Minn. Stat. § 297A.01

LumiData, Inc., Relator v. Commissioner of Revenue · 2014 1 citation

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Custom Ag Service of Montevideo, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue · 2007 7 citations

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Sprint Spectrum LP v. Commissioner of Revenue · 2004 64 citations

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Great Lakes Gas Transmission L.P. v. Commissioner · 2002 1 citation

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A&H VENDING CO. v. Commissioner of Revenue · 2000 9 citations

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Minnesota Twins Partnership v. Commissioner of Revenue · 1998 7 citations

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Larson v. Commissioner of Revenue · 1998 4 citations

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US SPRINT COMM. v. Commissioner of Rev. · 1998 6 citations

OPINION PAGE, Justice. By Notice of Determination on Appeal dated March 8, 1996, the Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue (Commissioner) assessed an additional sales tax, with interest, and a penalty against respondent, U.S. Sprint Communications Company, Ltd. (Sprint) for the period July 31, 1990, through December 31, 1993. In the Notice, the Commissioner concluded that Sprint improperly excluded the federal excise tax on long-distance telephone service from the base amount for calculating the Minnesota state sales tax on its sales of long-distance telephone service. Sprint appealed to the Minnesota Tax Court which determined that the federal excise tax is not part of the gross receipts Sprint receives from its sales of long-distance service or part of the sales price customers pay for long-distance telephone service. Therefore, the tax court reversed the Commissioner's determination and held that the federal excise tax is not includable in the base amount for calculating the Minnesota sales tax. Because we hold that the federal excise tax is not part of the consideration paid by the customer for long-distance telephone service, we affirm. Sprint is a limited partnership that provides long-distance telephone service to customers throughout the United States. Federal law imposes a 3 percent excise tax on amounts paid for communications services, *753 including long-distance telephone service.[1] Sprint collects the federal excise tax from its customers and holds the proceeds in trust for the benefit of the federal government until remitting them to the Internal Revenue Service. The State of Minnesota imposes a 6.5 percent sales tax on gross receipts from retail sales of long-distance telephone service.[2] As with the federal excise tax, Sprint collects the state sales tax from its customers and remits the proceeds to the Commissioner of Revenue. In 1994, the Department of Revenue audited Sprint's sales tax remissions for the period July 31, 1990, through December 31, 1993. The audit revealed that Sprint did not include the amount of the federal excise tax it collected from long-distance telephone service customers during that period in the base amount for calculating the Minnesota sales tax. As a result, the Commissioner issued Sprint a notice of change in its sales tax. In the notice, the Commissioner asserted that the federal excise tax should have been included in the base amount for calculating the Minnesota sales tax. After rejecting Sprint's protest, the Commissioner issued the Notice of Determination on Appeal, assessing Sprint an additional tax of $482,796.04, interest in the amount of $130,376.26, and a penalty pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 289A.60, subd. 5 (1996), in the amount of $33,693.03. The Commissioner contends that the federal excise tax is part of the sales price for Sprint's long-distance telephone service and therefore must be included in the base amount for calculating the Minnesota sales tax on that long-distance telephone service. Whether the federal excise tax is includable in the base amount for calculating Minnesota's sales tax is a question of statutory construction which we review de novo.[3] Minnesota Statutes section 297A.02 (1996) imposes a 6.5 percent sales tax on the gross receipts from sales at retail made within the state. A "sale at retail" includes furnishing long-distance telephone service for consideration.[4] "Gross receipts" consist of "the total amount received, in money or otherwise, for all sales at retail as measured by the sales price."[5] Therefore, the federal excise tax is only includable in the base amount for calculating the sales tax on long-distance telephone service if it is part of the "sales price" for that service. Minnesota Statutes section 297A.01, subdivision 8 (1996), defines "sales price," as "the total consideration valued in money, for a retail sale whether paid in money or otherwise."