§ 518.64

Minnesota Statutes

Source: 2025 Minnesota Statutes. For the official text, see revisor.mn.gov.

Citing Cases (430)

Showing 100 most recent of 430 citing cases.

Minnesota Supreme Court

Lee v. Lee · 2009 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Butt v. Schmidt · 2008 4 citations

+ 4 more citations in this opinion.

Putz v. Putz · 2002 7 citations

OPINION LANCASTER, Justice. This is an appeal by Benton County from a court of appeals’ decision affirming a child support magistrate’s order that reduced Paul Ben-Yehuda’s monthly child support obligation from $400 to $50. Ben-Yehuda sought the downward modification after voluntarily terminating his full-time employment and enrolling full time as an undergraduate student at Saint Cloud State University. We reverse and remand. I. Paul Ben-Yehuda — formerly known as Paul Putz — and Jamile Putz were married in 1992. In September 1994, Ben-Yehuda and Putz had their only child: Rita Marie Putz.1 Ben-Yehuda and Putz separated in July 1999, and their marriage was dissolved on October 13,1999. At the time of the dissolution, Ben-Yehuda was employed as a supervisor of distribution operations by the United States Postal Service (USPS), and had gross earnings of approximately $40,000 per year. Putz worked full time at the Adult and Pediatric Urology Clinic in Saint Cloud, Minnesota, and earned a gross hourly wage of $9.50. Ben-Yehuda and Putz reached an agreement with respect to custody, child support, and all other issues related to the dissolution, and on October 13, 1999, the district court issued stipulated findings of fact, conclusions of law, an order for judgment, and a judgment and decree (1999 Order) reflecting the parties’ agreement. Under the 1999 Order, the parties were awarded joint legal custody of Rita Marie and Putz was awarded sole physical custody. The 1999 Order required Ben-Yehuda to pay Putz $400 per month beginning September 1, 1999, for child support. In addition, it required Ben-Yehuda to pay 50% of Putz’s child care expenses, 50% of Rita Marie’s uninsured medical, dental, orthodontic, optical, and mental health care expenses, and 50% of Rita Marie’s health and dental insurance costs not covered by either of the parties’ employers. Ben-Yehuda’s support obligation of $400 per month was a downward departure from the child support guidelines found in Minn. Stat. § 518.551, subd. 5(b) (Supp. 1999).2 The district court noted three reasons for the parties’ agreement to deviate from the guidelines. First, under the parties’ physical custody arrangement, Rita Marie was to spend approximately three months per year with Ben-Yehuda. Second, Putz was capable of earning an income. Third, at the time of the dissolution, Ben-Yehuda was planning to move out of the United States to take a lower-paying job. Ben-Yehuda did not move out of the country, nor did he take a lower-paying job. Instead, he remarried on November *34624, 1999 — six weeks after the district court issued the 1999 Order — and continued to live in Saint Cloud. He also continued to work as a supervisor with the USPS until July 1, 2000, at which time he voluntarily terminated his employment and enrolled as a full-time student at Saint Cloud State University (St. Cloud State). In October 2000, Benton County intervened in the case as provided for by Minn. Stat. § 518.551, subd. 9(b) (2000).3 In November 2000, the county made a motion to modify the 1999 Order. In its proposed order modifying child support (Proposed Order), the county requested an increase in Ben-Yehuda’s monthly support obligation from $400 to $543. The county arrived at the requested amount by applying the child support guidelines to the monthly net income Ben-Yehuda earned at the USPS. The Proposed Order also requested that Ben-Yehuda pay $186.86 per month for medical support, $107.42 per month for child care expenses, and $108.60 per month toward the $5,320.76 in arrears Ben-Yehuda incurred between September 1,1999, and October 31, 2000. In January 2001, Ben-Yehuda made a countermotion to “terminate” his child support and health insurance obligations during his attendance at St. Cloud State. In an affidavit attached to his motion, Ben-Yehuda stated that his only income was a small amount he received as a military veteran4 and that he was relying on his wife to support him while he was in school. He also stated that he was in class approximately 20 hours per week, studied outside of class approximately 40 hours per week, and expected to earn a degree in computer science in four years. With respect to his future earnings, Ben-Yehuda stated: At that time [when I receive my degree], my ability to earn an income will be substantially higher in this field of employment than it is with the United States Postal Service, or any other place of employment without a college degree. I anticipate that I will be earning, at a minimum, $70,000 when I have completed my studies. A child support magistrate held a hearing on the parties’ motions, and in January 2001, the magistrate issued findings of fact, conclusions of law, an order modifying support, and an order for judgment (2001 Modified Order). The magistrate found that Ben-Yehuda received $460 per month from the GI bill and that his unemployment was “temporary and * * * designed to lead to an increase in income.” The magistrate also found that, excluding child care expenses, Putz’s monthly expenses for herself and Rita Marie were $1,970. Excluding public assistance benefits, Putz’s net monthly income was $1,302. Based on these findings, the magistrate concluded that there had been a substantial change in circumstances that rendered the 1999 Order unreasonable and unfair. Applying the guidelines to Ben-Yehuda’s monthly net income, the magistrate concluded that he had the ability to pay $50 per month for child support. The magistrate found that the $50 support award was not a deviation from the guidelines. In addition, the 2001 Modified Order reduced Ben-Yehuda’s contribution to Putz’s child care expenses to zero, reserved the issue of medical and dental support “until further order,” entered a judgment against *347Ben-Yehuda establishing his arrears through October 31, 2000, as $5,321.16, and directed Ben-Yehuda to notify Putz in ■writing of any change in his education or employment status. The county appealed the magistrate’s 2001 Modified Order to the court of appeals,5 arguing that the magistrate erred by (1) finding that Ben-Yehuda was not voluntarily unemployed; (2) finding that Ben-Yehuda’s return to school constituted a substantial change in circumstances; (3) finding that Ben-Yehuda’s modified support obligation was not a deviation from the child support guidelines; and (4) setting Ben-Yehuda’s support obligation without considering the contribution he received from his spouse and others. The court of appeals, relying on In re Custody of A.S.R., 539 N.W.2d 607, 612 (Minn.App.1995), for the proposition that an obligor is generally not considered voluntarily unemployed while attending school, held that the magistrate acted within his discretion in concluding that Ben-Yehuda was not voluntarily unemployed. Addressing the county’s second argument, the court of appeals held that the magistrate did not abuse his discretion by concluding that the reduction in Ben-Yehuda’s net monthly income resulted in a substantial change in circumstances. The court of appeals based its holding on Minn. Stat. § 518.64, subd. 2(b) (2000), which creates a presumption of a substantial change in circumstances when “the application of the child support guidelines * * * to the current circumstances of the parties results in a calculated court order that is at least 20 percent and at least $50 per month * * * lower than the current support order.” With respect to the county’s third argument, the court of appeals observed that, when an obligor’s net monthly income is $550 or less, the obligor’s support obligation is based on the obligor’s ability to pay. Thus, the court of appeals concluded that the magistrate’s award of $50 per month was not a deviation from the guidelines. Finally, the court of appeals concluded that the magistrate did not err by failing to include contributions from Ben-Yehuda’s spouse and others in its calculation of Ben-Yehuda’s income. After noting that the county had not raised this issue before the magistrate, the court of appeals rejected the county’s argument on the ground that the record did not contain any information concerning the alleged contributions. II. We have repeatedly stated that the district court enjoys broad discretion in ordering modifications to child support orders. Gully v. Gully, 599 N.W.2d 814, 820 (Minn.1999); Moylan v. Moylan, 384 N.W.2d 859, 864 (Minn.1986). However, the district court’s discretion must be exercised within the limits set by the legislature. Moylan, 384 N.W.2d at 864. We will reverse a district court’s order regarding child support only if we are convinced that the district court abused its broad discretion by reaching, a clearly erroneous conclusion that is against logic and the facts on record. Gully, 599 N.W.2d at 820; Moylan, 384 N.W.2d at 864. The court of appeals in this case stated that the abuse of discretion standard also applies to or*348ders issued by child support magistrates. Putz v. County of Benton, No. C7-01-527, 2001 WL 950088, at *1 (Minn.App. Aug.21, 2001); see also Brazinsky v. Bmzinsky, 610 N.W.2d 707, 710 (Minn.App.2000) (stating that “when reviewing a child support magistrate’s order in an expedited child support process proceeding, [the court of appeals] will apply the same standard of review that [it] would apply to the order if it had been issued by a district court”). While we have never addressed the question, the court of appeals applied the abuse of discretion standard and the parties agree that it is the appropriate standard of review. A support order can be modified if a party experiences a substantial increase or decrease in earnings that makes the terms of the existing support order unreasonable and unfair. MinmStat. § 518.64, subd. 2(a)(1) (2000). When considering a motion for the modification of a support order, child support magistrates must apply Minn. Stat. § 518.551, subd. 5. Minn. Stat. § 518.64, subd. 2(c)(1). Under the child support guidelines found in section 518.551, subd. 5(b), an obligor’s support obligation is calculated as a percentage of his or her monthly net income. The guideline percentages range from 16% to 50%, and the percentage applicable in any given case depends on the obligor’s monthly net income and the number of children to be supported. Id. If the obligor’s monthly net income is $550' or less, the support obligation is calculated “based on the ability of the obligor to provide support at these income levels, or at higher levels, if the obligor has the earning ability.” Id. There is a rebuttable presumption that the support obligation calculated under the guidelines is correct. Id., subd. 5(i). When, as here, a party seeks the modification of a support order on the basis of a change in the obligor’s earnings, the support obligation calculated under the guidelines helps a magistrate ascertain whether a modification is warranted. If the application of the guidelines to the obligor’s current circumstances results in a calculation that is at least 20% and at least $50 per month higher or lower than the obligor’s existing support obligation, it is presumed that there has been a substantial change in circumstances and the terms of the existing support order are rebutt-ably presumed to be unreasonable and unfair. Minn. Stat. § 518.64, subd. 2(b)(1). Given the importance of the guidelines