§ 514.05

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OPINION KEITH, Chief Justice. The question to be decided in this case is whether the services performed by engineers and surveyors are entitled to lien priority under Minn. Stat. § 514.05 even though the interest of a purchaser in good faith and a mortgagee were recorded prior to the actual and visual beginning of the improvement on the ground. We affirm the Court of Appeals. Charles B. Faegre, in early 1989, formed a wholly owned corporation, Duckwood Crossings, Inc. (Duckwood) to develop a retail shopping mall on three lots located in Dakota County. In preparation for the sale of one lot to Holiday Stationstores, Inc. (Holiday) and the closing on two mortgages to Miller and Schroeder Investments Corporation (Miller) to complete the purchase of the other lots, Duckwood hired Minnesota Valley Surveyors, Inc. (MN Valley) and Ulteig Engineers, Inc. (Ulteig) to perform surveying and engineering services for the development. MN Valley began work on February 20, 1989, and Ulteig began work April 10, 1989. Neither company was fully paid for its services by Duckwood. The closing on the sale of the lot to Holiday and the execution of the two mortgages to Miller were completed by October 30, 1989. The trial court found that Holiday and Miller knew of the work performed by Ulteig and MN Valley and knew or should have known that they had not been paid by Duckwood. The first actual and visible construction on the ground of the proposed shopping center began November 2, 1989. Liens were filed subsequent to November 2, 1989, by MN Valley, Ulteig, and various other parties who contributed labor or materials to the project. When Duckwood failed to meet its leasing obligations, Miller foreclosed and ultimately took title to its portion of the property. This litigation was commenced to establish lien priority. The trial court held that, under Minn. Stat. § 514.05, the interests of Holiday and Miller *243 were subordinate to the liens of MN Valley, Ulteig, and all other parties who contributed labor and material to the project after November 2, 1989. The Court of Appeals partially reversed the trial court, holding that under the statute Holiday and Miller had priority over the liens of all claimants other than MN Valley and Ulteig, 498 N.W.2d 465. This appeal deals only with the priority claims of MN Valley and Ulteig. A review of the history of Minn. Stat. § 514.05 is helpful. Prior to 1974, surveyors and engineers were not entitled to mechanics' liens in Minnesota. See Dunham Assoc., Inc. v. Group Investments, Inc., 223 N.W.2d 376 (Minn.1974); Anderson v. Breezy Point Estates, 168 N.W.2d 693 (Minn.1969). The legislature in 1974 included the services of engineers and surveyors in the amendment to Minn. Stat. § 514.01 which read, in relevant part: Whoever performs engineering or land surveying services with respect to real estate, or contributes to the improvement of real estate by performing labor, or furnishing skill, material or machinery for any of the purposes hereinafter stated, * * * shall have a lien upon the improvement, and upon the land on which it is situated * * *. Laws of Minnesota for 1974, c 381, s 1. In addition, the following amendment was made to Minn. Stat. § 514.05: WHEN LIEN ATTACHES; NOTICE. All such liens, as against the owner of the land, shall attach and take effect from the time the first item of material or labor is furnished upon the premises for the beginning of the improvement, and shall be preferred to any mortgage or other encumbrance not then of record, unless the lienholder had actual notice thereof. As against a bona fide purchaser, mortgagee, or encumbrancer without notice, no lien shall attach prior to the actual and visible beginning of the improvement on the ground, but a person having a contract for the furnishing of labor, skill, material, or machinery for the improvement, may file for record with the register of deeds of the county within which the premises are situated, or, if claimed under section 514.04, with the secretary of state, a brief statement of the nature of such contract, which statement shall be notice of his lien. Engineering or land surveying services with respect to real estate shall not constitute the actual and visible beginning of the improvement on the ground referred to in this section, except when such engineering or land surveying services include a visible staking of the premises.