[6] Subdivision 8 does not specifically include or exclude federal excise taxes in the "sales price." However, before 1987, Minn. Stat. § 297A.01, subd. 8, explicitly excluded all federal excise taxes from the sales price for calculating Minnesota's sales tax. In 1987, the legislature removed from subdivision 8 the language excluding federal excise taxes.[7] In doing so, the legislature did not indicate which, if any, *754 federal excise taxes were to be included in the sales price for calculating the Minnesota sales tax. The Commissioner asserts that, due to the removal of the language excluding federal excise taxes from the statute, the federal excise tax at issue here is part of Sprint's sales price for its long-distance services. The flaw in the Commissioner's argument, however, is that the language of subdivision 8, as it exists today, is clear and unambiguous; therefore, in construing subdivision 8, this court will not look beyond its plain meaning.[8] If, in 1987, the legislature sought to include the federal excise tax on long-distance telephone service as part of the sales price, the language it used in the statute does not accomplish that task. It is not our role to complete what the legislature began, but left unfinished.[9] Subdivision 8 defines "sales price" as the total consideration for a retail sale, and then it expressly lists certain deductions and inclusions.[10] While discerning what constitutes "consideration" may involve some analysis, the term "consideration" is neither unclear nor ambiguous. On the contrary, it is a legal term of art that has been applied by this court for over a hundred years.[11] Looking to legislative history to infer something that is not plainly there is neither necessary nor proper.[12] Thus, if the federal excise tax does not constitute consideration paid for long-distance telephone service, it is not includable in the base amount for calculating Minnesota's sales tax. Consideration requires that one party to a transaction voluntarily assume an obligation on the condition of an act or forbearance by the other party.[13] However, a thing is not consideration unless both parties to a contract have adopted it as such.[14] Here, customers agree to pay a certain price to Sprint on the condition that Sprint provides them with long-distance telephone service. Likewise, Sprint agrees to furnish long-distance telephone service in exchange for a set price from its customers. Above and beyond the price agreed to between Sprint and its customers, the federal government, independent of either Sprint or the customers, imposes a 3 percent excise tax. Unlike the proceeds Sprint receives from the sales price, the amounts that Sprint collects from its customers in federal excise taxes do not constitute part of Sprint's revenue and gross income and do not constitute consideration paid for long-distance telephone service.[15] Sprint merely collects the federal excise tax and holds it in trust for the federal government until remitted to the Internal Revenue Service. Sprint does not derive any benefit from collecting the federal excise tax. This is not a case where the legal incidence of the federal excise tax falls on Sprint as a producer or seller of the service[16] and thus becomes part of Sprint's cost of doing business included in its sales price. In short, the federal excise tax on long-distance telephone service is not something of value given in return for the service; therefore, it is not part of the consideration customers pay for that service. In conclusion, we hold that the federal excise tax on long-distance telephone service, *755 does not constitute consideration that customers pay for long-distance telephone service and is therefore not part of the sales price for that service and is not includable in the base amount for calculating Minnesota's sales tax. Having determined that the federal excise tax is not part of the sales price for long-distance telephone service and not includable in the base amount for calculating Minnesota's sales tax, we do not reach either the constitutional arguments raised by Sprint or the propriety of the penalty imposed by the Commissioner. Affirmed. BLATZ, C.J., and GILBERT, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. NOTES [1] 26 U.S.C. §§ 4251(a), 4291 (1989). [2] Minn. Stat. § 297A.02, subd. 1 (1996); Minn. Stat. § 297A.01, subds. 3(f) and 4 (1996). [3] See Homart Dev. Co. v. County of Hennepin, 538 N.W.2d 907, 910-11 (Minn.1995). [4] See Minn. Stat. § 297A.01, subds. 3(f) and 4 (1996). [5] Minn. Stat. § 297A.01, subd. 9 (1996). [6] Minn. Stat. § 297A.01, subd. 8 (1996), provides:

OPINION PAGE, Justice. By Notice of Determination on Appeal dated March 8, 1996, the Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue (Commissioner) assessed an additional sales tax, with interest, and a penalty against respondent, U.S. Sprint Communications Company, Ltd. (Sprint) for the period July 31, 1990, through December 31, 1993. In the Notice, the Commissioner concluded that Sprint improperly excluded the federal excise tax on long-distance telephone service from the base amount for calculating the Minnesota state sales tax on its sales of long-distance telephone service. Sprint appealed to the Minnesota Tax Court which determined that the federal excise tax is not part of the gross receipts Sprint receives from its sales of long-distance service or part of the sales price customers pay for long-distance telephone service. Therefore, the tax court reversed the Commissioner's determination and held that the federal excise tax is not includable in the base amount for calculating the Minnesota sales tax. Because we hold that the federal excise tax is not part of the consideration paid by the customer for long-distance telephone service, we affirm. Sprint is a limited partnership that provides long-distance telephone service to customers throughout the United States. Federal law imposes a 3 percent excise tax on amounts paid for communications services, *753 including long-distance telephone service.[1] Sprint collects the federal excise tax from its customers and holds the proceeds in trust for the benefit of the federal government until remitting them to the Internal Revenue Service. The State of Minnesota imposes a 6.5 percent sales tax on gross receipts from retail sales of long-distance telephone service.[2] As with the federal excise tax, Sprint collects the state sales tax from its customers and remits the proceeds to the Commissioner of Revenue. In 1994, the Department of Revenue audited Sprint's sales tax remissions for the period July 31, 1990, through December 31, 1993. The audit revealed that Sprint did not include the amount of the federal excise tax it collected from long-distance telephone service customers during that period in the base amount for calculating the Minnesota sales tax. As a result, the Commissioner issued Sprint a notice of change in its sales tax. In the notice, the Commissioner asserted that the federal excise tax should have been included in the base amount for calculating the Minnesota sales tax. After rejecting Sprint's protest, the Commissioner issued the Notice of Determination on Appeal, assessing Sprint an additional tax of $482,796.04, interest in the amount of $130,376.26, and a penalty pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 289A.60, subd. 5 (1996), in the amount of $33,693.03. The Commissioner contends that the federal excise tax is part of the sales price for Sprint's long-distance telephone service and therefore must be included in the base amount for calculating the Minnesota sales tax on that long-distance telephone service. Whether the federal excise tax is includable in the base amount for calculating Minnesota's sales tax is a question of statutory construction which we review de novo.[3] Minnesota Statutes section 297A.02 (1996) imposes a 6.5 percent sales tax on the gross receipts from sales at retail made within the state. A "sale at retail" includes furnishing long-distance telephone service for consideration.[4] "Gross receipts" consist of "the total amount received, in money or otherwise, for all sales at retail as measured by the sales price."[5] Therefore, the federal excise tax is only includable in the base amount for calculating the sales tax on long-distance telephone service if it is part of the "sales price" for that service. Minnesota Statutes section 297A.01, subdivision 8 (1996), defines "sales price," as "the total consideration valued in money, for a retail sale whether paid in money or otherwise."[6] Subdivision 8 does not specifically include or exclude federal excise taxes in the "sales price." However, before 1987, Minn. Stat. § 297A.01, subd. 8, explicitly excluded all federal excise taxes from the sales price for calculating Minnesota's sales tax. In 1987, the legislature removed from subdivision 8 the language excluding federal excise taxes.[7] In doing so, the legislature did not indicate which, if any, *754 federal excise taxes were to be included in the sales price for calculating the Minnesota sales tax. The Commissioner asserts that, due to the removal of the language excluding federal excise taxes from the statute, the federal excise tax at issue here is part of Sprint's sales price for its long-distance services. The flaw in the Commissioner's argument, however, is that the language of subdivision 8, as it exists today, is clear and unambiguous; therefore, in construing subdivision 8, this court will not look beyond its plain meaning.[8] If, in 1987, the legislature sought to include the federal excise tax on long-distance telephone service as part of the sales price, the language it used in the statute does not accomplish that task. It is not our role to complete what the legislature began, but left unfinished.[9] Subdivision 8 defines "sales price" as the total consideration for a retail sale, and then it expressly lists certain deductions and inclusions.[10] While discerning what constitutes "consideration" may involve some analysis, the term "consideration" is neither unclear nor ambiguous. On the contrary, it is a legal term of art that has been applied by this court for over a hundred years.[11] Looking to legislative history to infer something that is not plainly there is neither necessary nor proper.[12] Thus, if the federal excise tax does not constitute consideration paid for long-distance telephone service, it is not includable in the base amount for calculating Minnesota's sales tax. Consideration requires that one party to a transaction voluntarily assume an obligation on the condition of an act or forbearance by the other party.[13] However, a thing is not consideration unless both parties to a contract have adopted it as such.[14] Here, customers agree to pay a certain price to Sprint on the condition that Sprint provides them with long-distance telephone service. Likewise, Sprint agrees to furnish long-distance telephone service in exchange for a set price from its customers. Above and beyond the price agreed to between Sprint and its customers, the federal government, independent of either Sprint or the customers, imposes a 3 percent excise tax. Unlike the proceeds Sprint receives from the sales price, the amounts that Sprint collects from its customers in federal excise taxes do not constitute part of Sprint's revenue and gross income and do not constitute consideration paid for long-distance telephone service.[15] Sprint merely collects the federal excise tax and holds it in trust for the federal government until remitted to the Internal Revenue Service. Sprint does not derive any benefit from collecting the federal excise tax. This is not a case where the legal incidence of the federal excise tax falls on Sprint as a producer or seller of the service[16] and thus becomes part of Sprint's cost of doing business included in its sales price. In short, the federal excise tax on long-distance telephone service is not something of value given in return for the service; therefore, it is not part of the consideration customers pay for that service. In conclusion, we hold that the federal excise tax on long-distance telephone service, *755 does not constitute consideration that customers pay for long-distance telephone service and is therefore not part of the sales price for that service and is not includable in the base amount for calculating Minnesota's sales tax. Having determined that the federal excise tax is not part of the sales price for long-distance telephone service and not includable in the base amount for calculating Minnesota's sales tax, we do not reach either the constitutional arguments raised by Sprint or the propriety of the penalty imposed by the Commissioner. Affirmed. BLATZ, C.J., and GILBERT, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. NOTES [1] 26 U.S.C. §§ 4251(a), 4291 (1989). [2] Minn. Stat. § 297A.02, subd. 1 (1996); Minn. Stat. § 297A.01, subds. 3(f) and 4 (1996). [3] See Homart Dev. Co. v. County of Hennepin, 538 N.W.2d 907, 910-11 (Minn.1995). [4] See Minn. Stat. § 297A.01, subds. 3(f) and 4 (1996). [5] Minn. Stat. § 297A.01, subd. 9 (1996). [6] Minn. Stat. § 297A.01, subd. 8 (1996), provides:

OPINION PAGE, Justice. By Notice of Determination on Appeal dated March 8, 1996, the Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue (Commissioner) assessed an additional sales tax, with interest, and a penalty against respondent, U.S. Sprint Communications Company, Ltd. (Sprint) for the period July 31, 1990, through December 31, 1993. In the Notice, the Commissioner concluded that Sprint improperly excluded the federal excise tax on long-distance telephone service from the base amount for calculating the Minnesota state sales tax on its sales of long-distance telephone service. Sprint appealed to the Minnesota Tax Court which determined that the federal excise tax is not part of the gross receipts Sprint receives from its sales of long-distance service or part of the sales price customers pay for long-distance telephone service. Therefore, the tax court reversed the Commissioner's determination and held that the federal excise tax is not includable in the base amount for calculating the Minnesota sales tax. Because we hold that the federal excise tax is not part of the consideration paid by the customer for long-distance telephone service, we affirm. Sprint is a limited partnership that provides long-distance telephone service to customers throughout the United States. Federal law imposes a 3 percent excise tax on amounts paid for communications services, *753 including long-distance telephone service.[1] Sprint collects the federal excise tax from its customers and holds the proceeds in trust for the benefit of the federal government until remitting them to the Internal Revenue Service. The State of Minnesota imposes a 6.5 percent sales tax on gross receipts from retail sales of long-distance telephone service.[2] As with the federal excise tax, Sprint collects the state sales tax from its customers and remits the proceeds to the Commissioner of Revenue. In 1994, the Department of Revenue audited Sprint's sales tax remissions for the period July 31, 1990, through December 31, 1993. The audit revealed that Sprint did not include the amount of the federal excise tax it collected from long-distance telephone service customers during that period in the base amount for calculating the Minnesota sales tax. As a result, the Commissioner issued Sprint a notice of change in its sales tax. In the notice, the Commissioner asserted that the federal excise tax should have been included in the base amount for calculating the Minnesota sales tax. After rejecting Sprint's protest, the Commissioner issued the Notice of Determination on Appeal, assessing Sprint an additional tax of $482,796.04, interest in the amount of $130,376.26, and a penalty pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 289A.60, subd. 5 (1996), in the amount of $33,693.03. The Commissioner contends that the federal excise tax is part of the sales price for Sprint's long-distance telephone service and therefore must be included in the base amount for calculating the Minnesota sales tax on that long-distance telephone service. Whether the federal excise tax is includable in the base amount for calculating Minnesota's sales tax is a question of statutory construction which we review de novo.[3] Minnesota Statutes section 297A.02 (1996) imposes a 6.5 percent sales tax on the gross receipts from sales at retail made within the state. A "sale at retail" includes furnishing long-distance telephone service for consideration.[4] "Gross receipts" consist of "the total amount received, in money or otherwise, for all sales at retail as measured by the sales price."[5] Therefore, the federal excise tax is only includable in the base amount for calculating the sales tax on long-distance telephone service if it is part of the "sales price" for that service. Minnesota Statutes section 297A.01, subdivision 8 (1996), defines "sales price," as "the total consideration valued in money, for a retail sale whether paid in money or otherwise."[6] Subdivision 8 does not specifically include or exclude federal excise taxes in the "sales price." However, before 1987, Minn. Stat. § 297A.01, subd. 8, explicitly excluded all federal excise taxes from the sales price for calculating Minnesota's sales tax. In 1987, the legislature removed from subdivision 8 the language excluding federal excise taxes.