Minn. Stat. § 518.552

Minnesota Statutes

Source: 2025 Minnesota Statutes. For the official text, see revisor.mn.gov.

Citing Cases (250)

Showing 100 most recent of 250 citing cases.

Minnesota Supreme Court

In re the Marriage of: Christine J. Curtis v. Gregory M. Curtis · 2016 3 citations

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Lee v. Lee · 2009 7 citations

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Butt v. Schmidt · 2008 5 citations

+ 5 more citations in this opinion.

Marriage of Dobrin v. Dobrin · 1997 8 citations

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Marriage of Hecker v. Hecker · 1997 2 citations

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Marriage of Gales v. Gales · 1996 30 citations

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Marriage of Kornberg v. Kornberg · 1996 4 citations

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Loo v. Loo · 1994 1 citation

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Marriage of Miller v. Miller · 1990 1 citation

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Marriage of Lyon v. Lyon · 1989 3 citations

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Marriage of Stich v. Stich · 1989 1 citation

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Marriage of Sefkow v. Sefkow · 1988 2 citations

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Marriage of Nardini v. Nardini · 1987 6 citations

Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 1 (1986).

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

Marriage of Rohling v. Rohling · 1986 3 citations

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Marriage of McClelland v. McClelland · 1984 10 citations

359 N.W.2d 7 (1984) In Re the Marriage of Helen E. McCLELLAND, Petitioner, Respondent, v. Robert Rugh McCLELLAND, Appellant. No. C2-83-354. Supreme Court of Minnesota. November 30, 1984. *9 Timothy A. Sullivan, Steven R. Kruger, St. Paul, for appellant. Judith L. Oakes, Kathleen M. Knutson, St. Paul, for respondent. Considered and decided by the court en banc without oral argument. SIMONETT, Justice. The appellant husband appeals the trial court's award of child support and permanent spousal maintenance. Concluding that the awards do not conform to the statutory criteria, we reverse and remand. After 20 years of marriage, petitioner Helen E. McClelland commenced this dissolution proceeding against her husband, Robert Rugh McClelland. The parties were married in 1963 and had four children. At the time the dissolution decree was entered on January 3, 1983, Helen McClelland was 44 and Robert McClelland was 50 years of age. One of their four children was of age, and the other three were 16, 12 and 10 years old. The second child attained her majority in March 1984; the youngest will reach 18 in November 1990. The three youngest children have lived with their mother since the parties separated in 1978. Robert McClelland is a radiologist with a gross annual income of $230,000 and a net monthly income of $9,000. Helen McClelland, a college graduate, was the homemaker during the marriage and was not, nor is she now, employed. Prior to trial, the parties stipulated to an equal division of the marital estate valued at $367,457. Helen McClelland's share included the home and $30,728 cash. The cash presumably will yield an annual income of $2,400. In addition, she receives about $5,600 annual income from her own nonmarital stock portfolio. The three youngest children own stock worth $65,000 under the Uniform Gift to Minors Act. The case went to trial primarily because of a child custody dispute, which necessarily left open the issues of maintenance and support. The trial court awarded custody to Helen McClelland. On appeal, the appellant husband raises only issues as to the maintenance and child support awards. At trial, in her proposed findings, Helen McClelland asked for spousal maintenance of $1,750 a month to age 65 and child support of $850 a month per child to terminate as each child reached majority or graduated from high school, whichever occurred later. The wife's expenses for herself and the minor children were found by the trial court to be approximately $3,200 a month. In its decree, however, the trial court awarded Helen McClelland $2,000 a month for the support of the minor children until the last child is 18, plus $2,000 a month for spousal maintenance until she "dies, remarries or further Order of the Court." The husband was also required, as additional support, to pay for the minor children's health insurance and for all medical and dental expenses of the minors not covered by insurance. Thus Dr. McClelland pays $4,000 a month or $48,000 a year until November 1990, when the youngest child is 18, and thereafter $2,000 a month or $24,000 a year for the rest of Helen McClelland's life (assuming she does not remarry). On appeal, Dr. McClelland claims that maintenance should not be permanent, that child support should decrease as each child reaches majority, and that the sums awarded are excessive in fact, they are even more than his wife had