Minn. Stat. § 260.015

State v. Grigsby · 2012 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Reed · 2007 1 citation

Under the law as of May 1970, the juvenile court had “original and exclusive jurisdiction in proceedings concerning any child who is alleged to be delinquent, a juvenile traffic offender, neglected, or dependent, and in proceedings concerning any minor alleged to have been a delinquent or a juvenile traffic offender prior to having become eighteen years of age.” Minn. Stat. § 260.111, subd. 1 (1969). A “child” was defined as an individual under 18 years of age. Minn. Stat. § 260.015, subd. 2 (1969). A “minor” was defined as an individual under 21 years of age. Minn. *580 Stat. § 260.015, subd. 9 (1969). Thus, there were two situations in which the juvenile court had exclusive jurisdiction: when an individual under 18 was alleged to be delinquent and when an individual under 21 was alleged to have been delinquent before turning 18. Reed was not subject to the juvenile court’s exclusive jurisdiction under either prong of section 260.111, subd. 1, because he was over 18 at the time of the offense. 1 The district court therefore properly overruled Reed’s objection to the court’s subject matter jurisdiction.

State v. Burg · 2002 1 citation

For example, in L.Z., we interpreted Minn. Stat. § 260.015, subd. 19 (1984), 4 which defined the juvenile offense of habitual truancy. L.Z., 396 N.W.2d at 216 & n. 1. Section 260.015, subdivision 19, provided:

State v. Mitchell · 1998 2 citations

II. Mitchell argues that the wide disparity in punishment for first-degree murder for *491 adults versus children violates his right to substantive due process. Mitchell points out that first-degree murder is the only offense for which a court cannot consider mitigating factors, and he argues that the fact that he was certified to be tried as an adult is separate from whether he should be sentenced as an adult. The state responds that the legislature has the power to determine appropriate punishment and that a life sentence for first-degree murder serves the legitimate state goal of protecting society. Unless there is a fundamental right at issue, judicial scrutiny of state legislation under substantive due process is not exacting. State v. Behl, 564 N.W.2d 560, 567 (1997). This court has held that no person, regardless of age, has the right to a juvenile disposition. Id. Likewise, there is no fundamental right to have age considered in adult sentencing. When there is no fundamental right at issue, substantive due process requires only that a statute "not be arbitrary or capricious or, stated another way, that [it] be a reasonable means to a permissive object." Id. We have held that the automatic certification of a 16-year-old indicted for first-degree murder without a hearing did not violate substantive due process. Id. at 568 (applying Minn. Stat. § 260.015, subd. 5(b)). We have also held that a mandatory life sentence for first-degree murder does not violate substantive due process, even though such a sentence does not allow the district court to consider mitigating factors. Walker, 306 Minn. at 111, 235 N.W.2d at 815. In Behl, we stated that we would prefer that the legislature provide the courts with the option to treat children differently than adults. Behl, 564 N.W.2d at 568. Here, as in Behl, we find no constitutional violation in the child's sentence, but we are sympathetic to the concern expressed by the district court judge who sentenced Mitchell when he stated that there should have been a "middle ground." Had Mitchell remained under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, that court would have only had jurisdiction over him until he turned 19. Minn. Stat. § 260.181, subd. 4(a) (1996). His sentence would have been four years at most. Had Mitchell been treated under the EJJ alternative included in the 1994 legislation, the court would have been able to exercise its authority until Mitchell turned 21. Id. at subd. 4(b). Because he was certified as an adult, Mitchell must serve a mandatory minimum of 30 years, and may serve up to a life term in prison. A strong argument can be made that a four-year sentence is insufficient for a crime of this magnitude. After all, Mitchell shot Wilfert in the face while committing a robbery. But an equally strong argument can be made that 30 years in prison is excessive when applied to a 15-year-old child such as Mitchell who has never had a network of family and friends to provide him emotional support and was offered very little guidance from either his parents or his community. Mitchell's background does not excuse or justify his crime — he is guilty of murder. But his background does speak to culpability and it adds to the tragedy of what occurred on the night of November 17, 1994. Just as Wilfert's life would have been spared had Mitchell not pulled the trigger, perhaps Mitchell would not have pulled the trigger had he had the support needed to grow up emotionally healthy. The greatest tragedy of this crime is that it was potentially preventable. It is a further tragedy that a 15-year-old will spend a minimum of 30 years in prison, especially given that his psychologist concluded that Mitchell could be "quite a different individual in ten to fifteen years given appropriate treatment and education." We would prefer that the legislature had provided a sentencing alternative, such as indeterminate sentencing, for someone like Mitchell — someone still a child, yet certified to stand trial as an adult. But the legislature did not choose to provide such an alternative. Moreover, the legislature did not choose to grant the district court the authority to consider factors such as age when sentencing a 15-year-old child such as Mitchell who has been certified to stand trial as an adult and convicted of first-degree murder. Mitchell attempts to overcome this lack of authority by asserting that the statute violates substantive due process. But a defendant carries a great burden in proving that a statute violates substantive due process, and Mitchell has failed to meet this *492 burden. We conclude that it does not violate substantive due process that a court may not consider age as a mitigating factor when sentencing a child who has been certified as an adult and subsequently convicted of first-degree murder.

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Behl · 1997 8 citations

+ 8 more citations in this opinion.

