§ 541.051

Minnesota Statutes

Source: 2025 Minnesota Statutes. For the official text, see revisor.mn.gov.

Citing Cases (148)

Showing 100 most recent of 148 citing cases.

Minnesota Supreme Court

Great N. Ins. Co. v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc. · 2018 8 citations

+ 8 more citations in this opinion.

· 2015 24 citations

+ 24 more citations in this opinion.

328 Barry Avenue, LLC v. Nolan Properties Group, LLC · 2015 19 citations

+ 19 more citations in this opinion.

Hooper v. State · 2013 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

In re Individual 35W Bridge Litigation · 2011 6 citations [Concurrence]

+ 6 more citations in this opinion.

In re Individual 35W Bridge Litigation · 2011 18 citations

+ 18 more citations in this opinion.

Dahlin v. Kroening · 2011 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Siewert v. Northern States Power Co. · 2011 11 citations

+ 11 more citations in this opinion.

Day Masonry v. Independent School District 347 · 2010 16 citations

+ 16 more citations in this opinion.

State Farm Fire & Casualty v. Aquila Inc. · 2006 19 citations

+ 19 more citations in this opinion.

Lietz v. Northern States Power Co. · 2006 15 citations

+ 15 more citations in this opinion.

Weston v. McWilliams & Associates, Inc. · 2006 16 citations

OPINION HANSON, Justice. This appeal requires us to determine the proper application of the statute of repose to contribution and indemnity claims by a general contractor against subcontractors or material suppliers arising out of an improvement to real property. The statute of repose applicable here is the 2002 version of section 541.051, which provides in part as follows: Except where fraud is involved, no action by any person in contract, tort, or otherwise to recover damages for any injury to property, real or personal, or for bodily injury or wrongful death, arising out of the defective and unsafe condition of an improvement to real property, nor any action for contribution or indemnity for damages sustained on account of the injury, shall be brought against any person performing or furnishing the design, planning, supervision, materials, or observation of construction or construction of the improvement to real property or against the owner of the real property more than two years after discovery of the injury or, in the case of an action for contribution or indemnity, accrual of the cause of action, nor, in any event shall such a cause of action accrue more than ten years after substantial completion of the construction. Date of substantial completion shall be determined by the date when construction is sufficiently completed so that the owner or the owner’s representative can occupy or use the improvement for the intended purpose. Minn. Stat. § 541.051, subd. 1(a) (2002). Respondent McWilliams & Associates, Inc., d/b/a Top Value Homes, a general contractor (hereinafter “Top Value”), was sued in May 2003 for damages when a home it completed in July 1993 developed *637water-intrusion and mold problems. In March 2004, Top Value brought contribution and indemnity claims against subcontractors and a supplier, who had contributed to the construction of the home. The Dakota County District Court held that Top Value’s contribution and indemnity claims were extinguished by the statute of repose and granted summary judgment to the subcontractors and supplier. The court of appeals reversed, holding that claims for contribution and indemnity that have not otherwise accrued within 10 years of completion of construction will be deemed to have accrued in the tenth year, thus triggering the extension feature of subdivision 2 of section 541.051 that provides as follows: Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision 1, in the case of an action which accrues during the ninth or tenth year after substantial completion of the construction, an action to recover damages may be brought within two years after the date on which the action accrued, but in no event may an action be brought more than 12 years after substantial completion of the construction. Weston v. McWilliams & Assocs., 694 N.W.2d 558, 562-64 (Minn.App.2005). We reverse the court of appeals and reinstate the district court’s summary judgment. The parties do not dispute the underlying facts. William Weston contracted with Top Value to build a home in Eagan. Tappe Construction was the framing, carpentry, and window-installation subcontractor; Panelcraft installed the siding; and Windsor Window Company manufactured the windows. Construction was substantially completed on July 20,1993, when a certificate of occupancy was issued. Weston submitted evidence of inspections and testing on the home in the spring and summer of 2002, which revealed water-intrusion problems that had caused the growth of mold in the walls and allegedly consequent health problems for Weston and his family. The testing submitted by Weston indicated that the water problems were the result of construction-related defects. In May 2003, Weston and his family brought suit against Top Value for damages arising out of the allegedly defective and unsafe condition of the home. This was approximately two months before the end of the 10-year statutory repose period for such claims, which reads: “[N]or, in any event shall such a cause of action accrue more than ten years after substantial completion of the construction.” Minn. Stat. § 541.051, subd. 1(a). The words “such a cause of action” include Weston’s claim because they refer back, in part, to an “action by any person * * ⅜ to recover damages for any injury to property * * * or for bodily injury * * * arising out of the defective and unsafe condition of an improvement to real property * * Id. Top Value answered Weston’s complaint on January 30, 2004, alleging that its subcontractors and material supplier caused any damages suffered by Weston. In March and April 2004, Top Value served Tappe, Panelcraft, and Windsor (hereinafter referred to collectively as “Tappe”) with third-party complaints, seeking contribution and indemnity. Tappe moved for summary judgment on the grounds that Top Value’s contribution and indemnity action was extinguished because it was not brought within the 10-year