§ 525.753

Matter of Blilie · 1993 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Bailey v. Noot · 1982 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Matter of Blilie · 1992 11 citations

FACTS Appellant was born in 1938. On January 10, 1952, a petition was filed to commit her as mentally deficient, citing as grounds her inability to make a good adjustment at school, where she was making few friends and doing poorly. On January 23, 1952, the court found appellant mentally deficient, appointed the director of public institutions guardian of her person, and committed her to its care and custody.[1] Pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 253B.12 (1984), a hearing was held in 1984 on the continued judicial commitment of appellant as a mentally retarded person. At that time, she was a patient at the Cambridge State Hospital. Appellant was diagnosed as mentally retarded and schizophrenic, and has had a lobotomy. She was being treated with various types of neuroleptic medication. The court in 1984 found appellant was likely to fail to provide necessary food, clothing, shelter, and medical care unless involuntary commitment was continued. It also found her maladaptive behavior, which included aggression towards others, pulling fire alarms, and, three years previously, lighting a fire, prevented her placement in the community. The trial court found appellant continued to be mentally retarded and ordered her commitment for an indeterminate period. Another hearing was held in 1987 pursuant to In re Harhut, 385 N.W.2d 305, 312 (Minn.1986), in which the supreme court required that all indeterminate commitments for mentally retarded persons be reviewed at least every three years. The court in 1988 found appellant needed 24-hour supervision and care, that she had delusional thinking and loose associations, she was aggressive towards others at times, and her conduct, along with her mental illness, severely hampered her placement in the community. Appellant was being treated with neuroleptics, and the court found a Jarvis order was required to continue such treatment. The trial court terminated appellant's prior indeterminate commitment and recommitted her as a mentally retarded person through March 12, 1990 to Cambridge Regional Treatment Center. In 1990, another petition for the judicial commitment of appellant as a mentally retarded person was brought. The court found that she was diagnosed with mild mental retardation, conduct disorder, and schizophrenia. Her mental illness was being treated with a neuroleptic medication, with consent obtained through Ramsey County without a Jarvis hearing. Evidence indicated appellant could be placed in the community. The court concluded that appellant was a mentally retarded person, but that involuntary hospitalization commitment was not necessary. It found appellant should be placed in the community and that only a lack of funding precluded such placement. In an order dated August 17, 1990, the court denied the petition for judicial commitment. Appellant nonetheless remained at Cambridge, apparently because no appropriate community placement was available. *36 A new petition dated September 26, 1990 for the judicial commitment of appellant as mentally retarded or mentally ill was brought. The court again found appellant was mentally retarded or mentally ill, but that involuntary hospitalization and commitment was not necessary for her protection. The court found that since the prior court order of August 17, 1990, appellant's condition had not changed, and that community placement was apparently being delayed by lack of funding, which it determined was not a reason to commit appellant to Cambridge. Appellant remained at Cambridge for lack of an appropriate community placement. On May 29, 1991, appellant's counsel petitioned the district court pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 252A.19, subd. 2 (1990) asking, first, that the court issue a declaratory judgment holding that the original appointment of the Commissioner[2] as guardian of appellant was terminated in 1968 by repeal of Minn. Stat. § 525.753 (1949), under which the guardianship was commenced; second, that the court declare Minn. Stat. § 253B.03, subd. 6a (Supp.1991), which authorizes treatment of individuals with developmental disabilities with neuroleptic medication upon guardian consent without further court review, to be unconstitutional; and third, that the court order the Commissioner to show cause why she continued to provide residential services to appellant at Cambridge Regional Human Services Center without a commitment. The trial court denied the petition in its entirety and Blilie appealed. The Commissioner moves to dismiss the appeal as moot in part because appellant has since been placed in residence in the community, and the Commissioner is no longer providing residential services or neuroleptic medications to her. Appellant opposes the motion, and also moves for clarification of the record, which the Commissioner opposes. On November 20, 1991, a new commitment petition was brought in district court. Ramsey County has since informed this court that it has stipulated to withdraw the petition.

