§ 514.12

Ryan Contracting Company v. O'Neill & Murphy, LLP · 2016 1 citation

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Odunlade v. City of Minneapolis · 2012 1 citation [Dissent]

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Eclipse Architectural Group, Inc. v. Lam · 2012 1 citation

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Premier Bank v. BECKER DEVELOPMENT, LLC · 2010 1 citation

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Mavco, Inc. v. Eggink · 2007 8 citations

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Ryan Contracting, Inc. v. Jag Investments, Inc. · 2001 24 citations

OPINION LANCASTER, Justice. Appellant JAG Investments, Inc. appeals from the court of appeals' decision affirming the district court's denial of JAG's motion for summary judgment. JAG asks us to reverse the court of appeals' holding that respondent Ryan Contracting, Inc. effectively served JAG in a mechanics' lien action even though Ryan failed to serve JAG within the one-year time limit imposed by Minn. Stat. § 514.12, subd. 3 (2000). JAG also contends that the court of appeals erred when it failed to dismiss respondent GMH Asphalt Corporation's cross-claim against JAG because Ryan never effectively served JAG and because GMH's cross-claim does not stand on independent jurisdictional grounds. In short, JAG asks this court to reverse the court of appeals' decision and dismiss respondents' mechanics' lien actions for lack of personal jurisdiction. We agree that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over JAG and reverse. In April 1997, Jagodzinski Development Corporation (JDC) hired Ryan to perform clearing, grading, sewer and water main installation, and street construction for the Fairway Hills residential development project in Chaska, Minnesota. JDC is a Minnesota corporation whose president and sole shareholder is Joe Jagodzinski. JAG is a Minnesota investment company that owned much of the Fairway Hills property that JDC planned to develop.[1] Jim Jagodzinski is JAG's sole shareholder and Joe Jagodzinski's father. Ryan subcontracted with GMH to perform street and paving work. On April 8, 1998, Ryan served and filed a mechanics' lien against the Fairway Hills property to recover amounts allegedly due from JDC. The lien listed Ryan's last day of work as December 16, 1997. Ryan, however, claims that it performed additional work after the lien was filed and that its actual last day of work was September 13, 1998. On December 4, 1998, Ryan filed a lawsuit to foreclose on its lien.[2] Ryan personally served JDC on the same day by serving the summons and complaint on Joe Jagodzinski. Ryan did not personally serve JAG at this point.[3] Nonetheless, *180 JAG served Ryan with an answer on December 23, 1998, and raised the affirmative defense of lack of personal jurisdiction, asserting that Ryan failed to serve JAG within the one-year time limit imposed by section 514.12, subd. 3, of the mechanics' lien statutes. According to JAG, the one-year limit expired on December 16, 1998, because Ryan stated in its lien statement that it last performed work on December 16, 1997. On December 28, 1998, GMH, also named as a defendant in Ryan's complaint, filed its answer and asserted a cross-claim against JAG in an attempt to foreclose its own mechanics' lien.[4] GMH mailed a copy of its answer to JAG's attorney on December 28, 1998. On July 15, 1999, JAG, JDC, and other defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. In the memorandum of law supporting that motion, JAG argued for the dismissal of Ryan's complaint and release of JAG's property from Ryan's and GMH's mechanics' liens based on lack of personal jurisdiction. JAG also argued for summary judgment based on the merits of the claim. In August 1999, Ryan personally served JAG. We note that both Ryan and JAG seem to agree that JAG, not JDC, was the owner of the Fairway Hills property. Ryan alleged as much in its complaint and JAG admitted so in its answer. However, in Ryan's mechanics' lien statement, it alleged that JAG, JDC, and Joe Jagodzinski were the "present owners of the [p]remises," and in two other documents submitted to the court attached to Joe Jagodzinski's affidavit, JDC was designated as the owner of the premises. For purposes of this appeal, however, we will assume that JAG is the owner of the property; as owner, JAG is an essential defendant to Ryan's lien action because mechanics' liens attach to property interests. Dunham Assocs. v. Group Invs., Inc., 301 Minn. 108, 118, 223 N.W.2d 376, 383 (1974). Whether JDC may have a property interest in Fairway Hills is a question properly left to the district court in Ryan's and GMH's claims against JDC; it