repose period. The district court granted the motions and dismissed Top Value’s claims, noting that: A statute of repose operates to preclude the existence of an available remedy. * * * Despite the fact that Top Value’s cause of action had not yet accrued, its claims for indemnity and contribution were extinguished on July 20, 2003. *638The court of appeals reversed, determining that when a contribution or indemnity claim actually accrues within two years after the 10-year statutory repose period, the claim should be deemed as a matter of law to have accrued at the end of the tenth year following completion of construction (i.e., the last day of the repose period). Weston, 694 N.W.2d at 562, 564. The court held that Top Value’s contribution and indemnity claims could be timely brought in the eleventh or twelfth year after completion of construction. Id. We granted Tappe’s petition for further review. I. When the district court grants summary judgment based on the application of a statute to undisputed facts, the result is a legal conclusion that we review de novo. Lefto v. Hoggsbreath Enters., Inc., 581 N.W.2d 855, 856 (Minn.1998). The interpretation of a statute is a question of law that this court also reviews de novo. Olmanson v. LeSueur County, 693 N.W.2d 876, 879 (Minn.2005). Our first task is to determine whether the statute needs interpreting — that is, whether the language of the statute is ambiguous. Molloy v. Meier, 679 N.W.2d 711, 723 (Minn.2004). The court of appeals did not state that the repose provision of section 541.051 was ambiguous, but did say that the provision “begs for clarity.” Weston, 694 N.W.2d at 562. The court observed that section 541.051 deviates from the standard statute of repose by using accrual to mark the end point of the repose period instead of requiring that an action be brought within a certain number of years. Weston, 694 N.W.2d at 561-62. The court concluded that this feature presented the possibility of conflicting inferences: either that “no suit can ever be brought if the claim accrues in fact in year eleven or twelve,” or that the “ripening of the cause of action is deemed by law to occur at the end of the tenth year, and that no action on the claim can be brought after the end of year twelve.” Id. at 562. The court determined that the second inference is compelling and must be declared as a matter of law. Id. We conclude that the court of appeals read too much into the word “accrue” because the plain language of the statute is not ambiguous. See Owens v. Water Gremlin Co., 605 N.W.2d 733, 736 (Minn.2000) (“[I]f the words of the statute are ‘clear and free from all ambiguity,’ further construction is neither necessary nor permitted” (quoting Minn. Stat. § 645.12 (2004))). We have specifically noted with regard to section 541.051 that “we must * ⅜ ⅜ s^rjve gjve effect to the plain meaning of the words of the statute without resort to technical legal constructions of its terms.” Pacific Indem. Co. v. Thompson-Yaeger, Inc., 260 N.W.2d 548, 554 (Minn.1977). In effect, the court of appeals’ interpretation would convert the negative statement of the statute — that “a cause of action [shall not] accrue more than ten years after substantial completion of the construction” — into a positive statement — that a cause of action for contribution or indemnity shall accrue no later than ten years after completion of construction. This conversion goes beyond interpretation and actually modifies the words of the statute. The reference to “accrues” in the repose provision must be read together with the definition that is given later in section 541.051: For purposes of paragraph (a), a cause of action accrues upon discovery of the injury or, in the ease of an action for contribution or indemnity, upon payment of a final judgment, arbitration award, or settlement arising out of the defective and unsafe condition. *639Minn. Stat. § 541.051, subd. 1(b) (2002).1 This definition determines when a contribution or indemnity claim will accrue. It does not permit such accrual to be deemed by law to have occurred at some time prior to payment. Further, the court of appeals’ interpretation is inconsistent with the extension of the repose period for claims that accrue in the ninth and tenth year after completion of construction. The repose provision applies not only to contribution and indemnity claims, but also to the underlying injury claim of the home owner. See Minn. Stat. § 541.051, subd. 1(a). That injury claim accrues on discovery of the injury. See id. Because the repose provision requires that a cause of action accrue within the statutory period, injury claims would not actually accrue unless they were discovered within the 10-year period. For consistency’s sake, the rationale of the court of appeals would suggest that an injury claim that had not accrued within the repose period would likewise be deemed by law to have accrued at the end of the tenth year. If both the injury and the contribution and indemnity claims are deemed to have accrued in the tenth year, the period of repose would necessarily be extended from a 10-year period to a 12-year period. If the legislature had intended this result, it could have simply enacted a 12-year statute of repose. It is true that the legislature’s decision to define accrual one way for injury claims and another way for contribution and indemnity claims presents the possibility that an injury claim, which will necessarily accrue first, could accrue within the repose period while a contribution or indemnity claim involving the same improvement to real property would not accrue until after the repose period. Top Value argues that such a result is absurd and is in derogation of the presumption that “the legislature does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution, or unreasonable.” Minn. Stat. § 645.17(1) (2004). But this rule of construction only operates where the words of a statute are ambiguous; the rule cannot generally be used to override the plain language of a statute. Hyatt v. Anoka Police Dep’t, 691 N.W.2d 824, 827-28 (Minn.2005). We can “disregard a statute’s plain meaning only in rare cases where the plain meaning ‘utterly confounds a clear legislative purpose.’ ” Id. at 827 (quoting Mut. Serv. Cas. Ins. Co. v. League of Minn. Cities, 659 N.W.2d 755, 760 (Minn.2003)). Here, the plain meaning of accrual does not confound a clear legislative purpose; to the contrary, it accomplishes the clear legislative purpose of preventing the accrual of a cause of action after a specified period of time from the completion of construction. Top Value also argues that it had no control over when it could bring its contribution and indemnity claims because they are derivative of the underlying injury action and it had no control over when the injury action was commenced. That argument presents a distinction that the legislature could have recognized, but did not. We agree with Tappe’s assertion that, had the legislature wanted to declare a separate and different repose period for contribution and indemnity claims, it could have done so explicitly. In that connection, we note that the Wisconsin legislature enacted a similar statute of repose but provided an indefinite time for a contribution claim to be brought if the underlying injury action is brought late in the repose period. See *640Wis. Stat. § 893.89(3)(c) (2004) (providing “An action for contribution is not barred due to the accrual of the cause of action for contribution beyond the end of the exposure period if the underlying action that the contribution action is based on is extended under par. (b),” (which extends the period of repose if the damage is sustained during the period from the first day of the eighth year to the last day of the tenth year)). Finally, we note that Top Value did not press before us the court of appeals’ interpretation of the repose provision. It argues, instead, that the provision should be read to apply only to underlying injury actions, not to contribution or indemnity claims. Top Value suggests that the use of the singular “such cause of action” in the repose provision indicates that it applies only to the underlying injury action. The court of appeals dismissed this interpretation as “without merit.” Weston, 694 N.W.2d at 564. We agree with the court of appeals’ conclusion because the words “such a cause of action” follow the description of both an injury action and a contribution or indemnity action. See Minn. Stat. § 541.051, subd. 1(a). For these reasons, we hold that the repose provision of section 541.051, subd. 1(a), bars a contribution and indemnity claim that has not accrued (i.e., where the principal claim has not been paid) and has not been brought within the 10 years from the completion of the construction.2 II. Top Value argues that an interpretation of the statute that bars its contribution and indemnity claim violates the Due Process Clauses of the United States and Minnesota Constitutions. Without naming it explicitly, Top Value also presents arguments implicating the Remedies Clause of the Minnesota Constitution.3 Preliminarily, we note that Top Value failed to notify the attorney general of its constitutional challenge, as required by Minn. R. Civ. P. 24.04 and Minn. R. CivApp. P. 144. Top Value asserts that the requirement does not apply because it is not arguing that the statute is unconstitutional on its face, only as interpreted by the district court. But we have said that “it is extremely doubtful we would hold a statute unconstitutional if the attorney general had not been properly notified.” Sartori v. Harnischfeger Corp., 432 N.W.2d 448, 452 (Minn.1988). Further, Top Value failed to raise its argument either at the district court or to the court of appeals. Generally, a reviewing court should not consider issues that were neither considered in the district court nor adequately briefed on appeal. Broehm v. Mayo Clinic Rochester, 690 N.W.2d 721, *641728 (Minn.2005) (citing Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582-83 (Minn.1988)). Nonetheless, we have the latitude to address any matter “as the interest of justice may require,” Minn. R. Civ.App. P. 103.04, and the constitutionality of section 541.051 as applied to Top Value’s contribution-indemnity claims merits our consideration. With regard to the constitutional arguments, we think it important to differentiate between statutes of repose and statutes of limitations. The constitutional legitimacy of statutes of repose stems from their substantive, rather than procedural, nature: a statute of limitations limits the time within which a party can pursue a remedy (that is, it is a procedural limit), whereas a statute of repose limits the time within which a party can acquire a cause of action (thus it is a substantive limit). See Hodder v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 426 N.W.2d 826, 830 n. 3 (Minn.1988) (discussing the operation of a statute of repose to bar recovery even before the cause of action accrues). [A] statute [of repose] is intended to terminate the possibility of liability after a defined period of time, regardless of the potential plaintiffs lack of knowledge of his or her cause of action. Such statutes reflect the legislative conclusion that a point in time arrives beyond which a potential defendant should be immune from liability for past conduct. 51 Am.Jur.2d Limitation of Actions § 18 (2000) (footnotes omitted). This difference between statutes of repose and statutes of limitations is significant when either is challenged as being violative of state remedies or due process clauses. Because statutes of limitations are procedural in nature, intended to deny a remedy even though a right has vested, they typically are not triggered until the cause of action has accrued. See Wichelman v. Messner, 250 Minn. 88, 108, 83 N.W.2d 800, 816 (1957). For this reason, one focus of a constitutional challenge to a statute of limitations is whether it allows a reasonable time after the cause of action accrues for the party to enforce her rights. Id. at 108-09, 83 N.W.2d at 816-17. A statute of repose, on the other hand, is intended to eliminate the cause of action. In at least the majority of jurisdictions, it has been held that such statutes may constitutionally eliminate causes of action even before they accrue. See, e.g., Kanne v. Bulkley, 306 Ill.App.3d 1036, 240 Ill.Dec. 97, 715 N.E.2d 784, 789-90 (1999); McIntosh v. Melroe Co., 729 N.E.2d 