Minn. Stat. § 518.003
Citing Cases (96)
Minnesota Supreme Court
Gill v. Gill · 2018 19 citations
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Lee v. Lee · 2009 23 citations
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Marriage of Frauenshuh v. Giese · 1999 2 citations
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Marriage of Ayers v. Ayers · 1993 1 citation
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Larson v. Dunn · 1990 2 citations
Public Policy: In analyzing the important public policies raised by this case, we should consider, inter alia, the following factors: a.) respect for unappealed court orders regarding custody; b.) a recognized need for compensation; c.) historical developments in related tort law; d.) the moral aspects of the defendant's conduct; and e.) the prevention and punishment aspects of liability. See W. Prosser & W. Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts § 4, at 20-26 (5th ed.1984). Larson was deprived of his parental rights for seven years in clear violation of the custody decree. Similarly, Jessica was denied the right to a relationship *48 with her father during a critical stage in her development. Although this precious lost time can never be regained, some form of redress undoubtedly is in order. Tort law long has protected "relational" interests, such as between family members, from interference. Prosser & Keeton, supra, § 124, at 915; see, e.g., In re Parks, 267 Minn. 468, 127 N.W.2d 548 (1964); Miller v. Monsen, 228 Minn. 400, 37 N.W.2d 543 (1949) (holding child could bring action for enticement of parent). In 1978, however, our legislature abolished alienation of affection and other "heart balm" actions because they "have been subject to grave abuses." Act of March 23, 1978, ch. 515, §§ 1, 2, 1978 Minn.Laws 141, 141, codified at Minn. Stat. §§ 553.01; 553.02 (1988); see Bock v. Lindquist, 278 N.W.2d 326, 327 (Minn.1979) (refusing to recognize a cause of action by a parent against relatives for alienation of a child's affections). These limitations are distinguishable because, with the custody tort, "the interference with family relations is accomplished by means of some independent tort, such as fraud * * *." Prosser & Keeton, supra, § 124, at 930; see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 699 (1977) ("Restatement") (parent has no action for mere alienation of child's affections). Indeed, Larson also pleaded fraud as a cause of action and, in support of the interference action, claims the Rigenhagens and Olson gave fraudulent information to authorities and in court documents. This litigation has precipitated bitter accusations and contradictory affidavits. Unfortunately, such personal disputes are common today and the parent-child relationship is increasingly threatened by family members. Cf. Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595, 601 (Minn.1980) (abolishing parent-child immunity). Child abduction has become a recurring scenario on the family law landscape, and such situations, where the parties' actions are motivated by runaway emotions, have evolved into a disturbing social trend. Indeed, about 100,000 to 750,000 parental child kidnappings occur each year, and the abducting parent often is aided by relatives and friends. Larson, 449 N.W.2d at 754 (citing authority). The Rigenhagens argue tort liability will have little deterrent effect where, as here, the alleged interferers believe their actions were "morally right." Loree Dunn, however, neither appealed the custody order nor petitioned for a change of custody, as is required once custody has been established, Morey v. Peppin, 375 N.W.2d 19, 25 (Minn.1985), but instead fled the state with Jessica. The custody decree vests the custodial parent with certain rights, including the right to determine the child's upbringing, education, health care, and religious training. Minn. Stat. §§ 518.003, subd. 3(a); 518.176, subd. 1 (1988). These rights should be legally protected against intentional interference. See Minn. Const. art. 1, § 8 (everyone entitled to remedy for wrongs to "person, property or character"). No party is above the law and resort to such self-help measures is not justified. As the majority notes, the legal system may not be the best arena to settle personal, family disputes. Yet, the familial relationships were already wounded by the divorce and kidnapping before