§ 480.059

State v. Askerooth · 2004 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

In Re Olson · 2002 1 citation

We have never specifically articulated the appropriate standard of review of a court of appeals’ decision not to address an issue on the grounds that it was not briefed. However, it is unquestionable that we have the power to regulate matters of procedure in all criminal actions in all Minnesota courts. See State v. Johnson, 514 N.W.2d 551, 554 (Minn.1994) (noting that the courts govern matters of procedure); see also Minn. Stat. § 480.059, *228 subd. 1 (2000) (acknowledging that the supreme court regulates matters of procedure in all state criminal actions). Accordingly, we will apply a de novo standard of review to the court of appeals’ decision not to address an issue on the grounds that it was not adequately briefed.

State v. Gianakos · 2002 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Santiago v. State · 2002 4 citations

+ 4 more citations in this opinion.

State v. Lindsey · 2001 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Azure · 2001 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

In Re the Welfare of G.L.H. · 2000 3 citations

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

State v. Ambaye · 2000 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

State v. Windish · 1999 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Erickson · 1999 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

State v. Nerz · 1998 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Johnson · 1994 3 citations

This court has the authority to “regulate the pleadings, practice, procedure, and the forms thereof in criminal actions in all courts of this state, by rules promulgated by it from time to time.” Minn. Stat. § 480.-059, subd. 1 (1992). This authority, acknowledged by the legislature, arises from the court’s inherent judicial powers. State v. Willis, 332 N.W.2d 180, 184 (Minn.1983). 3 Notwithstanding this inherent power, the enabling legislation for the Rules of Criminal Procedure purports to reserve to the legislature the right to “enact, modify, or repeal any statute or modify or repeal any rule of the supreme court adopted pursuant thereto.” Minn. Stat. § 480.059, subd. 8. Commentators have recognized, however, as do we, that since the 1956 amendment to the Judiciary Article of the Minnesota Constitution removed the constitutional requirement that pleadings and proceedings be under the direction of the legislative body, under the separation of powers doctrine the legislature “has no constitutional authority in their enabling acts or otherwise to reserve a right to *554 modify or enact statutes that will govern over court rules [of procedure] already in place.” 4 Maynard E. Pirsig & Randall M. Tietjen, Court Procedure and the Separation of Powers in Minnesota, 15 Wm. Mitchell L.Rev. 141, 182 (1989). 5 But, as we noted in Willis, 332 N.W.2d at 184, due respect for coequal branches of government requires this court to exercise great restraint in considering the constitutionality of statutes particularly when the consideration involves what is a legislative function and what is a judicial function.

This court has the authority to “regulate the pleadings, practice, procedure, and the forms thereof in criminal actions in all courts of this state, by rules promulgated by it from time to time.” Minn. Stat. § 480.-059, subd. 1 (1992). This authority, acknowledged by the legislature, arises from the court’s inherent judicial powers. State v. Willis, 332 N.W.2d 180, 184 (Minn.1983). 3 Notwithstanding this inherent power, the enabling legislation for the Rules of Criminal Procedure purports to reserve to the legislature the right to “enact, modify, or repeal any statute or modify or repeal any rule of the supreme court adopted pursuant thereto.” Minn. Stat. § 480.059, subd. 8. Commentators have recognized, however, as do we, that since the 1956 amendment to the Judiciary Article of the Minnesota Constitution removed the constitutional requirement that pleadings and proceedings be under the direction of the legislative body, under the separation of powers doctrine the legislature “has no constitutional authority in their enabling acts or otherwise to reserve a right to *554 modify or enact statutes that will govern over court rules [of procedure] already in place.” 4 Maynard E. Pirsig & Randall M. Tietjen, Court Procedure and the Separation of Powers in Minnesota, 15 Wm. Mitchell L.Rev. 141, 182 (1989). 5 But, as we noted in Willis, 332 N.W.2d at 184, due respect for coequal branches of government requires this court to exercise great restraint in considering the constitutionality of statutes particularly when the consideration involves what is a legislative function and what is a judicial function.

This court has the authority to “regulate the pleadings, practice, procedure, and the forms thereof in criminal actions in all courts of this state, by rules promulgated by it from time to time.” Minn. Stat. § 480.-059, subd. 1 (1992). This authority, acknowledged by the legislature, arises from the court’s inherent judicial powers. State v. Willis, 332 N.W.2d 180, 184 (Minn.1983). 3 Notwithstanding this inherent power, the enabling legislation for the Rules of Criminal Procedure purports to reserve to the legislature the right to “enact, modify, or repeal any statute or modify or repeal any rule of the supreme court adopted pursuant thereto.” Minn. Stat. § 480.059, subd. 8. Commentators have recognized, however, as do we, that since the 1956 amendment to the Judiciary Article of the Minnesota Constitution removed the constitutional requirement that pleadings and proceedings be under the direction of the legislative body, under the separation of powers doctrine the legislature “has no constitutional authority in their enabling acts or otherwise to reserve a right to *554 modify or enact statutes that will govern over court rules [of procedure] already in place.” 4 Maynard E. Pirsig & Randall M. Tietjen, Court Procedure and the Separation of Powers in Minnesota, 15 Wm. Mitchell L.Rev. 141, 182 (1989). 5 But, as we noted in Willis, 332 N.W.2d at 184, due respect for coequal branches of government requires this court to exercise great restraint in considering the constitutionality of statutes particularly when the consideration involves what is a legislative function and what is a judicial function.

State v. Krejci · 1990 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

State v. Cermak · 1984 4 citations

+ 4 more citations in this opinion.

State v. Norton · 1982 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Cottew · 2007 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

State v. Flemino · 2006 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Breaux · 2001 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

State, City of Maple Grove v. Breuhl · 2000 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Ronquist · 1998 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Johnson · 1993 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

State v. Batzer · 1989 4 citations

+ 4 more citations in this opinion.

State v. Lopez · 1986 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

In Re the Welfare of D.K. · 1985 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

ADT Security Services, Inc. v. Swenson · 2011 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.