Minn. Stat. § 525.56, subd. 4(1) (1994) (emphasis added). The district court interpreted the statute to require Nelson to pay for Blake’s necessities without using Blake’s social security benefits. The court reasoned that because Nelson is Blake’s father, he is obligated to provide for Blake.

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Nodes · 1995 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

In Re Public Conservatorship of Foster · 1995 8 citations

+ 8 more citations in this opinion.

Morris v. Hennepin County Welfare Board · 1994 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

In Re the Custody of A.K.H. · 1993 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

In Re Guardianship of Dawson · 1993 3 citations

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

Matter of Blilie · 1992 2 citations

II. Appellant next challenges the administration of neuroleptic medication to her, absent a court order or consent of a guardian ad litem. She contends that even if a valid guardianship exists, her constitutional rights are violated when she is treated with neuroleptic medication with only the consent of the public guardian pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 253B.03, subd. 6a (Supp.1991). She argues that a conflict of interest exists where the state, through the Commissioner as guardian, authorizes another state employee to administer medication. The Commissioner responds that ample safeguards already exist and that no conflict exists where the county social services agency acts as public guardian. We observe, initially, that the Commissioner seeks dismissal of the appeal of this issue as moot, since appellant no longer resides at the Regional Treatment Center, and the Commissioner no longer administers neuroleptic medication. These two circumstances tend to support dismissal on the basis of mootness. See In re Schmidt, 443 N.W.2d 824, 826 (Minn.1989). However, because Minn. Stat. § 525.56, subd. 3(1) (1990) authorizes a guardian to admit a ward to a regional treatment center to receive temporary care, for a period not to exceed 90 days in any calendar year, and because neuroleptic medications may be given during the 90-day temporary stay, we conclude that this issue of whether a state appointed guardian may constitutionally consent to administration of such medications may recur and yet may evade review. See Schmidt, 443 N.W.2d at 826. Thus, we shall address this issue on its merits. In Jarvis v. Levine, 418 N.W.2d 139, 150 (Minn.1988), the supreme court held that medical authorities seeking to administer neuroleptic medication to individuals who were involuntarily committed as mentally ill must first obtain pretreatment judicial review. The legislature adopted procedures to be employed in the administration of neuroleptic medication to mentally ill, committed persons. 1988 Minn.Laws ch. 689, art. 2, § 119. This provision is presently found in Minn. Stat. § 253B.03, subd. 6c (Supp.1991). In 1987, the legislature promulgated a statute specifically addressing administration of neuroleptic medications to mentally retarded patients. 1987 Minn.Laws ch. 185, art. 2, § 3. Under this provision, a patient who is mentally retarded or the patient's guardian has the right to give or withhold consent before psychotropic medication is administered. Id. This provision is currently found at Minn. Stat. § 253B.03, *39 subd. 6a(2) (Supp.1991). Appellant does not contend that the procedure mandated by the statute was not followed. Instead, she argues that her constitutional rights are violated when the neuroleptic medication is administered without court approval or the approval of a guardian ad litem. We discern no constitutional violation here. There is a distinction between the procedures addressed in Jarvis and the treatment of developmentally disabled persons with neuroleptic medications pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 253B.03, subd. 6a. Our review of the case law demonstrates that challenges to the constitutionality of application of neuroleptic medications arose primarily in the context of utilizing these intrusive treatment methods upon the unfettered discretion of medical personnel. See, e.g., Jarvis, 418 N.W.2d at 148; In re Schmidt, 443 N.W.2d at 827. In Schmidt, the supreme court upheld the constitutionality of a statute which permitted application of neuroleptic medications to incompetent mentally ill patients upon consent of a guardian ad litem, observing that the statute: facially provides to the patient, in substance, a procedure which protects the patient from the exercise of sole unrestrained discretion of the medical personnel at our state hospitals with respect to the use of such invasive procedures. The statute, therefore, attempts to address the concerns we expressed in Price that the imposition of an intrusive form of treatment, such as this, must not rest solely in the discretion of the medical personnel at the state institution. Id. Because under section 253B.03, subd. 6a, consent to administer neuroleptic medications may be either given or withheld by the ward or the guardian, there should be no concern that unrestrained discretion of medical personnel will be