in child support modification cases, it is essential that magistrates carefully examine the evidence presented by the parties and make thorough and accurate findings of fact regarding the obligor’s monthly net income. Ordinarily, an obli-gor’s monthly net income is equal to his or her actual monthly gross income minus the deductions specified in section 518.551, subd. 5(b). If, however, a magistrate finds that an obligor is “voluntarily unemployed or underemployed,” then the magistrate must calculate the support obligation “based on a determination of [the obligor’s] imputed income.” Minn. Stat. § 518.551, subd. 5b(d) (2000). “Imputed income” is defined as “the estimated earning ability of a parent based on the parent’s prior earnings history, education, and job skills, and on availability of jobs within the community for an individual with the parent’s qualifications.” Id. Section 518.551, subd. 5b(d), also states: A parent is not considered voluntarily unemployed or underemployed upon a showing by the parent that the unemployment or underemployment: (1) is temporary and will ultimately lead to an increase in income; or (2) represents a bona fide career change that outweighs the adverse effect of that parent’s diminished income on the child. *349In this case, both the court of appeals and the magistrate appear to have proceeded under the belief that an obligor who voluntarily terminates employment and returns to school is automatically considered not to be voluntarily unemployed under the statute. In its decision affirming the magistrate’s 2001 Modified Order, the court of appeals relied heavily on its earlier decision in A.S.R., citing it for the proposition that “[a]n obligor generally is not considered voluntarily unemployed or underemployed while the obligor is attending school.” Putz, 2001 WL 950088, at *2. At the child support modification hearing, A.S.R. was the only case cited by Ben-Yehuda in support of his position that he was not voluntarily unemployed. At the conclusion of counsel’s argument, the magistrate stated: [T]hese are difficult cases when someone goes to school, particularly when you have an Order in place that is helpful, and then all of a sudden that gets changed, you don’t participate in the decision. In the cases that I’ve handled in past years, if I try to have the support continued, even if the child is in the late teens, I’ve been reversed by the Court of Appeals. So it puts you in a very difficult spot. And I think the options that I can utilize to help you [Putz] are very limited here pursuant to what the case law is. And [Ben-Yehu-da] has certainly cited the pertinent cases on that. (Emphasis added.) In A.S.R., a dispute over child support arose when custody of the child was transferred from the child’s mother, who had been murdered, to the child’s maternal grandparents. 539 N.W.2d at 608. The obligor had terminated his full-time employment and enrolled at the University of Minnesota as a full-time student. Id. at 609. A family court referee reduced the obligor’s monthly support obligation from $394 to $50. Id. The district court reversed the referee’s order on the ground that the obligor failed to show a substantial change in circumstances. Id. at 610. The court of appeals reversed and reinstated the referee’s order. Id. at 613-14. In its discussion of the background of the case, the court of appeals noted the existence of “legislation providing that an obli-gor is not voluntarily underemployed or unemployed if he goes to school. See Minn. Stat. § 518.551, subd. 5b(d) (1994).” A.S.R., 539 N.W.2d at 612. We did not review the court of appeals’ decision in A.S.R. Indeed, we have never considered whether an obligor who voluntary stops working and returns to school qualifies as voluntarily unemployed under section 518.551, subd. 5b(d). That section does not specifically address the question. Thus, although an obligor who returns to school is, we conclude, free to argue that he or she is not voluntarily unemployed, such a finding is warranted only if the obligor shows that the unemployment “(1) is temporary and will ultimately lead to an increase in income; or (2) represents a bona fide career change that outweighs the adverse effect of that parent’s diminished income on the child.” Id. Citing case law from the court of appeals, the county argues that, in addition to the two conditions enumerated in section 518.551, subd. 5b(d), the court should also consider whether the obligor unjustifiably self-limited his or her income in bad faith regarding the support obligation. In response, Ben-Yehuda notes that the case law cited by the county predates the enactment of section 518.551, subd. 5b(d), and argues that cases decided before the statute went into effect are no longer applicable. Furthermore, Ben-Yehuda argues that the county waived this issue by failing *350to raise it before the magistrate at the child support modification hearing. Generally, issues not raised below will not be considered on appeal. Funchess v. Cecil Newman Corp., 632 N.W.2d 666, 673 (Minn.2001) (citing Thiele v. Stick, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn.1988)). “This is not, however, an ironclad rule.” Oanes v. Allstate Ins. Co., 617 N.W.2d 401, 403 (Minn.2000). This court has the authority to take any action “as the interest of justice may require.” Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.04. In this case, neither Putz nor the county was represented by counsel at the child support modification hearing.6 In light of the fact that the state’s interest in protecting the well-being of children is at stake, we conclude that justice requires us to consider the issue raised by the county even though it was not raised below. See Chilly, 599 N.W.2d at 823 (“In cases involving child support obligations, the court plays a unique role in that it sits as a third party, representing all of the citizens of the state of Minnesota to see that children benefit from the income of their parents.”). The legislature enacted what is now section 518.551, subd. 5b(d), in 1991.7 Act of June 4, 1991, ch. 292, art. 5, § 76, 1991 Minn. Laws 1653, 1902. Prior to that time, Minnesota’s child support statutes did not expressly provide for the imputation of income to an unemployed or underemployed obligor. Our holding in Giesner v. Giesner, 319 N.W.2d 718 (Minn.1982), filled in this statutory gap. In Giesner, the obligor was involuntarily terminated from his employment and, after attempting unsuccessfully to obtain employment in his field, chose to start a new business. Id. at 719. The obligor then moved to suspend his support obligation for a period of 8 to 12 months. Id. A referee denied the obli-gor’s motion and the trial court affirmed the referee’s decision. Id. We reversed and remanded for further findings on the issue of the obligor’s subjective intent in starting the new business. Id. at 720. We noted that, in cases involving an obligor’s ability to comply with a support order for contempt purposes, “there is no defense if the party directed to pay ‘has not made a reasonable effort by means of his own selection to conform to an order well within his inherent but unexercised capacities.’ ” Id. at 719-20 (citations omitted). We stated that “a similar test should apply where an individual seeks modification of a decree on the ground that a career change has resulted in decreased earnings.” Id. at 720. We went on to explain: If the change was made in good faith, the child and the separated spouse should share in the hardship as they would have had the family remained together. The same is true as to benefits. * * * If the trial court finds that the [obligor’s] entry into the new business * * * was made in good faith so that [the obligor] might meet his obligations, * * * the court may then fashion a modification that will reflect equities for the parties and the child. Id. (citation omitted). Following Giesner, a number of court of appeals decisions held that an obligor’s earning capacity could be used as a measure of income if the obligor’s actual income was “unjustifiably self-limited” — that is, if the obligor self-limited his or her income in bad faith. See, e.g., Schneider v. *351Schneider, 473 N.W.2d 329, 332 (Minn.App.1991); Anderson v. Anderson, 450 N.W.2d 384, 386 (Minn.App.1990); Curtis v. Curtis, 442 N.W.2d 173, 177-78 (Minn.App.1989); Rohrman v. Moore, 423 N.W.2d 717, 720-21 (Minn.App.1988); Hedburg v. Hedburg, 412 N.W.2d 43, 47 (Minn.App.1987); Goff v. Goff, 388 N.W.2d 28, 30 (Minn.App.1986); Juelfs v. Juelfs, 359 N.W.2d 667, 670 (Minn.App.1984), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 29, 1985). Ben-Yehuda contends that the case law allowing courts to impute income to an obligor who unjustifiably self-limits his or her income in bad faith was superseded by section 518.551, subd. 5b(d). In Holmberg v. Holmberg, 588 N.W.2d 720 (Minn.1999), we stated that the jurisdiction of the courts in cases involving child support is equitable in origin and the courts’ authority to craft remedies in such cases is an outgrowth of inherent equitable powers. Id. at 724-26. In deciding whether section 518.551, subd. 5b(d), limits the power of the courts to take an obligor’s bad faith into account, we are guided by the rule that statutes are not to be construed in derogation of well-established principles of the common law or equity unless such a construction is required by the express words of the statute or by necessary implication. Swogger v. Taylor, 243 Minn. 458, 465, 68 N.W.2d 376, 382 (1955); see also Ly v. Nystrom, 615 N.W.2d 302, 314 (Minn.2000) (stating that we have “long presumed that statutes are consistent with the common law”). The language of section 518.551, subd. 5b(d), does not expressly prohibit courts from considering whether an obli-gor’s unemployment or underemployment is in bad faith. Nor does the statute necessarily imply such a prohibition. On the contrary, the statute gives rise to the opposite implication. Under section 518.551, subd. 5b(d), there are only two situations in which an obligor who chooses to terminate or scale back employment is not voluntarily unemployed or underemployed. In all other situations, including those in which the obligor unjustifiably self-limits his or her income in bad faith, the obligor is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed and the court must calculate the support obligation on the basis of imputed income. See id. We therefore hold that section 518.551, subd. 5b(d), does not limit the power of the courts to consider whether an obligor’s unemployment or underemployment is in bad faith toward his or her support obligation. In addition to determining the obligor’s monthly net income and applying the guidelines, a magistrate ruling on a motion for the modification of a support order must also consider the six factors enumerated in section 518.551, subd. 5(c). The six factors are: (1) all earnings, income, and resources of the parents, including real and personal property, but excluding income from excess employment of the obligor or obligee that meets [certain statutory criteria]; (2) the financial needs and resources, physical and emotional condition, and educational needs of the child or children to be supported; (3) the standard of living the child would have enjoyed had the marriage not been dissolved, but recognizing that the parents now have separate households; (4) which parent receives the income taxation dependency exemption and what financial benefit the parent receives from it; (5) the parents’ debts [if they meet specified statutory criteria]; and *352(6) the obligor’s receipt of public assistance under the AFDC program[.]

