§ 480.061

Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co. v. Nishika Ltd. · 1997 1 citation

Four companies involved in the three-dimensional photography business (“respondents”) sued Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company (“3M”) in Texas state court seeking lost profits. The jury found that 3M breached express and implied warranties, and the trial court allowed the four respondents to recover one lump-sum damages award. The Texas Court of Appeals affirmed in all relevant respects, see Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Nishika Ltd., 885 S.W.2d 603, 636, 639 (Tex.Ct.App.1994) (“3M ”), but the Texas Supreme Court withheld judgment and certified two questions of Minnesota law to this court pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 480.061 (1996):

Olson v. Ford Motor Co. · 1997 2 citations

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In Re Butler · 1996 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Shields v. Goldetsky · 1996 1 citation

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Current Technology Concepts, Inc. v. Irie Enterprises, Inc. · 1995 2 citations

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Honeywell, Inc. v. Minnesota Life & Health Insurance Guaranty Ass'n · 1994 1 citation

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United States v. O'Shaughnessy · 1994 1 citation

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Fogie v. Rent-A-Center, Inc. · 1994 1 citation

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Medica Primary v. Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Health & Welfare Fund · 1993 1 citation

The United States District Court, District of Minnesota, Third Division has certified to this court, pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 480.061 (1992), two questions of law in an effort to determine whether the Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) Agreement at issue between the parties in this case is in violation of Minn. Stat. § 62D.04, subd. 1(f) of the Minnesota Health Maintenance Act. We answer the first certified question in the negative and do not reach the second certified question.

Kaiser v. Memorial Blood Center of Minneapolis, Inc. · 1992 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Hapka v. Paquin Farms · 1990 2 citations

