Minn. Stat. § 462.351

Minnesota Statutes

Source: 2025 Minnesota Statutes. For the official text, see revisor.mn.gov.

Citing Cases (28)

Minnesota Supreme Court

RDNT, LLC v. City of Bloomington · 2015 1 citation [Concurrence]

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

White v. City of Elk River · 2013 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

In Re Hubbard · 2010 1 citation

2. The fact that the DNR does not have express statutory authority to certify the City's decision does not end our analysis. The Commissioner also argues that the authority to approve the City's variance decision can be implied from the authority the legislature gave to the DNR. We are "reluctant to find implied statutory authority." In re N. States Power Co., 414 N.W.2d 383, 387 (Minn.1987). And, while we need not give an agency's express statutory authority "a cramped reading," any enlargement of powers by implication must be "fairly drawn and fairly evident from the agency's objectives and powers expressly given by the legislature." Peoples Natural Gas, 369 N.W.2d at 534. In order to determine whether an administrative agency has implied powers, we look to the "necessity and logic of the situation." Id. The question of implied authority therefore requires that we "look closely at the statutory scheme created by the legislature." Qwest, 702 N.W.2d at 261.[6] The Commissioner argues that we may imply authority to certify the City's variance decision from both the MRA and the MLSCA. The stated purpose of the MRA is to "preserve and protect" certain designated Minnesota rivers, and their adjacent lands that possess "outstanding scenic, recreational, natural, historical, scientific and similar values." Minn. Stat. § 103F.305. To effectuate that purpose the legislature conferred powers on the DNR. As noted above, those express powers include the power to classify and designate rivers for protection, Minn. Stat. § 103F.325; the power to set minimum guidelines and standards for local zoning ordinances, by which *322 counties and municipalities that abut designated rivers must abide, Minn. Stat. § 103F.321; the power to impose ordinances on counties and municipalities if they fail to adopt their own ordinances in compliance with the DNR minimum guidelines and standards, Minn. Stat. § 103F.335; the power to "adopt rules to manage and administer" the state wild and scenic rivers system, Minn. Stat. § 103F.321; and the power to aid counties and municipalities with passing and enforcing ordinances that comply with the DNR minimum guidelines and standards, Minn. Stat. § 103F.335. Like the MRA, the MLSCA authorizes the DNR to set minimum guidelines and standards for local zoning ordinances, by which local government units abutting the lower St. Croix River must abide. See Minn. Stat. § 103F.351, subd. 4. The MLSCA also grants the DNR authority to "administer" the lower St. Croix River in conjunction with Wisconsin and federal officials. See Minn. Stat. § 103F.351, subd. 5. The Commissioner argues that an implied power to certify the City's variance decision is fairly drawn and fairly evident from the purposes of the MRA and the MLSCA, and the DNR's express powers in these statutes, looking to the logic and necessity of the situation. Specifically, the Commissioner argues that the authority to certify is fairly implied from the DNR's broad rulemaking authority in both statutes. The Commissioner relies on Welsand v. Railroad and Warehouse Commission of Minnesota, 251 Minn. 504, 88 N.W.2d 834 (1958), to support this rulemaking argument. In Welsand, the agency had adopted a rule that required applicants for contract carrier permits to identify their customers, and if the agency found that there were more than 10 customers, the agency required an applicant to show that it was not a common carrier. Id. at 506-07, 88 N.W.2d at 836-37. When the agency found that the appellant was in violation of this rule, the agency cancelled the appellant's permit. Id. at 506, 88 N.W.2d at 836. On appeal, the appellant argued that the agency had no authority to promulgate the rule. Id. at 508-09, 88 N.W.2d at 837-38. The agency had "the power to adopt rules necessary for the regulation of contract carriers," but the legislature did not specifically define "contract carriers" other than to provide generally that a "contract carrier" is "`any person engaged in the business of transporting property for hire over the public highways of this state, other than as a common carrier.'" Id. at 509, 88 N.W.2d at 838 (quoting Minn. Stat. § 221.02, subd. 14 (1949)). The agency also had the "power . . . to make such rules and regulations . . . as may be necessary to the enforcement" of the relevant statutes. Id. at 508, 88 N.W.2d at 838 (citation omitted). Within the agency's broad grant of rulemaking and enforcement authority, we implied the authority for the agency to "adopt whatever definitions were reasonably necessary within the area of authorized regulation." Id. at 509, 88 N.W.2d at 838. Welsand does not support the implication of authority in this case. First, unlike the agency in Welsand, the DNR does not have broad express authority to enforce the relevant statutes. Rather, the legislature has given the DNR the express authority to "assist local governments in the. . . enforcement" of ordinances. Minn. Stat. § 103F.335, subd. 1(c). The DNR argues that authority to certify is implicit in this provision. But "assist" means to "give help or support to, especially as a subordinate or supplement." The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 