Minn. Stat. § 253B.09

In Re Brown · 2002 12 citations

+ 12 more citations in this opinion.

In Re McCaskill · 1999 3 citations

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

In Re Senty-Haugen · 1998 3 citations

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

Matter of Knops · 1995 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Matter of Wolf · 1992 5 citations

+ 5 more citations in this opinion.

Matter of Colbert · 1991 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Matter of Fredrickson · 1986 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

In Re the Alleged Psychopathic Personality of Joelson · 1986 1 citation

Joelson also makes the related argument that he is entitled to be placed in the least restrictive facility that can meet his treatment needs. Minn. Stat. § 253B.09, subd. 1 (1984). Nothing in the record indicates that there is a facility less restrictive than MSH which would accept Joelson. More to the point, Joelson has been adjudicated a psychopathic personality pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 526.09 (1984), and committed to the Minnesota Security Hospital. Section 526.10 makes those provisions of chapter 253B pertaining to persons mental *812 ly ill and dangerous to the public applicable to persons having a psychopathic personality — i.e., persons suffering from conditions which render them irresponsible for conduct with respect to sexual matters and thereby dangerous to other persons. Persons committed to MSH as mentally ill and dangerous can be transferred out of MSH only if the commissioner of human services is satisfied, after a hearing and favorable recommendation by the special review board, that a transfer is appropriate. Minn. Stat. § 253B.18, subd. 6 (1984). Any transfer decision requires consideration of the public safety. Minn. Stat. § 253B.18, subd. 6(v) (1984). See also County of Hennepin v. Levine, 345 N.W.2d 217, 220 (Minn.1984); Lausche v. Commissioner of Public Welfare, 302 Minn. 65, 69, 225 N.W.2d 366, 368 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 993, 95 S.Ct. 1430, 43 L.Ed.2d 674 (1975). Inasmuch as the matter has not been brought before the special review board, the contention here that Joelson, who suffers from pedophilia with an antisocial personality, should be placed in a less restrictive facility — particularly in an unsecured house in a residential area — is, at least, premature.

Matter of Harhut · 1986 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

State v. Ward · 1985 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

County of Hennepin v. Levine · 1984 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

County of Hennepin v. Kolodrubetz · 1984 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Renee Jean Tapper · 2025 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Benjamin A. Ebert · 2025 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Dena Joy Alexander · 2025 3 citations

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Rakan Muhhammad Alam A23-1077, Court of Appeals Nonprecedential, December 26, ... · 2023 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Krista Jean Lynard · 2023 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Amy Jeankyoung Oh · 2023 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Michael Thomas Schumann. · 2016 2 citations

evidence that the proposed patient is a person who is mentally ill . . . .” Minn. Stat. § 253B.09, subd. 1(a) (2014). The MCTA defines a person who is mentally ill as:

Minn. Stat. § 253B.09, subd. 2.

In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Kenneth Raymond Newlin. · 2015 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Andrew Nordstrom. · 2014 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

In Re Horton · 2003 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

In Re Thulin · 2003 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

In Re of the Civil Commitment of Janckila · 2003 1 citation

In reviewing a commitment, we are limited to an examination of whether the district court complied with the requirements of the commitment act. In re Schaefer, 498 N.W.2d 298, 300 (Minn.App.1993). An appellate court will not reverse a district court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. In re McGaughey, 536 N.W.2d 621, 623 (Minn.1995). There must be clear and convincing evidence that a person is mentally ül in order to commit that person. Minn. Stat. § 253B.09, subd. 1(a) (2002). We review de novo the question of whether the evidence is sufficient to meet the standard of commitment. In re Knops, 536 N.W.2d 616, 620 (Minn.1995).

In Re Brown · 2001 4 citations

+ 4 more citations in this opinion.