requested. Minn. Stat. § 518.552 (1982) sets out the criteria for an award of spousal maintenance. In this case, the trial court considered the relevant factors and properly concluded that the wife lacked sufficient property, even considering the marital property awarded to her, to provide for her reasonable needs. Subdivision 2 of section 518.552 sets out seven factors relevant to the maintenance to be paid. These include, in the case of a homemaker, "the length of absence from employment and the extent to which any education, skills, or experience have become outmoded and earning capacity has become permanently diminished." Here, prior to the marriage, Helen *10 McClelland had obtained a bachelor's degree in chemistry and started medical school but then dropped out. While the parties dispute the reason for the wife's termination of her medical school training, the trial court found that both parties had contemplated the wife would return to school and the record indicates the wife deferred her return to raise the children. Thus the trial court found that Helen McClelland's earning capacity had become "permanently diminished" by reason of her deferral of medical school and by her absence from the job market for the 20 years of her marriage. Considering all seven factors and in recognition of the discretion given the trial court, it cannot be said that $2,000 a month is outside the bounds of a proper maintenance award. This leads to the duration of the award. Although diminished earning capacity is among the factors to be considered for an award of spousal maintenance, generally maintenance is only made permanent if the spouse "[i]s unable to adequately support himself after considering all relevant circumstances through appropriate employment * * *," and if there is little "probability, given the spouse's age and skills, of completing education or training and becoming fully self-supporting." Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subds. 1(b), 2(b) (1982). Thus in Arundel v. Arundel, 281 N.W.2d 663 (Minn.1979), we affirmed a permanent award after 29 years of marriage for a 51-year-old wife who had certain health problems and no vocational skills or independent resources. In O'Brien v. O'Brien, 343 N.W.2d 850 (Minn.1984), we noted that the trial court had properly granted a permanent award, after 30 years of marriage, to a 49-year-old wife who was a high school graduate with poor employment prospects and entrusted with the care and custody of a child severely afflicted with cerebral palsy. As we noted in Arundel, permanent awards are to be restricted to "certain exceptional cases" where there is little likelihood of the once-dependent spouse's attaining self-sufficiency. Arundel, 281 N.W.2d at 666. We do not think that this case presents one of those exceptional situations where permanent maintenance is warranted. Helen McClelland has her B.S. degree and, while her knowledge in chemistry would now be outmoded, she has used her general education in leadership roles in civic affairs and in managing her own and her children's stock portfolios. At age 44, her vocational interest now, as the trial court found, is in the area of business and finance. She intends to pursue training in computers and expects, in some 2 to 4 years, to seek employment in business or as a stock analyst. Except for an arthritic condition which is controlled with medication, she is in good health. She is a person of considerable aptitude and ability, and as soon as the children no longer require her presence at home, she desires to seek full-time employment. Under these circumstances, we conclude maintenance for a period of time (rehabilitation maintenance) rather than for a lifetime (permanent maintenance) is indicated here. Nevertheless, the older, dependent spouse who has had a lengthy "traditional" marriage presents a special situation, and the 1982 amendments to Minn. Stat. § 518.552 reflect this concern. To determine maintenance on what the present might have been but for the marriage is, at best, difficult. To base maintenance on what the future will be after the marriage dissolution, i.e., on the success of the rehabilitation plans, may be no less difficult. As to the future, some of the speculative risk can be avoided. In the case of an older, dependent spouse in a lengthy "traditional" marriage, where rehabilitation maintenance is used and the contemplated success of the rehabilitation plans is not clear from the record, the trial judge should consider retaining continuing jurisdiction to revise, if necessary, the amount and duration of the maintenance. This is the approach taken in In re Marriage of Morrison, 20 Cal.3d 437, 573 P.2d 41, 143 Cal.Rptr. 139 (1978); In re Marriage of Wilder, 122 Ill.App.3d 338, 77 Ill. Dec. 824, 833-34, 461 N.E.2d 447, 456-57 *11 (1983); and Molnar v. Molnar, 314 S.E.2d 73, 78 (W.Va.1984). We reverse, therefore, the maintenance award insofar as it is permanent, and we remand to the trial court to provide for maintenance for such period of time and on such basis as will properly reflect the relevant factors set out in the statute. We