112 (3d ed.1996). The imposition of a certification rule that operates to overturn local-government variance decisions *323 is at odds with the term "assist" in the statute, especially given that word's connotations of supplementation and subordination. The power to certify therefore is not fairly drawn from the power to assist. Second, unlike the agency in Welsand, the DNR here does not seek to define terms within the area of its designated responsibility. Rather, the DNR seeks to ratify a decision the legislature has delegated to another unit of government. The legislature has given to municipalities, subject to guidelines and restrictions, authority for zoning that encompasses the granting of variances. See Minn. Stat. § 462.351 and .357 (2008). In the MRA itself, the legislature specifically vested individual implementation and enforcement of the DNR standards in local governments. See Minn. Stat. § 103F.335, subd. 1(c) (noting that DNR is to "assist local governments in the . . . enforcement of [their] ordinances"). Construing the DNR's power to promulgate "rules to manage and administer the system" broadly enough to include the authority to certify actions taken by local governments does not give proper deference to the legislature's decision to give local governments the responsibility to enforce standards. Cf. Hirsch, 537 N.W.2d at 486-87 (concluding that an agency's promulgation of an exclusive list of reasons for departing from the rules was outside the agency's authority because the legislature placed responsibility for determining "necessity of treatment" not with the agency, but with workers compensation judges); Guerrero v. Wagner, 310 Minn. 351, 357, 246 N.W.2d 838, 841 (1976) ("The Commissioner cannot lawfully, by means of an internal departmental rule, circumvent the statute's grant of authority to the compensation judge"). And implying such review authority in the DNR "would introduce a new factor of considerable consequence into the regulatory equation." Peoples Natural Gas, 369 N.W.2d at 535. This type of variation should not come from this court, but from the legislature. After all, the legislature has given the express authority at issue herethe authority to certify local government variance decisionsto other statutory entities in other contexts. See Minn. Stat. § 103F.373 (2008) (expressly providing authority for the Mississippi Headwaters Board to certify variances granted by counties regulated under the Mississippi headwaters land use plan); Minn. Stat. § 103F.389 (2004) (repealed in part and amended 2005) (expressly providing authority for the Project Riverbend Board to certify variances granted by counties regulated under the Project Riverbend comprehensive plan).[7] The legislature declined to give such express authority to the DNR in any of the statutory sections at issue here even though the legislature knows how to grant such authority if it desires. The inclusion of express authority for certification in these other statutes, combined with the fact that the legislature has never amended the statutory provisions relating *324 to the DNR to expressly include authorization for a certification rule, provides important evidence that the legislature did not intend that the DNR have certification authority. Peoples Natural Gas, 369 N.W.2d at 534 (noting that implied authority inquiry "is whether the legislature intended, without saying so, to confer [the] power on the [agency]"). But the Commissioner argues the MLSCA and the MRA must include an implied power for the DNR to approve local government variance decisions. Without such power, the Commissioner asserts that local governments granting unjustified variances with no oversight could in essence undo the guidelines and standards that the DNR sets for river protection, which are supposed to apply uniformly and on a statewide basis. Accordingly, the Commissioner essentially argues that "the necessity and logic of the situation" require that we find implied power for the DNR to certify the City's variance decision. Peoples Natural Gas, 369 N.W.2d at 534.[8] We addressed a similar situation in Qwest, and faced with a broader express grant of authority than here, concluded that an agency's express authority to promulgate rules and standards did not necessarily grant it implied authority to enforce those standards as it wanted. 702 N.W.2d at 261. The agency in that case had the express authority to set standards for the quality of wholesale services, and it argued that the remedy at issue was "necessary to enforce the standards." Id. at 257. We disagreed, and said that "if nothing more than a broad grant of authority were needed to show that implied authority could be fairly drawn from the statutory scheme, the implied authority would be present in all cases in which the agency had a broad grant of authority." Id. at 261. We had rejected such a sweeping rule before and we did so again in Qwest. Id.; see also Peoples Natural Gas, 369 N.W.2d at 535 (noting that implied authority does not exist merely because "the power to order refunds would be useful to the Commission as an enforcement measure"). Finally, our decision in In re Minnegasco, 565 N.W.2d 706 (Minn.1997), does not support the Commissioner's argument that we should imply authority for the DNR to certify local government variance decisions. In Minnegasco, we held that the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) had implied authority to order recoupment to *325 remedy what we had concluded in an earlier case was the PUC's "exceeding its statutory authority in setting natural gas rates." Id. at 708 (citing Minnegasco v. Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 549 N.W.2d 904, 909-10 (Minn.1996)). We reached this result because we found that the PUC's statutory authority was ambiguous on the question of recoupment, and it would be inequitable to deny a remedy to Minnegasco after it successfully challenged the agency's ratemaking. Id. at 712-13. Unlike in Minnegasco, we are not presented in this case with a situation where an agency's decision has injured a party and that party would be left without a remedy in the absence of implied agency authority to provide a remedy. We also do not have an ambiguous statutory grant of authority that requires our interpretation. See Qwest, 702 N.W.2d at 261-62 (distinguishing Minnegasco). In sum, we conclude that the authority to certify the City's variance decision is not "fairly drawn and fairly evident" from the authority the legislature expressly gave to the DNR in either the MRA or the MLSCA. See Peoples Natural Gas, 369 N.W.2d at 534. We therefore hold that the DNR does not have implied authority to certify the City's decision.[9] Because the MRA and the MLSCA do not expressly or impliedly authorize the DNR's certification of the City's decision, the DNR did not have the authority to refuse to approve the variance the City granted to Hubbard, and its nonapproval is void. Our resolution of the authority issue makes it unnecessary for us to reach the other issues the parties raise. Affirmed. MAGNUSON, C.J., and PAGE, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. NOTES [1] We use the term "certify" in this opinion to refer to the DNR's claimed powerdescribed in Minn. R. 6105.0540 (2009)to certify, or refuse to certify, certain local-government land-use decisions. [2] The other two requests related to the setback for the sideyard and height restrictions in the City's ordinances. The City granted these two requests and the DNR has not challenged these decisions. We therefore discuss only the bluffline-setback variance in this opinion. [3] Under this statute, the "[f]ailure of an agency to deny a request within 60 days is approval of the request." Minn. Stat. § 15.99, subd. 2(a) (2008). [4] The Commissioner seemingly contends that because the DNR has construed its statutory authority to include certification, we must defer to the agency's determination of authority. In support of this suggestion of deference, the Commissioner cites Geo. A. Hormel & Co. v. Asper, 428 N.W.2d 47, 50 (Minn. 1988), but in that case, we did not have to address the question of whether the legislature had given the agency the authority to take the action (decision on a claim for unemployment compensation benefits) at issue in the case. We have also stated that "[w]hen the agency's construction of its own regulation is at issue . . . considerable deference is given to the agency interpretation, especially when the relevant language is unclear or susceptible to different interpretations." St. Otto's Home v. Minn. Dep't of Human Servs., 437 N.W.2d 35, 40 (Minn. 1989) (citing Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16, 85 S.Ct. 792, 13 L.Ed.2d 616 (1965); Resident v. Noot, 305 N.W.2d 311, 312 (Minn. 1981)). But in these cases, as in Geo. A. Hormel, the agency's underlying statutory authority to act was not at issue. In this case, by contrast, we are confronted with the threshold question of whether the legislature has granted an agency the authority to take the action at issue. The DNR's suggestion of deference is therefore misplaced. [5] The MLSCA, by its terms, applies to the lower St. Croix River and Hubbard's property, and therefore is relevant to the authority question presented here. Hubbard suggested in his brief that the MRA might not apply to the lower St. Croix, but at oral argument Hubbard confirmed that we did not need to reach this issue. We therefore assess the question of the DNR's authority using both the MLSCA and the MRA. [6] The Commissioner argues that Peoples Natural Gas and its progeny, including Qwest, do not apply to cases involving agency rule promulgation. But in Hirsch v. Bartley-Lindsay Co., we applied the Peoples Natural Gas test to determine an administrative agency's authority to promulgate a rule and held that the agency did not have either express or implied authority to promulgate the rule at issue. 537 N.W.2d at 485-87. [7] The Commissioner contends that the legislature's decision to grant certification authority to these boards should not inform us here because unlike these boards, the legislature has given the DNR rulemaking authority. The Commissioner also argues that because Minn. Stat. §§ 103F.373 and .389 granted authority to boards rather than administrative agencies, these statutes are inapposite. These distinctions are not material to the question of the agency's authority. Just like administrative agencies, the boards established in sections 103F.373 and .389 are "creature[s] of statute" having only those powers granted to them by the legislature. See Great N. Ry. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 284 Minn. 217, 220, 169 N.W.2d 732, 735 (1969). Powers granted by the legislature, whether to an agency or a board, are limited by the language of the enabling statutes. [8] In addition, the Commissioner argues that two cases, in particular, support his position: County of Pine v. State Dep't of Natural Res., 280 N.W.2d 625 (Minn. 1979), and Drum v. Minn. Bd. of Water & Soil Res., 574 N.W.2d 71 (Minn.App.1998). Neither case, however, supports the Commissioner's arguments.