[7] In doing so, the legislature did not indicate which, if any, *754 federal excise taxes were to be included in the sales price for calculating the Minnesota sales tax. The Commissioner asserts that, due to the removal of the language excluding federal excise taxes from the statute, the federal excise tax at issue here is part of Sprint's sales price for its long-distance services. The flaw in the Commissioner's argument, however, is that the language of subdivision 8, as it exists today, is clear and unambiguous; therefore, in construing subdivision 8, this court will not look beyond its plain meaning.[8] If, in 1987, the legislature sought to include the federal excise tax on long-distance telephone service as part of the sales price, the language it used in the statute does not accomplish that task. It is not our role to complete what the legislature began, but left unfinished.[9] Subdivision 8 defines "sales price" as the total consideration for a retail sale, and then it expressly lists certain deductions and inclusions.[10] While discerning what constitutes "consideration" may involve some analysis, the term "consideration" is neither unclear nor ambiguous. On the contrary, it is a legal term of art that has been applied by this court for over a hundred years.[11] Looking to legislative history to infer something that is not plainly there is neither necessary nor proper.[12] Thus, if the federal excise tax does not constitute consideration paid for long-distance telephone service, it is not includable in the base amount for calculating Minnesota's sales tax. Consideration requires that one party to a transaction voluntarily assume an obligation on the condition of an act or forbearance by the other party.[13] However, a thing is not consideration unless both parties to a contract have adopted it as such.[14] Here, customers agree to pay a certain price to Sprint on the condition that Sprint provides them with long-distance telephone service. Likewise, Sprint agrees to furnish long-distance telephone service in exchange for a set price from its customers. Above and beyond the price agreed to between Sprint and its customers, the federal government, independent of either Sprint or the customers, imposes a 3 percent excise tax. Unlike the proceeds Sprint receives from the sales price, the amounts that Sprint collects from its customers in federal excise taxes do not constitute part of Sprint's revenue and gross income and do not constitute consideration paid for long-distance telephone service.[15] Sprint merely collects the federal excise tax and holds it in trust for the federal government until remitted to the Internal Revenue Service. Sprint does not derive any benefit from collecting the federal excise tax. This is not a case where the legal incidence of the federal excise tax falls on Sprint as a producer or seller of the service[16] and thus becomes part of Sprint's cost of doing business included in its sales price. In short, the federal excise tax on long-distance telephone service is not something of value given in return for the service; therefore, it is not part of the consideration customers pay for that service. In conclusion, we hold that the federal excise tax on long-distance telephone service, *755 does not constitute consideration that customers pay for long-distance telephone service and is therefore not part of the sales price for that service and is not includable in the base amount for calculating Minnesota's sales tax. Having determined that the federal excise tax is not part of the sales price for long-distance telephone service and not includable in the base amount for calculating Minnesota's sales tax, we do not reach either the constitutional arguments raised by Sprint or the propriety of the penalty imposed by the Commissioner. Affirmed. BLATZ, C.J., and GILBERT, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. NOTES [1] 26 U.S.C. §§ 4251(a), 4291 (1989). [2] Minn. Stat. § 297A.02, subd. 1 (1996); Minn. Stat. § 297A.01, subds. 3(f) and 4 (1996). [3] See Homart Dev. Co. v. County of Hennepin, 538 N.W.2d 907, 910-11 (Minn.1995). [4] See Minn. Stat. § 297A.01, subds. 3(f) and 4 (1996). [5] Minn. Stat. § 297A.01, subd. 9 (1996). [6] Minn. Stat. § 297A.01, subd. 8 (1996), provides:

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

U.S. Sprint Communications Co. v. Commissioner · 1998 6 citations

+ 6 more citations in this opinion.

Northern States Power Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue · 1997 7 citations

Northern States Power Company (“NSP”) and United Power Association (“UPA”) sepa *574 rately purchased step-down, load tap, and line transformers between June 1, 1990, and March 31, 1994, for use in their business operations. Each paid the Minnesota sales tax on the transformers they purchased and then each filed for refunds of those taxes, claiming that the transformers are exempt from the sales tax as capital equipment under Minn. Stat. § 297A.25, subd. 42 (1992). The Commissioner of Revenue denied their refund claims, finding that none of the transformers qualified as exempt capital equipment under the statute. Both NSP and UPA filed separate notices of appeal to the Minnesota Tax Court. In each case, the tax court denied NSP’s and UPA’s motions for summary judgment and granted summary judgment to the commissioner, finding that the transformers were not capital equipment as defined in either the 1992 or 1993 statutory definitions. See Minn. Stat. § 297A.01, subd. 16. We reverse.

Northern States Power Company (“NSP”) and United Power Association (“UPA”) sepa *574 rately purchased step-down, load tap, and line transformers between June 1, 1990, and March 31, 1994, for use in their business operations. Each paid the Minnesota sales tax on the transformers they purchased and then each filed for refunds of those taxes, claiming that the transformers are exempt from the sales tax as capital equipment under Minn. Stat. § 297A.25, subd. 42 (1992). The Commissioner of Revenue denied their refund claims, finding that none of the transformers qualified as exempt capital equipment under the statute. Both NSP and UPA filed separate notices of appeal to the Minnesota Tax Court. In each case, the tax court denied NSP’s and UPA’s motions for summary judgment and granted summary judgment to the commissioner, finding that the transformers were not capital equipment as defined in either the 1992 or 1993 statutory definitions. See Minn. Stat. § 297A.01, subd. 16. We reverse.