972, 978 (Ind.2000); Plummer v. Gillieson, 44 Mass.App.Ct. 578, 692 N.E.2d 528, 532 (1998); O’Brien v. Hazelet & Erdal, 410 Mich. 1, 299 N.W.2d 336, 341-42 (1980); Schendt v. Dewey, 246 Neb. 573, 520 N.W.2d 541, 547 (1994); Craftsman Builder’s Supply, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co., 974 P.2d 1194, 1201 (Utah 1999). Particularly instructive on the distinction between statutes of limitations and statutes of repose is the Indiana Supreme Court’s decision in McIntosh. There, the court considered the validity of the state’s Products Liability Act that contained a statute of repose barring product liability claims for injuries sustained more than 10 years after the product is delivered to the initial consumer. McIntosh, 729 N.E.2d at 973. The court distinguished that statute of repose from the statute of limitations contained in Indiana’s Medical Malpractice Act. McIntosh, 729 N.E.2d at 978. The latter barred claims where the injury had occurred before the two-year period of limitations but had not been discovered within the two-year period. Martin v. Richey 711 N.E.2d 1273, 1278 (Ind.1999). Although the Indiana court in Martin had held that the application of the medical statute of limitations to bar an accrued claim before it reasonably could be discov*642ered was an unconstitutional impairment of an existing remedy, in McIntosh it distinguished the products statute of repose because it extinguished any cause of action before it accrued. Martin, 711 N.E.2d at 1285; McIntosh, 729 N.E.2d at 978. The court said: The holding in Martin v. Richey is that a claim that exists cannot be barred before it is knowable. Here, we are dealing with a rule of law that says, in effect, that products that produce no injury for ten years are no longer subject to claims under the Product Liability Act. Whatever the wisdom of such a rule, in our view, it is a matter well within the legislature’s ability to regulate. Id. at 979. The court further concluded that a statute of repose may legitimately eliminate a common law right where such elimination is a “rational means to achieve a legitimate legislative goal.” Id. at 979. The court said: The statute of repose represents a determination by the General Assembly that an injury occurring ten years after the product has been in use is not a legally cognizable “injury” that is to be remedied by the courts. This decision was based on its apparent conclusion that after a decade of use, product failures are “due to reasons not fairly laid at the manufacturer’s door.” The statute also serves the public policy concerns of reliability and availability of evidence after long periods of time, and the ability of manufacturers to plan their affairs without the potential for unknown liability. The statute of repose is rationally related to meeting these legitimate legislative goals. It provides certainty and finality with a bright line bar to liability ten years after a product’s first use. It is also rationally related to the General Assembly’s reasonable determination that, in the vast majority of cases, failure of products over ten years old is due to wear and tear or other causes not the fault of the manufacturer, and the substantial interests already identified warrant establishing a bright line after which no claim is created. Id. at 980 (citations omitted). This majority rule, upholding the constitutionality of statutes of repose as applied to a variety of causes of action, has also been recognized in connection with statutes of repose for claims arising from the improvement to real property. As the Minnesota legislature has done in section 541.051, “[legislatures in almost every state have enacted statutes of repose imposing time limitations upon lawsuits against architects, engineers and builders for injury to persons, injury to property or death arising out of the defective or unsafe condition of an improvement to real property.” Martha Ratnoff Fleisher, Annotation, Validity, as to Claim Alleging Design or Building Defects, of Statute Imposing Time Limitations Upon Action Against Architect, Engineer, or Builder for Injury or Death Arising Out of Defective or Unsafe Condition of Improvement to Real Property, 5 A.L.R. 6th 497, 516 (2005). Such statutes generally “bar * * * claims by owners and third parties a designated number of years following substantial completion of the improvement or following another event unrelated to accrual of the cause of action.” Id. These statutes have generally been applied to bar contribution and indemnity claims. See, e.g., Eastern Iowa Propane, Ltd. v. Honeywell, Inc., 652 N.W.2d 462, 463, 466 (Iowa 2002) (applying 15-year statute of repose to bar contribution-indemnity claim while the underlying claim went forward). And they have been upheld, in the face of challenges under state due process and remedies clauses, in sev*643eral jurisdictions. See Fleisher, supra, 5 A.L.R. 6th § 4-5, at 522-39 (open courts/remedies clause); § 7, at 541-54 (due process). Thus in Blaske v. Smith & Entzeroth, Inc., 821 S.W.2d 822, 832-35 (Mo.1991), the Missouri Supreme Court upheld the statute of repose protecting architects, engineers and persons who provided construction services against due process and access to court challenges. As to the access to courts (remedies) clause, the court determined that because the legislature could totally eliminate the cause of action, “the legislature can eliminate such a cause of action from and after 10 years following the completion of construction.” Id. at 833. The court said that the statute of repose “does not bar the courts to a person with a valid cause of action; rather, it modifies the common law to provide that there is no such cause of action.” Id. As to the due process clause, the court said: A litigant does not have a vested property right in a cause of action before it accrues. Thus, no due process violation occurs if this non-property right is eliminated by a change in the law. Id. at 834. The court concluded: It is understandable that the plaintiffs would disagree with the decision of the legislature to grant immunity to designers and builders from and after 10 years following the completion of construction; however, this Court cannot say that the