458 N.W.2d 683 (1990) Conrad HAPKA, individually, Brian Hapka, individually, and Conrad and Brian Hapka, Petitioners, Appellants, v. PAQUIN FARMS, et al., Gust Hangsleben and State of Minnesota, Department of Agriculture, Respondents. No. C4-88-410. Supreme Court of Minnesota. August 3, 1990. *684 Robert W. Wattson, Mark E. O'Boyle, Zelle & Larson, Minneapolis, for appellants. Dennis M. Sobolik, Roger C. Malm, Brink, Sobolik, Severson, Vroom & Malm, P.A., Hallock, for Paquin Farms. Hubert H. Humphrey, III, Atty. Gen., Paul A. Strandberg, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, for State of Minn. Donald Leonard, East Grand Forks, for Gust Hangsleben. Minnesota Defense Lawyers Ass'n, Louis A. Dovre, Rider, Bennett, Egan & Arundel, Minneapolis, amicus curiae. Heard, considered and decided by the court en banc. COYNE, Justice. On petition of plaintiffs Conrad and Brian Hapka, we review the decision of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's declination pursuant to Superwood Corp. v. Siempelkamp Corp., 311 N.W.2d 159 (Minn.1981), to submit tort theories to the jury in an action for damages resulting from diseased seed potatoes purchased from defendant P & H Farms. Hapka v. Paquin Farms, 431 N.W.2d 907, 910 (Minn. App.1988). We affirm. Minnesota prohibits the planting of seed potatoes unless the seed meets minimum requirements prescribed by the commissioner of the department of agriculture. Minn. Stat. § 21.118 (1982); 3 MCAR § 1.0131 (1982). Compliance with the requirements may be evidenced by certificates of inspection which demonstrate "the varietal purity and the freedom from disease and physical injury" of the certified potatoes, and also contain any other information prescribed by rules promulgated by the commissioner. Minn. Stat. § 21.113 (1982). A certificate of inspection can be issued only if the seed potatoes have been inspected while growing in the field, usually on several occasions during the growing season, and again after harvest at the time of shipment. Minn. Stat. § 21.113; 3 MCAR § 1.0129(A)(1) (1982). Minnesota's inspection program is part of a national effort to eradicate the destructive and highly contagious disease called "bacterial ring rot" from the potato crop. 3 MCAR §§ 1.0127 to 1.0135 (1982). Although the certification rules make provisions to allow the presence of certain diseases at specified low levels, there is a zero tolerance for bacterial ring rot, and the discovery of a single plant in the field or of a single tuber in storage infected with bacterial ring rot causes the rejection of the entire field or lot. 3 MCAR § 1.0129(E). The absence of a finding of ring rot is not to be construed to mean that the field or lot inspected is free from the disease. Id. Furthermore, certification does not "represent a warranty of any kind * * * as to the quality of the crop produced from the certified seed potatoes." 3 MCAR § 1.0129(F). *685 Conrad Hapka and his son Brian are potato farmers in Marshall County, Minnesota.[1] The Hapkas grow seed potatoes to be sold to other farmers for growing various kinds of commercial potatoes. Like the Hapkas, Richard and David Paquin, the principal owners of Paquin Farms, Inc., also enjoyed a good reputation for growing disease-free, high quality seed potatoes, which they marketed through the Paquin Potato Company. On Memorial Day, Monday, May 30, 1983, the Hapkas purchased a truckload of seed potatoes from the Paquins. This load of potatoes, like a subsequent load purchased on the following day, was grown by P & H Farms, a partnership composed of the Paquins and Gust Hangsleben, a farmer whose reputation for growing seed potatoes did not, according to the Hapkas, match that of the Paquins.[2] Neither the Paquins nor the Hapkas arranged for the required shipping point inspection of the seed potatoes purchased on either day; instead, a random sample of seed potatoes was selected from the lot and submitted for state inspection at a later date. Even though the first sale took place on a legal holiday, a state inspector was available upon request, and Conrad Hapka testified that on an earlier occasion he had arranged for an inspection on a Sunday. The Hapkas planted the seed potatoes immediately. The planting process included cutting the potatoes into smaller pieces for propagation. The machinery used for cutting and planting those seed potatoes was later used for cutting and planting other potatoes bought from a third source and planted in another field. All of the Hapkas' fields passed the first two state inspections. On the third inspection, however, a state inspector found signs of ring rot in the fields planted with P & H Farms seed potatoes and in the fields later planted with seeds from a different source. No ring rot was found in fields planted before Memorial Day. The presence of ring rot infection was confirmed by a laboratory analysis, and all the infected fields were rejected for certification as seed potatoes. The evidence was that the P & H seeds purchased by the Hapkas were infected with ring rot, which was spread by the Hapkas' potato cutter to the seed potatoes acquired from another source. Because of the loss of seed certification, the Hapkas were forced to sell most of their potatoes at the much lower price available for potatoes on the commercial market. One load of potatoes could not be sold and had to be destroyed. The Hapkas were also put to the expense of disinfecting and cleaning their farm machinery and warehouses. The Hapkas sued Paquin Farms, Inc., Paquin Potato Company, P & H Farms, the Paquins individually, Gust Hangsleben,[3] and the Minnesota Department of Agriculture. The Hapkas asserted that the state negligently failed to inspect the seed potatoes and also breached a contractual duty of inspection and then alleged that all other defendants were guilty of misrepresentation, acted negligently, breached both express and implied warranties, and were strictly liable for selling seed potatoes infected with ring rot. At the close of the evidence, the trial court directed a verdict in favor of the state, ruled that tort theories of negligence and strict products liability were unavailable, and submitted to the jury only questions regarding misrepresentation and warranty. The jury found that no express warranties had been made and that there had been neither misrepresentation nor breach of implied warranty. The court of appeals affirmed judgment in favor of all