are also troubled by the award for child support. The trial court's decision offers no explanation why the $2,000 monthly child support payment remains the same until November 1990 even though the number of minor children to be supported decreases from three to one. Whether Dr. McClelland intends to aid his emancipated children in their postsecondary educations, outside the obligation of the decree, is not known. In any event, on the present state of the record and as the trial court's decision now reads, we conclude that on remand the trial court should also reconsider the provision for child support to the extent it continues unabated to 1990 and establish a schedule for its automatic reduction as each of the children becomes emancipated. Finally, the appellant husband claims reversible error for trial court bias occurring after the trial was in progress, as well as the trial court's refusal to recuse. Appellant claims that the trial judge inappropriately interjected herself into the questioning of one of the witnesses, interrupted the testimony of appellant's expert, prematurely stopped further inquiry into the wife's marital and nonmarital assets, and refused to make a record of her comments made in chambers. Judges, of course, should be sensitive to the "appearance of impropriety" and should take measures to assure that litigants have no cause to think their case is not being fairly judged. Jones v. Jones, 242 Minn. 251, 64 N.W.2d 508 (1954). Nevertheless, a judge who feels able to preside fairly over the proceedings should not be required to step down upon allegations of a party which themselves may be unfair or which simply indicate dissatisfaction with the possible outcome of the litigation. In the situation we have here, on this record, neither a reversal nor a mistrial is warranted. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. WAHL, Justice (dissenting in part, concurring in part). I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion which reverses the trial court's award of permanent maintenance. For reasons I have set out at length in Abuzzahab v. Abuzzahab, 359 N.W.2d 12, filed today, it is clear that the legislature responded to our decision in Otis v. Otis, 299 N.W.2d 114 (Minn.1980), by its 1982 amendments to Minn. Stat. § 518.552, and repudiated Otis to the extent that it emphasized rehabilitative maintenance to the exclusion of permanent maintenance: Subd. 2. The maintenance order shall be * * * either temporary or permanent, as the court deems just, * * * after considering all relevant factors including: * * * * * * (b) * * * [T]he probability, given the spouse's age and skills, of completing education or training and becoming fully self-supporting; * * * * * * (d) The duration of the marriage, and, in the case of a homemaker, the length of absence from employment and the extent to which any education, skills, or experience have become outmoded and earning capacity has become permanently diminished. Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2 (1982) (clarifying amendments underlined). In light of the unmistakable legislative intent spelled out in these amendments, and under the facts of this case and of Abuzzahab, the trial court was not compelled, as a matter of law, as the majority holds in effect it was, to award no permanent maintenance. The facts of the two cases are remarkably similar. Among other similarities, there are 20-year marriages during which the skills of the wives became *12 outmoded and their earning capacity permanently diminished as they devoted themselves to full-time homemaking and child-rearing; four children, with the custody of at least two minor children with the mother; and husbands who are professionals with annual incomes of over $200,000. In both cases, the amount of maintenance would be subject to reduction when the women return to the work force full time. The trial court has continuing jurisdiction in such matters. To suggest that the trial court consider "retaining continuing jurisdiction," as the majority opinion does after reversing that court's grant of permanent maintenance, does nothing more than shift the burden of getting an attorney and going back into court onto the woman who may by that time be making $18,000-$20,000 a year, or less. There are limits, of course. In Broms v. Broms, 353 N.W.2d 135 (Minn.1984), we held that an award of temporary maintenance for a period longer than 5 years was an abuse of discretion where the party awarded maintenance was a 32-year-old college graduate in general good health who needed 2 years of graduate study to pursue a career in her chosen field and where nothing in the conditions and circumstances of the party's children made it appropriate to delay completion of her education and entry into the work force. That is not this case, nor is it the Abuzzahab case. Under the McClelland facts, and under the Abuzzahab facts, the award of permanent maintenance was not an abuse of the broad discretion of the trial court. I would affirm. COYNE, Justice (dissenting in part, concurring in part). I join in the dissent of Justice Wahl.