was not raised to this court and JDC is not a party to this appeal. On September 21, 1999, the district court held that it had personal jurisdiction over JAG even though it concluded that it is "undisputed that [Ryan] never served [JAG] * * * individually with the Summons and Complaint during" the one-year time limit of section 514.12, subd. 3. The court noted that December 16, 1997, was Ryan's last day of work and therefore Ryan had until December 16, 1998, to serve JAG. Ryan served JDC by the deadline, but did not individually serve JAG until August 1999. In deciding that Ryan effectively served JAG and that JAG was "properly `made a party'" to Ryan's lien action, the district court relied on an alternative theory of service: [B]oth [Ryan] and GMH Asphalt argue that the lien foreclosures are still valid. [JAG] has appeared and participated in every aspect of this case. In addition, Defendant JDC and [JAG] are undertaking the development of the subject property as a "joint venture" and * * * the attorney representing all of the JAG, [et al.] Defendants was served and did file answers and responsive papers on behalf of his clients. Furthermore, the action itself, which names [JAG as a party], was commenced within the required time period. For these reasons, *181 [Ryan] and GMH argue that property owners have been made party to the action. The Court agrees and finds that, based on all the reasons just discussed, [JAG is a] legitimate part[y] to this action. * * * Thus, [JAG is] subject to judgment on the foreclosure of the mechanic's liens and the motion for summary judgment on this point is denied. In a published opinion, the court of appeals agreed with the district court's analysis. It held that "[s]ervice of process on JAG was effective because JAG's joint-venture partner was properly served, JAG received actual notice, and JAG was not prejudiced." Ryan Contracting, Inc. v. JAG Invs., Inc., 609 N.W.2d 642, 647 (Minn. App.2000). The court of appeals held that, because the district court had personal jurisdiction over JAG in Ryan's lien action, the district court also had personal jurisdiction over JAG in GMH's lien action.[5]Id. at 646 n. 3. JAG appealed. Generally, an order denying a motion for summary judgment is not appealable. McGowan v. Our Savior's Lutheran Church, 527 N.W.2d 830, 832 (Minn.1995). However, there are exceptions to that general rule; for instance, a denial of a motion for summary judgment based on lack of personal jurisdiction is immediately appealable. Id. On appeal from a denial of summary judgment, we determine whether any genuine issues of material fact remain and whether the district court erred in applying the law. See Zank v. Larson, 552 N.W.2d 719, 721 (Minn.1996). Specifically, this case requires us to consider whether service of process was effectuated and therefore whether the district court had personal jurisdiction over JAG. Whether personal jurisdiction exists is a question of law, which we review de novo. Patterson v. Wu Family Corp., 608 N.W.2d 863, 866 (Minn.2000). In this case, whether personal jurisdiction exists will depend in part on a construction of the mechanics' lien statutes. Statutory construction is also a question of law which we review de novo. State v. Ambaye, 616 N.W.2d 256, 258 (Minn.2000). The mechanics' lien statutes set forth the requirements for commencing a lien action, including a time limit within which the action must be commenced. The lien statutes govern the procedural requirements for initiating and maintaining a mechanics' lien action insofar as they are inconsistent with or in conflict with the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure. Minn. R. Civ. P. 81.01(a) & App. A. Under the lien statutes, an action may be commenced by any lienholder who has filed a lien statement for record and served a copy thereof on the owner pursuant to section 514.08, and all other such lienholders shall be made defendants therein. The summons shall state that the complaint has been filed with the court administrator and shall be of no effect unless such complaint be in fact so filed. Minn. Stat. § 514.11. The mechanics' lien statutes also provide a one-year time limit on the commencement of the action: No lien shall be enforced in any case unless the holder thereof shall assert the same, either by filing a complaint or answer with the court administrator, within one year after the date of the last item of the claim as set forth in the recorded lien statement; and, no person *182 shall be bound by any judgment in such action unless made a party thereto within the year * * *. Minn. Stat. § 514.12, subd. 3 (emphasis added). This one-year time limit is at the center of this dispute.