In Re Robledo · 2000 2 citations

The Minnesota Commitment and Treatment Act provides for an initial commitment period not to exceed six months. Minn. Stat. § 253B.09, subd. 5 (1998). If the person is confined more than 60 days, the act requires the custodial facility to provide a report indicating,, among other things, whether the patient is in need of further care and treatment. Minn. Stat.. § 253B.12, subd. 1(b) (1998).

The Minnesota Commitment and Treatment Act provides for an initial commitment period not to exceed six months. Minn. Stat. § 253B.09, subd. 5 (1998). If the person is confined more than 60 days, the act requires the custodial facility to provide a report indicating,, among other things, whether the patient is in need of further care and treatment. Minn. Stat.. § 253B.12, subd. 1(b) (1998).

Matter of Ayers · 1997 4 citations

Appellant contends that under Minn. Stat. § 253B.09, subd. 2 (1996), the court was required to make specific findings listing less restrictive alternatives considered and rejected by the court, as well as reasons for rejecting them. He asserts that the district court should have cited and considered his scheduled release plan from prison as an alternative in which he would be placed on electronic monitoring, make daily reports to his parole officer, and be evaluated and referred for sex offender treatment.

Appellant contends that under Minn. Stat. § 253B.09, subd. 2 (1996), the court was required to make specific findings listing less restrictive alternatives considered and rejected by the court, as well as reasons for rejecting them. He asserts that the district court should have cited and considered his scheduled release plan from prison as an alternative in which he would be placed on electronic monitoring, make daily reports to his parole officer, and be evaluated and referred for sex offender treatment.

Appellant contends that under Minn. Stat. § 253B.09, subd. 2 (1996), the court was required to make specific findings listing less restrictive alternatives considered and rejected by the court, as well as reasons for rejecting them. He asserts that the district court should have cited and considered his scheduled release plan from prison as an alternative in which he would be placed on electronic monitoring, make daily reports to his parole officer, and be evaluated and referred for sex offender treatment.

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Maloney v. Dakota County Receiving Center, Inc. · 1997 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

In Re the Welfare of J.A.J. · 1996 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

In Re Linehan · 1996 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Matter of Kellor · 1994 4 citations

+ 4 more citations in this opinion.

Matter of Schaefer · 1993 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Matter of Duvick · 1993 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Lidberg v. Steffen · 1993 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

State Ex Rel. Humphrey v. Alpine Air Products, Inc. · 1992 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Matter of Zemple · 1992 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Matter of Grafstrom · 1992 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Matter of May · 1991 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Matter of McPherson · 1991 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Matter of King · 1991 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Matter of Roberds · 1991 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Matter of Colbert · 1990 3 citations

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

Matter of Martin · 1990 2 citations

Minn. Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 13 (1988). A trial court must find a person mentally ill by clear and convincing evidence. Minn. Stat. § 253B.09, subd. 1. The commitment must be “justified by findings based upon evidence at the hearing.” Minn.R.Civ. Commitment 11.01.

Minn. Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 13 (1988). A trial court must find a person mentally ill by clear and convincing evidence. Minn. Stat. § 253B.09, subd. 1. The commitment must be “justified by findings based upon evidence at the hearing.” Minn.R.Civ. Commitment 11.01.

Matter of Bowers · 1990 2 citations

The trial court was required to determine whether Bowers was mentally ill, to examine alternatives to commitment, and to select the least restrictive facility to meet Bowers’ treatment needs. Minn. Stat. § 253B.09, subd. 1. The authority of the committing court is limited, and it may not inquire into every issue related to commitment. For instance, the court is not authorized to inquire into most treatment issues, Wicks, 364 N.W.2d at 847, except when the treating facility has sought court approval of intrusive treatment, such as electrocon-vulsive therapy or neuroleptic medications. Jarvis v. Levine, 418 N.W.2d 139, 145 (Minn.1988).