OPINION KEITH, Chief Justice. The question to be decided in this case is whether the services performed by engineers and surveyors are entitled to lien priority under Minn. Stat. § 514.05 even though the interest of a purchaser in good faith and a mortgagee were recorded prior to the actual and visual beginning of the improvement on the ground. We affirm the Court of Appeals. Charles B. Faegre, in early 1989, formed a wholly owned corporation, Duckwood Crossings, Inc. (Duckwood) to develop a retail shopping mall on three lots located in Dakota County. In preparation for the sale of one lot to Holiday Stationstores, Inc. (Holiday) and the closing on two mortgages to Miller and Schroeder Investments Corporation (Miller) to complete the purchase of the other lots, Duckwood hired Minnesota Valley Surveyors, Inc. (MN Valley) and Ulteig Engineers, Inc. (Ulteig) to perform surveying and engineering services for the development. MN Valley began work on February 20, 1989, and Ulteig began work April 10, 1989. Neither company was fully paid for its services by Duckwood. The closing on the sale of the lot to Holiday and the execution of the two mortgages to Miller were completed by October 30, 1989. The trial court found that Holiday and Miller knew of the work performed by Ulteig and MN Valley and knew or should have known that they had not been paid by Duckwood. The first actual and visible construction on the ground of the proposed shopping center began November 2, 1989. Liens were filed subsequent to November 2, 1989, by MN Valley, Ulteig, and various other parties who contributed labor or materials to the project. When Duckwood failed to meet its leasing obligations, Miller foreclosed and ultimately took title to its portion of the property. This litigation was commenced to establish lien priority. The trial court held that, under Minn. Stat. § 514.05, the interests of Holiday and Miller *243 were subordinate to the liens of MN Valley, Ulteig, and all other parties who contributed labor and material to the project after November 2, 1989. The Court of Appeals partially reversed the trial court, holding that under the statute Holiday and Miller had priority over the liens of all claimants other than MN Valley and Ulteig, 498 N.W.2d 465. This appeal deals only with the priority claims of MN Valley and Ulteig. A review of the history of Minn. Stat. § 514.05 is helpful. Prior to 1974, surveyors and engineers were not entitled to mechanics' liens in Minnesota. See Dunham Assoc., Inc. v. Group Investments, Inc., 223 N.W.2d 376 (Minn.1974); Anderson v. Breezy Point Estates, 168 N.W.2d 693 (Minn.1969). The legislature in 1974 included the services of engineers and surveyors in the amendment to Minn. Stat. § 514.01 which read, in relevant part: Whoever performs engineering or land surveying services with respect to real estate, or contributes to the improvement of real estate by performing labor, or furnishing skill, material or machinery for any of the purposes hereinafter stated, * * * shall have a lien upon the improvement, and upon the land on which it is situated * * *. Laws of Minnesota for 1974, c 381, s 1. In addition, the following amendment was made to Minn. Stat. § 514.05: WHEN LIEN ATTACHES; NOTICE. All such liens, as against the owner of the land, shall attach and take effect from the time the first item of material or labor is furnished upon the premises for the beginning of the improvement, and shall be preferred to any mortgage or other encumbrance not then of record, unless the lienholder had actual notice thereof. As against a bona fide purchaser, mortgagee, or encumbrancer without notice, no lien shall attach prior to the actual and visible beginning of the improvement on the ground, but a person having a contract for the furnishing of labor, skill, material, or machinery for the improvement, may file for record with the register of deeds of the county within which the premises are situated, or, if claimed under section 514.04, with the secretary of state, a brief statement of the nature of such contract, which statement shall be notice of his lien. Engineering or land surveying services with respect to real estate shall not constitute the actual and visible beginning of the improvement on the ground referred to in this section, except when such engineering or land surveying services include a visible staking of the premises.