+ 7 more citations in this opinion.

Abuzzahab v. Abuzzahab · 1984 20 citations

359 N.W.2d 12 (1984) Beverly ABUZZAHAB, Respondent, v. Faruk Said ABUZZAHAB, Appellant. No. C7-82-1540. Supreme Court of Minnesota. November 30, 1984. *13 Walter M. Baker, Edina, Mary C. Sherman, Minneapolis, for appellant. James H. Hennessy, Dale M. Wagner, Minneapolis, for respondent. Considered and decided by the court en banc without oral argument. KELLEY, Justice. Respondent in this marital dissolution proceeding Faruk Said Abuzzahab appeals from the order of the district court denying his motion for a new trial, claiming that the court failed to properly consider a liability in reaching a distribution of marital property and that it abused its discretion in awarding permanent spousal maintenance in the amount of $4,000 per month to the petitioner Beverly Abuzzahab. We affirm the property distribution and reverse and remand the question of spousal maintenance. The parties were married on June 29, 1962 in Washington D.C. and shortly thereafter moved to Minnesota to enable the respondent to obtain a post-graduate degree in pharmacology. Respondent is a board-certified psychiatrist who is presently engaged in the full-time practice of psychiatry and pharmacology. Four children were born during the marriage, three of whom remain unemancipated. In addition, the parties adopted the child of the respondent's deceased sister; that daughter is no longer a minor. A stipulation executed by the parties provided for joint legal custody of the minor children, the physical custody of each of the minor children, liberal visitation rights and a valuation of several of the major marital assets. That stipulation was approved by the court and the substantial marital estate was essentially equally divided. The court awarded Beverly $4,000 per month as permanent spousal maintenance and $400 per month per child as child support for the two children in her physical custody. 1. The respondent first contends that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to recognize and credit to him as against the marital estate, a liability of $80,600, a prepayment for services to be performed by Psychopharmacology Fund, a research concern owned and operated by him. In our view, the fact that payment has been received but the work not yet performed does not require that the valuation of services be included as a liability against the marital estate. As a result, the property distribution, as challenged, shall stand. 2. The primary issue on appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion in awarding $4,000 per month as permanent spousal maintenance to Beverly. Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 1 (1982) authorizes a trial court to award spousal maintenance if it finds that two criteria are satisfied, i.e., that the spouse: (a) Lacks sufficient property, including marital property apportioned to him, to provide for his reasonable needs, especially during a period of training or education, and (b) Is unable to adequately support himself after considering all relevant circumstances through appropriate employment or is the custodian of a child whose condition or circumstances make it appropriate *14 that the custodian not be required to seek employment outside the home. Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 1 (1982). Subdivision 2 of that section sets forth the factors to be considered by the trial court in determining the amount and duration of an award. Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2 (1982). The record demonstrates that Beverly is a registered nurse, although she has not been so employed since the parties' marriage. At the time of trial, she was enrolled in a course in real estate sales, intending to obtain her real estate license. She presently is employed by Merrill Lynch Realty as a sales person. Although she suffers from chondromalacia, an inflammation beneath the kneecap, her treating physician did not suggest that the condition would affect her employment. The trial court found that she has a maximum earning capacity of $18,000 to $22,000 per year. As a result, she is capable of attaining a degree of self-sufficiency through employment. Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 1(b) (1982). Moreover, under the distribution of marital property, the petitioner has sufficient property to provide for her reasonable needs, including the cash proceeds representing her share of the homestead equity and the cash payments due her as a result of the property settlement. Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 1(a) (1982). Under those circumstances, we conclude that a permanent award is not justified under either statutory or precedential authority and remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings to establish the durational limitation of the award. See Otis v. Otis, 299 N.W.2d 114 (Minn. 1980). In so doing, we affirm the amount of the award, but direct the trial court to reexamine the criteria contained in section 518.552, subd. 2 (1982) for the purpose of its determination of the appropriate period for an award of temporary maintenance. As we point out in McClelland v. McClelland, 359 N.W.2d 7 (Minn., filed November 30, 1984), filed herewith, the older dependent spouse who has a "traditional marriage" presents a special situation. The dissent in this case likewise stresses that the 1982 amendments to Minn. Stat. § 518.552 reflect this concern. If on remand the trial court determines from the record that it cannot clearly predict the success of the rehabilitation plan, it can, as suggested in McClelland, retain continuing jurisdiction to revise, if necessary, the amount and duration of the maintenance. Affirmed in part; reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this decision. SIMONETT, Justice (concurring specially). As part of her property award, the wife receives $300,863.50 in cash, $200,000 of which represents her half equity share in the homestead, for which the husband has mortgaged the homestead to pay her share. The wife apparently intends to purchase a $160,000 house with a downpayment of $100,000. The real estate she receives, which has a negative cash flow, offers a substantial tax shelter. The property distribution and its income and tax consequences are complex and varied. Suffice it to say here that I join in affirmance of the property awards. Interestingly, the trial court says it "took cognizance" of the manner in which the husband attempted to put marital property out of the wife's reach in arriving at its property distribution. I mention the property award because it has a bearing on spousal maintenance. My concern is not with the permanency of the maintenance as I think that might be justified in this case, unlike in McClelland (also decided today) but whether, in view of the property settlement, the maintenance is too much. But I concur with the majority opinion on the assumption that the trial court, on remand, will "retain continuing jurisdiction to revise, if necessary, the amount and duration of the maintenance." WAHL, Justice (dissenting). I respectfully dissent. The majority opinion perpetuates this court's misreading *15 of the intent of the legislature in enacting Minn. Stat. § 518.552, 1978 Minn. Laws, ch. 772, § 51, and the court's subsequent misinterpretation of that statute in Otis v. Otis, 299 N.W.2d 114 (Minn.1980). We must review Otis in the light of the legislature's response to our decision in that case, which we have not, until now, had the opportunity to do. Section 518.552 is concerned with the granting of maintenance in marriage dissolution proceedings under Chapter 518. Formerly, alimony[1] was the provision made for a needy wife from the future income or earnings of the husband. The court could determine in any judgment of divorce, as one of the issues of the case, whether or not the wife was entitled to an award of alimony, even though such an award was not then made. Minn. Stat. § 518.55 (1982). The statute did not specify whether alimony should be awarded on a permanent basis, a temporary basis, or either of the two depending on the facts and circumstances of the case. Under this statute, in the exercise of their sound discretion, courts of this state awarded alimony both permanently, Cashman v. Cashman, 256 N.W.2d 640 (Minn.1977); Arundel v. Arundel, 281 N.W.2d 663 (Minn.1979), and for lesser periods of time, Ruzic v. Ruzic, 281 N.W.2d 502 (Minn.1979) (6 years) but not as a matter of right, Cooper v. Cooper, 298 Minn. 247, 251, 214 N.W.2d 682, 685 (1974). An award of permanent alimony was considered a substitute for a husband's duty to support a wife to the extent that her earning capacity was permanently impaired due to the fact that "she was married at a time when the prevailing social custom made her professional career subordinate to her husband's and required that she abandon a career to raise her son and keep house for her husband." Otis, 299 N.W.2d at 118 (Otis, J., dissenting). Factors considered important in the award of permanent alimony were length of the marriage, the wife's age, health, earning capacity, lack of vocational skills or independent resources, contribution to marriage by child-rearing and maintenance of family home in such a way as to contribute to establishment and furtherance of the husband's career, and resources and income of the husband. Loth v. Loth, 227 Minn. 387, 35 N.W.2d 542 (1949); Arundel v. Arundel, 281 N.W.2d at 666. A divorced wife, where alimony was appropriate, was entitled, not just to the bare necessities of life, but to a sum which would enable her to maintain her standard of living at the time of the divorce to the extent the husband was reasonably able to provide it. Arundel, id.; Cooper, 298 Minn. at 251-52, 214 N.W.2d at 686; Botkin v. Botkin, 247 Minn. 25, 77 N.W.2d 172, 175 (1956). In 1978, as the Otis court recognized, the legislature significantly amended the law of divorce. 1978 Minn. Laws, ch. 772. "Alimony" was still allowed but had now become "maintenance" which could be awarded from the future income or earnings of either spouse for the support and maintenance of the other. Minn. Stat. § 518.54, subd. 3 (1978). To have granted maintenance, a court must have found that the spouse seeking maintenance a) lacked sufficient property, including apportioned marital property, to provide for the spouse's reasonable needs, "especially during a period of training or education," and b) was unable to be adequately self-supporting "after considering all relevant circumstances through appropriate employment or is the custodian of a child whose condition or circumstances make it appropriate that the custodian not be required to seek employment outside the home." Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 1 (1978). Again, the statute did not specify whether such support and maintenance should be awarded on a permanent basis, a temporary basis, or either of the two depending on the facts and circumstances of the case, but provided that the maintenance order should be in amounts and for "periods of time" as the *16 court deems just, without regard to marital misconduct and after considering all relevant factors. Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2 (1978). These factors include for the most part the factors previously considered relevant by our cases in the award of alimony. Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2(a)-(g)(1978). The court in Otis seemed to read the word "especially" out of the requirement that the spouse seeking maintenance lack "sufficient property, including marital property apportioned to him, to provide for his reasonable needs, especially during a period of training or education," seemed to read "for periods of time" to be something less than permanent, and, citing Florida Court of Appeals cases for the proposition, seemed to conclude that the legislature intended maintenance to be for rehabilitative purposes only. It is true that rehabilitative maintenance is all that many women need, if they need it at all, particularly those women growing up in the 1960s and 1970s with careers and job skills and every expectation of sharing equally in the parenting, household work and finances of marriage. Midlife women, however, those women between the ages of 45 and 65, entered marriage under a very different set of rules. Like Georgia Contos Otis and Beverly Abuzzahab, they abandoned their own jobs and careers to fulfill the expected, traditional roles of mother, wife and hostess for rising business and professional men. In those years in which they would have developed job skills and careers, gained seniority and built up Social Security accounts, they worked at home. Their husbands, like Emmanuel Otis, often forbade these women to seek outside employment because they were "not going to have any wife of mine pound a typewriter." Otis, 299 N.W.2d at 118. There is no indication in section 518.552 that the Minnesota legislature intended the courts to turn this group of women out to lives of poverty in their later years.[2] It is absolutely clear in the legislature's response to Otis v. Otis that the legislature did not so intend. Otis was released October 3, 1980. The 1982 session of the Minnesota legislature adopted, as Chapter 535-S.F. No. 378, the following "act relating to marriage dissolution; clarifying factors to consider in awarding maintenance; amending Minnesota Statutes 1980, Section 518.552" (emphasis added).