In re the Denial of Certification of the Variance Granted to Hubbard · 2010 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Mendota Golf, LLP v. City of Mendota Heights · 2006 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Pergament v. Loring Properties, Ltd. · 1999 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Country Joe, Inc. v. City of Eagan · 1997 1 citation

The city of Eagan is a “statutory city,” meaning it is a municipal corporation that has not adopted a home rule charter as provided for under Minnesota law. See Minn. Stat. § 410.015. As a limited statutory creation, the city has no inherent powers beyond those “expressly conferred by statute or implied as necessary in aid of those powers which have been expressly conferred.” Mangold Midwest Co. v. Village of Richfield, 274 Minn. 347, 357, 143 N.W.2d 813, 820 (1966). We first consider the city’s contention that the road unit connection charge is a valid exercise of its implied municipal planning authority under Minn. Stat. eh. 462, the Municipal Planning Act. The policy statement introducing the act clearly expresses the legislature’s intent to confer broad planning authority on cities: “It is the purpose of sections 462.351 to 462.364 to provide municipalities, in a single body of law, with the necessary powers and a uniform procedure for adequately conducting and implementing municipal planning.” Minn. Stat. § 462.351. The city asserts that the road unit connection charge is merely an example of its lawful exercise of the broad planning authority conferred upon it under the act.