+ 4 more citations in this opinion.

Marriage of Rogers v. Rogers · 2001 4 citations

+ 4 more citations in this opinion.

Marriage of Gully v. Gully · 1999 16 citations

+ 16 more citations in this opinion.

Marriage of Dobrin v. Dobrin · 1997 4 citations

+ 4 more citations in this opinion.

Marriage of Hecker v. Hecker · 1997 4 citations

+ 4 more citations in this opinion.

Marriage of Beck v. Kaplan · 1997 3 citations

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

Loo v. Loo · 1994 4 citations

+ 4 more citations in this opinion.

Marriage of Telma v. Telma · 1991 2 citations

At issue is a coordinated reading of specific provisions of the parties’ stipulations, with regard to the amount, duration and termination of a spousal maintenance award as incorporated in the judgment and decree of marital dissolution, and Minn. Stat. § 518.64, subd. 3 (1988) which states: “Unless otherwise agreed in writing or expressly provided in the decree, the obligation to pay future maintenance is terminated upon the death of either party or the remarriage of the party receiving maintenance.”

Marriage of Erickson v. Erickson · 1989 12 citations

+ 12 more citations in this opinion.

Marriage of Perrington v. Perrington · 1989 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Marriage of Karon v. Karon · 1989 18 citations

+ 18 more citations in this opinion.

Marriage of Sefkow v. Sefkow · 1988 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Searles v. Searles · 1988 1 citation

1. We hold that dissolution of the marriage under the Missouri decree did not extinguish Antonia’s claim to a marital interest in the Minnesota real estate. In Larsen v. Erickson, 222 Minn. 363, 24 N.W.2d 711 (1946), relied on by the trial court, this court held that a wife’s inchoate dower interest in Minnesota land was extinguished when the marriage was extinguished under a Nevada divorce decree. But we are not dealing here with a widow’s dower; moreover, the law has changed since 1946. Since then the law recognizes that spouses have a common ownership interest in property acquired during cover-ture, regardless of who holds title; and this interest, rather than being extinguished upon dissolution, is determined and defined at dissolution for the purpose of distribution to the spouses. See Minn. Stat. § 518.54, subd. 5 (1971); see also footnote 3, infra. Once ownership shares are determined, they ordinarily become final unless the court later finds conditions justifying reconsideration. See Minn. Stat. § 518.64 (1986). But where a decree makes no division of any real estate and, indeed, makes no mention of real estate, it would seem the matter of ownership rights remains to be determined. 1 Thus, in Grodzicki v. Quasi, 276 Minn. 34, 149 N.W.2d 8 (1967), when a Florida divorce decree failed to dispose of the parties’ property, we held that the property remained to be disposed of by the court.

Marriage of Nardini v. Nardini · 1987 2 citations

On appeal the court of appeals affirmed, commenting that sometime before expiration of her award of temporary maintenance, Marguerite may renew her request for permanent maintenance. See Minn. Stat. § 518.64, subd. 1 (1986).

Marriage of Gunderson v. Gunderson · 1987 3 citations

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

Marriage of Katz v. Katz · 1987 4 citations [Dissent]

+ 4 more citations in this opinion.