legislature’s decision to do so does not rationally further a legitimate state objective. Id. at 835. We now turn to our case law under section 541.051. After section 541.051 was amended in 1980 to address the equal-protection deficiencies we described in Po-cific Indem. Co,,4 it has faced challenges on Due Process and Remedies Clause grounds. In each case, we determined that the legitimate legislative objective underlying the repose provision was sufficient to support its constitutionality. See Sartori, 432 N.W.2d at 454 (stating that the legislative objective behind the statute was “reasonable * * * and should not be lightly disregarded by this court absent a clear abuse”); Calder, 318 N.W.2d at 843-44 (holding the statute constitutional). But our analysis has not been completely satisfactory because it has, at times, failed to properly distinguish between the limitations and repose provisions of section 541.051 and intermingles principles applicable from one to the other. In Calder, although we were asked to enforce the statute of repose provision in section 541.051, our analysis relied significantly on principles that are only applicable to statutes of limitation. We determined that the repose provision did not violate the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses because the defendant had a reasonable time after being sued (14 months) to bring its contribution claim. Calder, 318 N.W.2d at 844. We declined to define a period that would be constitutionally unreasonable, but cautioned that “a statute which does not allow any time whatever [to join third parties] is clearly unconstitutional.” Id. We also observed, We do not believe the legislature can pass a statute allowing a substantive remedy and yet, by adopting a procedural statute of limitations, make the remedy impossible to achieve and meaningless by barring the suit from being brought before it has matured. *644Id. at 844. All of these comments were dicta. As we have seen, the requirement of a reasonable time to bring a claim is only relevant to the application of a statute of limitations after a cause of action has already accrued. And the comment about the statutory remedy had no application because the underlying claim in Colder was based in common law negligence and a contribution claim is an equitable action. Id. at 839, 841. As a result, Colder is best limited to its particular facts. Colder did appropriately reject the argument that the statute of repose provision of section 541.051 violated due process because it “abrogates a common law right of action without providing a reasonable substitute.” Colder, 318 N.W.2d at 843-44. We cited Tri-State Insurance Co. of Minnesota v. Bouma, 306 N.W.2d 564, 566 (Minn.1981), which rejected that argument as to Minn. Stat. § 176.179 (1974) (eliminating any right to seek a refund of the overpayment of worker’s compensation). In Bouma we said: [W]e have recognized that the legislature could constitutionally abrogate a common law right without providing a reasonable substitute if it is pursuing a permissible, legitimate legislative objective. 306 N.W.2d at 566. But Colder, through citing this language, did not carry this holding from Bouma forward to any conclusion. Colder, 318 N.W.2d at 844. In Sartori, we began our remedies and due process analyses with the discussion in Colder that the legislature may abrogate a common law right without providing a substitute if it is pursuing a legitimate legislative objective. Sartori, 432 N.W.2d at 453. And we held that the legislative objective of section 541.051, to “avoid litigation and stale claims which could occur many years after an improvement to real property has been designed, manufactured and installed,” was a legitimate one. Sartori, 432 N.W.2d at 454. But we may have confused this holding by emphasizing that Sartori had alternative remedies. See id. That discussion of alternative remedies was not necessary to the holding that the legislature could eliminate a common-law cause of action without providing a substitute if it were pursuing a legitimate legislative objective, and it does not control this case. We hold that the repose provision of section 541.051 is based on a legitimate legislative objective and does not violate the Due Process or Remedies Clauses of the Minnesota Constitution. Because we see no reason to differentiate between the Due Process Clause of the Minnesota Constitution and that of the United State Constitution as applied to these facts, we likewise hold that the repose provision of section 541.051 does not violate federal due process. III. Finally, Top Value argues that principles of equity and justice should preclude reading the statute to cut off contribution and indemnity claims before they accrue. The argument, however, is premised on the idea that the statute is ambiguous, which we have determined it is not. Top Value did not present an equal protection challenge to the statute. Top Value supports its equity argument with this court’s statement in City of Will-mar v. Short-ElliotP-Hendrickson, Inc.: As a practical matter, a party may lose the protection afforded by the statute of limitations against a plaintiffs claim when there are other defendants who do not have a statute of limitations defense to plaintiffs claims; but equity deems it more important that a defendant not evade its liability at the literal expense of a codefendant. *645512 N.W.2d 872, 875 (Minn.1994). City of Willmar is inapposite because the issue was whether the crossclaim for contribution and indemnity could go forward when the underlying action had been barred by the statute of limitations. Id. at 873. Nonetheless, Top Value argues that the City of Willmar should inform us because it concerned a derivative claim that, like Top Value’s contribution and indemnity claims, depends on the filing of a damages claim by the plaintiff, an event over which the defendant has no control. Without doubt the consequences of the district court’s plain reading of the statute are prejudicial to Top Value, but that prejudice is the natural consequence of the statute of repose that the legislature has chosen to enact. Reversed and remanded to the district court for reinstatement of its summary judgment orders.

