Minnesota’s unequivocal policy of keeping intoxicated drivers off the road when coupled with the Cabazon Band “shorthand test” brings the implied consent statute clearly under Pub.L. 280. Cabazon Band does not support denying the state the right to prohibit intoxicated persons from driving, even when those intoxicated persons are tribal members driving on a reservation. See also State v. LaRose, 543 N.W.2d 426, 427-28 (Minn.App.1996) (applying Cabazon Band and holding that state had jurisdiction over a trespass against a tribal member for an offense occurring on a reservation because the law was not regulating real property ownership and occupancy but prohibiting the entry or occupancy of another’s property).

Hotchkiss v. Commissioner of Public Safety · 1996 9 citations

+ 9 more citations in this opinion.

Haveri v. Commissioner of Public Safety · 1996 1 citation

Minn. Stat. § 169.123, subd. 3 (1994) (emphasis added).

O'Brian v. Commissioner of Public Safety · 1996 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Gergen v. Commissioner of Public Safety · 1996 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Welch v. Commissioner of Public Safety · 1996 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Palme v. Commissioner of Public Safety · 1995 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Heuton v. Commissioner of Public Safety · 1995 5 citations

+ 5 more citations in this opinion.