Marriage of Erickson v. Erickson · 1986 4 citations

385 N.W.2d 301 (1986) In re the Marriage of Jean Ann ERICKSON, Respondent, v. Lawrence Gregory ERICKSON, Petitioner, Appellant. No. C7-84-1770. Supreme Court of Minnesota. April 11, 1986. Dennis L. Briguet, West St. Paul, for appellant. Paul M. Nesvig, St. Paul, for respondent. *302 Considered and decided by the court en banc without oral argument. AMDAHL, Chief Justice. This case involves substantially the same issues we addressed in the companion case of Moylan v. Moylan, 384 N.W.2d 859 (Minn.1986) (filed herewith). Because of our holding in Moylan that the child support guidelines of Minn. Stat. § 518.551, subd. 5 (1984), apply in all cases, including modification proceedings, we need not discuss those matters here.[1] Appellant does, however, raise some issues which merit our attention. The marriage of Lawrence Erickson and Jean Erickson was dissolved in October 1978. The dissolution decree, based upon the stipulation of the parties, awarded Jean custody of the parties' three minor children and set child support at $300 per child per month. It also required Lawrence to maintain, among other things, health insurance for the children and life insurance on his own life in the amount of $355,000. This award was based upon the trial court's finding that in 1978 Lawrence had a gross income of $40,000 as a physician and that Jean grossed $3,000 as a bookkeeper.[2] On May 17, 1984, Jean filed a motion to modify the child support award and to find Lawrence in contempt of court for failing to maintain life and health insurance as required by the court's decree. Because the health coverage procured by Lawrence could only be used in Hastings, Minnesota, Jean was forced to purchase separate coverage on her own since she lived in St. Paul with the children. There is no evidence in the record, however, other than a statement to the court by Jean's attorney, as to the cost of this insurance to Jean. Jean and Lawrence each remarried. Jean's new husband earned $28,000 per year and Jean's annual income was $11,750. In November 1983, her new husband started his own business and eventually both he and Jean quit their former jobs to devote their full time to the new venture. This business lost money in 1983 and was only breaking even at the time this motion was heard in June 1984. On June 13, the trial court issued an order modifying the original decree after finding a drastic increase in Lawrence's gross income to approximately $90,000 per year in the years 1982-83. It held that this constituted a significant change in circumstances entitling the minor children to increased support. Relying on the child support guidelines, the court increased the total child support amount from $900 to $1,420 per month, or 30% of Lawrence's monthly net income. On June 22, 1984, the trial court issued a second order finding Lawrence in contempt of court for failing to comply with the insurance requirements of the original decree. The order provided that Lawrence could purge himself of the contempt by: (1) obtaining $155,000 in life insurance coverage on his life, naming the three children as beneficiaries; (2) paying $50 to Jean each month for the establishment of a trust fund for each child (this was in lieu of the additional $200,000 life insurance coverage required by the original decree); (3) reimbursing Jean $1,500 for the children's health insurance; (4) paying $500 in attorney fees; and (5) either obtaining medical coverage for the children at the SHARE Clinic in St. Paul or paying Jean the cost of maintaining her policy. On July 11, Lawrence's attorney appeared before the trial court and stated that Lawrence had made the appropriate arrangements to ensure insurance *303 coverage and he paid into court the $1,500 insurance reimbursement. The trial court noted on the record that Lawrence had substantially complied with the purgative provisions of the contempt order and took no further action on the matter. Lawrence petitioned the Court of Appeals for discretionary review, first of the modification order and later of the contempt order. Both petitions were denied since judgment had not been entered on the modification order and initial constructive civil contempt orders are not appealable. It found no compelling reason to grant discretionary review. An amended judgment and decree was entered on August 28, 1984, incorporating the demands of both the modification order and the contempt order into the judgment and decree. Lawrence appealed from that judgment, alleging: (1) The trial court erred in finding him in contempt with respect to the medical insurance payments since Jean gave no specific grounds for her complaint; (2) A trial court may not modify the terms of a dissolution decree through the exercise of its contempt powers; (3) The trial court erred by ordering child support modification based solely upon changes in the parties' incomes; (4) The trial court erred in interpreting prior Court of Appeals' decisions as requiring utilization of the child support guidelines in modification proceedings; (5) The trial court erred in setting the modified support amount by failing to consider that Lawrence must now support two children by his second marriage in addition to the three from his previous marriage; and (6) There was insufficient evidence to support the court's findings of fact. The Court of Appeals disagreed with each of Lawrence's contentions and, in fact, reversed and remanded the case to the trial court ordering an award of 35% of Lawrence's net income rather than 30%. It held the trial court improperly deviated from the guidelines without making express findings justifying the deviation. Erickson v. Erickson, 367 N.W.2d 685, 687 (Minn.App.1985). It further held that the trial court properly utilized the child support guidelines in determining the modified amount and that its use of its contempt power was within its discretion. Id. We granted Lawrence's petition for further review on all issues and now affirm in part and reverse in part the decision of the Court of Appeals. 1. For reasons stated in our Moylan opinion, we affirm the Court of Appeals holding that the child support guidelines were properly applied in this modification proceeding. However, we hold that the trial court's findings were inadequate to support the modification and we remand the case for further consideration. The trial court's findings merely state that Lawrence's gross income has "more than doubled during a five-year period since the dissolution and is a significant change in circumstances entitling the minor children to increased support." Although Minn. Stat. § 518.64, subd. 2(1) (Supp.1985), lists "substantially increased or decreased earnings of a party" as one of the factors on which a modification may be based, the trial court made no finding that Lawrence's increased income makes the terms of the original decree "unreasonable and unfair" as is required by the statute. Additionally, the findings do not reveal whether the trial court considered the needs of the children in reaching its conclusion. See Minn. Stat. § 518.64, subd. 2(2) (Supp.1985). The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court with respect to this issue, observing that the record contains ample evidence to support a conclusion that Lawrence's increase in income rendered the terms of the original decree unreasonable and unfair. It further noted that the record contains evidence of the needs of the children; therefore, the modification was justifiable. We believe that the trial court, however, must make these observations in its findings of fact. We cannot stress enough the importance of having findings of fact that demonstrate the trial court actually did take all relevant factors into consideration. *304 This will help prevent blind adherence to the guideline amounts. Lawrence also contends that the trial court and Court of Appeals erred in setting the child support award because both courts, in determining the appropriate amounts of support under the guidelines, failed to consider that Lawrence now has two additional children by his later marriage to support. We affirm the Court of Appeals on this issue. Children by a subsequent marriage, while relevant to a trial court's decision, are not to be factored into the child support guideline tables in Minn. Stat. § 518.551, subd. 5 (1984). 2. We also affirm the Court of Appeals holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in utilizing its contempt power to enforce the child support order. The purpose of the contempt power is to provide the trial court with the means to enforce its orders. See Hopp v. Hopp, 279 Minn. 170, 174, 156 N.W.2d 212, 216 (1968). This power gives the trial court inherently broad discretion to hold an individual in contempt but only where the contemnor has acted "contumaciously, in bad faith, and out of disrespect for the judicial process." Minnesota State Bar Association v. Divorce Assistance Association, Inc., 311 Minn. 276, 284, 248 N.W.2d 733, 740 (1976). As we observed in Hopp: If the duty is one specifically defined by a proper decree of the court, it must be free to compel performance by methods which are speedy, efficient, and sufficiently flexible to meet the problem at hand. Particularly in support cases, the proper discharge of the judge's responsibilities should not be frustrated by delay and formalism. Hopp, 279 Minn. at 174, 156 N.W.2d at 216. The question raised here is whether the trial court may still enforce the terms of the original contempt order. The trial court did not expressly vacate that order when it found that Lawrence had essentially complied with the purgative provisions of the order. It did, however, incorporate the provisions of this contempt order into the amended judgment and decree issued August 28, 1984. Accordingly, we hold that if Jean wishes to move the court to find Lawrence in contempt, she should do so on the basis of alleged violations of the amended decree. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. YETKA and KELLEY, JJ., concur specially. YETKA, Justice (concurring specially). I concur in the opinion of the court, but re-emphasize the points I raised in the companion case of Moylan v. Moylan, 384 N.W.2d 859 (Minn.1986), concerning the application of the child support guidelines to cases such as this which do not involve public assistance: a. While the guidelines apply to all custodial cases, they are only guidelines and are not mandatory. b. Each parent can be an obligor towards his or her children. c. All the resources and income of each parent can be considered in arriving at the total support for the child or children. d. The order for support should be drawn in such a way that the custodial parent not incur legal liability for an accounting to the child or children being supported. e. The court should, in every case, draft findings and reasons for its support order. KELLEY, Justice (concurring specially). I join in the special concurrence of Justice YETKA. NOTES [1] In the Moylan case, we noted that the 1986 Minnesota Legislature recently passed major revisions in the marriage dissolution laws, including changes in certain provisions concerning child support. See Act of March 24, 1986, ch. ___, 1986 Minn. Laws ___. The interpretation of the statutes as amended, however, was not before us and we declined to comment on the effect, if any, of these changes. [2] A review of the couple's 1978 tax returns, however, reveals that the gross income figures were closer to $64,000 for Lawrence and $4,600 for Jean. Note also that the child support guidelines were not effective in 1978.

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Moylan v. Moylan · 1986 16 citations

+ 16 more citations in this opinion.

Ruud v. Ruud · 1986 1 citation

Therefore, we reverse that portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals reversing the trial court with regard to Charles’ continuing obligation to make the $10,000 payment due May 1984. Our decision is based upon the true nature of the award, not the method of identification chosen by the parties in drafting their agreement. Minn. Stat. § 518.64, subd. 3 (1984) is therefore inapplicable to this proceeding.

