Minn. Stat. § 518.58

Minnesota Statutes

Source: 2025 Minnesota Statutes. For the official text, see revisor.mn.gov.

Citing Cases (251)

Showing 100 most recent of 251 citing cases.

Minnesota Supreme Court

Gill v. Gill · 2018 13 citations

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Kremer v. Kremer · 2018 2 citations [Dissent]

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Kimberlee Ann Nelson v. Lynette Nelson · 2015 16 citations

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Citizens State Bank Norwood Young America v. Gordon Brown · 2014 2 citations

Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1 (2012). Thus, what may look like a transfer to hide or

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Marriage of Angell v. Angell · 2010 4 citations

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Lee v. Lee · 2009 6 citations

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Peterka v. Dennis · 2009 1 citation

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Marriage of Baker v. Baker · 2008 4 citations

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Antone v. Mirviss · 2006 2 citations

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Marriage of Gottsacker v. Gottsacker · 2003 2 citations

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In Re Estate of Palmen · 1999 1 citation

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Potucek v. City of Warren · 1995 2 citations

OPINION COYNE, Justice. We review on certiorari a decision of the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals reversing the compensation judge’s calculation of the government benefits offset provided to an employer pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 176.101, subd. 4 (1994).1 We reverse and reinstate the decision of the compensation judge. Delvin W. Potucek, a laborer in the Street Department of the City of Warren, sustained a compensable injury on February 14, 1990, and has been permanently totally disabled since August of that year. The employer paid permanent total disability benefits to $25,000, and became eligible for the offset provided by section 176.101, subd. 4. Meanwhile, Potucek made application to the Public Employee’s Retirement Association (PERA) for disability benefits which were calculated on the basis of his election of a joint and survivor benefit pension plan. The compensation judge said that the section 176.101, subd. 4 offset was based on the joint and survivor benefit amount — the “benefits being paid” by PERA to the employee. On appeal, the WCCA reversed, deciding the offset should be calculated on the single life amount: Minn. Stat. § 176.101, subd. 4, should be construed, in the context of an offset from PERA benefits, in such a way as to defer to the PERA statute’s actuarial approach in valuing “disability benefits being paid.” We, therefore, conclude that the self-insured employer has overpaid permanent total disability benefits to the extent that the offset taken was based on the PERA *335disability cheeks actually received by the employee instead of the actuarial value of the normal plan single-life annuity, consistent with Minn. Stat. § 353.33, subd. 5. Potucek v. City of Warren, — Workers’ Comp.Dec. — (WCCA, filed March 7, 1995) (slip op. at 7) (footnote omitted).2 Pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 353.33, subd. 3a, a disabled PERA member may elect to receive, in lieu of a full or “normal single life” annuity payable to him during his life, a “joint and survivor optional annuity,” ie., a reduced monthly benefit, with monthly benefits payable after the disabled member’s death to a named beneficiary. In the event the named beneficiary predeceases the member, the member’s benefits immediately “bounce back” to that of a normal single life annuity. The optional annuities are actuarially equivalent to the normal single life annuities, Minn. Stat. § 353.30, subd. 3; the election of an optional annuity must be made prior to commencement of the payment of the disability benefit; and the optional annuity begins to accrue on the same date as provided for the disability benefit, Minn. Stat. § 353.33, subd. 3a. Under Minn. Stat. § 353.27, subd. 2, there is deducted 8.23 percent of a “basic” member’s total salary and 4.23 percent of a “coordinated” member’s total salary, and these sums are deposited in the state treasury to the credit of the public employees retirement fund from which annuities, refunds and allowances are paid as provided in the Act.3 By Minn. Stat. § 353.15, annuities are not assignable or subject to execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process, with the exceptions provided in subdivision 2 of Minn. Stat. § 353.15, or Minn. Stat. §§ 518.58, 518.581, or 518.611. PERA disability benefits are coordinated with “any amounts received or receivable under workers’ compensation law,” after deduction for attorney fees; and PERA benefits are to be calculated as follows: If the total of the single life annuity actuarial equivalent disability benefit and the workers’ compensation benefit