§ 507.02

Marine Credit Union v. Detlefson-Delano · 2013 10 citations

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Antone v. Mirviss · 2006 1 citation

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Kipp v. Sweno · 2004 6 citations

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Staples v. Miller · 1982 1 citation

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Dvorak v. Maring · 1979 3 citations

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The Bank of New York Mellon f/k/a The Bank of New York as Trustee for the Certificateholders of CWALT, Inc., Alternative Loan Trust 2005-19CB, Mortgage Pass Through Certificates, Series 2005-19CB v. Marvin G. Westrom, Bremer Bank, National Association · 2017 2 citations

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In the Matter of the Petition of Prime Security Bank For a New Certificate of Title After Mortgage Foreclosure. · 2015 1 citation

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CitiMortgage, Inc. a successor by merger to ABN AMRO Mortgage Group, Inc. v. Sandra Lee Akers, William Lee Akers · 2014 4 citations

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Marine Credit Union v. Detlefson-Delano · 2012 5 citations

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HSBC Mortgage Services, Inc. v. Graikowski · 2012 7 citations

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National City Bank v. Engler · 2010 12 citations

Because the purpose of Minn. Stat. § 507.02, which seeks to protect the non-signing spouse’s interest in the homestead from wrongful conveyance, was satisfied by respondent’s waiver of homestead rights, we reverse.

Because the purpose of Minn. Stat. § 507.02, which seeks to protect the non-signing spouse’s interest in the homestead from wrongful conveyance, was satisfied by respondent’s waiver of homestead rights, we reverse.

Because the purpose of Minn. Stat. § 507.02, which seeks to protect the non-signing spouse’s interest in the homestead from wrongful conveyance, was satisfied by respondent’s waiver of homestead rights, we reverse.

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Gores v. Schultz · 2009 13 citations

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Antone v. Mirviss · 2005 2 citations

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Blackowiak v. Mielke · 2005 1 citation

Minn. Stat. § 507.02 (2004). 1

Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc. v. Chojnacki · 2003 6 citations

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Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc. v. Newton · 2002 25 citations

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Peterson v. Hinz · 2000 2 citations

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Affiliated Banc Group, Ltd. v. Zehringer · 1995 1 citation

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State Bank of Pennock v. Schwenk · 1986 1 citation

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Boulevard Del, Inc. v. Stillman · 1986 1 citation

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Greer v. Greer · 1986 1 citation

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Renneke v. Shandorf · 1985 2 citations

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Cleys v. Cleys · 1985 2 citations

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Johnson v. Bank of New York Mellon · 2023 2 citations

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Larson v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A. · 2011 32 citations

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Marshall v. Marshall · 1995 6 citations

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Running v. Dolan (In re Goodspeed) · 2015 2 citations

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Holmes v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (In Re Holmes) · 2009 6 citations

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In Re Hermann · 1998 2 citations

Without the right to sever the joint tenancy or to convey his interest in the homestead property, if lawfully severed, Mr. O’Hagan’s right to use and occupy the property is a limited, personal right of possession. See Elfelt, 485 N.W.2d at 62 (stating that “the statutory requirement of spousal consent illustrates that the nature of the property interest owned by a spouse in a jointly held homestead is a limited interest”). Neither the government nor a third-party purchaser would be able to exercise this limited right of possession because under Minnesota law only the spouses have this possessory right in homestead property. See Minn. Stat. § 507.02; see generally United States v. Certain Real Property Located at 2525 Leroy Lane, 910 F.2d 343, 351 (6th Cir.1990) (stating that “the Government may properly acquire only the interest which Mr. Marks held as cotenant by the entireties ... [but] cannot occupy the position of Mr. Marks in the .entireties estate, since the estate is founded on marital union, and the Government obviously cannot assume the role of spouse to Mrs. Marks”), cert. denied, Marks v. United States, 499 U.S. 947, 111 S.Ct. 1414, 113 L.Ed.2d 467 (1991). Therefore, Mr. O’Hagan’s possessory interest in the homestead property “wears out” when it is held by another party. This would seem to be the precise scenario contemplated by the phrase that the government “ ‘steps into the taxpayer’s shoes but must go barefoot if the shoes wear out.” ’ Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 691 n. 16, 103 S.Ct. at 2141 n. 16 (quoting 4 Bittker, ¶ 111.5.4 at 111-102). O’Hagan, 86 F.3d at 782.