McClelland v. Pierce · 1985 1 citation

and Wiedemann, however, arose on motions for modification of maintenance orders. Because modification of the terms of a decree respecting maintenance or support depends on a substantial change in the circumstances of one or both of the parties, Minn. Stat. § 518.64 (1984), a proceeding for modification, by its very nature, requires a hearing for presentation of evidence of the events which have occurred since issuance of the current order and which the movant claims make the terms of the current order unreasonable and unfair; and it also requires a decision based on the evidence adduced at that hearing. See Abbott v. Abbott, 282 N.W.2d 561 (Minn.1979). Thus, the motion for modification initiates a “new proceeding” and renews the right of the parties to invoke the automatic reassignment provisions of Rule 63.03 by the filing of an affidavit of prejudice.

Marriage of Angelos v. Angelos · 1985 2 citations

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Marriage of Rudolf v. Rudolf · 1984 1 citation

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Peevy v. Mutual Services Casualty Insurance Co. · 1984 2 citations

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Marriage of McMahon v. McMahon · 1983 2 citations

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Marriage of Smoot v. Smoot · 1983 1 citation

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Heaton v. Heaton · 1983 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Marriage of Taylor v. Taylor · 1983 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Giesner v. Giesner · 1982 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Claybaugh v. Claybaugh · 1981 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Rydell v. Rydell · 1981 3 citations

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Marriage of Rydell v. Rydell · 1981 3 citations

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St. George v. St. George · 1981 2 citations

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Lillehei v. Lillehei · 1980 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Wiese v. Wiese · 1980 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Minnesota Court of Appeals

Marriage of Anderson v. Anderson · 2017 1 citation

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In re the Marriage of: Sharon Alice Gribble v. William Daniel Gribble · 2015 1 citation

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In re the Marriage of: Martha Jean Abbott v. James William Abbott Ladner · 2014 1 citation

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Leifur v. Leifur · 2012 1 citation

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Marriage of Jones v. Jarvinen · 2012 1 citation

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Coalition of Greater Minnesota Cities v. Minnesota Pollution Control Agency · 2009 1 citation

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Marriage of Hunley v. Hunley · 2008 1 citation

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Frank-Bretwisch v. Ryan · 2007 4 citations

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Moore v. Moore · 2007 4 citations

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Maschoff v. Leiding · 2005 1 citation

*839 The issue, then, is whether appellant’s two motions presented the same legal issue. While “child support” may be used narrowly to refer only to the monetary amount an obligor pays under the guidelines, “child support” can also be used more broadly to refer to other childcare costs. Compare Minn. Stat. § 518.551, subd. 5(b) (2004) (child-support guidelines) with Minn. Stat. § 518.54, subd. 4a (2004) (“[s]upport order” includes rulings requiring a party to provide “monetary support, child care, [or] medical support”). Because the substantially changed circumstances required by Minn. Stat. § 518.64, subd. 2, to modify child support must render the existing support obligation unreasonable and unfair, the changed circumstances must pertain to the portion of the obligation sought to be modified. Thus, if multiple types of child support are involved in multiple motions to modify, the mere statement in a prior order that there was no substantial change in circumstances rendering the existing obligation unreasonable and unfair does not necessarily justify invoking res judicata in a subsequent proceeding. See Loo, 520 N.W.2d at 744 (holding untimeliness of motion to modify medical insurance payment did not preclude motion to modify maintenance).

Maki v. Hansen · 2005 1 citation

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County of Stearns v. Barnell · 2005 3 citations

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Gatfield v. Gatfield · 2004 1 citation

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Marriage of O'Donnell v. O'Donnell · 2004 6 citations

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State Ex Rel. Jarvela v. Burke · 2004 2 citations

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Marriage of Peterka v. Peterka · 2004 1 citation

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Marriage of Kielley v. Kielley · 2004 6 citations

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Kammueller v. Kammueller · 2003 1 citation

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Evans v. Evans · 2003 1 citation

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Long v. Creighton · 2003 7 citations

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Eisenschenk v. Eisenschenk · 2003 1 citation

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Youker v. Youker · 2003 1 citation

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In Re Paternity of JMV · 2003 3 citations

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Valento v. Swenson · 2003 3 citations

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In Re Ramsey Cty. Ex Rel. Pierce Cty., Wis. · 2002 2 citations

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Ramsey County ex rel. Pierce County, Wisconsin v. Carey · 2002 2 citations

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Bormann v. Bormann · 2002 8 citations

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Marriage of Ludwigson v. Ludwigson · 2002 3 citations

Appellant contends that his alternate calculation of his net monthly income would produce a child support award that is insufficient to permit modification of the 1996 order. Child support may be modified if the moving party shows a substantial change in circumstances that renders the existing support award unreasonable and unfair. Minn. Stat. § 518.64, subd. 2(a) (2000). To establish a rebuttable presumption that the existing child support order is “unreasonable and unfair” the moving party may show a change in earning or needs of the party or the children that would result in payments at least 20% and $50 per month higher or lower than the current order requires. Id., subd. 2(b)(1) (2000). Given the magistrate’s determination of $2,004 for child support, even if adjusted for the summer visits, *447 appellant’s monthly obligation would still be $1,878.75 — representing more than a 20% increase over the $1,521 — and presumptively establishing a substantial change in circumstances. 4 Moreover, as respondent contends, the present calculation of appellant’s net income includes a pension deduction of five percent of his gross income, a deduction that appellant never previously enjoyed. Finally, we observe appellant’s error in assuming that if the total award were not increased by 20%, modification could not occur. While section 518.64 establishes a presumption for modification when the new award would change by 20% and $50, it does not proscribe modification in other circumstances. To the contrary, a court may determine whether other situations, involving lesser changes in income, warrant modification.

Marriage of Williams v. Williams · 2001 4 citations

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Marriage of Davis v. Davis · 2001 3 citations

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Marriage of Johnson v. Johnson · 2001 1 citation

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Marriage of Geske v. Marcolina · 2001 1 citation

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Sharp v. Bilbro · 2000 1 citation

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Marriage of Brazinsky v. Brazinsky · 2000 1 citation

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Kemp v. Kemp · 2000 1 citation

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Marriage of Rogers v. Rogers · 2000 4 citations

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Berg v. D.D.M. · 1999 5 citations

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State, County of St. Louis Ex Rel. Rimolde v. Tinker · 1999 1 citation

Tinker challenges the district court’s denial of his request for a downward deviation from the child support guidelines, claiming that child support should be returned to his 1995 payment of $344 per month. When the parties agreed to a change of custody, however, a substantial change in circumstances occurred that required recalculation of child support. Minn. Stat. § 518.64, subd. 2(a) (1998); Buntje v. Buntje, 511 N.W.2d 479, 481 (Minn.App.1994).

Marriage of Redmond v. Redmond · 1999 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Marriage of Fulmer v. Fulmer · 1999 2 citations

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Marriage of Guyer v. Guyer · 1999 1 citation

Appellant also contends that the trial court erred in determining the date of commencement of the child support modification that reflects the change in physical care of L.G. Appellant claims a basis in Minn. Stat. § 518.57, subd. 3 (1998), for his assertion that his support obligation should have been modified retroactively to the date that L.G. was integrated into his home. Id. (providing that the court may consider a support obligation satisfied by direct provision of care for a child “integrated into the family of the obli-gor with the consent of the obligee”). But L.G. could only be said to be integrated into appellant’s home with respondent’s consent after the December 10, 1997, stipulation of the parties. Because retroactive modification is within the discretion of the trial court, we conclude that the minor differences between a December and a February commencement of the date of modification do not constitute an abuse of the trial court’s discretion. See Finch v. Marusich, 457 N.W.2d 767, 770 (Minn.App.1990) (the use of “may” in Minnesota statutes is permissive, see Minn. Stat. § 645.44, subd. 15 (1998), and the trial court has broad discretion to set the effective date of support modification); Minn. Stat. § 518.64, subd. 2(d) (1998) (permissive “may” on modification); Minn. Stat. § 518.57, subd. 3 (permissive “may” on satisfaction by direct provision of care).