OPINION KEITH, Chief Justice. The question to be decided in this case is whether the services performed by engineers and surveyors are entitled to lien priority under Minn. Stat. § 514.05 even though the interest of a purchaser in good faith and a mortgagee were recorded prior to the actual and visual beginning of the improvement on the ground. We affirm the Court of Appeals. Charles B. Faegre, in early 1989, formed a wholly owned corporation, Duckwood Crossings, Inc. (Duckwood) to develop a retail shopping mall on three lots located in Dakota County. In preparation for the sale of one lot to Holiday Stationstores, Inc. (Holiday) and the closing on two mortgages to Miller and Schroeder Investments Corporation (Miller) to complete the purchase of the other lots, Duckwood hired Minnesota Valley Surveyors, Inc. (MN Valley) and Ulteig Engineers, Inc. (Ulteig) to perform surveying and engineering services for the development. MN Valley began work on February 20, 1989, and Ulteig began work April 10, 1989. Neither company was fully paid for its services by Duckwood. The closing on the sale of the lot to Holiday and the execution of the two mortgages to Miller were completed by October 30, 1989. The trial court found that Holiday and Miller knew of the work performed by Ulteig and MN Valley and knew or should have known that they had not been paid by Duckwood. The first actual and visible construction on the ground of the proposed shopping center began November 2, 1989. Liens were filed subsequent to November 2, 1989, by MN Valley, Ulteig, and various other parties who contributed labor or materials to the project. When Duckwood failed to meet its leasing obligations, Miller foreclosed and ultimately took title to its portion of the property. This litigation was commenced to establish lien priority. The trial court held that, under Minn. Stat. § 514.05, the interests of Holiday and Miller *243 were subordinate to the liens of MN Valley, Ulteig, and all other parties who contributed labor and material to the project after November 2, 1989. The Court of Appeals partially reversed the trial court, holding that under the statute Holiday and Miller had priority over the liens of all claimants other than MN Valley and Ulteig, 498 N.W.2d 465. This appeal deals only with the priority claims of MN Valley and Ulteig. A review of the history of Minn. Stat. § 514.05 is helpful. Prior to 1974, surveyors and engineers were not entitled to mechanics' liens in Minnesota. See Dunham Assoc., Inc. v. Group Investments, Inc., 223 N.W.2d 376 (Minn.1974); Anderson v. Breezy Point Estates, 168 N.W.2d 693 (Minn.1969). The legislature in 1974 included the services of engineers and surveyors in the amendment to Minn. Stat. § 514.01 which read, in relevant part: Whoever performs engineering or land surveying services with respect to real estate, or contributes to the improvement of real estate by performing labor, or furnishing skill, material or machinery for any of the purposes hereinafter stated, * * * shall have a lien upon the improvement, and upon the land on which it is situated * * *. Laws of Minnesota for 1974, c 381, s 1. In addition, the following amendment was made to Minn. Stat. § 514.05: WHEN LIEN ATTACHES; NOTICE. All such liens, as against the owner of the land, shall attach and take effect from the time the first item of material or labor is furnished upon the premises for the beginning of the improvement, and shall be preferred to any mortgage or other encumbrance not then of record, unless the lienholder had actual notice thereof. As against a bona fide purchaser, mortgagee, or encumbrancer without notice, no lien shall attach prior to the actual and visible beginning of the improvement on the ground, but a person having a contract for the furnishing of labor, skill, material, or machinery for the improvement, may file for record with the register of deeds of the county within which the premises are situated, or, if claimed under section 514.04, with the secretary of state, a brief statement of the nature of such contract, which statement shall be notice of his lien. Engineering or land surveying services with respect to real estate shall not constitute the actual and visible beginning of the improvement on the ground referred to in this section, except when such engineering or land surveying services include a visible staking of the premises.