defendants, and we granted further review. We first consider the nature and scope of the review obtained by the Hapkas by virtue of their petition for further review pursuant to Rule 117, Minnesota *686 Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure. Among a number of directives of that rule, a petitioning party is required to identify the legal issues and their disposition by the court of appeals and to specify and discuss the criteria justifying review. The Hapkas focused their petition for further review exclusively on the availability of tort theories of liability — negligence and strict products liability — in their action against the sellers of the diseased seed potatoes. The petition contained no reference to their claims that the Minnesota Department of Agriculture had breached a duty of inspection. Even after the state advised that it would not interpose a response to the petition that raised no issues involving the state, the Hapkas made no effort to declare their intention to pursue those issues. Nevertheless, in their brief to this court the Hapkas once again challenged the propriety of the directed verdict in favor of the state. We decline to consider that issue. Rule 117 not only provides a procedural mechanism by which a petitioner may seek further review of a court of appeals decision by the supreme court, but is designed to facilitate effective appellate review of that petition by imposing on the petitioner a burden of identifying and discussing all critical issues. Certainly, parties cast in the role of respondent are entitled to know that issues relating to them will be raised and, more significantly, this court must be aware of the scope of the review requested. We are, of course, cognizant of the limited opportunity for discussion of multiple issues in a petition for further review and of the suggestion implicit in the Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure that the art of advocacy is better served by focusing the argument on the issue which best satisfies the criteria for review. Minn.R.Civ.App.P. 117, subd. 2. For that reason, unless the order granting review specifically limits the issues, we customarily allow parties considerable latitude in their presentation of the case. However, this latitude is not without practical limitations. The claims of sellers' liability and breach of duty by the state, although connected with the diseased seed potatoes, rest on completely different and independent legal theories. The petition, directed only to the issue of the sellers' liability, gave the state no reason to suspect that it would be implicated in this court's review or that it needed to protect its position by filing a response to the petition or a respondent's brief on the merits. It was therefore incumbent upon the Hapkas, particularly under these circumstances, to raise the unrelated question of the state's liability, however succinctly, in order to apprise the state of the necessity to respond and to accord this court the opportunity to limit the issues to be reviewed. We entertain review because, in attempting to reconcile the cumulative pronouncements of this court in Superwood Corp. v. Siempelkamp Corp., 311 N.W.2d 159 (Minn.1981), and its progeny, the court of appeals has injected yet another element into the already confusing inquiry regarding the applicability and exclusivity of the Uniform Commercial Code to commercial transactions. More specifically, the issues which are before us center on the scope of the holding in Superwood and the availability of tort theories of negligence and strict products liability to support an award of damages for economic losses. Superwood presented three questions certified by the federal court pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 480.061 (1988). This court declared that the answer to the questions depended on whether economic losses arising out of commercial transactions are recoverable under negligence and strict products liability theories. Basing its decision on previously demonstrated approval of the rationale of Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal.2d 9, 45 Cal.Rptr. 17, 403 P.2d 145 (1965), see Farr v. Armstrong Rubber, 288 Minn. 83, 93-94, 179 N.W.2d 64, 70-71 (1970), the Superwood court said, "[W]e hold that economic losses that arise out of commercial transactions, except those involving personal injury or damage to other property, are not recoverable under the tort theories of negligence or strict products liability." 311 N.W.2d at 162. Inasmuch as the damages alleged to have resulted from the failure of Superwood's *687 21-year-old hot plate press were limited to damage to the press itself and lost profits, it seems apparent that the exception in the holding for personal injury and damage to other property was not necessary to the decision there. Nevertheless, in several subsequent cases, Minneapolis Soc'y of Fine Arts v. Parker-Klein Assocs. Architects, 354 N.W.2d 816, 819 (Minn.1984); S.J. Groves & Sons Co. v. Aerospatiale Helicopter Corp., 374 N.W.2d 431, 433 (Minn.1985); Valley Farmers' Elevator v. Lindsay Bros., 398 N.W.2d 553, 555 (Minn.1987), this court seems to have treated the exception for "other property" as part of the holding. At the same time, the court of appeals, while paying lip service to the exception, so limited the definition of "other property" that it could not apply the exception in any case arising out of a commercial transaction. See Thofson v. Redex Indus., 433 N.W.2d 901, 903 (Minn.App.1988), pet. for rev. denied (Minn., Feb. 22, 1989); Holstad v. Southwestern Porcelain, Inc., 421 N.W.2d 371, 375 (Minn.App.1988), pet. for rev. denied (Minn., Apr. 28, 1988); see also American Home Assur. Co. v. Major Tool & Mach. Inc., 767 F.2d 446, 447-48 (8th Cir.1985) (applying Minnesota law); Agristor Leasing v. Guggisberg, 617 F.Supp. 902, 908 (D.Minn.1985) (applying Minnesota law). Regardless, however, whether the exception for economic losses arising out of personal injury or damage to other property be holding or dicta, the discussion preceding the decision in Superwood contemplates an exception applicable to consumer actions only, and an exception applicable to personal injuries or damage to other property arising out of commercial transactions is a non sequitur. First, the Superwood court set out this quotation from Farr v. Armstrong Rubber, 288 Minn. at 93-94, 179 N.W.2d at 70-71 (emphasis added in original quotation):