OPINION LANCASTER, Justice. Appellant JAG Investments, Inc. appeals from the court of appeals' decision affirming the district court's denial of JAG's motion for summary judgment. JAG asks us to reverse the court of appeals' holding that respondent Ryan Contracting, Inc. effectively served JAG in a mechanics' lien action even though Ryan failed to serve JAG within the one-year time limit imposed by Minn. Stat. § 514.12, subd. 3 (2000). JAG also contends that the court of appeals erred when it failed to dismiss respondent GMH Asphalt Corporation's cross-claim against JAG because Ryan never effectively served JAG and because GMH's cross-claim does not stand on independent jurisdictional grounds. In short, JAG asks this court to reverse the court of appeals' decision and dismiss respondents' mechanics' lien actions for lack of personal jurisdiction. We agree that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over JAG and reverse. In April 1997, Jagodzinski Development Corporation (JDC) hired Ryan to perform clearing, grading, sewer and water main installation, and street construction for the Fairway Hills residential development project in Chaska, Minnesota. JDC is a Minnesota corporation whose president and sole shareholder is Joe Jagodzinski. JAG is a Minnesota investment company that owned much of the Fairway Hills property that JDC planned to develop.[1] Jim Jagodzinski is JAG's sole shareholder and Joe Jagodzinski's father. Ryan subcontracted with GMH to perform street and paving work. On April 8, 1998, Ryan served and filed a mechanics' lien against the Fairway Hills property to recover amounts allegedly due from JDC. The lien listed Ryan's last day of work as December 16, 1997. Ryan, however, claims that it performed additional work after the lien was filed and that its actual last day of work was September 13, 1998. On December 4, 1998, Ryan filed a lawsuit to foreclose on its lien.[2] Ryan personally served JDC on the same day by serving the summons and complaint on Joe Jagodzinski. Ryan did not personally serve JAG at this point.[3] Nonetheless, *180 JAG served Ryan with an answer on December 23, 1998, and raised the affirmative defense of lack of personal jurisdiction, asserting that Ryan failed to serve JAG within the one-year time limit imposed by section 514.12, subd. 3, of the mechanics' lien statutes. According to JAG, the one-year limit expired on December 16, 1998, because Ryan stated in its lien statement that it last performed work on December 16, 1997. On December 28, 1998, GMH, also named as a defendant in Ryan's complaint, filed its answer and asserted a cross-claim against JAG in an attempt to foreclose its own mechanics' lien.[4] GMH mailed a copy of its answer to JAG's attorney on December 28, 1998. On July 15, 1999, JAG, JDC, and other defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. In the memorandum of law supporting that motion, JAG argued for the dismissal of Ryan's complaint and release of JAG's property from Ryan's and GMH's mechanics' liens based on lack of personal jurisdiction. JAG also argued for summary judgment based on the merits of the claim. In August 1999, Ryan personally served JAG. We note that both Ryan and JAG seem to agree that JAG, not JDC, was the owner of the Fairway Hills property. Ryan alleged as much in its complaint and JAG admitted so in its answer. However, in Ryan's mechanics' lien statement, it alleged that JAG, JDC, and Joe Jagodzinski were the "present owners of the [p]remises," and in two other documents submitted to the court attached to Joe Jagodzinski's affidavit, JDC was designated as the owner of the premises. For purposes of this appeal, however, we will assume that JAG is the owner of the property; as owner, JAG is an essential defendant to Ryan's lien action because mechanics' liens attach to property interests. Dunham Assocs. v. Group Invs., Inc., 301 Minn. 108, 118, 223 N.W.2d 376, 383 (1974). Whether JDC may have a property interest in Fairway Hills is a question properly left to the district court in Ryan's and GMH's claims against JDC; it was not raised to this court and JDC is not a party to this appeal. On September 21, 1999, the district court held that it had personal jurisdiction over JAG even though it concluded that it is "undisputed that [Ryan] never served [JAG] * * * individually with the Summons and Complaint during" the one-year time