Swanson v. City of Bloomington · 1988 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Amcon Corp. v. City of Eagan · 1984 3 citations

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

Chanhassen Estates Residents Ass'n v. City of Chanhassen · 1984 2 citations

342 N.W.2d 335 (1984) CHANHASSEN ESTATES RESIDENTS ASSOCIATION, Michael E. Murphy, Thomas Katsonas, David Soenen, R.W. Lownsbury, R.W. Connell, Gary Arndt and Keith Boudrie, Respondents (C2-82-1039), Appellants (C9-82-1250), v. The CITY OF CHANHASSEN, Respondent, and McDonald's Corporation, intervenor, Appellant (C2-82-1039), Respondent (C9-82-1250). Nos. C2-82-1039, C9-82-1250. Supreme Court of Minnesota. January 13, 1984. *336 Cragg & Bailly, Ltd., Robert L. McCollum, Minneapolis, for respondents-appellants. *337 Larkin, Hoffman, Daly & Lindgren, James P. Larkin, Kathleen M. Oates, Minneapolis, for appellant-respondent. Larson & Mertz, Craig M. Mertz, Minneapolis, for respondent City of Chanhassen. Considered and decided by the court en banc without oral argument. COYNE, Justice. Chanhassen Estates Residents Association (CERA) sued to enjoin the issuance to McDonald's Corporation of the building permit which the Chanhassen city council had authorized on May 10, 1982. The trial court concluded that the McDonald's facility as proposed was a conditional, rather than permitted, use but that the proposed McDonald's restaurant without a drive-thru window was a permitted use, and the trial court directed the city to issue a permit upon receipt of McDonald's plan for the restaurant without a drive-thru window. We reverse and remand for an order directing issuance of the building permit authorized by the city council on May 10, 1982. In November of 1981 McDonald's entered into an agreement for the purchase of the westerly 1.3 acres of an 8.5 acre tract described as Outlot 2, Chanhassen Estates. Chanhassen Estates, a residential and commercial subdivision in the city of Chanhassen, is bounded on the north by Trunk Highway No. 5 and includes property lying east and west of Dakota Avenue. The McDonald's site is situated at the southeasterly corner of the intersection of Dakota Avenue with Highway 5. Access to the McDonald's site is afforded by the frontage road on the south side of the property. The McDonald's property has been zoned C-2 commercial since 1966, when Chanhassen Estates was platted, and the site is almost completely surrounded by properties zoned commercial or industrial. On March 5, 1982, McDonald's applied for consideration of its planning request. In accordance with the provisions of Ordinance 33, McDonald's sought approval of its acquisition of part of Outlot 2. Ordinance 33 requires a public hearing before the planning commission and approval by the city council, prior to conveyance, for the division of any tract of land into two or more parcels. The application was also directed to the requirements of Ordinance 47, Chanhassen's zoning ordinance, for the issuance of building permits. Ordinance 47 requires design review, including review of the site plan, by the planning commission and approval by the city council in accordance with the procedures prescribed for the issuance of conditional use permits. Under the zoning ordinance a restaurant is a permitted use and a drive-in is a conditional use. McDonald's sought a permit for the construction of a restaurant with a "drivethru" window. The city attorney advised the council that he regarded McDonald's proposed use as a permitted use. The city planner and the city engineer reviewed McDonald's plan and recommended approval. The city engineer included in his report specific recommendations with respect to traffic management. Following a public hearing at which a spokesman for CERA voiced objection to the plan, the planning commission, an advisory body, recommended denial of McDonald's application. On April 19, 1982, McDonald's application for subdivision plat approval and site plan review came before the city council. The city planner and engineer again recommended approval. Although a public hearing is not required unless the application is for a conditional use permit and although the council's deliberations were not noticed as a public hearing on McDonald's application, spokesmen for CERA spoke at length in opposition. A motion to approve McDonald's application failed to carry; the votes of the four council members present were equally divided. McDonald's promptly instituted proceedings for a writ of mandamus commanding the city council to approve its application. At the next council meeting on May 3rd the member who had been absent from the previous meeting