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II. After the case was remanded to the trial court, two nonappealing lien claimants made a motion to have the judgment against them vacated under Minn.R.Civ.P. 60.02(f) (vacation of judgments allowed for reasons which justify relief), arguing that they should be allowed to benefit from the appeal. The trial court granted this motion, denied CMI's motion to affirm the judgment against other nonappealing lien claimants, and stated that all lien claimants who had complied with the mechanics' lien statute, regardless of whether they had appealed, were entitled to benefit from the appeal. A trial court's decision to vacate a judgment is not reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion. Charson v. Temple Israel, 419 N.W.2d 488, 490 (Minn.1988). However, the trial court's decision to vacate the judgment was based upon a question of law, whether the nonappealing lien claimants may benefit from the earlier appeal. Questions of law are reviewed without deference to the trial court. See Frost-Benco Elec. Ass'n v. Minnesota Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 358 N.W.2d 639, 642 (Minn.1984); see also Sorenson v. St. Paul Ramsey Med. Ctr., 457 N.W.2d 188, 190 (Minn.1990) (dismissal based upon question of law subject to de novo review on appeal). Generally, a party who fails to appeal is bound by the lower court's decision. Loram Maintenance of Way, Inc. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 354 N.W.2d 111, 113 (Minn.App. 1984), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 11, 1985). Ordinarily, an interested party who does not appeal from a judgment or order affecting his rights does not benefit by the appeal of another party likewise affected by such judgment or order, but whose interests therein are different from his. In re Guardianship of Hudson's Estate, 235 Minn. 444, 51 N.W.2d 103 (1952). There is an exception to the general rule, but the exception is not as broad as the nonappealing lien claimants argue. They argue that as long as their interests are not adverse to the appealing lien claimants, they should be allowed to benefit from the appeal. We disagree. The exception is limited to situations involving parties with joint interests where only one party appeals an adverse ruling. If the ruling on appeal would place the nonappealing parties in a position worse than before the appeal, the ruling on appeal will apply to all the parties. See Wood v. Cullen, 13 Minn. 394, 13 Gil. 365 (1868). In Wood, one partner of jointly liable partners appealed and won reversal. The court reversed as to all the partners because the judgment could not be reversed without injuring the rights of the partners who did not appeal. Those partners would have to pay the appealing partner's share of the judgment. Therefore, they would be injured because they would be liable for more than they were liable for before the appeal. See id. at 399, 13 Gil. at 370. In re Guardianship of Hudson's Estate, 235 Minn. 444, 51 N.W.2d 103 (1952) did not broaden the exception. In Hudson's Estate, the court found a nonappealing party could not benefit from an appeal by an adverse party. The court distinguished its case from the situation where the parties have joint liability, and pointed out that not only were the parties' interests not joint, they were actually adverse. Id. at 452, 51 N.W.2d at 107-08. Appellant argues that this ruling should be interpreted to mean that whenever the nonappealing parties' interests are not adverse to the appeal party's interests, they benefit from the appeal. We disagree. They receive the benefit only if their interests are *893 so intertwined that they are harmed by the result on appeal. Here, the lien claimants' interests are similar. But they are not joint, and the reversal did not increase the nonappealing lien claimants' liability. The nonappealing lien claimants, if not given the benefit of the appeal, are in the same position they were after the trial court decided the case. They continue to be lower in priority to CMI's construction mortgage. Their liability did not increase after the reversal. They are not harmed by the appeal, therefore they may not benefit from the appeal. We reverse the trial court's order vacating the judgment against the nonappealing claimants. Reversed. HARTEN, Judge (concurring in part, dissenting in part). I agree that the trial court order should be reversed to allow completion of the trial on the issue of priority. Because I believe the trial court correctly allowed the nonappealing lien claimants to benefit from the appeal, however, I respectfully dissent on that issue. I have no quarrel with this court's recognition of the general rule that a party who fails to appeal is bound by the lower court's decision. Loram Maintenance of Way, Inc. v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 354 N.W.2d 111, 113 (Minn.App.1984). Applied to the facts of this case, however, this