limit of section 514.12, subd. 3. The court noted that December 16, 1997, was Ryan's last day of work and therefore Ryan had until December 16, 1998, to serve JAG. Ryan served JDC by the deadline, but did not individually serve JAG until August 1999. In deciding that Ryan effectively served JAG and that JAG was "properly `made a party'" to Ryan's lien action, the district court relied on an alternative theory of service: [B]oth [Ryan] and GMH Asphalt argue that the lien foreclosures are still valid. [JAG] has appeared and participated in every aspect of this case. In addition, Defendant JDC and [JAG] are undertaking the development of the subject property as a "joint venture" and * * * the attorney representing all of the JAG, [et al.] Defendants was served and did file answers and responsive papers on behalf of his clients. Furthermore, the action itself, which names [JAG as a party], was commenced within the required time period. For these reasons, *181 [Ryan] and GMH argue that property owners have been made party to the action. The Court agrees and finds that, based on all the reasons just discussed, [JAG is a] legitimate part[y] to this action. * * * Thus, [JAG is] subject to judgment on the foreclosure of the mechanic's liens and the motion for summary judgment on this point is denied. In a published opinion, the court of appeals agreed with the district court's analysis. It held that "[s]ervice of process on JAG was effective because JAG's joint-venture partner was properly served, JAG received actual notice, and JAG was not prejudiced." Ryan Contracting, Inc. v. JAG Invs., Inc., 609 N.W.2d 642, 647 (Minn. App.2000). The court of appeals held that, because the district court had personal jurisdiction over JAG in Ryan's lien action, the district court also had personal jurisdiction over JAG in GMH's lien action.[5]Id. at 646 n. 3. JAG appealed. Generally, an order denying a motion for summary judgment is not appealable. McGowan v. Our Savior's Lutheran Church, 527 N.W.2d 830, 832 (Minn.1995). However, there are exceptions to that general rule; for instance, a denial of a motion for summary judgment based on lack of personal jurisdiction is immediately appealable. Id. On appeal from a denial of summary judgment, we determine whether any genuine issues of material fact remain and whether the district court erred in applying the law. See Zank v. Larson, 552 N.W.2d 719, 721 (Minn.1996). Specifically, this case requires us to consider whether service of process was effectuated and therefore whether the district court had personal jurisdiction over JAG. Whether personal jurisdiction exists is a question of law, which we review de novo. Patterson v. Wu Family Corp., 608 N.W.2d 863, 866 (Minn.2000). In this case, whether personal jurisdiction exists will depend in part on a construction of the mechanics' lien statutes. Statutory construction is also a question of law which we review de novo. State v. Ambaye, 616 N.W.2d 256, 258 (Minn.2000). The mechanics' lien statutes set forth the requirements for commencing a lien action, including a time limit within which the action must be commenced. The lien statutes govern the procedural requirements for initiating and maintaining a mechanics' lien action insofar as they are inconsistent with or in conflict with the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure. Minn. R. Civ. P. 81.01(a) & App. A. Under the lien statutes, an action may be commenced by any lienholder who has filed a lien statement for record and served a copy thereof on the owner pursuant to section 514.08, and all other such lienholders shall be made defendants therein. The summons shall state that the complaint has been filed with the court administrator and shall be of no effect unless such complaint be in fact so filed. Minn. Stat. § 514.11. The mechanics' lien statutes also provide a one-year time limit on the commencement of the action: No lien shall be enforced in any case unless the holder thereof shall assert the same, either by filing a complaint or answer with the court administrator, within one year after the date of the last item of the claim as set forth in the recorded lien statement; and, no person *182 shall be bound by any judgment in such action unless made a party thereto within the year * * *. Minn. Stat. § 514.12, subd. 3 (emphasis added). This one-year time limit is at the center of this dispute.