this action was brought. Depriving the victimized parent of a forum for redress, then, will not necessarily promote the family's healing. Further, a parent's right to custody has been likened to a constitutional inalienable right. State v. Whaley, 246 Minn. 535, 547-48, 75 N.W.2d 786, 794 (1956). Not only is the conduct alleged in violation of this right particularly egregious, but it was done in arrogant defiance of the sanctity of court orders. The majority does not indicate how best interests of the child are served by condoning this type of activity. State legislatures have responded to this crisis by enacting the UCCJ, designed to prevent kidnapping aimed at forum shopping in hopes of gaining custody of the child. See Minn. Stat. § 518A.01 (1988). Redress also has been initiated at the federal level. See Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, Pub.L. No. 96-611, 94 Stat. 3566 (codified in scattered sections of 18, 28 & 42 U.S.C.); 18 U.S.C.A. § 1073 (West 1976 & Supp.1989) (criminal penalty for parental kidnapping). Under Minnesota's current criminal code, to which Dunn *49 apparently pleaded guilty, it is a felony to intentionally deprive another of custodial or parental rights. Minn. Stat. § 609.26 (1988 & Supp.1989). The statute, however, only provides for a discretionary award of costs incurred in recovering the child and does not allow compensation for other damages resulting from the kidnapping. Id. at subd. 4. This court, however, is in a position to fill the gaps left by the laws in this area. See Prosser & Keeton, supra, § 3, at 19. The judiciary has broad discretion to protect custodial and visitation rights. See Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 3 (custodial parent may not move child out-state if intent is to interfere with visitation rights) & subd. 4 (contempt of court for unwarranted denial of or interference with visitation rights) (1988); id. at § 518.176 (judicial supervision of custody and visitation terms); see, e.g., Tischendorf v. Tischendorf, 321 N.W.2d 405, 412 (Minn.1982) (approving requirement that noncustodial parent post bond and provide transportation for adult companion to secure return of child to custodial parent after foreign visits), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1037, 103 S.Ct. 1426, 75 L.Ed.2d 787 (1983). By limiting the frequency and circumstances under which custodial modification may be made, the legislature acknowledges the importance of maintaining a consistent and stable custody situation. See Minn. Stat. § 518.18 (1988). The fact that alienation of affection actions are not viable does not "diminish[] other remedies for interference with familial relationships * * *." Bock, 278 N.W.2d at 328. Indeed, liability for custodial interference appears to be the national trend. Larson, 449 N.W.2d at 755 n. 3 & 4.[1] The unifying thread running through these cases is the tacit recognition that a parent has an enforceable interest in the care and custody of a minor child.
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Minnesota Court of Appeals
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and residence of the child.” Id. (citing Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3(c) (2016)). The
and residence of the child.” Id. (citing Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3(c) (2016)). The
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the marriage.” Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3b(b) (2022). For property acquired before
the marriage.” Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3b(b) (2022). For property acquired before
exchange for property with marital and nonmarital characteristics. See Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3b(c); Schmitz, 309 N.W.2d at 750.
Madden v. Madden · 2019 1 citation
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Christensen v. Healey · 2017 3 citations
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the child’s upbringing, including education, health care, and religious training.” Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3(b) (2014). When one parent has requested joint legal custody,
spouse during their marriage and before the valuation date. Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd.
spouse during their marriage and before the valuation date. Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd.