exceeds: (1) the salary the disabled member received as of the date of the disability or (2) the salary currently payable for the same employment position or an employment position substantially similar to the one the person held as of the date of the disability, whichever is greater, the disability benefit must be reduced to that amount which, when added to the workers’ compensation benefits, does not exceed the greater of the salaries described in clauses (1) and (2). Minn. Stat. § 353.33, subd. 5. This provision sets the maximum combined payment of PERA and workers’ compensation benefits. For example, if a PERA member’s weekly wage at the date of injury was $600, the member-employee’s workers’ compensation benefits would be $400 and his maximum weekly PERA disability benefit would be $200. If the member’s weekly PERA benefit, calculated as a normal single life annuity, were $350, that benefit would be reduced to $200 per week. But if the member’s weekly PERA benefit, calculated pursuant to the joint and survivor option, were $150, that weekly benefit would be unaffected because it is less than the maximum allowable benefit. On the other hand, if the weekly PERA benefit, calculated as a normal single life *336annuity, were $500 and the weekly benefit calculated pursuant to the joint and survivor option were $225, the weekly PERA benefit payable under either option would be limited to $200. In contrast, section 176.101, subd. 4 contemplates a simple dollar-for-dollar reduction in the “amount of the weekly compensation benefits being paid by the employer” by the “amount of any disability benefits being paid by any government disability benefit program * * In our opinion, Potucek’s position — that “benefits being paid” refers to monetary sums disbursed to an employee — is supported by Teske v. Young, 309 N.W.2d 753 (Minn.1981) where we said that the term “compensation * * * paid” in section 176.101, subd. 4 means compensation “actually paid.” Id. at 755. In recognition that workers’ compensation is but one element of a system of wage-loss protection, the Minnesota legislature early on provided a means for coordinating workers’ compensation with the federal social security system4 and the state pension system. At the same time, it must be remembered that workers’ compensation and retirement programs are based upon entirely different considerations so that offsets aimed at preventing duplicate benefits must be read with the basic purposes of each system in mind. As Professor Larson explains: Some states put the beneficiaries to an election between their compensation and pension rights. But in the absence of such express statutory election or offset provisions, and under the familiar provision forbidding reduction of compensation because of other income or benefits, the benefits of both a public pension law and a compensation act can be simultaneously drawn. Moreover, statutory offsets are to be confined to the exact recipient specified; thus, an offset applicable by statute to an employee will not reduce benefits to his widow, and an offset applicable to a widow will not reduce benefits to dependent children. 4 Arthur Larson, The Law of Workmen’s Compensation § 97.41(c) (1995) (footnotes omitted). While section 176.101, subd. 4 furnishes an offset for government benefits being paid, we see nothing in that provision that justifies calculating the amount of the offset for government benefits on an actuarial basis rather than the amount of government benefits actually being paid. Furthermore, it seems to us that an employee ought not be required to subsidize the workers’ compensation system by requiring him to forgo a retirement and disability option that the employer is obligated by statute to make available. We therefore reverse the decision of the WCCA and reinstate the decision of the compensation judge. Reversed and compensation judge’s decision reinstated. The employee is awarded $400 in attorney fees.

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Marriage of Oldewurtel v. Redding · 1988 4 citations

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Marriage of Nardini v. Nardini · 1987 5 citations

Minn. Stat. § 518.58 (1986) provides that-when a marriage is dissolved, “the court shall make a just and equitable division of the marital property of the parties.” Notwithstanding the common law’s somewhat cynical reference to the length of the chancellor’s foot, 1 equity denotes fairness and requires the application of the dictates of conscience or the principles of natural justice to the settlement of controversies. Hence, the statutory mandate requiring the courts to consider all relevant factors in making the division:

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Marriage of Rohling v. Rohling · 1986 4 citations

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Marriage of Miller v. Miller · 1984 2 citations

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Ronnkvist v. Ronnkvist · 1983 1 citation

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Marriage of Janssen v. Janssen · 1983 1 citation