Matter of Welfare of DDG · 1997 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

In Re the Welfare of L.A.F. · 1996 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Marriage of Sanderson v. Sanderson · 1995 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

In Re the Welfare of A.D. · 1995 6 citations

On July 17, 1990, on petition of the Anoka County Community Health and Social Services Department, A.D. was adjudicated a child in need of protection or services (CHIPS) pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 260.015, subd. 2a(8) (1994), 1 based on D.D.’s apparent mental illness. Although the psychotic behavior resulting in D.D.’s commitment has apparently resolved since her final discharge from AMRTC on July 13, 1990, at subsequent review hearings on the CHIPS finding, the court has continued A.D.’s CHIPS status.

On July 17, 1990, on petition of the Anoka County Community Health and Social Services Department, A.D. was adjudicated a child in need of protection or services (CHIPS) pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 260.015, subd. 2a(8) (1994), 1 based on D.D.’s apparent mental illness. Although the psychotic behavior resulting in D.D.’s commitment has apparently resolved since her final discharge from AMRTC on July 13, 1990, at subsequent review hearings on the CHIPS finding, the court has continued A.D.’s CHIPS status.

On July 17, 1990, on petition of the Anoka County Community Health and Social Services Department, A.D. was adjudicated a child in need of protection or services (CHIPS) pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 260.015, subd. 2a(8) (1994), 1 based on D.D.’s apparent mental illness. Although the psychotic behavior resulting in D.D.’s commitment has apparently resolved since her final discharge from AMRTC on July 13, 1990, at subsequent review hearings on the CHIPS finding, the court has continued A.D.’s CHIPS status.

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

Valentine v. Lutz · 1994 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

In Re the Welfare of D.A.G. · 1992 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

In Re the Welfare of C.K. · 1988 6 citations

+ 6 more citations in this opinion.

In Re the Welfare of J.W. · 1987 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

In Re the Welfare of L.Z. · 1986 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

In Re the Welfare of J.W. · 1986 5 citations

+ 5 more citations in this opinion.

In Re the Welfare of J.J.B. · 1986 3 citations

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

Complaint Concerning Winton · 1984 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State Ex Rel. L.E.A. v. Hammergren · 1980 6 citations