exercised in these matters. We conclude that appellant's constitutional rights are safeguarded without the necessity of additional consent by a guardian ad litem. Appellant raises an additional constitutional concern, however, in her argument that "[e]veryone involved in giving consent to neuroleptic medications for the alleged wards of the state is either an employee of the State of Minnesota or an employee of the county serving the ward's case." Appellant urges that the relationship constitutes a conflict of interest and prohibits mentally retarded individuals from receiving advocacy for their rights as fully and effectively as those individuals who have the protections of a Jarvis hearing. We agree with the dissent that in Price v. Sheppard, 307 Minn. 250, 262 n. 11, 239 N.W.2d 905, 913 n. 11 (1976), the supreme court recognized that the guardian ad litem, who is to represent the interests of the patient as well as the guardian, who could otherwise consent to intrusive treatment, should not also be the person responsible for the patient's commitment. However, the sparse record before us demonstrates no indication or suggestion that a conflict, in fact, exists. Neither is there any indication in the record before us that the freedom of the public guardian, in this case the Ramsey County social worker, to make an informed judgment on behalf of Blilie has ever been limited formally or informally by the Commissioner's responsibility to operate a Regional Treatment Center such as Cambridge. We further note that the patient's public guardian is statutorily assigned a wide range of duties and powers with regard to the ward. See Minn. Stat. §§ 252A.111, 525.56, subds. 1-3 (1990). Such a guardian will consequently have much broader knowledge of the ward, and the appropriateness of intrusive treatment, than would a guardian ad litem, who is appointed in Jarvis hearings to represent the interests of the patient only with regard to administration of neuroleptic medication. See Jarvis, 418 N.W.2d at 144; Minn. Stat. § 253B.03, subd. 6c(d)(2) (Supp.1991). We note, further, that certain safeguards to ensure the independence of a public guardian are in place both pursuant to statute and Department of Human Services procedures. For instance, only a county *40 social worker other than the ward's case manager may act as guardian when providing or denying informed consent to administer neuroleptic medications. See Minn. Stat. § 252A.21, subd. 2 (1990); Crawford v. Minnesota Dept. of Human Servs., 468 N.W.2d 583, 587 (Minn.App.1991). Under Department of Human Services procedures, the county social workers are also directed to consult with the ward's family and are encouraged to seek a second medical opinion if deemed necessary. Finally, Minn. Stat. § 252A.19, subd. 2 (1990), authorizes anyone, including counsel for the person with the developmental disabilities, to petition the court for review of any decision made by the public guardian. Thus, any time any person questions the consent given by the public guardian for treatment with neuroleptic medication, a hearing can be obtained before the court on the appropriateness of the decision. See id.; see also Harhut, 385 N.W.2d at 312 (setting out procedural safeguards for indeterminately committed mentally retarded individual, including representation by informed attorney, periodic medical reviews sent to court and counsel, annual medical review, and judicial review at least once every three years). The supreme court has held that a trial court's refusal to appoint a guardian ad litem to represent a patient indeterminately committed as mentally retarded did not violate her constitutional rights, when the patient is represented by counsel, unless the representation is ineffective for some reason. In re Fredrickson, 388 N.W.2d 717, 722 (Minn.1986). In this case, the failure to appoint a guardian ad litem also did not violate Blilie's constitutional rights. On the limited record before us, we can discern no unconstitutionality in permitting public guardians to consent on behalf of wards to the administration of neuroleptic medications.

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In Re Guardianship of Kowalski · 1991 1 citation

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In Re Conservatorship of Lundgaard · 1990 1 citation

These findings merely restate the statutory definition of incapacitation found in Minn. Stat. § 525.54, subds. 2 and 3. Finding number 6 states that Lundgaard is incapable of exercising all the rights and powers, except for voting, which are outlined in Minn. Stat. § 525.56, subds. 3, 4 (1988).

Matter of Atkinson · 1989 1 citation

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In Re Conservatorship of Moore · 1987 2 citations

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In Re Conservatorship of W.R.L. · 1986 1 citation

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In Re Guardianship of Kowalski · 1986 1 citation

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In re Conservatorship of Edwards · 1986 1 citation

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Matter of Estate of Kroyer · 1986 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.