+ 13 more citations in this opinion.

Camacho v. Todd and Leiser Homes · 2005 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Olmanson v. LeSueur County · 2005 28 citations

OPINION MEYER, Justice. In this case we are asked to decide whether the 10-year statute of repose provision in Minn. Stat. § 541.051, subd. 1(a) (2004), applies to claims for negligence based on a landowner’s common-law duty to inspect and maintain the property. The court of appeals held that the claims were not time-barred by the statute. We affirm. Appellant Shoreland Recreational Cooperative (Shoreland) owns and operates an 18-hole golf course with golf holes on both sides of LeSueur County Road 21. Sometime prior to 1989, Shoreland designed and built a golf cart culvert under County Road 21 to allow golfers access to the golf course on both sides of the road. The opening of the culvert is 5 feet wide and 7 feet high and the top of the culvert is located 76 inches from the edge of the pavement on County Road 21. The east side of the culvert is marked by a 2-by-4 board on iron posts located above the culvert opening. Appellant LeSueur County (the county) and Shoreland do not know when the barricade was placed and who *879placed it there. The culvert opening on the west side of County Road 21 is unmarked and unguarded. Shoreland acknowledges that it owns the property where the culvert is located, and the county acknowledges that it holds a prescriptive easement over the property, which entitles the county to use it for road purposes.1 In the afternoon and early evening of February 18, 2000, respondent David C. Olmanson went snowmobiling with friends in and around St. Peter, Minnesota. The snowmobilers rode primarily on trails and in the ditches along state and county roads, including County Road 21. On his way home, Olmanson was driving his snowmobile in the ditch on the east side of County Road 21. He decided to cross from the ditch on the east side of County Road 21 to the ditch on the west side. As he crossed the road and headed down the ditch, the snowmobile went off the edge of the golf cart culvert and struck the culvert’s side wall. Olmanson was thrown from the snowmobile and injured. Olmanson brought a negligence claim against the county and Shoreland in Le-Sueur County District Court. The county and Shoreland moved for summary judgment, arguing that the statute of repose for improvements to real property, Minn. Stat. § 541.051, barred Olmanson’s suit, and that neither the county nor Shoreland had a duty to warn entrants of the existence of the culvert. The county also claimed statutory and official immunity. The district court denied summary judgment based on immunity and failure to warn, but granted summary judgment based on the statute of repose. The court of appeals affirmed the denial of summary judgment based on immunity but reversed the grant of summary judgment based on the statute of repose, holding that under the statute of repose, the duty to warn is inherent in a landowner’s duty both to maintain and inspect. Olmanson v. Le-Sueur County, 673 N.W.2d 506 (Minn.App. 2004). We granted review on the issue of the statute of repose. We affirm the decision of the court of appeals. I. This case comes before us on an appeal from summary judgment. On appeal from summary judgment, we must determine whether there are any genuine issues of material fact, and whether the lower court erred in its application of the law. State by Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 4 (Minn.1990); see also Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.03. The construction of a statute is a question of law, which this court reviews de novo. Ryan v. ITT Life Ins. Corp., 450 N.W.2d 126, 128 (Minn.1990). When determining the meaning of a statute, we are guided by several principles of statutory construction. Our primary object is to interpret and construct laws so as to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature. Mankato Citizens Tel. Co. v. Comm’r of Taxation, 275 Minn. 107, 111, 145 N.W.2d 313, 317 (1966); Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2004). When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, this court looks only to its plain language. Owens v. Water Gremlin Co., 605 N.W.2d 733, 736 (Minn.2000). If a statute is ambiguous, the construction that avoids constitutional problems should be used, even if such a construction is less natural. *880State on Behalf of Forslund v. Bronson, 305 N.W.2d 748, 751 (Minn.1981). Minnesota Statutes § 541.051 (2004), is a statute of repose for injuries arising out of real property improvements.2 The pertinent statutory language is as follows: (a) Except where fraud is involved, no action by any person in contract, tort, or otherwise to recover damages for any injury to property, real or personal, or for bodily injury or wrongful death, arising out of the defective and unsafe condition of an improvement to real property, nor any action for contribution or indemnity for damages sustained on account of the