FACTS Appellant was born in 1938. On January 10, 1952, a petition was filed to commit her as mentally deficient, citing as grounds her inability to make a good adjustment at school, where she was making few friends and doing poorly. On January 23, 1952, the court found appellant mentally deficient, appointed the director of public institutions guardian of her person, and committed her to its care and custody.[1] Pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 253B.12 (1984), a hearing was held in 1984 on the continued judicial commitment of appellant as a mentally retarded person. At that time, she was a patient at the Cambridge State Hospital. Appellant was diagnosed as mentally retarded and schizophrenic, and has had a lobotomy. She was being treated with various types of neuroleptic medication. The court in 1984 found appellant was likely to fail to provide necessary food, clothing, shelter, and medical care unless involuntary commitment was continued. It also found her maladaptive behavior, which included aggression towards others, pulling fire alarms, and, three years previously, lighting a fire, prevented her placement in the community. The trial court found appellant continued to be mentally retarded and ordered her commitment for an indeterminate period. Another hearing was held in 1987 pursuant to In re Harhut, 385 N.W.2d 305, 312 (Minn.1986), in which the supreme court required that all indeterminate commitments for mentally retarded persons be reviewed at least every three years. The court in 1988 found appellant needed 24-hour supervision and care, that she had delusional thinking and loose associations, she was aggressive towards others at times, and her conduct, along with her mental illness, severely hampered her placement in the community. Appellant was being treated with neuroleptics, and the court found a Jarvis order was required to continue such treatment. The trial court terminated appellant's prior indeterminate commitment and recommitted her as a mentally retarded person through March 12, 1990 to Cambridge Regional Treatment Center. In 1990, another petition for the judicial commitment of appellant as a mentally retarded person was brought. The court found that she was diagnosed with mild mental retardation, conduct disorder, and schizophrenia. Her mental illness was being treated with a neuroleptic medication, with consent obtained through Ramsey County without a Jarvis hearing. Evidence indicated appellant could be placed in the community. The court concluded that appellant was a mentally retarded person, but that involuntary hospitalization commitment was not necessary. It found appellant should be placed in the community and that only a lack of funding precluded such placement. In an order dated August 17, 1990, the court denied the petition for judicial commitment. Appellant nonetheless remained at Cambridge, apparently because no appropriate community placement was available. *36 A new petition dated September 26, 1990 for the judicial commitment of appellant as mentally retarded or mentally ill was brought. The court again found appellant was mentally retarded or mentally ill, but that involuntary hospitalization and commitment was not necessary for her protection. The court found that since the prior court order of August 17, 1990, appellant's condition had not changed, and that community placement was apparently being delayed by lack of funding, which it determined was not a reason to commit appellant to Cambridge. Appellant remained at Cambridge for lack of an appropriate community placement. On May 29, 1991, appellant's counsel petitioned the district court pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 252A.19, subd. 2 (1990) asking, first, that the court issue a declaratory judgment holding that the original appointment of the Commissioner[2] as guardian of appellant was terminated in 1968 by repeal of Minn. Stat. § 525.753 (1949), under which the guardianship was commenced; second, that the court declare Minn. Stat. § 253B.03, subd. 6a (Supp.1991), which authorizes treatment of individuals with developmental disabilities with neuroleptic medication upon guardian consent without further court review, to be unconstitutional; and third, that the court order the Commissioner to show cause why she continued to provide residential services to appellant at Cambridge Regional Human Services Center without a commitment. The trial court denied the petition in its entirety and Blilie appealed. The Commissioner moves to dismiss the appeal as moot in part because appellant has since been placed in residence in the community, and the Commissioner is no longer providing residential services or neuroleptic medications to her. Appellant opposes the motion, and also moves for clarification of the record, which the Commissioner opposes. On November 20, 1991, a new commitment petition was brought in district court. Ramsey County has since informed this court that it has stipulated to withdraw the petition.