Without the right to sever the joint tenancy or to convey his interest in the homestead property, if lawfully severed, Mr. O’Hagan’s right to use and occupy the property is a limited, personal right of possession. See Elfelt, 485 N.W.2d at 62 (stating that “the statutory requirement of spousal consent illustrates that the nature of the property interest owned by a spouse in a jointly held homestead is a limited interest”). Neither the government nor a third-party purchaser would be able to exercise this limited right of possession because under Minnesota law only the spouses have this possessory right in homestead property. See Minn. Stat. § 507.02; see generally United States v. Certain Real Property Located at 2525 Leroy Lane, 910 F.2d 343, 351 (6th Cir.1990) (stating that “the Government may properly acquire only the interest which Mr. Marks held as cotenant by the entireties ... [but] cannot occupy the position of Mr. Marks in the .entireties estate, since the estate is founded on marital union, and the Government obviously cannot assume the role of spouse to Mrs. Marks”), cert. denied, Marks v. United States, 499 U.S. 947, 111 S.Ct. 1414, 113 L.Ed.2d 467 (1991). Therefore, Mr. O’Hagan’s possessory interest in the homestead property “wears out” when it is held by another party. This would seem to be the precise scenario contemplated by the phrase that the government “ ‘steps into the taxpayer’s shoes but must go barefoot if the shoes wear out.” ’ Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 691 n. 16, 103 S.Ct. at 2141 n. 16 (quoting 4 Bittker, ¶ 111.5.4 at 111-102). O’Hagan, 86 F.3d at 782.

In Re Dale · 1993 4 citations

This argument is refuted by the holding of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Boyd v. Robinson, 741 F.2d 1112 (8th Cir.1984). In Boyd, the debtor was the sole owner of the homestead prior to her marriage, and she continued sole ownership throughout the marriage. When the debt- or’s marriage was dissolved, the dissolution decree awarded the homestead to the debt- or, granting her spouse a lien against the homestead. Looking to Minnesota law, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found that even though title was held solely in the debtor’s name, the debtor’s spouse had a pre-existing interest in the homestead in three different respects: (1) the spouse had rights to reject a conveyance of the homestead, and certain inchoate interests under Minn. Stat. §§ 507.02 and 525.145; (2) the spouse had interests created by his investment of non-marital funds into the homestead during the marriage; and (3) the spouse had an undivided interest in the homestead equity acquired with marital assets during the marriage. Boyd at 1114.

This argument is refuted by the holding of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Boyd v. Robinson, 741 F.2d 1112 (8th Cir.1984). In Boyd, the debtor was the sole owner of the homestead prior to her marriage, and she continued sole ownership throughout the marriage. When the debt- or’s marriage was dissolved, the dissolution decree awarded the homestead to the debt- or, granting her spouse a lien against the homestead. Looking to Minnesota law, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found that even though title was held solely in the debtor’s name, the debtor’s spouse had a pre-existing interest in the homestead in three different respects: (1) the spouse had rights to reject a conveyance of the homestead, and certain inchoate interests under Minn. Stat. §§ 507.02 and 525.145; (2) the spouse had interests created by his investment of non-marital funds into the homestead during the marriage; and (3) the spouse had an undivided interest in the homestead equity acquired with marital assets during the marriage. Boyd at 1114.

This argument is refuted by the holding of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Boyd v. Robinson, 741 F.2d 1112 (8th Cir.1984). In Boyd, the debtor was the sole owner of the homestead prior to her marriage, and she continued sole ownership throughout the marriage. When the debt- or’s marriage was dissolved, the dissolution decree awarded the homestead to the debt- or, granting her spouse a lien against the homestead. Looking to Minnesota law, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found that even though title was held solely in the debtor’s name, the debtor’s spouse had a pre-existing interest in the homestead in three different respects: (1) the spouse had rights to reject a conveyance of the homestead, and certain inchoate interests under Minn. Stat. §§ 507.02 and 525.145; (2) the spouse had interests created by his investment of non-marital funds into the homestead during the marriage; and (3) the spouse had an undivided interest in the homestead equity acquired with marital assets during the marriage. Boyd at 1114.

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.