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In re the Matter of: Emily M. Pederson v. Scott H. Meyer · 2016 1 citation
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In re the Marriage of: Rachel Lynn Rogers v. David Matthew Rogers · 2016 1 citation
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In re the Marriage of: Sonya Sebring Stylos v. Lee Stylos · 2016 1 citation
(quoting Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3a (2008)). Minn. Stat. § 518.552 specifies eight
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In re the Marriage of: Reno L. Brandt v. Jessie J. Johnson, f/k/a Jessie J. Brandt · 2016 1 citation
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In re the Marriage of: Matthew John Miller v. Jody Lynn Bichrt · 2016 1 citation
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In re the Marriage of: Stephanie Kay Nelson v. Steven John Nelson · 2016 1 citation
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In re the Marriage of: Emily-Jean Chinwendu Aguocha v. Ikechukwu Hisa Aguocha · 2016 2 citations
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In re the Matter of: Jesse Eugene Schultz v. Christie Jo Ruff · 2015 1 citation
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v. Lee, 775 N.W.2d 631, 639−42 (Minn. 2009); see Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3a
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I. Wife first argues that the district court erred as a matter of law when it held that the appreciation of husband's premarital retirement funds is nonmarital property. Whether property is marital or nonmarital is a question of law over which we exercise de novo review. Gottsacker v. Gottsacker, 664 N.W.2d 848, 852 (Minn. 2003). But in doing so, we defer to the district court's findings of fact. Id. Marital property is "property, real or personal, including vested public or private pension plan benefits or rights, acquired by the parties, or either of them, to a dissolution . . . proceeding at any time during the existence of the marriage." Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3b (2006) (codified at Minn. Stat. § 518.54, subd. 5 (2004)). All property acquired by either spouse during the marriage is presumed to be marital property. Id. To overcome this presumption, a spouse must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the property is nonmarital. Crosby v. Crosby, 587 N.W.2d 292, 296 (Minn.App. 1998), review denied (Minn. Feb. 18, 1999). Nonmarital property includes property acquired by either spouse before marriage and any increase in the value thereof, Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3b, provided such an increase is the result of passive appreciation, Gottsacker, 664 N.W.2d at 853 (citing Nardini v. Nardini, 414 N.W.2d 184, 193 (Minn. 1987)); Swick v. Swick, 467 N.W.2d 328, 331 (Minn.App. 1991), review denied (Minn. May 16, 1991). Appreciation is passive when it is "`attributable to inflation or to market forces or conditions.'" Gottsacker, 664 N.W.2d at 853 (quoting Nardini, 414 N.W.2d at 192). In other words, appreciation occurring when "no investment decisions are made, and neither [spouse] may withdraw the funds or otherwise control the investments," is passive. Prahl v. Prahl, 627 N.W.2d 698, 706 (Minn.App. 2001). Conversely, appreciation that is attributable to the exertion of efforts by one or both spouses during the marriage generally is deemed active and, thus, marital property. Gottsacker, 664 N.W.2d at 853 (quoting Nardini, 414 N.W.2d at 192); White v. White, 521 N.W.2d 874, 878 (Minn.App. 1994). Such efforts may include the application or investment of marital funds, marital labor, or entrepreneurial decision-making *820 that is marital in nature. White, 521 N.W.2d at 878. When the parties married, husband had $957,473 in a retirement plan entitled Specialists in General Surgery Pension and Profit Sharing Plan ("SIGS accounts"). During the marriage, additional contributions and investment returns caused the value of the SIGS accounts to reach $3,088,072 on the date of valuation for the dissolution proceedings. During trial, husband's expert, Thomas Harjes, testified as to the proper allocation of that amount between marital and nonmarital property. To derive this allocation, Harjes classified the premarital amount of $957,473 as nonmarital property and all contributions made during the marriage as marital property. For each year of marriage, Harjes determined the percentage of funds in the SIGS accounts that was marital property and the percentage that was nonmarital property. He then used those percentages to divide the investment returns between marital and nonmarital property. Based on these calculations, Harjes concluded that $639,577 of $3,088,072 was marital property subject to equitable division. The district court adopted Harjes's conclusions and allocated the final value of the SIGS accounts between marital and nonmarital property accordingly. Wife challenges this allocation, arguing that the district court should have allocated the entire amount by which the SIGS accounts have increased above the premarital amount of $957,473 to marital