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Tomfohr v. Mayo Foundation · 1990 1 citation

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In Re Haggerty · 1989 1 citation

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Roering v. Grinnell Mutual Reinsurance Co. · 1989 2 citations

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Hazelden Foundation v. Meleen · 1989 1 citation

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Sartori v. Harnischfeger Corp. · 1988 1 citation

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AMCO Insurance Co. v. Lang · 1988 1 citation

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Johnson v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc. · 1988 1 citation

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Hanson v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co. · 1987 1 citation

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In Re Tveten · 1987 1 citation

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DeRogatis Ex Rel. DeRogatis v. Mayo Clinic · 1986 1 citation

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Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc. v. Metropolitan Sports Facilities Commission · 1986 2 citations

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Hildebrandt v. Whirlpool Corp. · 1985 2 citations

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Wolner v. Mahaska Industries, Inc. · 1982 3 citations

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Sargent v. Johnson · 1982 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

United States Jaycees v. McClure · 1981 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Leisure Dynamics, Inc. v. Falstaff Brewing Corp. · 1980 1 citation

Pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 480.061 (1978), the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota has certified the following five questions of law to this court, all of which concern the statutes of limitations on the collection of Minnesota sales and use tax from a buyer by a seller:

Behm v. John Nuveen & Co., Inc. · 1996 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Lommen v. City of East Grand Forks · 1994 2 citations

Further, in Biscoe the court — seeming to short circuit any real choice-of-law process — stated that had the injured party filed in Virginia — the state of the officer's jurisdiction (as Lommen did here) — Virginia would likely apply its own law: [H]ad this case been brought in Virginia state court, we would not expect that Virginia would apply District rules on immunity * * *, but instead would treat the issue as a threshold one of amenability to suit controlled by Virginia law. Id. at 1360 n. 4. [3] We believe that any difficulty in ascertaining or applying a substantive rule of another state is better addressed through certification of the question, rather than by rote application of forum law. See Unif.Cert. of Questions of Law Act §§ 1, 8, 12 U.L.A. 52 (1990) (codified as Minn. Stat. § 480.061). [4] We also note that the Minnesota Supreme Court has given the "better law" consideration no significant weight in a case for more than a decade — since its 1981 decision in Bigelow v. Halloran, 313 N.W.2d 10 (Minn.1981). [1] The court stated these interests were considerably weakened because: (1) Virginia police officers are not immune from liability in this context, and their personal amenability to suit accomplishes at least some of the deterrence that it is feared would result if the county were liable as well; (2) under District of Columbia law, the county is liable only for negligent performance of nondiscretionary acts, which by definition leave the governmental actor little choice on procedure — the only actions deterred would be violations of a state's orders to its employees; (3) much as the prospect of liability might thwart discretionary decision-making, it may also deter misconduct; and (4) the State of Virginia had recently waived its immunity from suit in tort in certain cases, though it limited the amount recoverable. Id. at 1360-61. [2] The injured party in Biscoe lived in Maryland but worked in the District of Columbia. The court cited authority recognizing the District's unique interest in protecting persons who lived in the surrounding suburbs and worked in the District. Biscoe, 738 F.2d at 1361.

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Allstate Insurance v. Steele · 1995 6 citations

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Nesladek v. Ford Motor Co. · 1994 2 citations

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Independent School District No. 197 v. W.R. Grace & Co. · 1990 2 citations

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RPJ Energy Fund Management, Inc. v. Collins · 1982 2 citations

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United States Jaycees v. McClure · 1982 2 citations

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Minnesota Recipients Alliance v. Noot · 1981 4 citations

Since this controversy may be resolved by a complete judicial analysis of the state statutes involved, and since the Minnesota Supreme Court has never had the opportunity to construe these statutes, this Court will certify the interpretation of these statutes to the Minnesota Supreme Court pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 480.061 (1980).

Since this controversy may be resolved by a complete judicial analysis of the state statutes involved, and since the Minnesota Supreme Court has never had the opportunity to construe these statutes, this Court will certify the interpretation of these statutes to the Minnesota Supreme Court pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 480.061 (1980).

Since this controversy may be resolved by a complete judicial analysis of the state statutes involved, and since the Minnesota Supreme Court has never had the opportunity to construe these statutes, this Court will certify the interpretation of these statutes to the Minnesota Supreme Court pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 480.061 (1980).

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Hodgson v. Flakne · 1978 4 citations

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Fleck v. Spannaus · 1976 6 citations

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