injury, shall be brought against any person performing or furnishing the design, planning, supervision, materials, or observation of construction or construction of the improvement to real property or against the owner of the real property more than two years after discovery of the injury * * * nor, in any event shall such a cause of action accrue more than ten years after substantial completion of the construction. [[Image here]] (c) Nothing in this section shall apply to actions for damages resulting from negligence in the maintenance, operation or inspection of the real property improvement against the owner or other person in possession. Minn. Stat. § 541.051, subd. 1. Shoreland and the county argue that the language of subdivision 1(a) is clear and unambiguous and operates to expressly bar Olmanson’s claim. They reason that (1) the golf cart culvert was completed more than 10 years before Olmanson’s accident; (2) the culvert is an improvement to real property; (3) Olmanson’s claim is against the owners of the culvert; and (4) Olmanson’s claim arises out of the defective and unsafe condition of the culvert. Under these facts, appellants contend, subdivision 1(a) explicitly bars Olmanson’s claim. Olmanson asserts that his injury arose from the county and Shoreland’s negligence in inspecting the culvert and then-resulting failure to notice that it was dangerous. Olmanson argues that had Shore-land and the county properly inspected the culvert, they would have known that the roadside ditch was commonly used by snowmobiles, and that the culvert created a dangerous condition because it was unguarded and unmarked. Olmanson argues that subdivision 1(c), the “maintenance, operation or inspection” exception, applies to preserve his claim. Specifically, Olmanson claims that this exception preserves the common-law duty of reasonable care owed by landowners to entrants, as evidenced by the use of negligence terminology in the subdivision. We agree with Olmanson’s interpretation of Minn. Stat. § 541.051. It is well established in our jurisprudence that a landowner has a duty to use reasonable care for the safety of all entrants upon the premises. Louis v. Louis, 636 N.W.2d 314, 318 (Minn.2001); Pietila v. Congdon, 362 N.W.2d 328, 332-33 (Minn.1985); Peterson v. Balach, 294 Minn. 161, 174, 199 N.W.2d 639, 647 (1972). The landowner’s *881duty of reasonable care is modified according to the expected use of the land, and the entrant also has a duty of reasonable care, which varies according to the circumstances under which he enters the land. Peterson, 294 Minn, at 174, 199 N.W.2d at 647.3 However, the landowner’s duty of reasonable care includes an ongoing duty to inspect and maintain property to ensure entrants on the landowner’s land are not exposed to unreasonable risks of harm. Pietila, 362 N.W.2d at 332-33; Conover v. Northern States Power Co., 313 N.W.2d 397, 401 (Minn.1981) (owner has duty to inspect, warn). If dangerous conditions are discoverable through reasonable efforts, the landowner must either repair the conditions or provide invited entrants with adequate warnings. See Bonniwell v. St. Paul Union Stockyards Co., 271 Minn. 233, 238, 135 N.W.2d 499, 502 (1965); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343 cmt. d (1965) (“[An entrant] is entitled to expect that the possessor will take reasonable care to ascertain the actual condition of the premises and, having discovered it, either to make it reasonably safe by repair or to give warning of the actual condition and the risk involved therein.”). If a reasonable inspection does not reveal a dangerous condition, such that the landowner has neither actual nor constructive knowledge of it, under the theory of negligence the landowner is not liable for any physical injury caused to invited entrants by the dangerous condition. See Hanson v. Christensen, 275 Minn. 204, 212, 145 N.W.2d 868, 873-74 (1966). The common-law duty to inspect, repair, and warn is not absolute. This court has adopted Restatement (See-ond) of Torts § 343A, subsection (1), which states: “A possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for physical harm caused to them by any activity or condition on the land whose danger is known or obvious to them, unless the possessor should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or obviousness.