Marriage of Holmberg v. Holmberg · 1998 6 citations

The amended judgment dissolving the marriage of Ronald and Sandra Holmberg awarded Ronald Holmberg the marital homestead and custody of the children. It awarded Sandra Holmberg a lien on the home, to *825be paid by Ronald Holmberg in 80 months. It also set Sandra Holmberg’s support obligation and Ronald Holmberg’s maintenance obligation. On appeal, we affirmed the judgment. Holmberg v. Holmberg, 529 N.W.2d 456 (Minn.App.1995), review denied (Minn. May 31, 1995). Later, Sandra Holmberg signed a confession of judgment in favor of her attorney. When Ronald Holmberg failed to pay the lien, Sandra Holmberg sought to compel sale of the home and a division of proceeds. Ronald Holmberg asked that payment of the lien be postponed until the children were emancipated. In March 1997, the district court took those issues, as well as support issues, under advisement. In April 1997, the district court ruled that the lien was in the nature of child support and could be modified to defer Ronald Holm-berg’s obligation to pay it until the children were emancipated. The accompanying memorandum noted that Sandra Holmberg was not currently paying support but stated that it was likely the court would require security for any support obligation because of her limited income and the outstanding judgment against her for attorney fees. A week later, the ALJ required Sandra Holmberg to pay prospective support and to reimburse the county for past support. Sandra Holmberg argues that her homestead lien is not subject to modification because it is part of the parties’ property division.8 Contrary to Sandra Holmberg’s claims, our prior opinion reviewing the judgment contains no such ruling. See Holmberg, 529 N.W.2d at 461. As the dissolution judgment did not indicate whether the lien was a property interest, neither law of the case nor res judicata9 precluded the district court from addressing the nature of the lien. See In re Welfare of M.D.O., 462 N.W.2d 370, 375 (Minn.1990) (law of the case applies to issues “decided in earlier stages of the same case”); Demers v. City of Minneapolis, 486 N.W.2d 828, 830 (Minn.App.1992) (res judica-ta requires prior ruling on merits of an issue). Sandra Holmberg claims the district court erred in treating her lien as child support rather than as property. The dissolution judgment is ambiguous on this point and could be read either way. See Head v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 449 N.W.2d 449, 452 (Minn.App.1989) (whether dissolution judgment ambiguous is legal question), review denied (Minn. Feb. 21, 1990). Because the judge interpreting the ambiguous judgment is the same judge who issued it, this court gives “great weight” to the judge’s construction of the judgment. Mikoda v. Mikoda, 413 N.W.2d 238, 242 (Minn.App.1987), review denied (Minn. Dec. 22, 1987). In this case, the district court did not err by ruling that the lien was in the nature of child support and subject it to modification. See Trondson v. Janikula, 458 N.W.2d 679, 682 (Minn.1990) (district court’s resolution of ambiguity in contract treated as finding of fact); Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01 (findings of fact not set aside unless clearly erroneous); see also Plonske v. Plonske, 473 N.W.2d 911, 913 (Minn.App.1991) (allowing modification of lien payment period where lien in nature of child support). The district court extended the lien, stating that if Sandra Holmberg were paying support, she “would likely” be ordered to provide security for that obligation. The district court also sought to ensure that Sandra Holmberg’s interest in the homestead would remain accessible to the children, rather than being subject to execution by her attorney. Although these considerations are proper, the court failed to recognize that (1) the dissolution judgment was based on an assumption that Ronald Holmberg would have “little trouble” refinancing the homestead to pay Sandra Holmberg’s lien; (2) the *826September 1996 order stated that Ronald Holmberg “waited until the last possible moment to attempt to satisfy [the] lien”; and (3) the April 1997 order contained no findings on whether Ronald Holmberg made good faith attempts to pay off the lien. Absent a true inability to pay off Sandra Holmberg’s lien or changed circumstances rendering Ronald Holmberg’s duty to pay unreasonable and unfair, the duration of Sandra Holmberg’s lien may not be altered, even though it is in the nature of child support. See Minn. Stat. § 518.64, subd. 2(a) (support may be modified upon showing of substantially changed circumstances rendering existing award unreasonable and unfair); Gorz v. Gorz, 552 N.W.2d 566, 569 (Minn.App.1996) (moving party has burden to show changed circumstances); cf. Marriage of Hecker, 568 N.W.2d 705, 709 (Minn.1997) (frustration of expectations on which judgment is based can constitute substantial change in circumstances justifying maintenance modification). We remand for the district court to determine whether Ronald Holmberg, in good faith, lacked the ability to repay the lien and to make any necessary adjustments to its order based on that determination. III.