property because that increase is attributable to the exertion of marital efforts. Specifically, wife argues that this increase is the result of husband's active management of the SIGS accounts himself and through his financial advisor. The district court rejected this argument, holding that the appreciation of a spouse's nonmarital retirement funds is not active appreciation "simply because the spouse . . . hires a financial advisor to manage the funds." We agree that a financial advisor's management of a retirement account containing nonmarital funds does not necessitate a finding that the appreciation of those funds is active. That nonmarital funds are managed by a financial advisor, however, does not preclude a finding that the appreciation thereof is active. Rather, to make this determination, a district court must examine the nature of the spouses' efforts regarding these retirement accounts. Gottsacker, 664 N.W.2d at 853. Here, the district court's findings of fact and the record evidence of husband's involvement with the SIGS accounts establish that the appreciation of the SIGS accounts is active and, therefore, marital property. At trial, wife testified that she and husband hired financial advisor Randy Trask to manage the SIGS accounts. Specifically, wife testified that "after we were married we invited Merrill Lynch representatives to come out to our home and discuss retirement plans for our future. . . . [T]ogether we sat down and chose some Merrill Lynch plans and then invested money in those plans." Trask testified that husband paid him an annual fee to manage these accounts.[2] Trask confirmed that he "could not have discretionary management over any of these accounts if [husband] would not allow it" and that husband "has the ultimate control over [the] accounts." Harjes also confirmed that husband has full discretion regarding how the accounts are controlled. *821 The evidence conclusively establishes that husband and Trask created an agency relationship when they mutually agreed that Trask would act on husband's behalf but subject to husband's control. See A. Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 285, 290 (Minn. 1981) ("Agency is the fiduciary relationship that results from the manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act."); see also Dalager v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 350 N.W.2d 391, 394 (Minn.App. 1984) (holding that whether agency relationship exists is fact question unless evidence is conclusive). As such, husband is bound by Trask's active management of the accounts as if it were his own. See Fingerhut Mfg. Co. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 267 Minn. 201, 204, 125 N.W.2d 734, 737 (1964) (holding that when agent acts within scope of express or implied authority, principal is bound thereby); Kellogg v. Woods, 720 N.W.2d 845, 852 (Minn.App. 2006) (holding that principal is liable for agent's acts that are within scope of agency relationship). Not only did husband actively manage the SIGS accounts through Trask, husband also actively managed them himself. During the trial, there was extensive evidence and testimony presented about husband's ability to control and withdraw funds from the SIGS accounts. Harjes testified that husband had full authority to make changes to the SIGS accounts, which he often exercised by rolling funds from one account to another. Trask testified that, during his tenure as manager of the SIGS accounts, husband made at least one stock purchase in which husband bought stock of a company with which husband's son was associated. Wife testified, and Trask confirmed, that, at one point, husband transferred the SIGS accounts to another financial advisor, but husband later transferred them back to Trask. Trask and Harjes also testified that, during the marriage, the funds in the SIGS accounts were available as liquid assets that husband could withdraw at any time.[3] We have held that the ability to control investments or withdraw funds can defeat a claim that the increases in value of premarital funds were the result of passive appreciation.[4]See Prahl, 627 N.W.2d at 706 (stating that appreciation is passive when "no investment decisions are made, and neither [spouse] may withdraw the funds or otherwise control the investments"). Taken together, and with the statutory presumption that all property acquired during the marriage is marital property, these characteristics establish that the appreciation of husband's premarital *822 funds in husband's SIGS accounts was not the result of mere market forces or conditions but rather the result of marital efforts in the form of entrepreneurial decision-making. Accordingly, this increase constitutes active appreciation that is marital property subject to just and equitable division under Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1 (2006).[5] Because the district court erroneously concluded that the value of the appreciation of husband's premarital funds in his SIGS accounts is nonmarital property, we reverse and remand to the district court with instructions to divide the parties' marital property in a just and equitable manner.