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Marriage of Taylor v. Taylor · 1983 4 citations

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Faus v. Faus · 1982 3 citations

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Marriage of Brown v. Brown · 1982 1 citation

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Marriage of DeLa Rosa v. DeLa Rosa · 1981 2 citations

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Steele v. Steele · 1981 1 citation

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Melamed v. Melamed · 1979 2 citations

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Minnesota Court of Appeals

In re the marriage of: Lori Ann Saari v. Mark Steven Saari · 2025 1 citation

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In re the Marriage of: Robert Thomas Nord, A v. Katherine Elizabeth Bowers, B, ... · 2024 1 citation

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In re the Marriage of: Chriss O. Latterell v. Mary Jean Latterell · 2024 1 citation

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In re the Marriage of: Kiran Kumar Arise v. Anjali Naresh · 2024 4 citations

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In re the Marriage of: Donald Floyd Deeble, Jr. v. Hayley Elizabeth Espelien, ... · 2023 3 citations

division” of the parties’ marital property. Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1 (2022). The district

In re the Marriage of: Michelle Beth Kremer v. Robbie Michael Kremer · 2017 12 citations

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In re the Marriage of: Kathleen Jean Rucker v. Kraig Vernon Rucker · 2016 1 citation

that respondent did not misuse marital property. Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1a. (2014),

In re the Marriage of: Rachel Lynn Rogers v. David Matthew Rogers · 2016 5 citations

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In re the Marriage of: Christopher John Anton v. Romona L. Sparks, f/k/a Romona L. Anton · 2016 1 citation

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In re the Marriage of: Christopher Hutchenson Owen v. Angela Dawn Owen · 2016 1 citation

the marital property of the parties.” Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1 (2014). When dividing

In re the Marriage of: Lana Michelle Kerola v. Greg William Kerola · 2016 1 citation

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In re the Marriage of: David Scott Pederson v. Elizabeth Joan Pederson · 2016 3 citations

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In re the Marriage of: Stephanie Kay Nelson v. Steven John Nelson · 2016 3 citations

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In re the Marriage of: Marianne Ronate Reis v. Thomas Michael Hallberg · 2016 2 citations

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In re the Marriage of: James Walter Shaw v. Barbara Ann Shaw · 2016 3 citations

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In re the Marriage of: Dontrell Valerie Thornton v. Herbert Thornton, Jr. · 2016 1 citation

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Leon Asle Baxter v. Debra Kay Baxter · 2016 2 citations

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In re the Marriage of: Janelle M. Schires v. Vernon D. Schires · 2016 2 citations

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In re the Marriage of: Todd Emil Nelson v. Leslie Ann Nelson · 2015 3 citations

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In re the Marriage of: Vitamin v. Misha Gordin · 2015 3 citations

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In re the Marriage of: Tarah Ann Aanerud v. James Richard Aanerud · 2015 2 citations

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In re the Marriage of: Charles DeBolt Hart v. Jennifer Jayne Hart · 2015 1 citation

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In re the Marriage of: Nicole Ruth Sela v. Amit Yitzhak Sela · 2015 1 citation

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In re the Marriage of Mary Ellen Block, f/k/a Mary Ellen Jensen v. William Ray Block · 2015 1 citation

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In re the Marriage of: Kathy Ann Hockenson, n/k/a Kathy Ann Lockhart v. Galen Jay Hockenson · 2015 2 citations

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In re the Marriage of: Christine J. Curtis v. Gregory M. Curtis · 2015 1 citation

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In re the Marriage of: Kristin Anne Schmidt v. Jonathan William Schmidt · 2015 1 citation

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In re the Marriage of: James Donald Knight v. Maria Pieternella Knight · 2015 6 citations

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In re the Marriage of: Stephen Joseph Moore v. Lisa Jo Jacobson, f/k/a Lisa Jo Moore · 2015 1 citation

disability portion of the PERA pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1.” Jacobson

In re the Marriage of: Kathryn R. Rauworth, n/k/a Kathryn R. Kendall v. Barry L. Rauworth · 2015 3 citations