rule is discordant. In a prior appeal in this case, we decided that initial excavation work constituted a first improvement under Minn. Stat. § 514.05 (1990). The law allows the perfected lien claimants to tack their liens to the first improvement and become coordinate with it. Id. Thus, the subsequent perfected lien claimants' positions are derived from the initial work. Any given lien shares functional equality with any and all the others; any foreclosure recovery is shared prorata. Application of the general rule to forfeit the interests of the nonappealing claimants artificially undermines the statutory scheme. Moreover, the supreme court decision in In re Guardianship of Hudson's Estate, 235 Minn. 444, 51 N.W.2d 103 (1952) suggests a contrary result. In Hudson's Estate, the supreme court terminated the interest of a special guardian who failed to perfect an appeal regarding his incurred fees and expenses. 235 Minn. at 452, 51 N.W.2d at 107. The daughter of the ward, who was interested in the residue of the estate, perfected her appeal. The court stated: [T]he situation [adverse interests of guardian and ward] is not similar to those involving a joint judgment or decree against several parties where the effect of an appeal by one, without concurrence of the others, carries up the whole case so that a reversal inures to the benefit of all. * * * Ordinarily, an interested party who does not appeal from a judgment or order affecting his rights does not benefit by the appeal of another party likewise affected by such judgment or order, but whose interests therein are different from his. Id. at 452, 51 N.W.2d at 107-08 (citations omitted). This is not an ordinary case. The nonappealing claimants here should benefit from the appeal because the appeal inexorably "carried up the whole case" under application of Minn. Stat. § 514.05. I would affirm the trial court's refusal to dismiss the claims of the nonappealing perfected lien claimants. NOTES [1] Respondents Dura Supreme, Inc., Creative Lighting, Inc., Stephen Donnelly Company, Inc., Northwestern Tile and Marble Company, Woodlake Cement Construction Company, and Richfield Plumbing Company.

II. After the case was remanded to the trial court, two nonappealing lien claimants made a motion to have the judgment against them vacated under Minn.R.Civ.P. 60.02(f) (vacation of judgments allowed for reasons which justify relief), arguing that they should be allowed to benefit from the appeal. The trial court granted this motion, denied CMI's motion to affirm the judgment against other nonappealing lien claimants, and stated that all lien claimants who had complied with the mechanics' lien statute, regardless of whether they had appealed, were entitled to benefit from the appeal. A trial court's decision to vacate a judgment is not reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion. Charson v. Temple Israel, 419 N.W.2d 488, 490 (Minn.1988). However, the trial court's decision to vacate the judgment was based upon a question of law, whether the nonappealing lien claimants may benefit from the earlier appeal. Questions of law are reviewed without deference to the trial court. See Frost-Benco Elec. Ass'n v. Minnesota Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 358 N.W.2d 639, 642 (Minn.1984); see also Sorenson v. St. Paul Ramsey Med. Ctr., 457 N.W.2d 188, 190 (Minn.1990) (dismissal based upon question of law subject to de novo review on appeal). Generally, a party who fails to appeal is bound by the lower court's decision. Loram Maintenance of Way, Inc. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 354 N.W.2d 111, 113 (Minn.App. 1984), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 11, 1985). Ordinarily, an interested party who does not appeal from a judgment or order affecting his rights does not benefit by the appeal of another party likewise affected by such judgment or order, but whose interests therein are different from his. In re Guardianship of Hudson's Estate, 235 Minn. 444, 51 N.W.2d 103 (1952). There is an exception to the general rule, but the exception is not as broad as the nonappealing lien claimants argue. They argue that as long as their interests are not adverse to the appealing lien claimants, they should be allowed to benefit from the appeal. We disagree. The exception is limited to situations involving parties with joint interests where only one party appeals an adverse ruling. If the ruling on appeal would place the nonappealing parties in a position worse than before the appeal, the ruling on appeal will apply to all the parties. See Wood v. Cullen, 13 Minn. 394, 13 Gil. 365 (1868). In Wood, one partner of jointly liable partners appealed and won reversal. The court reversed as to all the partners because the judgment could not be reversed without injuring the rights of the partners who did not appeal. Those partners would have to pay the appealing partner's share of the judgment. Therefore, they would be injured because