OPINION LANCASTER, Justice. Appellant JAG Investments, Inc. appeals from the court of appeals' decision affirming the district court's denial of JAG's motion for summary judgment. JAG asks us to reverse the court of appeals' holding that respondent Ryan Contracting, Inc. effectively served JAG in a mechanics' lien action even though Ryan failed to serve JAG within the one-year time limit imposed by Minn. Stat. § 514.12, subd. 3 (2000). JAG also contends that the court of appeals erred when it failed to dismiss respondent GMH Asphalt Corporation's cross-claim against JAG because Ryan never effectively served JAG and because GMH's cross-claim does not stand on independent jurisdictional grounds. In short, JAG asks this court to reverse the court of appeals' decision and dismiss respondents' mechanics' lien actions for lack of personal jurisdiction. We agree that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over JAG and reverse. In April 1997, Jagodzinski Development Corporation (JDC) hired Ryan to perform clearing, grading, sewer and water main installation, and street construction for the Fairway Hills residential development project in Chaska, Minnesota. JDC is a Minnesota corporation whose president and sole shareholder is Joe Jagodzinski. JAG is a Minnesota investment company that owned much of the Fairway Hills property that JDC planned to develop.[1] Jim Jagodzinski is JAG's sole shareholder and Joe Jagodzinski's father. Ryan subcontracted with GMH to perform street and paving work. On April 8, 1998, Ryan served and filed a mechanics' lien against the Fairway Hills property to recover amounts allegedly due from JDC. The lien listed Ryan's last day of work as December 16, 1997. Ryan, however, claims that it performed additional work after the lien was filed and that its actual last day of work was September 13, 1998. On December 4, 1998, Ryan filed a lawsuit to foreclose on its lien.[2] Ryan personally served JDC on the same day by serving the summons and complaint on Joe Jagodzinski. Ryan did not personally serve JAG at this point.[3] Nonetheless, *180 JAG served Ryan with an answer on December 23, 1998, and raised the affirmative defense of lack of personal jurisdiction, asserting that Ryan failed to serve JAG within the one-year time limit imposed by section 514.12, subd. 3, of the mechanics' lien statutes. According to JAG, the one-year limit expired on December 16, 1998, because Ryan stated in its lien statement that it last performed work on December 16, 1997. On December 28, 1998, GMH, also named as a defendant in Ryan's complaint, filed its answer and asserted a cross-claim against JAG in an attempt to foreclose its own mechanics' lien.[4] GMH mailed a copy of its answer to JAG's attorney on December 28, 1998. On July 15, 1999, JAG, JDC, and other defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. In the memorandum of law supporting that motion, JAG argued for the dismissal of Ryan's complaint and release of JAG's property from Ryan's and GMH's mechanics' liens based on lack of personal jurisdiction. JAG also argued for summary judgment based on the merits of the claim. In August 1999, Ryan personally served JAG. We note that both Ryan and JAG seem to agree that JAG, not JDC, was the owner of the Fairway Hills property. Ryan alleged as much in its complaint and JAG admitted so in its answer. However, in Ryan's mechanics' lien statement, it alleged that JAG, JDC, and Joe Jagodzinski were the "present owners of the [p]remises," and in two other documents submitted to the court attached to Joe Jagodzinski's affidavit, JDC was designated as the owner of the premises. For purposes of this appeal, however, we will assume that JAG is the owner of the property; as owner, JAG is an essential defendant to Ryan's lien action because mechanics' liens attach to property interests. Dunham Assocs. v. Group Invs., Inc., 301 Minn. 108, 118, 223 N.W.2d 376, 383 (1974). Whether JDC may have a property interest in Fairway Hills is a question properly left to the district court in Ryan's and GMH's claims against JDC; it was not raised to this court and JDC is not a party to this appeal. On September 21, 1999, the district court held that it had personal jurisdiction over JAG even though it concluded that it is "undisputed that [Ryan] never served [JAG] * * * individually with the Summons and Complaint during" the one-year time