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

In re the Marriage of: Lynn Desiree Wallace v. Christopher Michael Wallace · 2014 1 citation

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Kimberlee Ann Nelson v. Lynette Nelson · 2014 6 citations

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In re the Marriage of: Lizhi Zhang v. Zheng Fu · 2014 4 citations

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In re the Marriage of: Charles A. T. Gill v. Kathryn E. K. Gill · 2014 1 citation

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Redleaf v. Redleaf · 2011 1 citation

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RISK EX REL. MILLER v. Stark · 2010 2 citations

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Marriage of Angell v. Angell · 2009 1 citation

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Marriage of Kerr v. Kerr · 2009 1 citation

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Alam v. Chowdhury · 2009 8 citations

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Lee v. Lee · 2008 2 citations

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Marriage of Baker v. Baker · 2007 12 citations

I. Wife first argues that the district court erred as a matter of law when it held that the appreciation of husband's premarital retirement funds is nonmarital property. Whether property is marital or nonmarital is a question of law over which we exercise de novo review. Gottsacker v. Gottsacker, 664 N.W.2d 848, 852 (Minn. 2003). But in doing so, we defer to the district court's findings of fact. Id. Marital property is "property, real or personal, including vested public or private pension plan benefits or rights, acquired by the parties, or either of them, to a dissolution . . . proceeding at any time during the existence of the marriage." Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3b (2006) (codified at Minn. Stat. § 518.54, subd. 5 (2004)). All property acquired by either spouse during the marriage is presumed to be marital property. Id. To overcome this presumption, a spouse must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the property is nonmarital. Crosby v. Crosby, 587 N.W.2d 292, 296 (Minn.App. 1998), review denied (Minn. Feb. 18, 1999). Nonmarital property includes property acquired by either spouse before marriage and any increase in the value thereof, Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3b, provided such an increase is the result of passive appreciation, Gottsacker, 664 N.W.2d at 853 (citing Nardini v. Nardini, 414 N.W.2d 184, 193 (Minn. 1987)); Swick v. Swick, 467 N.W.2d 328, 331 (Minn.App. 1991), review denied (Minn. May 16, 1991). Appreciation is passive when it is "`attributable to inflation or to market forces or conditions.'" Gottsacker, 664 N.W.2d at 853 (quoting Nardini, 414 N.W.2d at 192). In other words, appreciation occurring when "no investment decisions are made, and neither [spouse] may withdraw the funds or otherwise control the investments," is passive. Prahl v. Prahl, 627 N.W.2d 698, 706 (Minn.App. 2001). Conversely, appreciation that is attributable to the exertion of efforts by one or both spouses during the marriage generally is deemed active and, thus, marital property. Gottsacker, 664 N.W.2d at 853 (quoting Nardini, 414 N.W.2d at 192); White v. White, 521 N.W.2d 874, 878 (Minn.App. 1994). Such efforts may include the application or investment of marital funds, marital labor, or entrepreneurial decision-making *820 that is marital in nature. White, 521 N.W.2d at 878. When the parties married, husband had $957,473 in a retirement plan entitled Specialists in General Surgery Pension and Profit Sharing Plan ("SIGS accounts"). During the marriage, additional contributions and investment returns caused the value of the SIGS accounts to reach $3,088,072 on the date of valuation for the dissolution proceedings. During trial, husband's expert, Thomas Harjes, testified as to the proper allocation of that amount between marital and nonmarital property. To derive this allocation, Harjes classified the premarital amount of $957,473 as nonmarital property and all contributions made during the marriage as marital property. For each year of marriage, Harjes determined the percentage of funds in the SIGS accounts that was marital property and the percentage that was nonmarital property. He then used those percentages to divide the investment returns between marital and nonmarital property. Based on these calculations, Harjes concluded that $639,577 of $3,088,072 was marital property subject to equitable division. The district court adopted Harjes's conclusions and allocated the final value of the SIGS accounts between marital and nonmarital property accordingly. Wife challenges this allocation, arguing that the district court should have allocated the entire amount by which the SIGS accounts have increased above the premarital amount of $957,473 to marital property because that increase is attributable to the exertion of marital efforts. Specifically, wife argues that