moved the reconsideration of McDonald's application. The four members present unanimously agreed to *338 reconsider the application at the May 10th council meeting and directed that CERA be notified of the scheduled reconsideration. CERA's spokesman again expressed opposition to the application. By a vote of three-to-two the council approved McDonald's application subject to certain conditions, one of which was the dismissal of McDonald's petition for a writ. On May 28, 1982, CERA instituted this action for a declaratory judgment that the city council's action of May 10th was invalid and for an injunction against the issuance of a building permit. When McDonald's intervened in the CERA action, McDonald's, the city, and CERA stipulated to the consolidation of the CERA and McDonald's actions.[1] The trial court found that McDonald's proposed facility was not a permitted use pursuant to Ordinance 47 and remanded the matter to the city council for consideration of McDonald's application as one for a conditional use permit. After the council had denied a conditional use permit, McDonald's and CERA both sought amended findings. In its amended findings issued July 26, 1982, the trial court found that although the facility as originally proposed was not a permitted use, the proposed restaurant without a drive-thru window was a permitted use, and he directed the city council to issue the necessary building permit. CERA's motion for a new trial was denied. Both CERA and McDonald's appeal. The principal issue is, of course, whether the proposed McDonald's facility is a permitted use or a conditional use under the Chanhassen zoning ordinance. Initially, however, we address the propriety of the city council's reconsideration of McDonald's application. Generally, a motion for reconsideration can be made only by one who voted with the prevailing side.[2] The movant for reconsideration of McDonald's application had been absent and had not voted when the original motion for approval failed on a tied vote. The four council members present on May 3rd, however, unanimously agreed to reconsider the matter; the rules of procedure may be waived by a 4/5 vote of the council members; and the fifth council member expressly acquiesced in the reconsideration at the May 10th meeting. If the procedure was technically flawed i.e., if the motion should have been for waiver instead of reconsideration to declare an action which the council unanimously agreed to take invalid because incorrectly titled would be indeed to exalt form over substance. We decline to do so. Whether the McDonald's facility as proposed is a permitted use or a conditional use in a C-2 commercial zone is governed by the zoning ordinance. The relevant sections of Ordinance 47 are these: Section 4.02, the "Definitions" section of the ordinance, which defines "Drive-In-Establishment" as follows: An establishment of the drive-in type is one which accomodates the patrons' automobiles, from which the occupants may receive a service or obtain a product which may be used or consumed in the vehicle on the same premises. Section 10.02, headed "Permitted Uses", which states: Within a C-2 Commercial District, no building or land shall be used except for the following uses: * * * * * * 4. Restaurants, theaters and taverns, but not including "drive-in" type service. Section 10.04, headed "Conditional Uses", which states: *339 Within a C-2 Commercial District, the following uses may be allowed, but only upon the securing of a Conditional Use Permit: * * * * * * 2. Establishments of the "drive-in" type, except drive-in theaters, offering goods or services directly to customers waiting in parked motor vehicles: provided that, in addition to such other conditions as may be prescribed by any conditional use permit, the following minimum standards shall apply: [standards enumerated for parking, access, etc.] (emphasis added). The trial court tested the propriety of the council's approval of the McDonald's facility as a permitted use by reference to §§ 4.02 and 10.02 only. Having found these two sections clear and unambiguous, the trial court declared that the McDonald's restaurant without a drive-thru window was a permitted use; with a drive-thru window, however, the establishment was not a permitted use because the product obtained at the drive-thru window could be consumed in the vehicle on the same premises. The trial court also determined that the proposed facility was not a "drive-in" within the provisions of section 10.04 enumerating conditional uses because customers served at a drive-thru window are not waiting in parked cars. The trial court resolved the conflicting definitions by construction: a use specifically excluded from permitted uses should be considered a conditional use. When the words of a statute or ordinance in their application to an existing situation are clear and free from ambiguity, judicial construction is inappropriate.