294 N.W.2d 705 (1980) STATE of Minnesota ex rel. L.E.A., petitioner, Appellant (50619), State of Minnesota ex rel. S.P., petitioner, Appellant (50620), State of Minnesota ex rel. C.S., petitioner, Appellant (50621), State of Minnesota ex rel. K.H., petitioner, Appellant (50622), State of Minnesota ex rel. K.H., petitioner, Appellant (50623), v. Donald HAMMERGREN, Superintendent, Hennepin County Juvenile Detention Facility, Woodview, Respondent, Donald Omodt, Hennepin County Sheriff, Defendant (50619). Nos. 50619-50623. Supreme Court of Minnesota. June 20, 1980. *706 William R. Kennedy, County Public Defender, and Patrick J. Sullivan, Asst. Public Defender, Minneapolis, for appellants. Thomas L. Johnson, County Atty., and David W. Larson, Asst. County Atty., Minneapolis, for respondent. Linda J. Gallant, Minneapolis, Coalition for the Protection of Youth Rights, Amicus Curiae. Heard before SHERAN, C. J., PETERSON, and TODD, JJ., and considered and decided by the court en banc. SHERAN, Chief Justice. Petitioners appeal from dismissal of their petition for habeas corpus in the Fourth Judicial District. Petitioners sought habeas corpus claiming they were wrongfully being held in the Hennepin County Detention Center for contempt of court. The lower court reasoned that under Minn. Stat. §§ 260.301 and 588.01, subd. 3 (1978), the court has the power to find status offenders in constructive contempt of court for failing to comply with court orders and that In re Welfare of R.L.W., 309 Minn. 489, 245 N.W.2d 204 (1976) permits confinement in any center authorized by the Juvenile Court Act. Consequently, the lower court found that detention in the secure facility was appropriate and dismissed the petition. The issue raised by this case is whether, despite the language of Minn. Stat. § 260.173, subd. 3 (1978) stating that wayward children shall be placed in shelter care facilities only, status offenders can be held in secure detention centers after being found in constructive contempt of court for failing to comply with court orders. Although each petitioner's case presents a slightly different fact pattern, the parties stipulated to the following common factors. At separate times, the juveniles were each charged with being wayward and habitually disobedient within the meaning of Minn. Stat. § 260.015 (1978). Thereafter, they were each charged with constructive contempt of court under Minn. Stat. § 588.01, subd. 3(3) (1978) for violating a court order by running away from a shelter care facility[1] or failing to appear for a hearing. As a result of a finding of constructive contempt of court, each was incarcerated in the Hennepin County Juvenile Detention Center. The individual juveniles may no longer be held in a secure facility. Normally, this would render the case moot but, we find that the issue raised is "capable of repetition but evading review" and take jurisdiction. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 546, 96 S.Ct. 2791, 2797, 49 L.Ed.2d 683 (1976); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 110 n. 11, 95 S.Ct. 854, 861, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125, 93 S.Ct. 705, 712, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973). We make these observations notwithstanding the mootness which moves us to discharge the writ. Juvenile courts have the authority to find a juvenile in contempt of court and to impose appropriate sanctions. But, given the Legislature's expressed disapproval of the *707 practice of confining status offender juveniles in secure facilities, juvenile courts should not direct such confinement for contempt of court unless they first find specifically that there is no less restrictive alternative which could accomplish the court's purpose.[2]In re Welfare of R.L.W., 309 Minn. 489, 245 N.W.2d 204 (1976); see also U. S. v. Wilson, 421 U. S. 309, 319, 95 S.Ct. 1802, 1808, 44 L.Ed.2d 186 (1975). Minn. Stat. § 260.173, subd. 3 (1978) was amended by the Legislature in 1978 in Minn. Laws, ch. 637. The statute before the amendment stated that a child taken into custody by reason of being wayward or habitually disobedient who had previously escaped from a shelter care facility might be placed in a secure detention facility. Minn. Stat. § 260.173 (1976). As amended, Minn. Stat. § 260.173, subd. 3 (1978) states that a child taken into custody because of waywardness or habitual disobedience "may be placed only in a shelter care facility" even if she is conditionally released and has violated her field supervision. The language in the former statute authorizing the placement of these children in a secure detention facility was eliminated. The Hennepin County Juvenile Detention Center where these juveniles were incarcerated is a "secure detention facility" defined in Minn. Stat. § 260.015, subd. 16 (1978) as a "physically restricting detention facility, including a detention home." The amendment brought Minnesota into compliance with the funding requirements of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration of the United States Justice Department. The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 requires that each state seeking funds under the Act submit a plan to ensure that wayward or disobedient children "shall not be placed in juvenile detention or correctional facilities." 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(12) (1976). Minnesota, in adopting the federal policy of deinstitutionalization of status offenders, is moving in the direction adopted by the ABA Juvenile Justice Standards Project, Standards Relating to Noncriminal Misbehavior.[3] The ABA Standards, and their Commentary, conclude that runaway youth, truant youth, and otherwise "incorrigible" or "wayward" youth are best served outside the juvenile court system and outside juvenile detention facilities. As Amicus Coalition for the Protection of Youth Rights rightly points out, once children are defined as delinquent and placed with delinquent law-breakers, they may conform their behavior to that label, thus countermanding the entire process. E. Schur, Radical Non-Intervention: Rethinking the Delinquency Problem, 118-126 (1973). The Legislature may well have determined that removing status offenders from facilities designed for and used for law violators would result in better treatment, better programs, and better services for the child and that child's family. In addition, we interpret the amendment as reflecting the Legislature's concern with the effects of comingling disobedient or wayward children with juveniles who have allegedly committed more serious crimes. In light of the foregoing, we hold that only under the most egregious circumstances should the juvenile courts exercise their contempt power in such a manner that a status offender will be incarcerated in a secure facility. If such action is necessary, the record must show that all less restrictive *708 alternatives have failed in the past. (See State in Interest of M.S., 73 N.J. 238, 374 A.2d 445 [1977] for other alternatives.) In L.A.M. v. State, 547 P.2d 827, 831 (Alaska, 1976), the Alaska Supreme Court noted: Before a party may be held in criminal or civil contempt for failure to abide by a court order, certain elements must be established: (1) the existence of a valid order directing the alleged contemnor to do or refrain from doing something and the court's jurisdiction to enter that order; (2) the contemnor's notice of the order within sufficient time to comply with it; and in most cases, (3) the contemnor's ability to comply with the order; and (4) the contemnor's willful failure to comply with the order. In order for the juvenile court to find a "willful failure to comply" which warrants a holding of contempt, the record from the previous hearing must show that the child understood that disobedience would result in incarceration in a secure facility. A child too young to comprehend the warning cannot be found in contempt of court. With these limitations, the juvenile court can resort to the use of the secure facility if absolutely necessary. Finally, if it is necessary to rely on the use of a secure facility, the order must include instructions to the administrator of the institution that the disobedient child's contact with the more committed juvenile be kept to a minimum. Writ discharged. WAHL, Justice (concurring specially). I concur with the discharge of the habeas corpus writs as to these four young people because, they no longer being confined, their petitions are moot. However, I believe that even where the circumstances are "most egregious" (a showing the state did not make in these cases), the use of constructive contempt to incarcerate young people under these circumstances directly contravenes the plain meaning of the statute, as set out in the text of that statute in unambiguous words, as revealed in its legislative history, and as recognized in the majority opinion. Minn. Stat. § 260.173, subd. 3 (1978), as amended, specifically addresses the conduct which the lower court labeled "contempt of court." It provides:

294 N.W.2d 705 (1980) STATE of Minnesota ex rel. L.E.A., petitioner, Appellant (50619), State of Minnesota ex rel. S.P., petitioner, Appellant (50620), State of Minnesota ex rel. C.S., petitioner, Appellant (50621), State of Minnesota ex rel. K.H., petitioner, Appellant (50622), State of Minnesota ex rel. K.H., petitioner, Appellant (50623), v. Donald HAMMERGREN, Superintendent, Hennepin County Juvenile Detention Facility, Woodview, Respondent, Donald Omodt, Hennepin County Sheriff, Defendant (50619). Nos. 50619-50623. Supreme Court of Minnesota. June 20, 1980. *706 William R. Kennedy, County Public Defender, and Patrick J. Sullivan, Asst. Public Defender, Minneapolis, for appellants. Thomas L. Johnson, County Atty., and David W. Larson, Asst. County Atty., Minneapolis, for respondent. Linda J. Gallant, Minneapolis, Coalition for the Protection of Youth Rights, Amicus Curiae. Heard before SHERAN, C. J., PETERSON, and TODD, JJ., and considered and decided by the court en banc. SHERAN, Chief Justice. Petitioners appeal from dismissal of their petition for habeas corpus in the Fourth Judicial District. Petitioners sought habeas corpus claiming they were wrongfully being held in the Hennepin County Detention Center for contempt of court. The lower court reasoned that under Minn. Stat. §§ 260.301 and 588.01, subd. 3 (1978), the court has the power to find status offenders in constructive contempt of court for failing to comply with court orders and that In re Welfare of R.L.W., 309 Minn. 489, 245 N.W.2d 204 (1976) permits confinement in any center authorized by the Juvenile Court Act. Consequently, the lower court found that detention in the secure facility was appropriate and dismissed the petition. The issue raised by this case is whether, despite the language of Minn. Stat. § 260.173, subd. 3 (1978) stating that wayward children shall be placed in shelter care facilities only, status offenders can be held in secure detention centers after being found in constructive contempt of court for failing to comply with court orders. Although each petitioner's case presents a slightly different fact pattern, the parties stipulated to the following common factors. At separate times, the juveniles were each charged with being wayward and habitually disobedient within the meaning of Minn. Stat. § 260.015 (1978). Thereafter, they were each charged with constructive contempt of court under Minn. Stat. § 588.01, subd. 3(3) (1978) for violating a court order by running away from a shelter care facility[1] or failing to appear for a hearing. As a result of a finding of constructive contempt of court, each was incarcerated in the Hennepin County Juvenile Detention Center. The individual juveniles may no longer be held in a secure facility. Normally, this would render the case moot but, we find that the issue raised is "capable of repetition but evading review" and take jurisdiction. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 546, 96 S.Ct. 2791, 2797, 49 L.Ed.2d 683 (1976); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 110 n. 11, 95 S.Ct. 854, 861, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125, 93 S.Ct. 705, 712, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973). We make these observations notwithstanding the mootness which moves us to discharge the writ. Juvenile courts have the authority to find a juvenile in contempt of court and to impose appropriate sanctions. But, given the Legislature's expressed disapproval of the *707 practice of confining status offender juveniles in secure facilities, juvenile courts should not direct such confinement for contempt of court unless they first find specifically that there is no less restrictive alternative which could accomplish the court's purpose.[2]In re Welfare of R.L.W., 309 Minn. 489, 245 N.W.2d 204 (1976); see also U. S. v. Wilson, 421 U. S. 309, 319, 95 S.Ct. 1802, 1808, 44 L.Ed.2d 186 (1975). Minn. Stat. § 260.173, subd. 3 (1978) was amended by the Legislature in 1978 in Minn. Laws, ch. 637. The statute before the amendment stated that a child taken into custody by reason of being wayward or habitually disobedient who had previously escaped from a shelter care facility might be placed in a secure detention facility. Minn. Stat. § 260.173 (1976). As amended, Minn. Stat. § 260.173, subd. 3 (1978) states that a child taken into custody because of waywardness or habitual disobedience "may be placed only in a shelter care facility" even if she is conditionally released and has violated her field supervision. The language in the former statute authorizing the placement of these children in a secure detention facility was eliminated. The Hennepin County Juvenile Detention Center where these juveniles were incarcerated is a "secure detention facility" defined in Minn. Stat. § 260.015, subd. 16 (1978) as a "physically restricting detention facility, including a detention home." The amendment brought Minnesota into compliance with the funding requirements of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration of the United States Justice Department. The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 requires that each state seeking funds under the Act submit a plan to ensure that wayward or disobedient children "shall not be placed in juvenile detention or correctional facilities." 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(12) (1976). Minnesota, in adopting the federal policy of deinstitutionalization of status offenders, is moving in the direction adopted by the ABA Juvenile Justice Standards Project, Standards Relating to Noncriminal Misbehavior.[3] The ABA Standards, and their Commentary, conclude that runaway youth, truant youth, and otherwise "incorrigible" or "wayward" youth are best served outside the juvenile court system and outside juvenile detention facilities. As Amicus Coalition for the Protection of Youth Rights rightly points out, once children are defined as delinquent and placed with delinquent law-breakers, they may conform their behavior to that label, thus countermanding the entire process. E. Schur, Radical Non-Intervention: Rethinking the Delinquency Problem, 118-126 (1973). The Legislature may well have determined that removing status offenders from facilities designed for and used for law violators would result in better treatment, better programs, and better services for the child and that child's family. In addition, we interpret the amendment as reflecting the Legislature's concern with the effects of comingling disobedient or wayward children with juveniles who have allegedly committed more serious crimes. In light of the foregoing, we hold that only under the most egregious circumstances should the juvenile courts exercise their contempt power in such a manner that a status offender will be incarcerated in a secure facility. If such action is necessary, the record must show that all less restrictive *708 alternatives have failed in the past. (See State in Interest of M.S., 73 N.J. 238, 374 A.2d 445 [1977] for other alternatives.) In L.A.M. v. State, 547 P.2d 827, 831 (Alaska, 1976), the Alaska Supreme Court noted: Before a party may be held in criminal or civil contempt for failure to abide by a court order, certain elements must be established: (1) the existence of a valid order directing the alleged contemnor to do or refrain from doing something and the court's jurisdiction to enter that order; (2) the contemnor's notice of the order within sufficient time to comply with it; and in most cases, (3) the contemnor's ability to comply with the order; and (4) the contemnor's willful failure to comply with the order. In order for the juvenile court to find a "willful failure to comply" which warrants a holding of contempt, the record from the previous hearing must show that the child understood that disobedience would result in incarceration in a secure facility. A child too young to comprehend the warning cannot be found in contempt of court. With these limitations, the juvenile court can resort to the use of the secure facility if absolutely necessary. Finally, if it is necessary to rely on the use of a secure facility, the order must include instructions to the administrator of the institution that the disobedient child's contact with the more committed juvenile be kept to a minimum. Writ discharged. WAHL, Justice (concurring specially). I concur with the discharge of the habeas corpus writs as to these four young people because, they no longer being confined, their petitions are moot. However, I believe that even where the circumstances are "most egregious" (a showing the state did not make in these cases), the use of constructive contempt to incarcerate young people under these circumstances directly contravenes the plain meaning of the statute, as set out in the text of that statute in unambiguous words, as revealed in its legislative history, and as recognized in the majority opinion. Minn. Stat. § 260.173, subd. 3 (1978), as amended, specifically addresses the conduct which the lower court labeled "contempt of court." It provides:

294 N.W.2d 705 (1980) STATE of Minnesota ex rel. L.E.A., petitioner, Appellant (50619), State of Minnesota ex rel. S.P., petitioner, Appellant (50620), State of Minnesota ex rel. C.S., petitioner, Appellant (50621), State of Minnesota ex rel. K.H., petitioner, Appellant (50622), State of Minnesota ex rel. K.H., petitioner, Appellant (50623), v. Donald HAMMERGREN, Superintendent, Hennepin County Juvenile Detention Facility, Woodview, Respondent, Donald Omodt, Hennepin County Sheriff, Defendant (50619). Nos. 50619-50623. Supreme Court of Minnesota. June 20, 1980. *706 William R. Kennedy, County Public Defender, and Patrick J. Sullivan, Asst. Public Defender, Minneapolis, for appellants. Thomas L. Johnson, County Atty., and David W. Larson, Asst. County Atty., Minneapolis, for respondent. Linda J. Gallant, Minneapolis, Coalition for the Protection of Youth Rights, Amicus Curiae. Heard before SHERAN, C. J., PETERSON, and TODD, JJ., and considered and decided by the court en banc. SHERAN, Chief Justice. Petitioners appeal from dismissal of their petition for habeas corpus in the Fourth Judicial District. Petitioners sought habeas corpus claiming they were wrongfully being held in the Hennepin County Detention Center for contempt of court. The lower court reasoned that under Minn. Stat. §§ 260.301 and 588.01, subd. 3 (1978), the court has the power to find status offenders in constructive contempt of court for failing to comply with court orders and that In re Welfare of R.L.W., 309 Minn. 489, 245 N.W.2d 204 (1976) permits confinement in any center authorized by the Juvenile Court Act. Consequently, the lower court found that detention in the secure facility was appropriate and dismissed the petition. The issue raised by this case is whether, despite the language of Minn. Stat. § 260.173, subd. 3 (1978) stating that wayward children shall be placed in shelter care facilities only, status offenders can be held in secure detention centers after being found in constructive contempt of court for failing to comply with court orders. Although each petitioner's case presents a slightly different fact pattern, the parties stipulated to the following common factors. At separate times, the juveniles were each charged with being wayward and habitually disobedient within the meaning of Minn. Stat. § 260.015 (1978). Thereafter, they were each charged with constructive contempt of court under Minn. Stat. § 588.01, subd. 3(3) (1978) for violating a court order by running away from a shelter care facility[1] or failing to appear for a hearing. As a result of a finding of constructive contempt of court, each was incarcerated in the Hennepin County Juvenile Detention Center. The individual juveniles may no longer be held in a secure facility. Normally, this would render the case moot but, we find that the issue raised is "capable of repetition but evading review" and take jurisdiction. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 546, 96 S.Ct. 2791, 2797, 49 L.Ed.2d 683 (1976); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 110 n. 11, 95 S.Ct. 854, 861, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125, 93 S.Ct. 705, 712, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973). We make these observations notwithstanding the mootness which moves us to discharge the writ. Juvenile courts have the authority to find a juvenile in contempt of court and to impose appropriate sanctions. But, given the Legislature's expressed disapproval of the *707 practice of confining status offender juveniles in secure facilities, juvenile courts should not direct such confinement for contempt of court unless they first find specifically that there is no less restrictive alternative which could accomplish the court's purpose.[2]In re Welfare of R.L.W., 309 Minn. 489, 245 N.W.2d 204 (1976); see also U. S. v. Wilson, 421 U. S. 309, 319, 95 S.Ct. 1802, 1808, 44 L.Ed.2d 186 (1975). Minn. Stat. § 260.173, subd. 3 (1978) was amended by the Legislature in 1978 in Minn. Laws, ch. 637. The statute before the amendment stated that a child taken into custody by reason of being wayward or habitually disobedient who had previously escaped from a shelter care facility might be placed in a secure detention facility. Minn. Stat. § 260.173 (1976). As amended, Minn. Stat. § 260.173, subd. 3 (1978) states that a child taken into custody because of waywardness or habitual disobedience "may be placed only in a shelter care facility" even if she is conditionally released and has violated her field supervision. The language in the former statute authorizing the placement of these children in a secure detention facility was eliminated. The Hennepin County Juvenile Detention Center where these juveniles were incarcerated is a "secure detention facility" defined in Minn. Stat. § 260.015, subd. 16 (1978) as a "physically restricting detention facility, including a detention home." The amendment brought Minnesota into compliance with the funding requirements of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration of the United States Justice Department. The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 requires that each state seeking funds under the Act submit a plan to ensure that wayward or disobedient children "shall not be placed in juvenile detention or correctional facilities." 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(12) (1976). Minnesota, in adopting the federal policy of deinstitutionalization of status offenders, is moving in the direction adopted by the ABA Juvenile Justice Standards Project, Standards Relating to Noncriminal Misbehavior.[3] The ABA Standards, and their Commentary, conclude that runaway youth, truant youth, and otherwise "incorrigible" or "wayward" youth are best served outside the juvenile court system and outside juvenile detention facilities. As Amicus Coalition for the Protection of Youth Rights rightly points out, once children are defined as delinquent and placed with delinquent law-breakers, they may conform their behavior to that label, thus countermanding the entire process. E. Schur, Radical Non-Intervention: Rethinking the Delinquency Problem, 118-126 (1973). The Legislature may well have determined that removing status offenders from facilities designed for and used for law violators would result in better treatment, better programs, and better services for the child and that child's family. In addition, we interpret the amendment as reflecting the Legislature's concern with the effects of comingling disobedient or wayward children with juveniles who have allegedly committed more serious crimes. In light of the foregoing, we hold that only under the most egregious circumstances should the juvenile courts exercise their contempt power in such a manner that a status offender will be incarcerated in a secure facility. If such action is necessary, the record must show that all less restrictive *708 alternatives have failed in the past. (See State in Interest of M.S., 73 N.J. 238, 374 A.2d 445 [1977] for other alternatives.) In L.A.M. v. State, 547 P.2d 827, 831 (Alaska, 1976), the Alaska Supreme Court noted: Before a party may be held in criminal or civil contempt for failure to abide by a court order, certain elements must be established: (1) the existence of a valid order directing the alleged contemnor to do or refrain from doing something and the court's jurisdiction to enter that order; (2) the contemnor's notice of the order within sufficient time to comply with it; and in most cases, (3) the contemnor's ability to comply with the order; and (4) the contemnor's willful failure to comply with the order. In order for the juvenile court to find a "willful failure to comply" which warrants a holding of contempt, the record from the previous hearing must show that the child understood that disobedience would result in incarceration in a secure facility. A child too young to comprehend the warning cannot be found in contempt of court. With these limitations, the juvenile court can resort to the use of the secure facility if absolutely necessary. Finally, if it is necessary to rely on the use of a secure facility, the order must include instructions to the administrator of the institution that the disobedient child's contact with the more committed juvenile be kept to a minimum. Writ discharged. WAHL, Justice (concurring specially). I concur with the discharge of the habeas corpus writs as to these four young people because, they no longer being confined, their petitions are moot. However, I believe that even where the circumstances are "most egregious" (a showing the state did not make in these cases), the use of constructive contempt to incarcerate young people under these circumstances directly contravenes the plain meaning of the statute, as set out in the text of that statute in unambiguous words, as revealed in its legislative history, and as recognized in the majority opinion. Minn. Stat. § 260.173, subd. 3 (1978), as amended, specifically addresses the conduct which the lower court labeled "contempt of court." It provides:

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

Matter of Welfare of Solomon · 1980 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

In re the Welfare of A.S. · 2016 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

In Re the Welfare of the Child of S.S.W. · 2009 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

In Re the Welfare of D.D.B. · 1999 5 citations

+ 5 more citations in this opinion.

In Re the Welfare of A.L.F. · 1998 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

In re Welfare of R.W. · 1998 3 citations

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

In Re the Welfare of B.A.B. · 1998 10 citations

+ 10 more citations in this opinion.

State v. Rojas · 1997 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

In Re the Welfare of J.J.T. · 1997 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

In Re the Welfare of C.M.K. · 1996 5 citations

+ 5 more citations in this opinion.

In re the Welfare of W.L.H. · 1996 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

State v. Behl · 1996 4 citations

+ 4 more citations in this opinion.

In Re the Welfare of L.A.F. · 1996 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Matter of Welfare of SAC · 1995 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Matter of Dn · 1994 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

In re the Welfare of D.N. · 1994 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

In Re the Welfare of J.D.L. · 1994 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

In Re the Welfare of K.C. · 1994 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Weiler v. Lutz · 1993 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

In Re the Custody of A.K.H. · 1993 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

In re the Welfare of M.D.C. · 1993 3 citations

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

In Re the Welfare of T.P. · 1992 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

In Re the Welfare of J.A.S. · 1992 3 citations

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

In Re the Welfare of C.J. · 1992 4 citations

+ 4 more citations in this opinion.

Matter of Welfare of TK · 1991 8 citations

+ 8 more citations in this opinion.

In Re the Welfare of J.S. · 1991 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

In Re the Custody of M.A.L. · 1990 4 citations

+ 4 more citations in this opinion.