this increase is the result of husband's active management of the SIGS accounts himself and through his financial advisor. The district court rejected this argument, holding that the appreciation of a spouse's nonmarital retirement funds is not active appreciation "simply because the spouse . . . hires a financial advisor to manage the funds." We agree that a financial advisor's management of a retirement account containing nonmarital funds does not necessitate a finding that the appreciation of those funds is active. That nonmarital funds are managed by a financial advisor, however, does not preclude a finding that the appreciation thereof is active. Rather, to make this determination, a district court must examine the nature of the spouses' efforts regarding these retirement accounts. Gottsacker, 664 N.W.2d at 853. Here, the district court's findings of fact and the record evidence of husband's involvement with the SIGS accounts establish that the appreciation of the SIGS accounts is active and, therefore, marital property. At trial, wife testified that she and husband hired financial advisor Randy Trask to manage the SIGS accounts. Specifically, wife testified that "after we were married we invited Merrill Lynch representatives to come out to our home and discuss retirement plans for our future. . . . [T]ogether we sat down and chose some Merrill Lynch plans and then invested money in those plans." Trask testified that husband paid him an annual fee to manage these accounts.[2] Trask confirmed that he "could not have discretionary management over any of these accounts if [husband] would not allow it" and that husband "has the ultimate control over [the] accounts." Harjes also confirmed that husband has full discretion regarding how the accounts are controlled. *821 The evidence conclusively establishes that husband and Trask created an agency relationship when they mutually agreed that Trask would act on husband's behalf but subject to husband's control. See A. Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 285, 290 (Minn. 1981) ("Agency is the fiduciary relationship that results from the manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act."); see also Dalager v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 350 N.W.2d 391, 394 (Minn.App. 1984) (holding that whether agency relationship exists is fact question unless evidence is conclusive). As such, husband is bound by Trask's active management of the accounts as if it were his own. See Fingerhut Mfg. Co. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 267 Minn. 201, 204, 125 N.W.2d 734, 737 (1964) (holding that when agent acts within scope of express or implied authority, principal is bound thereby); Kellogg v. Woods, 720 N.W.2d 845, 852 (Minn.App. 2006) (holding that principal is liable for agent's acts that are within scope of agency relationship). Not only did husband actively manage the SIGS accounts through Trask, husband also actively managed them himself. During the trial, there was extensive evidence and testimony presented about husband's ability to control and withdraw funds from the SIGS accounts. Harjes testified that husband had full authority to make changes to the SIGS accounts, which he often exercised by rolling funds from one account to another. Trask testified that, during his tenure as manager of the SIGS accounts, husband made at least one stock purchase in which husband bought stock of a company with which husband's son was associated. Wife testified, and Trask confirmed, that, at one point, husband transferred the SIGS accounts to another financial advisor, but husband later transferred them back to Trask. Trask and Harjes also testified that, during the marriage, the funds in the SIGS accounts were available as liquid assets that husband could withdraw at any time.[3] We have held that the ability to control investments or withdraw funds can defeat a claim that the increases in value of premarital funds were the result of passive appreciation.[4]See Prahl, 627 N.W.2d at 706 (stating that appreciation is passive when "no investment decisions are made, and neither [spouse] may withdraw the funds or otherwise control the investments"). Taken together, and with the statutory presumption that all property acquired during the marriage is marital property, these characteristics establish that the appreciation of husband's premarital *822 funds in husband's SIGS accounts was not the result of mere market forces or conditions but rather the result of marital efforts in the form of entrepreneurial decision-making. Accordingly, this increase constitutes active appreciation that is marital property subject to just and equitable division under Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1 (2006).[5] Because the district court erroneously concluded that the value of the appreciation of husband's premarital funds in his SIGS accounts is nonmarital property, we reverse and remand to the district court with instructions to divide the parties' marital property in a just and equitable manner.