+ 17 more citations in this opinion.

Marriage of Broms v. Broms · 1984 2 citations

Although our standard of review of a trial court’s maintenance award is narrow, the award will be reversed if it amounts to an abuse of the court’s wide discretion. Smoot v. Smoot, 329 N.W.2d 829, 831 (Minn.1983). On review that discretion must be examined in light of Minn. Stat. § 518.552 (1982), which contains a detailed enumeration of the factors to be considered by the trial court when making the award. Erlandson v. Erlandson, 318 N.W.2d 36, 38 (Minn.1982).

In Re the Marriage of O'Brien v. O'Brien · 1984 2 citations

1. First, the appellant-wife challenges the level of spousal maintenance on three grounds: that the trial court did not include rental income in the husband’s income, that the maintenance terminates at the husband’s death and is unsecured by life insurance, and that the court did not recognize the property awarded to the wife is illiquid. In considering the seven factors governing spousal maintenance awards under Minn. Stat. § 518.552 (1982), the trial court is awarded wide discretion and this court’s standard of review is accordingly narrow. We will not reverse unless the trial court abused that discretion. Smoot v. Smoot, 329 N.W.2d 829, 831 (Minn.1983), citing Erlandson v. Erlandson, 318 N.W.2d 36, 38 (Minn. 1982).

Marriage of McMahon v. McMahon · 1983 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Marriage of Smoot v. Smoot · 1983 2 citations

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Marriage of Taylor v. Taylor · 1983 5 citations

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Faus v. Faus · 1982 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Marriage of Erlandson v. Erlandson · 1982 10 citations

+ 10 more citations in this opinion.

Rydell v. Rydell · 1981 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Marriage of Rydell v. Rydell · 1981 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Marriage of DeLa Rosa v. DeLa Rosa · 1981 6 citations

+ 6 more citations in this opinion.

Marriage of Otis v. Otis · 1980 9 citations

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Hafner v. Hafner · 1980 2 citations

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relevant circumstances.” Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 1 (2014). “After the district court

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marriage and all relevant circumstances, through appropriate employment.” Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 1(a)-(b) (2014). The district court concluded that there is no statutory

for appropriate employment” to adequately support himself. Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd.

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maintenance. Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2(g); Erlandson v. Erlandson, 318 N.W.2d 36,

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(quoting Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3a (2008)). Minn. Stat. § 518.552 specifies eight

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while meeting those of the requesting spouse. Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2 (2014). “In

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1 In Karon v. Karon, 435 N.W.2d 501, 503-504 (Minn. 1989), the supreme court held that parties may enter into an enforceable stipulation to prohibit or limit modification of maintenance awards. This principle has been codified at Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 5 (Supp. 2015). 2 Husband’s statement in his affidavit that his Medicare income for 2014 was $349,919 appears to be a typographical error. 3 increased.3 Husband also alleged that wife’s income had increased by $15,325.00 to

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maintenance.” Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2(g) (2014). When deciding whether to award

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based on the [Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2 (2010)] factors.” Id. at *5. We also

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spousal maintenance and whether to award it on a permanent basis. Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2 (2012). “A district court generally has broad discretion in its

expenses. Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2(a), (g). Here, the district court determined:

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*825 IV. Husband challenges the district court's spousal-maintenance award to wife, arguing that the district court abused its discretion when it set husband's spousal maintenance obligation. A district court has broad discretion in determining spousal maintenance, and we will not reverse such a determination absent an abuse of discretion. Erlandson v. Erlandson, 318 N.W.2d 36, 38 (Minn. 1982). A district court abuses its discretion when it resolves the matter in a manner that is "against logic and the facts on record." Rutten v. Rutten, 347 N.W.2d 47, 50 (Minn. 1984). We will uphold findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Prahl, 627 N.W.2d at 702. A finding is clearly erroneous if it leaves us "with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." Id. (quotation omitted). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the district court's findings and defer to the district court's credibility determinations. Id. First, husband argues that the district court's spousal-maintenance determination is erroneous because the district court failed to make a specific finding regarding husband's income. Ordinarily, detailed factual findings are necessary to demonstrate that the district court considered the relevant statutory factors. Tuthill v. Tuthill, 399 N.W.2d 230, 232 (Minn. App. 1987). Insufficient findings render meaningful appellate review impossible. Stich v. Stich, 435 N.W.2d 52, 53 (Minn. 1989). The district court's findings are sufficient if they show that the district court considered the statutory factors relevant to its conclusion. Tuthill, 399 N.W.2d at 232. When setting a spousal-maintenance obligation, the statutory factors relevant to the district court's conclusion include (1) the financial resources of the spouse seeking maintenance, including the marital property apportioned to that spouse, and that spouse's ability to meet his or her needs; (2) the time necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable the spouse seeking maintenance to find appropriate employment and the probability that the spouse seeking maintenance will become fully or partially self-supporting; (3) the marital standard of living; (4) the duration of the marriage and, in the case of a homemaker, the length of absence from the job market and the effect thereof; (5) the loss of earnings and retirement benefits foregone by the spouse seeking maintenance; (6) the age and physical and emotional condition of the spouse seeking maintenance; (7) the ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is sought to meet his or her own needs; and (8) the contribution of each party to the acquisition and appreciation of marital property. Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2 (2006). Although the district court did not make a specific finding as to husband's income, the district court's findings demonstrate that the district court thoroughly considered the relevant statutory factors. Regarding the statutory factor that requires the district court to consider husband's income and his ability to meet his own needs, the district court examined husband's recent income levels, the impact a downturn in husband's surgical field would have on husband's income, the incomes of husband's business associates, and husband's intent to retire in the near future. Based on this thorough consideration of the relevant facts, we conclude that the district court's findings regarding this statutory factor are sufficient in spite of the failure to make a specific finding regarding husband's income. Next, husband argues that the district court made inconsistent findings regarding wife's mortgage debt, which resulted in an erroneous spousal-maintenance determination. *826 But the district court's findings regarding wife's mortgage obligation are consistent. Together, these findings establish that the resources available to wife are insufficient to allow her to meet her needs regardless of whether she continues to pay her monthly maintenance obligation or she chooses to use her property settlement to pay off her mortgage balance. Finally, husband challenges the district court's determinations that "it is not possible to conclude that [wife] could return to the field of professional nursing at this time" and that wife "is not capable of working full-time." Husband maintains that the district court should have imputed income to wife because wife can work but chooses not to. Before a district court may impute income to a party for the purpose of making a spousal-maintenance determination, it must find that the party is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed in bad faith. Carrick v. Carrick, 560 N.W.2d 407, 410 (Minn.App. 1997). Here, the district court did not make such a finding. Rather, it credited wife's testimony that she is unable to work in her field of nursing because of her physical limitations. And we defer to the district court's credibility determination. See Prahl, 627 N.W.2d at 702 (stating that appellate courts leave credibility determinations to fact-finder when reviewing evidence regarding spousal maintenance). Husband refers us to the testimony of his expert, Jan Lowe, in support of his argument that wife is voluntarily underemployed in bad faith. Lowe, an employability consultant, testified that there were a number of nursing positions available with job requirements that wife could perform. The district court did not find this testimony credible because "Lowe never interviewed [wife] so as to make a determination as to whether or not [wife] could perform the tasks of a nurse at the present time," "made no inquiry about whether [wife] had physical conditions which would prevent her from returning to the field of nursing," and "was unable to make any correlation between [wife] as an appropriate candidate for [nursing] jobs [available in the Twin Cities area]." This credibility determination also is accorded deference. Id. Therefore, because the record lacks any credible evidence that wife was voluntarily underemployed in bad faith, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to impute income to her. Although we reject husband's challenges to the district court's spousal-maintenance determination, we recognize that, when the district court revisits the other aspects of the division of marital property addressed in this opinion, the district court may need to reconsider the appropriate amount of spousal maintenance in light of our conclusions that the value of the appreciation of husband's premarital retirement funds in his SIGS accounts is marital property, that the value of the institutional goodwill in husband's surgical practice shall be included in the overall valuation of the practice, and that wife must be compensated for husband's improper disposal of marital property to pay his attorney fees. Indeed, these holdings may affect the district court's findings as to the statutory factors to be considered when setting spousal maintenance. Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2.

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