[3] Were the ordinance being applied to a 1972 "drive-in," where car-hops serve food on trays to customers in parked vehicles, its meaning would be clear. A "drive-thru," however, is not a traditional "drive-in." The trial court's inability to reconcile the various sections governing C-2 Commercial Zones is the result, as the city notes, of the application of the terms of an ordinance adopted in 1972 to business innovations developed years later. Ordinance 47 comprises a comprehensive plan for the regulation of the use of land and buildings in the City of Chanhassen. Since the various sections of the ordinance relate to the same subject matter and to each other, they should be construed together. In Re Improvement of County Ditch No. 11, Martin County, 253 Minn. 367, 91 N.W.2d 657 (1958). When the pertinent sections are taken together, it is apparent that the "drive-in" type service excluded in section 10.02 from permitted uses is the drive-in service specifically described in section 10.04 as a conditional use rather than that more generally defined in section 4.02. McCarthy v. State, 280 Minn. 226, 158 N.W.2d 708 (1968). Establishments of the "drive-in" type, described in language identical to that contained in section 10.04, are among the C-3 Commercial Zone permitted uses enumerated in § 11.02. Courts generally strive to construe a term according to its ordinary meaning. Cf. Charles W. Sexton Co. v. Hatfield, 263 Minn. 187, 116 N.W.2d 574 (1962). The description contained in sections 10.04 and 11.02 seems to be a more complete and accurate description and one more in accord with the commonly accepted concept of a "drive-in" than does the general definition in section 4.02. Nor are "drive-in" and "drive-thru" synonymous terms. Unless sections 10.02, 10.04 and 11.02 are construed together and the term "drive-in" is described uniformly for purposes of inclusion and exclusion, a drive-thru use would be neither a permitted use nor a conditional use i.e., a drive-thru would be a use excluded from the entire city an absurdity which the council could hardly have intended. Salmen v. City of St. Paul, 281 N.W.2d 355 (Minn.1979). If the term "drive-in" is consistently described according to its ordinary meaning, a restaurant with a drive-thru window is a permitted use in a C-2 Commercial Zone. *340 Furthermore, such a construction comports with the city's interpretation of its zoning ordinance. The city council approved the McDonald's application as a permitted use. Although the city's action is not determinative, its interpretation is entitled to some weight. Frank's Nursery Sales, Inc. v. City of Roseville, 295 N.W.2d 604, 608 (Minn.1980). Finally, a zoning ordinance is in derogation of the common law and should be construed strictly against the city and in favor of the property owner. Frank's Nursery Sales, Inc. v. City of Roseville, 295 N.W.2d at 608. 3 R. Anderson, American Law of Zoning, § 16.02 at p. 4 (2d ed. 1977). To be effective any restriction on land use must be clearly expressed. We conclude, therefore, that the McDonald's restaurant with drive-thru window, as proposed, is a permitted use. CERA contends, however, that even if the proposed use is permitted, the council's approval is invalid because the council did not make specific findings that (1) the proposed use would be consistent with the public health, safety, and general welfare, and (2) the proposed use would be consistent with the City's comprehensive plan. We find no merit in this contention and hold that approval, subject to McDonald's compliance with the requirements of the Chanhassen ordinances, was proper. The zoning ordinance defines a permitted use as "a use which may be lawfully established in a particular district or districts, provided it conforms with all requirements, regulations and performance standards of such district." Chanhassen, Minn., Zoning Ordinance 47, § 4.02 (1972). The proviso demonstrates that the council's review of an application for a permitted use need go only to the applicant's compliance with the specific "requirements, regulations and performance standards" prescribed by the ordinance. Subject to such compliance, approval of a permitted use follows as a matter of right. Cf. Zylka v. City of Crystal, 283 Minn. 192, 167 N.W.2d 45 (1969). A conditional or special use permit may be denied for reasons