FACTS Appellant was born in 1938. On January 10, 1952, a petition was filed to commit her as mentally deficient, citing as grounds her inability to make a good adjustment at school, where she was making few friends and doing poorly. On January 23, 1952, the court found appellant mentally deficient, appointed the director of public institutions guardian of her person, and committed her to its care and custody.[1] Pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 253B.12 (1984), a hearing was held in 1984 on the continued judicial commitment of appellant as a mentally retarded person. At that time, she was a patient at the Cambridge State Hospital. Appellant was diagnosed as mentally retarded and schizophrenic, and has had a lobotomy. She was being treated with various types of neuroleptic medication. The court in 1984 found appellant was likely to fail to provide necessary food, clothing, shelter, and medical care unless involuntary commitment was continued. It also found her maladaptive behavior, which included aggression towards others, pulling fire alarms, and, three years previously, lighting a fire, prevented her placement in the community. The trial court found appellant continued to be mentally retarded and ordered her commitment for an indeterminate period. Another hearing was held in 1987 pursuant to In re Harhut, 385 N.W.2d 305, 312 (Minn.1986), in which the supreme court required that all indeterminate commitments for mentally retarded persons be reviewed at least every three years. The court in 1988 found appellant needed 24-hour supervision and care, that she had delusional thinking and loose associations, she was aggressive towards others at times, and her conduct, along with her mental illness, severely hampered her placement in the community. Appellant was being treated with neuroleptics, and the court found a Jarvis order was required to continue such treatment. The trial court terminated appellant's prior indeterminate commitment and recommitted her as a mentally retarded person through March 12, 1990 to Cambridge Regional Treatment Center. In 1990, another petition for the judicial commitment of appellant as a mentally retarded person was brought. The court found that she was diagnosed with mild mental retardation, conduct disorder, and schizophrenia. Her mental illness was being treated with a neuroleptic medication, with consent obtained through Ramsey County without a Jarvis hearing. Evidence indicated appellant could be placed in the community. The court concluded that appellant was a mentally retarded person, but that involuntary hospitalization commitment was not necessary. It found appellant should be placed in the community and that only a lack of funding precluded such placement. In an order dated August 17, 1990, the court denied the petition for judicial commitment. Appellant nonetheless remained at Cambridge, apparently because no appropriate community placement was available. *36 A new petition dated September 26, 1990 for the judicial commitment of appellant as mentally retarded or mentally ill was brought. The court again found appellant was mentally retarded or mentally ill, but that involuntary hospitalization and commitment was not necessary for her protection. The court found that since the prior court order of August 17, 1990, appellant's condition had not changed, and that community placement was apparently being delayed by lack of funding, which it determined was not a reason to commit appellant to Cambridge. Appellant remained at Cambridge for lack of an appropriate community placement. On May 29, 1991, appellant's counsel petitioned the district court pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 252A.19, subd. 2 (1990) asking, first, that the court issue a declaratory judgment holding that the original appointment of the Commissioner[2] as guardian of appellant was terminated in 1968 by repeal of Minn. Stat. § 525.753 (1949), under which the guardianship was commenced; second, that the court declare Minn. Stat. § 253B.03, subd. 6a (Supp.1991), which authorizes treatment of individuals with developmental disabilities with neuroleptic medication upon guardian consent without further court review, to be unconstitutional; and third, that the court order the Commissioner to show cause why she continued to provide residential services to appellant at Cambridge Regional Human Services Center without a commitment. The trial court denied the petition in its entirety and Blilie appealed. The Commissioner moves to dismiss the appeal as moot in part because appellant has since been placed in residence in the community, and the Commissioner is no longer providing residential services or neuroleptic medications to her. Appellant opposes the motion, and also moves for clarification of the record, which the Commissioner opposes. On November 20, 1991, a new commitment petition was brought in district court. Ramsey County has since informed this court that it has stipulated to withdraw the petition.

+ 8 more citations in this opinion.