Woodin v. Rasmussen · 1990 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

In Re the Welfare of H.K. · 1990 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

In Re the Welfare of T.L.L. · 1990 6 citations

ANALYSIS Hennepin County's primary claim is that the court lacked jurisdiction to enter its dispositional order because T.L.L. is not in need of protection or services as a matter of law. Under Minn. Stat. § 260.241 (1988), the court's jurisdiction in response to a termination petition is limited: it may either find grounds for termination or dismiss the petition. Pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 260.235 (1988), the court has alternative subject matter jurisdiction to make a disposition under Minn. Stat. § 260.191 (1988). This jurisdiction requires a finding that the child is in need of protection or services. See Minn. Stat. § 260.015, subd. 2a (1988) (defining child in need of protection or services). Pursuant to the stipulation, the court proceeded on the theory that T.L.L. is in need of protection or services. In the August order, which considered the county's objection to its financial obligation and which incorporated the March order, the court included this finding: This Court found then, and again finds, that [T.L.L.] is in need of protection and services pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 260.015, subd. 2a(3). This reference to a prior finding evidently refers to the court's theory of the case, *357 because the March order contains no such finding. Rather, the March order simply stayed the termination of the father's parental rights upon the condition he complete the plan. The finding that T.L.L. is in need of protection or services is unsupported by more particular trial court findings. Section 260.015, subd. 2a(3), cited by the court, provides that a child is in need of protection or services when the child is without necessary food, clothing, shelter, education, or other required care for the child's physical or mental health or morals because the child's parent, guardian, or custodian is unable or unwilling to provide that care * * *. Minn. Stat. § 260.015, subd. 2a(3). The only fact cited to support the determination of need for protection or services is suggested in the court's statement that It is possible — and indeed likely — that upon his release from prison the father would seek visitation with his daughter. The child's emotional health and best interests are served by counselling being provided to all parties who comprise the parent-child relationship in this case * * *. The record does not show that such a visit will occur or that it should occur. The father did not testify, and the record demonstrates the mother's desire to avoid such a visit. No evidence supports the determination that the child possesses needs related to the prospect of a future visit by the father. The record does not indicate that any professional evaluated or even saw T.L.L., and no such testimony was presented. The record shows that the mother is adequately meeting all the child's identified needs. Accordingly, no evidence supports the court's determination that T.L.L. is without required care such that the child is in need of protection or services. In Re Welfare of A.S., 375 N.W.2d 596 (Minn.Ct. App.1985) (record that custodial parent is meeting all significant needs of child). The county also questions the court's personal jurisdiction over the county agency and contends the court committed additional errors in determining the disposition and the county's liability for the treatment costs. In light of our determination that the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to enter this order, we need not consider these additional issues.

ANALYSIS Hennepin County's primary claim is that the court lacked jurisdiction to enter its dispositional order because T.L.L. is not in need of protection or services as a matter of law. Under Minn. Stat. § 260.241 (1988), the court's jurisdiction in response to a termination petition is limited: it may either find grounds for termination or dismiss the petition. Pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 260.235 (1988), the court has alternative subject matter jurisdiction to make a disposition under Minn. Stat. § 260.191 (1988). This jurisdiction requires a finding that the child is in need of protection or services. See Minn. Stat. § 260.015, subd. 2a (1988) (defining child in need of protection or services). Pursuant to the stipulation, the court proceeded on the theory that T.L.L. is in need of protection or services. In the August order, which considered the county's objection to its financial obligation and which incorporated the March order, the court included this finding: This Court found then, and again finds, that [T.L.L.] is in need of protection and services pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 260.015, subd. 2a(3). This reference to a prior finding evidently refers to the court's theory of the case, *357 because the March order contains no such finding. Rather, the March order simply stayed the termination of the father's parental rights upon the condition he complete the plan. The finding that T.L.L. is in need of protection or services is unsupported by more particular trial court findings. Section 260.015, subd. 2a(3), cited by the court, provides that a child is in need of protection or services when the child is without necessary food, clothing, shelter, education, or other required care for the child's physical or mental health or morals because the child's parent, guardian, or custodian is unable or unwilling to provide that care * * *. Minn. Stat. § 260.015, subd. 2a(3). The only fact cited to support the determination of need for protection or services is suggested in the court's statement that It is possible — and indeed likely — that upon his release from prison the father would seek visitation with his daughter. The child's emotional health and best interests are served by counselling being provided to all parties who comprise the parent-child relationship in this case * * *. The record does not show that such a visit will occur or that it should occur. The father did not testify, and the record demonstrates the mother's desire to avoid such a visit. No evidence supports the determination that the child possesses needs related to the prospect of a future visit by the father. The record does not indicate that any professional evaluated or even saw T.L.L., and no such testimony was presented. The record shows that the mother is adequately meeting all the child's identified needs. Accordingly, no evidence supports the court's determination that T.L.L. is without required care such that the child is in need of protection or services. In Re Welfare of A.S., 375 N.W.2d 596 (Minn.Ct. App.1985) (record that custodial parent is meeting all significant needs of child). The county also questions the court's personal jurisdiction over the county agency and contends the court committed additional errors in determining the disposition and the county's liability for the treatment costs. In light of our determination that the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to enter this order, we need not consider these additional issues.