The trial court was required to determine whether Bowers was mentally ill, to examine alternatives to commitment, and to select the least restrictive facility to meet Bowers’ treatment needs. Minn. Stat. § 253B.09, subd. 1. The authority of the committing court is limited, and it may not inquire into every issue related to commitment. For instance, the court is not authorized to inquire into most treatment issues, Wicks, 364 N.W.2d at 847, except when the treating facility has sought court approval of intrusive treatment, such as electrocon-vulsive therapy or neuroleptic medications. Jarvis v. Levine, 418 N.W.2d 139, 145 (Minn.1988).

Matter of Gonzalez · 1990 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Marriage of Hofseth v. Hofseth · 1990 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Matter of Allen · 1990 4 citations

+ 4 more citations in this opinion.

In re the Conservatorship of Edelman · 1989 3 citations

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

In Re Heurung · 1989 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Matter of Peterson · 1989 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Matter of Stubbe · 1989 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

In re Jasmer · 1989 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Matter of Spence · 1989 4 citations

Stanley Spence appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for release from the chemical dependency program at Anoka Metro Regional Treatment Center (“Treatment Center”) pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 253B.17 (1986). Appellant argues he should be released because the six-month time limitation for commitment specified in Minn. Stat. § 253B.09, subd. 5 began to run on the date of the commitment order rather than on the date he actually arrived at the *478 Treatment Center almost six months later. Respondent Hennepin County contends that the six-month time limitation did not begin to run until appellant actually arrived at the Treatment Center. We agree with respondent, and affirm the trial court.

Stanley Spence appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for release from the chemical dependency program at Anoka Metro Regional Treatment Center (“Treatment Center”) pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 253B.17 (1986). Appellant argues he should be released because the six-month time limitation for commitment specified in Minn. Stat. § 253B.09, subd. 5 began to run on the date of the commitment order rather than on the date he actually arrived at the *478 Treatment Center almost six months later. Respondent Hennepin County contends that the six-month time limitation did not begin to run until appellant actually arrived at the Treatment Center. We agree with respondent, and affirm the trial court.

Stanley Spence appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for release from the chemical dependency program at Anoka Metro Regional Treatment Center (“Treatment Center”) pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 253B.17 (1986). Appellant argues he should be released because the six-month time limitation for commitment specified in Minn. Stat. § 253B.09, subd. 5 began to run on the date of the commitment order rather than on the date he actually arrived at the *478 Treatment Center almost six months later. Respondent Hennepin County contends that the six-month time limitation did not begin to run until appellant actually arrived at the Treatment Center. We agree with respondent, and affirm the trial court.

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Matter of Salkin · 1988 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

In re El-Rashad · 1987 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Matter of Rice · 1987 4 citations

+ 4 more citations in this opinion.

In re Nadeau · 1987 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Matter of Danielson · 1986 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Matter of Abrahams · 1986 3 citations

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

In Re Burmeister · 1986 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Matter of Beard · 1986 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Matter of Harvego · 1986 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

In Re Lufsky · 1986 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Matter of Desmond · 1986 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

In Re Lufsky · 1986 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

In re Butler · 1985 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Matter of Harhut · 1985 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

In Re Nadeau · 1985 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Matter of Chey · 1985 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Matter of Cieminski · 1985 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

In Re the Alleged Chemically Dependent Galusha · 1985 1 citation

If the trial court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that the proposed patient is chemically dependent and finds there is no suitable alternative to commitment, the trial court must commit the patient to the least restrictive facility which *847 can meet the patient’s treatment needs. Minn. Stat. § 253B.09, subd. 1. Appellant does not assert there are alternatives to commitment or that a less restrictive treatment facility was appropriate. Instead, appellant focuses on the finding of chemical dependency.

In Re the Alleged Mental Illness Of: Cordie · 1985 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Matter of Melas · 1985 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Matter of Davis · 1985 2 citations

In addition, commitment cannot occur unless the record shows the effort of the trial court to consider and find unsuitable all “reasonable alternative dispositions.” Minn. Stat. § 253B.09, subd. 1 (1984). Appellant also challenges the sufficiency of the record here on this effort.

