Minn. Stat. § 253B.12

In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Anthony Blake Swope · 2025 1 citation

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In re Civil Commitment of Lonergan · 2012 1 citation

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In Re Brown · 2002 10 citations

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In Re McCaskill · 1999 2 citations

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Matter of Blilie · 1993 1 citation

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Matter of Fredrickson · 1986 12 citations

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Matter of Harhut · 1986 6 citations

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In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Rachel B. Sabin. · 2016 7 citations

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In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Adam Christopher Robb. · 2014 6 citations

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In Re Thulin · 2003 6 citations

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In Re Brown · 2001 6 citations

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In Re Robledo · 2000 2 citations

Manuel Robledo was committed as a mentally ill person to the Minneapolis Veterans’ Affairs Medical Center and the Ano-ka-Metro Regional Treatment Center (AMRTC) on July 1, 1998. At a review hearing the following December, the court continued Robledo’s commitment through September 30, 1999, under Minn. Stat. §§ 253B.12, .13 (1998).

The standard of proof for an initial commitment is higher than the standard of proof for continued commitment after a review hearing. Compare Minn. Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 13 (1998) (defining mentally ill person as one who has made recent attempt or threat to physically harm self or others or recent failure to provide necessities), ivith Minn. Stat. § 253B.12, subd. 4 (specifying that determinations for continued treatment need not be based on finding of recent attempt or threat to physically harm self or others or recent failure to provide necessities, but must be based on finding that patient is likely to attempt physical harm or to fail to provide necessities).

Matter of Kellor · 1994 1 citation

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Matter of Blilie · 1992 2 citations

FACTS Appellant was born in 1938. On January 10, 1952, a petition was filed to commit her as mentally deficient, citing as grounds her inability to make a good adjustment at school, where she was making few friends and doing poorly. On January 23, 1952, the court found appellant mentally deficient, appointed the director of public institutions guardian of her person, and committed her to its care and custody.[1] Pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 253B.12 (1984), a hearing was held in 1984 on the continued judicial commitment of appellant as a mentally retarded person. At that time, she was a patient at the Cambridge State Hospital. Appellant was diagnosed as mentally retarded and schizophrenic, and has had a lobotomy. She was being treated with various types of neuroleptic medication. The court in 1984 found appellant was likely to fail to provide necessary food, clothing, shelter, and medical care unless involuntary commitment was continued. It also found her maladaptive behavior, which included aggression towards others, pulling fire alarms, and, three years previously, lighting a fire, prevented her placement in the community. The trial court found appellant continued to be mentally retarded and ordered her commitment for an indeterminate period. Another hearing was held in 1987 pursuant to In re Harhut, 385 N.W.2d 305, 312 (Minn.1986), in which the supreme court required that all indeterminate commitments for mentally retarded persons be reviewed at least every three years. The court in 1988 found appellant needed 24-hour supervision and care, that she had delusional thinking and loose associations, she was aggressive towards others at times, and her conduct, along with her mental illness, severely hampered her placement in the community. Appellant was being treated with neuroleptics, and the court found a Jarvis order was required to continue such treatment. The trial court terminated appellant's prior indeterminate commitment and recommitted her as a mentally retarded person through March 12, 1990 to Cambridge Regional Treatment Center. In 1990, another petition for the judicial commitment of appellant as a mentally retarded person was brought. The court found that she was diagnosed with mild mental retardation, conduct disorder, and schizophrenia. Her mental illness was being treated with a neuroleptic medication, with consent obtained through Ramsey County without a Jarvis hearing. Evidence indicated appellant could be placed in the community. The court concluded that appellant was a mentally retarded person, but that involuntary hospitalization commitment was not necessary. It found appellant should be placed in the community and that only a lack of funding precluded such placement. In an order dated August 17, 1990, the court denied the petition for judicial commitment. Appellant nonetheless remained at Cambridge, apparently because no appropriate community placement was available. *36 A new petition dated September 26, 1990 for the judicial commitment of appellant as mentally retarded or mentally ill was brought. The court again found appellant was mentally retarded or mentally ill, but that involuntary hospitalization and commitment was not necessary for her protection. The court found that since the prior court order of August 17, 1990, appellant's condition had not changed, and that community placement was apparently being delayed by lack of funding, which it determined was not a reason to commit appellant to Cambridge. Appellant remained at Cambridge for lack of an appropriate community placement. On May 29, 1991, appellant's counsel petitioned the district court pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 252A.19, subd. 2 (1990) asking, first, that the court issue a declaratory judgment holding that the original appointment of the Commissioner[2] as guardian of appellant was terminated in 1968 by repeal of Minn. Stat. § 525.753 (1949), under which the guardianship was commenced; second, that the court declare Minn. Stat. § 253B.03, subd. 6a (Supp.1991), which authorizes treatment of individuals with developmental disabilities with neuroleptic medication upon guardian consent without further court review, to be unconstitutional; and third, that the court order the Commissioner to show cause why she continued to provide residential services to appellant at Cambridge Regional Human Services Center without a commitment. The trial court denied the petition in its entirety and Blilie appealed. The Commissioner moves to dismiss the appeal as moot in part because appellant has since been placed in residence in the community, and the Commissioner is no longer providing residential services or neuroleptic medications to her. Appellant opposes the motion, and also moves for clarification of the record, which the Commissioner opposes. On November 20, 1991, a new commitment petition was brought in district court. Ramsey County has since informed this court that it has stipulated to withdraw the petition.

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Matter of Colbert · 1990 1 citation

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Matter of Stubbe · 1989 1 citation

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Matter of Spence · 1989 1 citation

The Minnesota Commitment Act is, however, designed to protect against such an indefinite, involuntary commitment. Section 253B.09, subd. 5 requires that the treating facility issue a written report within 60 days to 90 days after the commitment period commences, detailing with supporting data the diagnosis of the patient, the anticipated discharge date and the individualized treatment plan. The report must also state whether in the opinion of the head of the facility the patient satisfies the statutory requirement for continued commitment. See Minn. Stat. § 253B.12, subd. 1. Furthermore, a person adjudicated chemically dependent and in need of commitment may petition the court for release on the basis that he or she “is not in need of continued institutionalization or * * * that [he or she] is no longer * * * chemically dependent.” Minn. Stat. § 253B.17, subd. 1.

Matter of Richmond · 1988 1 citation

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Matter of Jarvis · 1988 1 citation

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In Re Melcher · 1987 2 citations

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Matter of Abrahams · 1986 2 citations

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Matter of Smith · 1986 1 citation

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Matter of Desmond · 1986 2 citations

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Matter of Frederickson · 1985 2 citations

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Matter of Harhut · 1985 1 citation

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In Re the Alleged Mental Illness Of: Cordie · 1985 1 citation

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Matter of Harhut · 1985 1 citation

Each of the commitment orders also specified (1) Hennepin County was to file a treatment report pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 253B.12, subd. 1, emphasizing progress made towards community placement, (2) Faribault State Hospital was to file a treatment plan with the court, rather than with the Commissioner of the Department of Human Services as required by Minn. Stat. § 253B.03, subd. 7, and (3) either party could seek a contempt citation directed at the employees or supervisors who submit the required reports. None of the orders specified the term of commitment.

Matter of Wicks · 1985 3 citations

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State v. Casanova · 1984 1 citation

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In Re the Alleged Mental Illness of Stewart · 1984 3 citations

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Matter of Adams · 1984 7 citations

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Matter of Skarsten · 1984 6 citations

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