ANALYSIS Hennepin County's primary claim is that the court lacked jurisdiction to enter its dispositional order because T.L.L. is not in need of protection or services as a matter of law. Under Minn. Stat. § 260.241 (1988), the court's jurisdiction in response to a termination petition is limited: it may either find grounds for termination or dismiss the petition. Pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 260.235 (1988), the court has alternative subject matter jurisdiction to make a disposition under Minn. Stat. § 260.191 (1988). This jurisdiction requires a finding that the child is in need of protection or services. See Minn. Stat. § 260.015, subd. 2a (1988) (defining child in need of protection or services). Pursuant to the stipulation, the court proceeded on the theory that T.L.L. is in need of protection or services. In the August order, which considered the county's objection to its financial obligation and which incorporated the March order, the court included this finding: This Court found then, and again finds, that [T.L.L.] is in need of protection and services pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 260.015, subd. 2a(3). This reference to a prior finding evidently refers to the court's theory of the case, *357 because the March order contains no such finding. Rather, the March order simply stayed the termination of the father's parental rights upon the condition he complete the plan. The finding that T.L.L. is in need of protection or services is unsupported by more particular trial court findings. Section 260.015, subd. 2a(3), cited by the court, provides that a child is in need of protection or services when the child is without necessary food, clothing, shelter, education, or other required care for the child's physical or mental health or morals because the child's parent, guardian, or custodian is unable or unwilling to provide that care * * *. Minn. Stat. § 260.015, subd. 2a(3). The only fact cited to support the determination of need for protection or services is suggested in the court's statement that It is possible — and indeed likely — that upon his release from prison the father would seek visitation with his daughter. The child's emotional health and best interests are served by counselling being provided to all parties who comprise the parent-child relationship in this case * * *. The record does not show that such a visit will occur or that it should occur. The father did not testify, and the record demonstrates the mother's desire to avoid such a visit. No evidence supports the determination that the child possesses needs related to the prospect of a future visit by the father. The record does not indicate that any professional evaluated or even saw T.L.L., and no such testimony was presented. The record shows that the mother is adequately meeting all the child's identified needs. Accordingly, no evidence supports the court's determination that T.L.L. is without required care such that the child is in need of protection or services. In Re Welfare of A.S., 375 N.W.2d 596 (Minn.Ct. App.1985) (record that custodial parent is meeting all significant needs of child). The county also questions the court's personal jurisdiction over the county agency and contends the court committed additional errors in determining the disposition and the county's liability for the treatment costs. In light of our determination that the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to enter this order, we need not consider these additional issues.

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

In Re the Welfare of B.K.J. · 1990 5 citations

+ 5 more citations in this opinion.

Matter of Welfare of J.L.U. · 1990 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

In Re the Welfare of D.M.D. · 1989 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Matter of Welfare of Sn · 1988 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

In Re the Welfare of J.A. · 1988 4 citations

J.A. was determined to be a dependent child as defined in Minn. Stat. § 260.015 subd. 6(d). Appellant D.A., J.A.’s mother, moved for amended findings or, in the alternative, a new trial. The trial court denied appellant’s motion. We affirm.

J.A. was determined to be a dependent child as defined in Minn. Stat. § 260.015 subd. 6(d). Appellant D.A., J.A.’s mother, moved for amended findings or, in the alternative, a new trial. The trial court denied appellant’s motion. We affirm.

J.A. was determined to be a dependent child as defined in Minn. Stat. § 260.015 subd. 6(d). Appellant D.A., J.A.’s mother, moved for amended findings or, in the alternative, a new trial. The trial court denied appellant’s motion. We affirm.

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

In Re the Welfare of T.J.M. · 1987 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

In Re the Welfare of V.H. · 1987 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

In Re the Welfare of M.A. · 1987 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

In Re Welfare of M.J.L. · 1987 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

In Re the Welfare of M.G. · 1987 4 citations

+ 4 more citations in this opinion.

In Re the Welfare of N.W. · 1987 4 citations

+ 4 more citations in this opinion.

In Re the Welfare of S.N.T.R. · 1987 4 citations

+ 4 more citations in this opinion.

In re the Welfare of M.E.W. · 1987 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

In re the Welfare of J.K.M. · 1986 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

In Re the Welfare of B.L.W. · 1986 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

In Re the Welfare of G.C. · 1986 3 citations

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

In Re the Welfare of B.B.B. · 1986 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

In Re the Welfare of S.A.V. · 1986 10 citations

+ 10 more citations in this opinion.

In Re the Welfare of S.G. · 1986 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Matter of Welfare of LZ · 1986 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

In re the Welfare of C.B. · 1986 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

In Re the Welfare of J.A. · 1985 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Matter of Welfare of JMG · 1985 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

In re the Welfare of A.S. · 1985 3 citations

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

In Re the Welfare of R.A. · 1985 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

In Re the Welfare of J.J.B. · 1985 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

In re the Welfare of A.C. · 1985 5 citations [Dissent]

+ 5 more citations in this opinion.

In Re the Welfare of C.A.N. · 1985 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Matter of Welfare of Clough · 1985 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

In Re the Welfare of S.J. · 1985 3 citations

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

Marriage of Murray v. Murray · 1985 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

In Re the Welfare of L.J.C. · 1985 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

In Re the Welfare of R.T. · 1985 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

In Re the Welfare of P.J.K. · 1985 3 citations

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

In re the Welfare of J.M.G. · 1985 3 citations

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

In Re the Welfare of A.K.K. · 1984 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

In Re the Welfare of V.R. · 1984 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

In re the Welfare of G.S. · 1984 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

In Re the Welfare of M.M.B. · 1984 4 citations

+ 4 more citations in this opinion.

Matter of Welfare of C. Children · 1984 3 citations

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.