limit of section 514.12, subd. 3. The court noted that December 16, 1997, was Ryan's last day of work and therefore Ryan had until December 16, 1998, to serve JAG. Ryan served JDC by the deadline, but did not individually serve JAG until August 1999. In deciding that Ryan effectively served JAG and that JAG was "properly `made a party'" to Ryan's lien action, the district court relied on an alternative theory of service: [B]oth [Ryan] and GMH Asphalt argue that the lien foreclosures are still valid. [JAG] has appeared and participated in every aspect of this case. In addition, Defendant JDC and [JAG] are undertaking the development of the subject property as a "joint venture" and * * * the attorney representing all of the JAG, [et al.] Defendants was served and did file answers and responsive papers on behalf of his clients. Furthermore, the action itself, which names [JAG as a party], was commenced within the required time period. For these reasons, *181 [Ryan] and GMH argue that property owners have been made party to the action. The Court agrees and finds that, based on all the reasons just discussed, [JAG is a] legitimate part[y] to this action. * * * Thus, [JAG is] subject to judgment on the foreclosure of the mechanic's liens and the motion for summary judgment on this point is denied. In a published opinion, the court of appeals agreed with the district court's analysis. It held that "[s]ervice of process on JAG was effective because JAG's joint-venture partner was properly served, JAG received actual notice, and JAG was not prejudiced." Ryan Contracting, Inc. v. JAG Invs., Inc., 609 N.W.2d 642, 647 (Minn. App.2000). The court of appeals held that, because the district court had personal jurisdiction over JAG in Ryan's lien action, the district court also had personal jurisdiction over JAG in GMH's lien action.[5]Id. at 646 n. 3. JAG appealed. Generally, an order denying a motion for summary judgment is not appealable. McGowan v. Our Savior's Lutheran Church, 527 N.W.2d 830, 832 (Minn.1995). However, there are exceptions to that general rule; for instance, a denial of a motion for summary judgment based on lack of personal jurisdiction is immediately appealable. Id. On appeal from a denial of summary judgment, we determine whether any genuine issues of material fact remain and whether the district court erred in applying the law. See Zank v. Larson, 552 N.W.2d 719, 721 (Minn.1996). Specifically, this case requires us to consider whether service of process was effectuated and therefore whether the district court had personal jurisdiction over JAG. Whether personal jurisdiction exists is a question of law, which we review de novo. Patterson v. Wu Family Corp., 608 N.W.2d 863, 866 (Minn.2000). In this case, whether personal jurisdiction exists will depend in part on a construction of the mechanics' lien statutes. Statutory construction is also a question of law which we review de novo. State v. Ambaye, 616 N.W.2d 256, 258 (Minn.2000). The mechanics' lien statutes set forth the requirements for commencing a lien action, including a time limit within which the action must be commenced. The lien statutes govern the procedural requirements for initiating and maintaining a mechanics' lien action insofar as they are inconsistent with or in conflict with the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure. Minn. R. Civ. P. 81.01(a) & App. A. Under the lien statutes, an action may be commenced by any lienholder who has filed a lien statement for record and served a copy thereof on the owner pursuant to section 514.08, and all other such lienholders shall be made defendants therein. The summons shall state that the complaint has been filed with the court administrator and shall be of no effect unless such complaint be in fact so filed. Minn. Stat. § 514.11. The mechanics' lien statutes also provide a one-year time limit on the commencement of the action: No lien shall be enforced in any case unless the holder thereof shall assert the same, either by filing a complaint or answer with the court administrator, within one year after the date of the last item of the claim as set forth in the recorded lien statement; and, no person *182 shall be bound by any judgment in such action unless made a party thereto within the year * * *. Minn. Stat. § 514.12, subd. 3 (emphasis added). This one-year time limit is at the center of this dispute.