In addition, commitment cannot occur unless the record shows the effort of the trial court to consider and find unsuitable all “reasonable alternative dispositions.” Minn. Stat. § 253B.09, subd. 1 (1984). Appellant also challenges the sufficiency of the record here on this effort.

In Re the Alleged Mental Illness of Picataci · 1985 2 citations

A court may commit a person found by clear and convincing evidence to be mentally ill to the least restrictive treatment facility that can meet the patient’s needs. See Minn. Stat. § 253B.09, subd. 1 (1984). A “mentally ill person” is defined as:

A court may commit a person found by clear and convincing evidence to be mentally ill to the least restrictive treatment facility that can meet the patient’s needs. See Minn. Stat. § 253B.09, subd. 1 (1984). A “mentally ill person” is defined as:

Matter of Harhut · 1985 2 citations

If the trial court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that the proposed patient is mentally retarded, and considers and rejects alternatives to judicial commitment, it must commit the patient to the least restrictive treatment facility which can meet that patient’s treatment needs. Minn. Stat. § 253B.09, subd. 1 (1984). The trial court must consider:

If the trial court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that the proposed patient is mentally retarded, and considers and rejects alternatives to judicial commitment, it must commit the patient to the least restrictive treatment facility which can meet that patient’s treatment needs. Minn. Stat. § 253B.09, subd. 1 (1984). The trial court must consider:

Matter of Anderson · 1985 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Matter of Emond · 1985 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Matter of Wicks · 1985 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

In re the Alleged Mental Illness of Pederson · 1985 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Matter of Redcloud · 1984 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Casanova · 1984 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Matter of Peterson · 1984 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Matter of Caldwell · 1984 1 citation

1. To support commitment, the trial court must find by clear and convincing evidence that the proposed patient is mentally ill as defined by statute. Minn. Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 13 (Supp.1983). The statute requires a finding the patient suffers from a substantial psychiatric disorder which grossly impairs his judgment, behavior, recognition of reality, or reasoning and understanding, that the illness is manifested by grossly disturbed behavior or faulty perceptions, and that the person poses a substantial likelihood of physical harm to himself or others as shown by a failure to provide necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical care. Id. The trial court must also consider alternatives less restrictive than judicial commitment. Minn. Stat. § 253B.09, subd. 1 (1982).

Matter of Fusa · 1984 1 citation

Our review is limited to an examination of the trial court’s compliance with the statute, which requires specific findings of fact, separate conclusions of law, and a listing of less restrictive alternatives considered and rejected. Minn. Stat. § 253B.09, subd. 2 (1982). Specifically, the commitment must be “justified by findings based upon evidence at the hearing.” Minn.R.Civ. Commitment 11.01. These factual findings “shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” Minn.R.Civ.P. 52.01.

In re Hieb · 1984 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Matter of Adams · 1984 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Matter of Leebl · 1984 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

In re the Alleged Mental Illness of Neubauer · 1984 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Matter of Pope · 1984 1 citation

The trial court has an obligation to consider alternatives less restrictive than commitment and to order hospitalization only if less restrictive alternatives are rejected. Minn. Stat. § 253B.09, subds. 1, 2 (1982). The record shows that the possibility of treatment at some facility other than Ano-ka State Hospital was carefully considered. Doctor Robert King, Pope’s psychologist at Anoka, testified that appellant was “absolutely not” ready for placement in the community, noting the “high probability” of recurring aggressive behavior.

Matter of Knapp · 1984 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

In Re the Alleged Mental Illness of Kennedy · 1984 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

In Re the Alleged Mental Illness of Johnson · 1984 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

In Re the Alleged Mental Illness of DeMatthew · 1984 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Northwest Residence, Inc. v. City of Brooklyn Center · 1984 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Matter of Ackerman · 1984 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

In Re Moll · 1984 3 citations

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.