SHUMAKER, Judge (concurring in part, dissenting in part). I concur in the majority’s decisions on all issues in these consolidated appeals except its determination that the administrative child support process established by Minn. *828Stat. § 518.5511, subd. 1 (1996), is unconstitutional. As to that holding, I respectfully dissent. In my view, the challengers have failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the process is unconstitutional. Upon a review of the relevant cases after Breimhorst v. Beckman, 227 Minn. 409, 35 N.W.2d 719 (1949), and similar legislative transfers of powers to administrative entities such as the workers’ compensation division, I conclude that section 518.5511 does not violate the separation of powers doctrine. Any analysis must begin with an acknowledgment that Minn. Stat. § 518.5511 ‘is presumed to be constitutional. In re Blilie, 494 N.W.2d 877, 881 (Minn.1993). This presumption can be overcome only by proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the statute is unconstitutional. Id. This is the weightiest burden of proof in the Anglo-American system of law. Since we are dealing with a purely legal question, the challengers’ burden is to prove beyond any reasonable doubt that there is no principled application of legal precedent that will sustain the statute. I believe that the challengers have failed to carry their burden and that when we subject the statute to the Breimhorst test, as that test is currently applied, the statute satisfies the separation of powers mandate. Preliminarily, it will be helpful to explore the general concept of “separation of powers” and the legal principles inherent in the concept. The Minnesota Constitution mándates that the powers of the three branches of government be exercised separately. Minn. Const, art. Ill, § 1. The purpose of the separation is to provide “checks and balances critical to our notion of democracy.” Wulff v. Tax Court of Appeals, 288 N.W.2d 221, 223 (Minn.1979). The unfettered concentration of a particular power in one branch of government to the exclusion of the other branches is abhorrent to our democratic system, for, according to Locke and Montesquieu, “tyranny would be the natural and probable result.” Id. at 222-23. Logically then, the powers of the three branches may be shared in some limited way, and one branch must have the ability to “check” the exercise of powers by the other branches. This “checking” requirement, formulated as the separation of powers doctrine, “has never been an absolute division of governmental functions in this country, nor was such even intended.” Id. at 223 (footnote omitted). Moreover, there has never been an all-inclusive definition of “judicial power”: “What is judicial power cannot be brought within the ring-fence of a definition. It is undoubtedly power to hear and determine; but this is not peculiar to the judicial office. Many of the acts of administrative and executive' officers involve the exercise of the’ same power.” * * * [M]any boards hear and determine questions affecting private as well as public rights, * * *. “The authority to ascertain facts and apply the law to the facts when ascertained pertains as well to other departments of government as to the judiciary.” Breimhorst, 227 Minn. at 432-33, 35 N.W.2d 719, 734 (1949), (quoting State ex rel. Yaple v. Creamer, 85 Ohio St. 349, 97 N.E. 602, 607 (1912)). “Courts have often validated the exercise of power by administrative agencies by characterizing it as ‘quasi-judicial.’ ” Wulff, 288 N.W.2d at 223. Courts do not interpret and apply the separation of powers doctrine strictly. Id. Rather, they employ the “checking” approach, always inquiring as to whether the power under scrutiny is so exclusively concentrated in one branch that tyranny, at least as to that power, is a genuine risk. Id. at 222-23. Thus, courts have permitted a delegation of powers to an agency so long as it was accompanied by adequate standards to act as a check on agency activity. By so limiting the powers of agencies, separation of powers is to some extent maintained. Id. at 223. Wulff recognized that many administrative agencies exercise the powers of all three branches of government and acknowledged that “a strict interpretation of the separation of powers doctrine would make the existence and functioning of such agencies nearly impossible.” Id. The majority relies on Breimhorst and Wulff in declaring Minn. Stat. § 518.5511 vio-lative of the separation of powers doctrine. Breimhorst held that the quasi-judicial functions of an administrative agency do not violate the separation of powers if (1) the agen*829cy’s decisions lack judicial finality because no judgment can be entered thereon without intervention by a “duly established court;” and (2) judicial appellate review is available. 227 Minn. at 433, 35 N.W.2d at 734. Wulff provided no new rule but only said: “We believe that the criteria set out in Breim-horst mark the outside limit of allowable quasi-judicial power in Minnesota.” Wulff, 288 N.W.2d at 223. Although Breimhorst and Wulff are prece-dential authorities, I believe that the more recent decision in Mack v. City of Minneapolis, 333 N.W.2d 744, 753 (Minn.1983), which incorporates only the second criterion and the reasoning of Breimhorst, provides the current, correct test for determining whether quasi-judicial administrative functions violate the separation of powers doctrine. Breimhorst involved a constitutional challenge to the Workers’ Compensation Act and system. A woman suffered a disfiguring injury on her job. Breimhorst, 227 Minn. at 414, 35 N.W.2d at 724. She received workers’ compensation benefits but she brought a common law tort action against her employer for damages that were not compensable under the act. Id. The supreme court ruled that the tort action was not available because the Workers’ Compensation Act was compulsory and provided'the complete and exclusive remedy against the employer. Id. at 429, 35 N.W.2d at 732. Neither the compulsory nature of the act nor the abrogation of established common law rights to tort damages and jury trial constituted a violation of the separation of powers doctrine. Id. at 433-36, 35 N.W.2d at 734-36. In sum, the 1949 Breimhorst court held that the Workers’ Compensation Act was a proper exercise of the state’s police power, was an adequate remedy for employee injuries, and was subject to both district and appellate court “cheeks” on the exercise of the power. In reaching its decision, Breimhorst recognized that the fluctuating needs and demands of a governed society can be met only if courts give deference to the legislature in the exercise of police power: In the exercise of this power, which is as flexible and adaptable as the vital needs of our changing society, the state acts as the conservator of the public welfare. * * * A wide discretion is vested in the legislature in determining when a public welfare need exists and in the selection of an appropriate remedy. Id. at 430, 35 N.W.2d at 732-33. The United States Supreme Court recognized that the public welfare interest underlying the workers’ compensation system included the “concern with the continued life and earning power of the individual” so as to prevent “pauperism, with its concomitants of vice and crime.” New York Cent. R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 207, 37 S.Ct. 247, 254, 61 L.Ed. 667 (1917). Like the Workers’ Compensation Act, the administrative child support process reflects the legislature’s exercise of police power in response to a public welfare concern. The supreme court has recognized the important public policies that affect legislative and judicial child support decisions. Regarding the recoupment of past child support, the court noted that there is a “strong state policy of assuring that children have the adequate and timely economic support of their parents,” while simultaneously limiting “the unnecessary drain of scarce social service and judicial resources.” Schaefer v. Weber, 567 N.W.2d 29, 33 (Minn.1997). Additionally, like the Workers’ Compensation Act, which abrogated common law rights and remedies and preempted the judicial system of redress for employee injuries, Minn. Stat. § 518.5511 is part of a system that is entirely legislative in jurisdiction and power. See, e.g. Melamed v. Melamed, 286 N.W.2d 716, 717 (Minn.1979) (“a trial court’s authority in divorce proceedings is strictly limited to that provided by statute”); Kiesow v. Kiesow, 270 Minn. 374, 379, 133 N.W.2d 652, 657 (1965) (“[d]i-vorce jurisdiction is statutory and the district court has no power not delegated to it by statute.”) For purposes of a separation of powers analysis, it is difficult to find legally meaningful differences between the workers’ compensation process and the administrative child support process. Both are administrative systems under the executive branch of government and both operate predominantly in a quasi-judicial capacity. It might be noted in passing that the workers’ compensation sys*830tem reflects a total transfer of plenary judicial power over a firmly-rooted, common law cause of action, while the child support process in question represents a comparatively minor delegation of judicial power over a limited class of family law proceedings. See Minn. Stat. § 518.5511, subd. 1(b) (1996) (only when the public authority is involved is the use of the administrative process for child support and maintenance required); see also Minn. Stat. § 518.5511, subd. 4(b) (1996) (recognizing the limited power of the ALJ; “[a]ny stipulation that involves a finding of contempt and a jail sentence * * * shall require the review and signature of a district court judge.”) Ostensibly, the majority’s principal constitutional concern with Minn. Stat. § 518.5511 is the absence of district court intervention, right of approval or disapproval, or other oversight of the administrative decision. The first criterion in the Breimhorst test requires such district court involvement; and, at the time of the Breimhorst decision in 1949, orders from the industrial commission were in the nature of referees’ recommendations which could be reviewed and approved .or disapproved by the district court. See Minn. Stat. § 176.43 (1949) (commission’s findings and decision “may be approved or disapproved in the same manner as ⅜ * * the report of a referee”). The current workers’ compensation laws require no district court intervention; rather, decisions are final, effective, and binding when rendered by the administrative workers’ compensation judges. Minn. Stat. §§ 176.281, 176.371 (1996). Thus, the current Workers’ Compensation Act, under the majority’s view and under strict adherence to Breimhorst, does not satisfy Breimhorst’s first criterion. If that criterion is still valid law, the Workers’ Compensation Act violates the separation of powers doctrine and is unconstitutional. In my view, Breimhorst ⅛ first criterion is no longer the law. Rather, Mack represents the contemporary refinement of Breimhorst. In Mack, the challenge was directed at the authority of the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals to regulate attorney fees according to a statutory fee structure. 333 N.W.2d at 752. The challengers argued that the regulation of- attorney fees was inherently a judicial function and that legislative limits on the fees violated the separation of powers doctrine. Id. The supreme court disagreed, noting that the issue of attorney fees was ultimately within the supreme court’s “plenary and summary authority to control.” Id. (quoting Hollister v. Ulvi, 199 Minn. 269, 277, 271 N.W. 493, 497 (1937)). Mack also held that the fee process did not violate the separation of powers because “[i]n our view, final authority over attorney fees is not given to a nonjudicial body, since ultimately we can review all attorney fees decisions.” Id. The court then quoted the Breimhorst test and held: “By the same reasoning, power in the commission to set attorney fees is constitu--tionally permissible, because these awards are reviewable by this court.” Id. at 753 (emphasis added). It is significant that Mack did not include the first Breimhorst criterion (district court review) in providing the reason that the administrative fee process is constitutionally permissible. Mack did not include district court review because it could not do so under the version of workers’ compensation it reviewed in 1983. By that time, the district court intervention contemplated by the 1949 Breimhorst decision no longer existed in the Workers’ Compensation Act. The court could not, therefore, accurately include it as a precondition to a properly separate exercise of powers. Mack should be read as a modification of the Breimhorst criteria. Mack implicitly abandoned the necessity of district court intervention as a precondition to a proper delegation of authority under the separation of powers doctrine, at least where appellate review is available. The majority states that I have interpreted Mack as reducing the test for separation of powers to the single criterion of the availability of appellate review, and that such a rule “would permit the legislature to make wholesale transfers to an administrative agency of what were traditionally judicial functions * * * ,” Actually, I indicated that Mack also adopted the reasoning of Breimhorst. The Breimhorst reasoning encompasses more than the two stated mechanical criteria of district court approval and availability , of appellate review. The threshold constitutional question was whether the creation of the *831workers’ compensation system was a proper exercise of the legislature’s police power. Breimhorst, 227 Minn. at 429-30, 35 N.W.2d at 732. Breimhorst reasoned that the legislature properly exercised its police power because the subject was of vital public interest and there was a reasonable need for regulation. Id. at 430, 35 N.W.2d at 733. Breimhorst further reasoned that the workers’ compensation system was an adequate substitute for the common law cause of action and the constitutional right of jury trial that were abolished by the enactment of the workers’ compensation laws. Id. at 433-36, 35 N.W.2d at 734-36. Reading Breimhorst and Mack together, which we must do, the separation of powers test has four components: (1) there is a vital public interest in the subject; (2) there is a reasonable need for statutory regulation; (3) the system of regulation is an adequate substitute for the procedures that formerly existed; and (4) there is a right of appellate review. I believe that this synthesis of Breimhorst and Mack reflects the nature, purpose, and historical foundation of the doctrine of separation of powers and provides for the absolute retention of the most significant “check” on the exercise of governmental power, namely appellate review with authority to reverse and remand to ensure compliance with the law. Because judicial appellate review of administrative child support decisions is available, the “whole” power of the judicial branch is not exercised by the executive branch. The judicial branch fully retains the authority to scrutinize administrative child support decisions in the same manner and by the same standards as it may with respect to judicial child support decisions. The judicial branch fully retains the authority to correct errors to ensure compliance with the law. Breimhorst and Mack are satisfied in both the workers’ compensation and the administrative child support and maintenance frameworks. Finally, it is appropriate to briefly address a few of the majority’s additional points. The majority expresses concern about the scope of the transfer of functions to ALJs under section 518.5511, suggesting that the statute allows ALJs to virtually usurp the authority of judges. Actually, the statute gives an ALJ the powers of a district judge only as to child support, maintenance and parentage issues and only when the public authority is involved. Minn. Stat. § 518.5511, subd. 1(b). ALJs are given no jurisdiction over domestic abuse, custody and visitation, or property issues and cannot issue contempt orders with jail sentences unless the district court approves. Id., subds. 1(b), 4(b). Furthermore, when such issues are combined with support issues, parties have a right to be heard in district court. Id., subd. 1(b). The majority appears to suggest that the transfer of limited child support matters to the ALJs deprives parties of the opportunity to have the district court exercise its “inherent power to grant equitable relief.” In reality, however, judges and ALJs are mandated to apply mechanical, statutory, child support guidelines and are subject to specific restrictive criteria for any deviation. Minn. Stat. § 518.551. There is very little room for even the exercise of discretion, let alone the exercise of broader “equitable” powers. The majority states that: Because many support orders and all maintenance orders originate in district court, the administrative child support process thus places the ALJs in the constitutionally untenable position of reviewing and modifying judicial decisions. This characterization is misleading because it suggests that ALJs have power to review district court awards and discretion as to the enforcement of those awards. There is no such power or discretion. Presumably, the majority is referring to the ALJs’ ability to modify previous orders. Such authority is available only if there has been a substantial change of circumstances since the entry of the previous order. Minn. Stat. § 518.64, subd. 2 (1996). Thus, if an ALJ modifies a previous district court child support order, the ALJ will always be doing so on the basis of substantially different facts. Lastly, the majority relies on several cases from foreign jurisdictions as persuasive. Of those cases, one involved a statute drafted in response to the same federal mandate that prompted the Minnesota statute. See Drennen v. Drennen, 229 Neb. 204, 426 N.W.2d 252 (1988). The Drennen case is not persua*832sive because as early as 1920 the Nebraska Supreme Court held that under the Nebraska Constitution Nebraska district courts have equity jurisdiction that may be exercised without legislative enactment. Id., 426 N.W.2d at 259 (citing Matteson v. Creighton University, 105 Neb. 219, 179 N.W. 1009 (1920)). In 1981, the Nebraska Supreme Court reaffirmed its 1920 holding in Matte-son. Id. (citing Omaha Fish and Wildlife Club, Inc. v. Community Refuse, Inc., 208 Neb. 110, 302 N.W.2d 379 (1981)). Drennen also reconfirmed that since 1939, Nebraska specifically found jurisdiction over divorce and child support orders in the equity powers of its district courts. Id. (citing Wassung v. Wassung, 136 Neb. 440, 286 N.W. 340 (1939)). Based upon Nebraska’s precedential construction of its state constitution, Dren-nen easily concluded that the Nebraska Referee Act was unconstitutional because it removed original jurisdiction from the district court. Id. Minnesota has no similar constitutional history. I remain unpersuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that Minn. Stat. § 518.5511 violates the separation of powers mandate of the Minnesota Constitution. I would, therefore, deny the challenge and sustain the constitutional validity of the statute.