relating to public health, safety, and general welfare. Authorization of a given use by special or conditional use permit reserves to the city the discretion to consider the proposed use in the light of the general welfare and the city's planning goals. Nevertheless, denial of a conditional use must be based on something more concrete than neighborhood opposition and expressions of concern for public safety and welfare. C.R. Investments, Inc. v. Village of Shoreview, 304 N.W.2d 320 (Minn.1981); Northwestern College v. City of Arden Hills, 281 N.W.2d 865 (Minn.1979); Inland Construction Co. v. City of Bloomington, 292 Minn. 374, 195 N.W.2d 558 (1972). On the record before us, for example, the non-specific testimony that the proposed McDonald's poses potential traffic hazards at the intersection of Dakota Avenue with Highway 5 cannot be said to rebut the city engineer's testimony that the intersection could handle the anticipated traffic. On the other hand, when a city designates a specific use as permissible in a particular zone or district, the city has exercised its discretion and determined that the permitted use is consistent with the public health, safety, and general welfare and consonant with the goals of its comprehensive plan. Until the district is rezoned or the zoning ordinance is either amended or successfully challenged, that determination is conclusive. We have also examined CERA's other contentions, including the contention that the city must apply the goals and objectives set out in its comprehensive plan as the criteria for approval of the requested subdivision of Outlot 2. We note only that CERA's objections do not focus on the concerns addressed in the subdivision ordinance, such as roads, sidewalks, and drainage. Rather, those objections go to McDonald's proposed use of the property a matter specifically addressed in the zoning ordinance. The city council's approval of the McDonald's proposed restaurant with a drive-thru *341 window as a permitted use of a portion of Outlot 2 was proper. We remand for an order directing issuance of the building permit authorized by the city council. Reversed and remanded with instructions. SIMONETT, Justice (concurring specially). I join in the court's opinion but cannot subscribe to the rule that zoning ordinances are to be strictly construed against the municipality, as stated in the majority opinion and in Frank's Nursery Sales, Inc. v. City of Roseville, 295 N.W.2d 604, 608 (Minn.1980). "Not so very long ago," wrote Justice Holt in 1920, "there would have been a revolt against restricting a property owner in the full use of his lot to the street line." State ex rel. Twin City Building & Investment Co. v. Houghton, 144 Minn. 1, 17, 176 N.W. 159, 161 (1920) (opinion on rehearing). This was because there was, in the early part of this century, a strong belief, as Justice Dibell stated in his dissent in Houghton, in "the fundamental principle that one may use and enjoy his property as best suits his convenience, so long as no unnecessary injury is done to his neighbor." Id., 144 Minn. at 23, 176 N.W. at 164. It was in this milieu, it seems to me, that the rule, "a zoning ordinance is in derogation of the common law and should be construed strictly against the city and in favor of the property owner," emerged. Surely the underpinning for this rule of strict construction no longer exists. If the common law is an evolving concept, today it is better illustrated by, to give just one example, the legislative statement of policy in Minn. Stat. § 462.351 (1982) which seeks to promote comprehensive municipal planning for land development. I would abandon the rule of strict construction for zoning ordinances. In this appeal, however, abandonment of the rule does not, in my opinion, require a different result and so I join the court's opinion. WAHL, Justice (concurring specially). I join the special concurrence of Justice Simonett. NOTES [1] Although McDonald's had proffered a stipulation of dismissal of its lawsuit, signed by McDonald's counsel, the stipulation was not executed on the city's behalf. [2] Neither Chanhassen Ordinance 67-A, which establishes rules of procedure for the city council, nor Robert's Rules of Order Revised, which the ordinance accepts as authority on matters not specifically covered, address the question whether an absent member is deemed, for purposes of a motion for reconsideration, to have cast a negative vote. [3] Ordinances are construed according to the recognized principles of statutory construction. State v. Simonsen, 252 Minn. 315, 89 N.W.2d 910 (1958).

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