+ 21 more citations in this opinion.

Mavco, Inc. v. Eggink · 2006 23 citations

+ 23 more citations in this opinion.

Ryan Contracting, Inc. v. JAG INVESTMENTS, INC. · 2000 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

J.W. Hulme Co. v. Reiling · 1989 3 citations

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

Thompson Plumbing Co. v. J.E.C., Inc. · 1988 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Marque Plumbing, Inc. v. Barris · 1986 1 citation [Concurrence]

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

RB Thompson, Jr. Lumber v. Windsor Dev. · 1986 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Marque Plumbing, Inc. v. Barris · 1986 2 citations

DECISION Subcontractor's appeal is not moot when, as a result of its failure to post a supersedeas bond at one and one-half times the amount of the lien claim, the trial court discharged the mechanic's lien and lis pendens. The trial court properly granted summary judgment for respondents when the subcontractor failed to serve its post-lien statement on the legal owner of record or on any person with an interest in the property. Affirmed. FOLEY, Judge (concurring specially). Although I concur in the majority's resolution on the merits of the case, I would dismiss the appeal as moot. It is well established that if pending an appeal, an event occurs which renders it impossible to grant any relief or which makes a decision unnecessary, the appeal will be dismissed. In re Township of Glendale, Scott County, 288 Minn. 340, 343, 180 N.W.2d 925, 927 (1970); Barnes v. Macken, 252 Minn. 412, 415, 90 N.W.2d 222, 226 (1958). Further, decisions by a court "should be limited to real controversies involving existing facts and rights asserted thereunder." Dehning v. Marshall Produce Co., 215 Minn. 339, 340, 10 N.W.2d 229, 229 (Minn.1943). *180 A supersedeas bond is not a prerequisite to securing appellate review. Tourville v. Tourville, 289 Minn. 544, 185 N.W.2d 281 (1971). Rule 108.01 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure provides that proceedings in the trial court shall be stayed and save all the rights thereby affected if the appellant posts a supersedeas bond "in the amount and form which the trial court shall order and approve * * *." Moreover, upon motion, the trial court has the discretion to require the filing of a supersedeas bond "if it determines that the provisions of Rule 108 do not provide adequate security to the respondent." Minn. R.Civ.App.P. 108.01, subd. 7. See State v. Northern Pacific Railway Co., 221 Minn. 400, 22 N.W.2d 569 (1946). Here, appellant was required to file a supersedeas bond equal to 1½ times the amount of each lien claim. Appellant refused to do this despite this court's July 30, 1985 order denying appellant's motion to reduce or vacate the bond as excessive under Sisto v. Housing and Redevelopment Authority of Duluth, 258 Minn. 391, 104 N.W.2d 529 (1960). Further, appellant's petition for review of this decision to the supreme court was denied. Appellant's claim that the trial court was without jurisdiction to discharge the lis pendens is similarly without merit. In Scofield v. Scheaffer, 104 Minn. 127, 116 N.W. 211 (1908), the trial court retained jurisdiction for purposes of executing a judgment when the appellant failed to file a supersedeas bond. Appellant should not be heard to complain when its own inaction vested the trial court with the power to discharge the lis pendens during pendency of the appeal. Minn. Stat. § 514.08 (1982) provides in part: The lien shall cease at the end of 90 days after doing the last of such work, or furnishing the last item of such skill, material, or machinery, unless within such period: (1) A statement of the claim therefor, be filed with the county recorder of the county in which the improved premises are situated, * * *. The logical import of this provision is that once a lien statement is filed of record, it must be maintained of record after that time. Failure to do so is a fatal defect to a continuing claim that a mechanics lien exists. In reference to the lis pendens, Minn. Stat. § 514.12, subd. 3 (1982) provides in part: [A]s to a bona fide purchaser, mortgagee, or encumbrancer without notice, the absence from the record of a notice of lis pendens of an action after the expiration of the year in which the lien could be so asserted shall be conclusive evidence that the lien may no longer be enforced * * *. Since both the mechanic's lien and the lis pendens were discharged on October 9, 1985, appellant no longer has a basis for enforcement of his claim. The issues are moot and the case should therefore be dismissed. NOTES [1] The 1982 version of the mechanic's lien statute is applicable to this case. The current version of the statute provides that the lien ceases at the end of 120 days after the last item of work or material is provided. See Minn. Stat. § 514.08, subd. 1 (1984).

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

AAA Electric & Neon Service, Inc. v. R-Design Co. · 1985 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Enviro-Fab, Inc. v. Blandin Paper Co. · 1984 1 citation

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In Re Zachman Homes, Inc. · 1984 2 citations

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Victoria Grain Co. of Manneapolis v. Janesville Elevator Construction, Inc. (In Re Victoria Grain Co.) · 1984 4 citations

+ 4 more citations in this opinion.