they would be liable for more than they were liable for before the appeal. See id. at 399, 13 Gil. at 370. In re Guardianship of Hudson's Estate, 235 Minn. 444, 51 N.W.2d 103 (1952) did not broaden the exception. In Hudson's Estate, the court found a nonappealing party could not benefit from an appeal by an adverse party. The court distinguished its case from the situation where the parties have joint liability, and pointed out that not only were the parties' interests not joint, they were actually adverse. Id. at 452, 51 N.W.2d at 107-08. Appellant argues that this ruling should be interpreted to mean that whenever the nonappealing parties' interests are not adverse to the appeal party's interests, they benefit from the appeal. We disagree. They receive the benefit only if their interests are *893 so intertwined that they are harmed by the result on appeal. Here, the lien claimants' interests are similar. But they are not joint, and the reversal did not increase the nonappealing lien claimants' liability. The nonappealing lien claimants, if not given the benefit of the appeal, are in the same position they were after the trial court decided the case. They continue to be lower in priority to CMI's construction mortgage. Their liability did not increase after the reversal. They are not harmed by the appeal, therefore they may not benefit from the appeal. We reverse the trial court's order vacating the judgment against the nonappealing claimants. Reversed. HARTEN, Judge (concurring in part, dissenting in part). I agree that the trial court order should be reversed to allow completion of the trial on the issue of priority. Because I believe the trial court correctly allowed the nonappealing lien claimants to benefit from the appeal, however, I respectfully dissent on that issue. I have no quarrel with this court's recognition of the general rule that a party who fails to appeal is bound by the lower court's decision. Loram Maintenance of Way, Inc. v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 354 N.W.2d 111, 113 (Minn.App.1984). Applied to the facts of this case, however, this rule is discordant. In a prior appeal in this case, we decided that initial excavation work constituted a first improvement under Minn. Stat. § 514.05 (1990). The law allows the perfected lien claimants to tack their liens to the first improvement and become coordinate with it. Id. Thus, the subsequent perfected lien claimants' positions are derived from the initial work. Any given lien shares functional equality with any and all the others; any foreclosure recovery is shared prorata. Application of the general rule to forfeit the interests of the nonappealing claimants artificially undermines the statutory scheme. Moreover, the supreme court decision in In re Guardianship of Hudson's Estate, 235 Minn. 444, 51 N.W.2d 103 (1952) suggests a contrary result. In Hudson's Estate, the supreme court terminated the interest of a special guardian who failed to perfect an appeal regarding his incurred fees and expenses. 235 Minn. at 452, 51 N.W.2d at 107. The daughter of the ward, who was interested in the residue of the estate, perfected her appeal. The court stated: [T]he situation [adverse interests of guardian and ward] is not similar to those involving a joint judgment or decree against several parties where the effect of an appeal by one, without concurrence of the others, carries up the whole case so that a reversal inures to the benefit of all. * * * Ordinarily, an interested party who does not appeal from a judgment or order affecting his rights does not benefit by the appeal of another party likewise affected by such judgment or order, but whose interests therein are different from his. Id. at 452, 51 N.W.2d at 107-08 (citations omitted). This is not an ordinary case. The nonappealing claimants here should benefit from the appeal because the appeal inexorably "carried up the whole case" under application of Minn. Stat. § 514.05. I would affirm the trial court's refusal to dismiss the claims of the nonappealing perfected lien claimants. NOTES [1] Respondents Dura Supreme, Inc., Creative Lighting, Inc., Stephen Donnelly Company, Inc., Northwestern Tile and Marble Company, Woodlake Cement Construction Company, and Richfield Plumbing Company.

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Where the facts are not in dispute, this court need not give deference to the trial court’s decision on matters of law. Hubred v. Control Data Corp., 442 N.W.2d 308, 310 (Minn.1989). The parties do not dispute the facts, only the application of Minn. Stat. § 514.05 (1986), which provides that:

Where the facts are not in dispute, this court need not give deference to the trial court’s decision on matters of law. Hubred v. Control Data Corp., 442 N.W.2d 308, 310 (Minn.1989). The parties do not dispute the facts, only the application of Minn. Stat. § 514.05 (1986), which provides that:

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