I. Wife first argues that the district court erred as a matter of law when it held that the appreciation of husband's premarital retirement funds is nonmarital property. Whether property is marital or nonmarital is a question of law over which we exercise de novo review. Gottsacker v. Gottsacker, 664 N.W.2d 848, 852 (Minn. 2003). But in doing so, we defer to the district court's findings of fact. Id. Marital property is "property, real or personal, including vested public or private pension plan benefits or rights, acquired by the parties, or either of them, to a dissolution . . . proceeding at any time during the existence of the marriage." Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3b (2006) (codified at Minn. Stat. § 518.54, subd. 5 (2004)). All property acquired by either spouse during the marriage is presumed to be marital property. Id. To overcome this presumption, a spouse must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the property is nonmarital. Crosby v. Crosby, 587 N.W.2d 292, 296 (Minn.App. 1998), review denied (Minn. Feb. 18, 1999). Nonmarital property includes property acquired by either spouse before marriage and any increase in the value thereof, Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3b, provided such an increase is the result of passive appreciation, Gottsacker, 664 N.W.2d at 853 (citing Nardini v. Nardini, 414 N.W.2d 184, 193 (Minn. 1987)); Swick v. Swick, 467 N.W.2d 328, 331 (Minn.App. 1991), review denied (Minn. May 16, 1991). Appreciation is passive when it is "`attributable to inflation or to market forces or conditions.'" Gottsacker, 664 N.W.2d at 853 (quoting Nardini, 414 N.W.2d at 192). In other words, appreciation occurring when "no investment decisions are made, and neither [spouse] may withdraw the funds or otherwise control the investments," is passive. Prahl v. Prahl, 627 N.W.2d 698, 706 (Minn.App. 2001). Conversely, appreciation that is attributable to the exertion of efforts by one or both spouses during the marriage generally is deemed active and, thus, marital property. Gottsacker, 664 N.W.2d at 853 (quoting Nardini, 414 N.W.2d at 192); White v. White, 521 N.W.2d 874, 878 (Minn.App. 1994). Such efforts may include the application or investment of marital funds, marital labor, or entrepreneurial decision-making *820 that is marital in nature. White, 521 N.W.2d at 878. When the parties married, husband had $957,473 in a retirement plan entitled Specialists in General Surgery Pension and Profit Sharing Plan ("SIGS accounts"). During the marriage, additional contributions and investment returns caused the value of the SIGS accounts to reach $3,088,072 on the date of valuation for the dissolution proceedings. During trial, husband's expert, Thomas Harjes, testified as to the proper allocation of that amount between marital and nonmarital property. To derive this allocation, Harjes classified the premarital amount of $957,473 as nonmarital property and all contributions made during the marriage as marital property. For each year of marriage, Harjes determined the percentage of funds in the SIGS accounts that was marital property and the percentage that was nonmarital property. He then used those percentages to divide the investment returns between marital and nonmarital property. Based on these calculations, Harjes concluded that $639,577 of $3,088,072 was marital property subject to equitable division. The district court adopted Harjes's conclusions and allocated the final value of the SIGS accounts between marital and nonmarital property accordingly. Wife challenges this allocation, arguing that the district court should have allocated the entire amount by which the SIGS accounts have increased above the premarital amount of $957,473 to marital property because that increase is attributable to the exertion of marital efforts. Specifically, wife argues that this increase is the result of husband's active management of the SIGS accounts himself and through his financial advisor. The district court rejected this argument, holding that the appreciation of a spouse's nonmarital retirement funds is not active appreciation "simply because the spouse . . . hires a financial advisor to manage the funds." We agree that a financial advisor's management of a retirement account containing nonmarital funds does not necessitate a finding that the appreciation of those funds is active. That nonmarital funds are managed by a financial advisor, however, does not preclude a finding that the appreciation thereof is active. Rather, to make this determination, a district court must examine the nature of the spouses' efforts regarding these retirement accounts. Gottsacker, 664 N.W.2d at 853. Here, the district court's findings of fact and the record evidence of husband's involvement with the SIGS accounts establish that the appreciation of the SIGS accounts is active and, therefore, marital property. At trial, wife testified that she and husband hired financial advisor Randy Trask to manage the SIGS accounts. Specifically, wife testified that "after we were married we invited Merrill Lynch representatives to come out to our home and discuss retirement plans for our future. . . . [T]ogether we sat down and chose some Merrill Lynch plans and then invested money in those plans." Trask testified that husband paid him an annual fee to manage these accounts.