Northern States Power Company (“NSP”) and United Power Association (“UPA”) sepa *574 rately purchased step-down, load tap, and line transformers between June 1, 1990, and March 31, 1994, for use in their business operations. Each paid the Minnesota sales tax on the transformers they purchased and then each filed for refunds of those taxes, claiming that the transformers are exempt from the sales tax as capital equipment under Minn. Stat. § 297A.25, subd. 42 (1992). The Commissioner of Revenue denied their refund claims, finding that none of the transformers qualified as exempt capital equipment under the statute. Both NSP and UPA filed separate notices of appeal to the Minnesota Tax Court. In each case, the tax court denied NSP’s and UPA’s motions for summary judgment and granted summary judgment to the commissioner, finding that the transformers were not capital equipment as defined in either the 1992 or 1993 statutory definitions. See Minn. Stat. § 297A.01, subd. 16. We reverse.

+ 4 more citations in this opinion.

Zip Sort, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue · 1997 23 citations

+ 23 more citations in this opinion.

Weigel v. Commissioner of Revenue · 1997 3 citations

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

Krech v. Commissioner of Revenue · 1997 4 citations

+ 4 more citations in this opinion.

Questar Data Systems, Inc. v. Commissioner · 1996 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Dahlberg Hearing Systems, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue · 1996 8 citations

+ 8 more citations in this opinion.

Carlson v. Commissioner of Revenue · 1994 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

U.S. West Material Resources, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue · 1994 9 citations

+ 9 more citations in this opinion.

Classic Affairs, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue · 1993 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Northern States Power Co. v. Commissioner · 1993 8 citations

+ 8 more citations in this opinion.

Morton Buildings, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue · 1992 2 citations

The legislature has broadly defined “use” for the purposes of the use and sales tax statutes: “ ‘Use’ includes the exercise of any right or power over tangible personal property * * *.” Minn. Stat. § 297A.01, subd. 6 (1990). The definition of “tangible personal property” is:

The legislature has broadly defined “use” for the purposes of the use and sales tax statutes: “ ‘Use’ includes the exercise of any right or power over tangible personal property * * *.” Minn. Stat. § 297A.01, subd. 6 (1990). The definition of “tangible personal property” is:

Benoit v. Commissioner of Revenue · 1990 3 citations

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

Fridlund Securities Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue · 1988 4 citations

+ 4 more citations in this opinion.

Color-Ad Packaging, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue · 1988 12 citations

+ 12 more citations in this opinion.

Acton Construction Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue · 1986 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Sterling Custom Homes Corp. v. Commissioner of Revenue · 1986 3 citations

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

Northwest Territories Gold & Silver Exchange, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue · 1985 1 citation

The parties agree that gold and silver coins or bullion are tangible personal property to which the sales tax applies. Accord Scotchman’s Coin Shop v. Commission, 654 S.W.2d 873 (Mo.1983) (en banc); Thorne & Wilson, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 681 P.2d 1237 (Utah 1984). Ordinarily, gold and silver are not (unless, say, converted into jewelry) consumable items and would be expected at one time or another to be resold. The fact, however, that the purchaser of an item of tangible personal property may at one time or another resell the item does not necessarily mean the purchase is not a retail sale. A retail sale, as defined by Minn. Stat. § 297A.01, subd. 4 (1984), is a sale “for any purpose other than resale in the regular course of business.” (Emphasis added.) This means a sale is at retail unless the customer’s resales are of a kind and frequency characteristic of a regular course of a business. The resales must meet the “requirement of commercial continuity or consistency” implicit in the operation of a business. Rose v. Executive Director of Dept. of Revenue, 42 Colo.App. 319, 593 P.2d 982, 983 (1979). 4 A customer who buys coins to invest — to hold for a rise in the market — is not ordinarily considered a “retailer”; an investor’s resales lack the commercial continuity or consistency of a regular course of business. Here the tax court found that Northwest’s sales were at retail and that Northwest’s customers purchased for investment purposes. These *452 findings as to most, if not all, of the transactions are supported by the evidence.