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

Marriage of Hughes v. Hughley · 1997 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Fausch v. Fausch · 1997 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Marriage of Borcherding v. Borcherding · 1997 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Santillan v. Martine · 1997 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Marriage of Carrick v. Carrick · 1997 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

In Re the Marriage of Dobrin · 1997 4 citations

In Duffey v. Duffey, 416 N.W.2d 830, 833 (Minn.App.1987), review denied (Minn. Feb. 24, 1988) (Duffey I), we reversed and remanded a trial court’s temporary spousal maintenance award, ordering the trial court to determine an appropriate permanent award. After the trial court did so, appellant obligee appealed the amount, arguing that the trial court erred by failing to reopen the ease to hear evidence about changes in the obligor’s financial circumstances during the pendency of the original appeal. Duffey v. Duffey, 432 N.W.2d 473, 475 (Minn.App.1988) {Duffey II)- Noting that we had given no specific instructions to the trial court in Duf-fey I as to how it should comply with the remand order, we held in Duffey II that the trial court’s decision not to reopen the record for further evidence was not an abuse of discretion and that the obligee’s recourse, if the obligor had experienced changed financial circumstances during the pendency of the appeal, was to seek modification under Minn. Stat. § 518.64. Id. at 476.

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Walker v. Walker · 1996 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Marriage of Gorz v. Gorz · 1996 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Marriage of Kuchinski v. Kuchinski · 1996 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Marriage of Kahn v. Tronnier · 1996 7 citations

+ 7 more citations in this opinion.

Emerick on Behalf of Howley v. Sanchez · 1996 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Marriage of Hecker v. Hecker · 1996 3 citations

To modify temporary maintenance into permanent maintenance, the moving party must show a substantial change in circumstances under Minn. Stat. § 518.64. Katter v. Katter, 457 N.W.2d 750, 752-53 (Minn.App.1990). If a temporary maintenance recipient tries but fails to become self-supporting during the term of a maintenance award, that failure can be a substantial change allowing a maintenance modification under Minn. Stat. § 518.64. See id.,

Marriage of Marden v. Marden · 1996 5 citations

+ 5 more citations in this opinion.

Rouland v. Thorson · 1996 3 citations

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

In Re Custody of ASR · 1995 3 citations

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

Mower County Human Services ex rel. Swancutt v. Swancutt · 1995 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Ruppert v. Schmidt · 1995 3 citations

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

DonCARLOS v. DonCARLOS · 1995 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Marriage of DonCarlos v. DonCarlos · 1995 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Marriage of Sweere v. Gilbert-Sweere · 1995 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Marriage of Hock-Lien v. Hicks · 1995 3 citations

Child support can be modified retroactively where “the petitioning party has pending a motion for modification but only from the date of service of notice of the motion on the responding party and on the public authority if ⅜ * * the county attorney is the attorney of record.” Minn. Stat. § 518.64, subd. 2(c) (Supp.1991). Respondent served appellant with his responsive motion to modify child support on May 15, 1992 but pursued the motion no further. Respondent conducted no discovery, requested no hearings and presented no evidence to support his motion. As a result, respondent is deemed to have abandoned this motion, waiving any claim to retroactive modification to May 1992 when the motion was served. See St. Paul, M. & M. Ry. Co. v. Eckel, 82 Minn. 278, 281-82, 84 N.W. 1008, 1009 (1901) (where there was lack of due diligence in prosecuting claim, moving party guilty of “grossest laches and neglect” and trial court should discourage such a stale claim).

Marriage of Johnson v. Johnson · 1995 14 citations

Modification of child support is within the district court’s discretion; this court will not reverse the modification absent an abuse of that discretion. Kuronen v. Kuronen, 499 N.W.2d 51, 53 (Minn.App.1993), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. June 22, 1993). The court may modify child support only after a party shows a change of circumstances that makes the existing order unreasonable and unfair. Minn. Stat. § 518.64, subd. 2(a) (Supp.1993); Kuronen, 499 N.W.2d at 53. The court may find a change of circumstances

+ 11 more citations in this opinion.