[2] Trask confirmed that he "could not have discretionary management over any of these accounts if [husband] would not allow it" and that husband "has the ultimate control over [the] accounts." Harjes also confirmed that husband has full discretion regarding how the accounts are controlled. *821 The evidence conclusively establishes that husband and Trask created an agency relationship when they mutually agreed that Trask would act on husband's behalf but subject to husband's control. See A. Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 285, 290 (Minn. 1981) ("Agency is the fiduciary relationship that results from the manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act."); see also Dalager v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 350 N.W.2d 391, 394 (Minn.App. 1984) (holding that whether agency relationship exists is fact question unless evidence is conclusive). As such, husband is bound by Trask's active management of the accounts as if it were his own. See Fingerhut Mfg. Co. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 267 Minn. 201, 204, 125 N.W.2d 734, 737 (1964) (holding that when agent acts within scope of express or implied authority, principal is bound thereby); Kellogg v. Woods, 720 N.W.2d 845, 852 (Minn.App. 2006) (holding that principal is liable for agent's acts that are within scope of agency relationship). Not only did husband actively manage the SIGS accounts through Trask, husband also actively managed them himself. During the trial, there was extensive evidence and testimony presented about husband's ability to control and withdraw funds from the SIGS accounts. Harjes testified that husband had full authority to make changes to the SIGS accounts, which he often exercised by rolling funds from one account to another. Trask testified that, during his tenure as manager of the SIGS accounts, husband made at least one stock purchase in which husband bought stock of a company with which husband's son was associated. Wife testified, and Trask confirmed, that, at one point, husband transferred the SIGS accounts to another financial advisor, but husband later transferred them back to Trask. Trask and Harjes also testified that, during the marriage, the funds in the SIGS accounts were available as liquid assets that husband could withdraw at any time.[3] We have held that the ability to control investments or withdraw funds can defeat a claim that the increases in value of premarital funds were the result of passive appreciation.[4]See Prahl, 627 N.W.2d at 706 (stating that appreciation is passive when "no investment decisions are made, and neither [spouse] may withdraw the funds or otherwise control the investments"). Taken together, and with the statutory presumption that all property acquired during the marriage is marital property, these characteristics establish that the appreciation of husband's premarital *822 funds in husband's SIGS accounts was not the result of mere market forces or conditions but rather the result of marital efforts in the form of entrepreneurial decision-making. Accordingly, this increase constitutes active appreciation that is marital property subject to just and equitable division under Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1 (2006).[5] Because the district court erroneously concluded that the value of the appreciation of husband's premarital funds in his SIGS accounts is nonmarital property, we reverse and remand to the district court with instructions to divide the parties' marital property in a just and equitable manner.
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In Re ARM · 2000 3 citations
+ 3 more citations in this opinion.
Marriage of McLain v. McLain · 1997 2 citations
+ 2 more citations in this opinion.
Marriage of Rosenfeld v. Rosenfeld · 1995 2 citations
+ 2 more citations in this opinion.
Marriage Of: Wopata v. Wopata · 1993 2 citations
+ 2 more citations in this opinion.
Marriage of Ayers v. Ayers · 1993 3 citations
+ 3 more citations in this opinion.
Marriage of Lutzi v. Lutzi · 1992 3 citations
+ 3 more citations in this opinion.
Novak v. Novak · 1989 3 citations
+ 3 more citations in this opinion.
Marriage of Jones v. Jones · 1987 1 citation
+ 1 more citation in this opinion.
Murphy v. Bergo · 1987 3 citations
+ 3 more citations in this opinion.
Marriage of Andros v. Andros · 1986 1 citation
The revised liberal visitation schedule formulated by the court does not restrict any other activities of appellant with his children, only his control of their religious training, which Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3(a) unambiguously gives to respondent, the custodial parent. We hold that revision of the visitation schedule was not an abuse of the trial court’s discretion.
Marriage of Bateman v. Bateman · 1986 1 citation
+ 1 more citation in this opinion.
Ozenna v. Parmelee · 1985 1 citation
+ 1 more citation in this opinion.
Sefkow v. Sefkow · 1985 1 citation
+ 1 more citation in this opinion.
Marriage of Murray v. Murray · 1985 2 citations
+ 2 more citations in this opinion.
Marriage of Pfeiffer v. Pfeiffer · 1985 1 citation
+ 1 more citation in this opinion.
Marriage of Vitalis v. Vitalis · 1985 1 citation
+ 1 more citation in this opinion.
Marriage of Hegerle v. Hegerle · 1984 1 citation
+ 1 more citation in this opinion.
Marriage of Heard v. Heard · 1984 2 citations
+ 2 more citations in this opinion.
U.S. District Court, D. Minnesota
United States v. Meadows · 2016 2 citations
+ 2 more citations in this opinion.
United States v. White · 2011 2 citations
+ 2 more citations in this opinion.