Zimpro, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue · 1983 13 citations

+ 13 more citations in this opinion.

Bituminous Roadways, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue · 1982 3 citations

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

Zimpro, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue · 1981 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

C. G. Rein Co. v. Roemer · 1981 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Commissioner v. Applebaums' Food Markets, Inc. · 1980 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Emil Olson, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue · 1980 3 citations

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

Standard Packaging Corp. v. Commissioner · 1979 6 citations

+ 6 more citations in this opinion.

Wanzek Construction, Inc. v. Employers Insurance of Wausau · 2003 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Minnesota Automatic Merchandising Council v. Smith · 2003 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Hampton Bank v. River City Yachts, Inc. · 1995 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Retail Systems, Inc. v. CNA Insurance Companies · 1991 2 citations

The parties have discussed several property and sales tax cases that address the question whether recorded material is tangible property for tax purposes. A number of tax decisions support our conclusion that the computer tape is tangible property. See Hasbro Indus., Inc. v. Norberg, 487 A.2d 124, 128-29 (R.I.1985); Citizens & Southern Sys., Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Comm’n, 280 S.C. 138, 142, 311 S.E.2d 717, 719 (1984); Chittenden Trust Co. v. King, 143 Vt. 271, 274, 465 A.2d 1100, 1102 (1983). These decisions parallel Minnesota’s current sales tax statute on computer software. Minn. Stat. § 297A.01, subd. 11 (1990). We also observe, however, *738 that the majority of tax decisions find that computer tapes are intangible property for tax purposes. See District of Columbia v. Universal Computer Assocs., Inc., 465 F.2d 615, 617 (D.C.Cir.1972); State v. Central Computer Servs., Inc., 349 So.2d 1160, 1162-63 (Ala.1977); Honeywell Information Sys., Inc. v. Maricopa County, 118 Ariz. 171, 173, 575 P.2d 801, 803 (Ct.App. 1977); First Nat’l Bank v. Department of Revenue, 85 Ill.2d 84, 88, 51 Ill.Dec. 667, 670, 421 N.E.2d 175,178 (1981); Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538 S.W.2d 405, 407-08 (Tenn.1976); Janesville Data Center, Inc. v. Wisconsin Dep’t. of Revenue, 84 Wis.2d 341, 346-47, 267 N.W.2d 656, 658-59 (1978).

The parties have discussed several property and sales tax cases that address the question whether recorded material is tangible property for tax purposes. A number of tax decisions support our conclusion that the computer tape is tangible property. See Hasbro Indus., Inc. v. Norberg, 487 A.2d 124, 128-29 (R.I.1985); Citizens & Southern Sys., Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Comm’n, 280 S.C. 138, 142, 311 S.E.2d 717, 719 (1984); Chittenden Trust Co. v. King, 143 Vt. 271, 274, 465 A.2d 1100, 1102 (1983). These decisions parallel Minnesota’s current sales tax statute on computer software. Minn. Stat. § 297A.01, subd. 11 (1990). We also observe, however, *738 that the majority of tax decisions find that computer tapes are intangible property for tax purposes. See District of Columbia v. Universal Computer Assocs., Inc., 465 F.2d 615, 617 (D.C.Cir.1972); State v. Central Computer Servs., Inc., 349 So.2d 1160, 1162-63 (Ala.1977); Honeywell Information Sys., Inc. v. Maricopa County, 118 Ariz. 171, 173, 575 P.2d 801, 803 (Ct.App. 1977); First Nat’l Bank v. Department of Revenue, 85 Ill.2d 84, 88, 51 Ill.Dec. 667, 670, 421 N.E.2d 175,178 (1981); Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538 S.W.2d 405, 407-08 (Tenn.1976); Janesville Data Center, Inc. v. Wisconsin Dep’t. of Revenue, 84 Wis.2d 341, 346-47, 267 N.W.2d 656, 658-59 (1978).

State v. Continental Forms, Inc. · 1984 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Burlington Northern Railroad v. Triplett · 1988 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.