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343A(1) (1965); Baber v. Dill, 531 N.W.2d 493, 495-96 (Minn.1995) (citing Peterson v. W.T. Rawleigh Co., 274 Minn. 495, 496-97, 144 N.W.2d 555, 557-58 (1966) (expressly approving Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343A)). Generally, whether a condition presents a known or obvious danger is a question of fact. See, e.g., Louis, 636 N.W.2d at 321-22 (holding that summary judgment was not appropriate because whether the danger posed by a swimming pool was known or obvious was a fact question). Whether the possessor could anticipate the danger is also a fact question. See Adee v. Evanson, 281 N.W.2d 177 (Minn.1979) (granting a new trial on the issue of liability where the original jury instructions omitted language imposing liability on the landowner if harm could be anticipated despite obviousness of danger). Under common law, then, several questions of fact would preclude summary judgment in the instant case. The county and Shoreland, as owners of the land, had an ongoing duty under common law to use reasonable care for the safety of entrants on their land, including the duty to inspect their premises for dangerous conditions and to repair them or warn entrants about them. The statute of repose does not bar claims that this duty has been breached, because under the *882plain language of Minn. Stat. § 541.051, subd. 1(e), owners or other persons in possession retain their ordinary landowner liability for negligent maintenance, operation, and inspection of real property improvements. We hold that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the county and Shoreland based on its conclusion that Olmanson’s claim was barred by the statute of repose. The county and Shoreland argue that because they inspected and maintained the culvert in a manner adequate for its use as a golf cart tunnel, they cannot be held liable for negligent inspection or maintenance caused by an unintended use. We agree with this basic premise but do not conclude as a matter of law that the use of the land for a snowmobile trail was an “unintended use.” Rather, this is a fact question to be left for determination by the fact finder. II. The county and Shoreland assert that if Minn. Stat. § 541.051 does not protect them, they are effectively being denied equal protection of the law because the benefit of the statute is given to persons who construct or design improvements to real estate, but denied to owners. They argue that we concluded that an earlier version of the statute of repose was unconstitutional for this very reason; i.e., that the statute time-barred certain claims against construction professionals while allowing those same claims to go forward against owners. We begin our analysis of this constitutional argument with a brief history of the statute of repose and this court’s decisions with respect to the statute. The Minnesota Legislature enacted section 541.051 in 1965. Act of May 21, 1965, ch. 564, § 1, 1965 Minn. Laws 803. As originally enacted, the statute barred suits against any person involved with the design, planning, supervision, or observation of construction, or performing the construction of a real property improvement (hereafter construction professionals) after 15 years. It made no reference to suppliers of materials, and it explicitly allowed the exception for owners of real property improvements: “This [section] shall not be applied in favor of any person in actual possession and control as owner, tenant, or otherwise * * * at the time the defective and unsafe conditions of such improvement constitutes the proximate cause of the injury * * *.” Id. We first examined the statute in Kittson County v. Wells, Denbrook & Associates, Inc., 308 Minn. 237, 241 N.W.2d 799 (1976). At that time, this court concluded that its enactment was apparently a legislative reaction to the erosion of the privity of contract doctrine, which threatened to greatly expand the liability of construction professionals. Id. at 241, 241 N.W.2d at 801-02. The statute limited the liability of these construction professionals by establishing an outer time limit beyond which they could not be held liable for design and construction defects. Id. at 242, 241 N.W.2d at 802. The legislature thus granted broad protection to construction professionals not available to owners of real property improvements. In 1977, we took up the constitutionality of excluding owners and materials suppliers from the class protected by the statute. Pacific Indem. Co. v. Thompson-Yaeger, Inc., 260 N.W.2d 548, 555 (Minn.1977). At the time Pacific Indemnity was decided, the statute of repose protected construction professionals but allowed suit against property owners. In Pacific Indemnity, a fire caused by a negligently-installed furnace destroyed part of a shopping mall. Pacific Indem. Co., 260 N.W.2d at 551-52. At trial, the jury found the furnace instal*883ler 80 percent negligent, the store tenant 10 percent negligent, and the furnace servicing company 10 percent negligent. Id. at 552. The trial court found that the furnace was not a real property improvement, and that therefore section 541.051 was inapplicable. Id. at 553. The servicing company appealed. Id. This court first held that the furnace was a real property improvement for purposes of section 541.051. Id. at 554. Next, this court noted that the legislature may create separate classes, but “[ljegisla-tive classifications must apply uniformly to all persons who are similarly situated, and the distinctions which separate those who are included within a classification from those who are not must be natural and reasonable, not fanciful and arbitrary.” Id. at 555 (citing Schwartz v. Talmo, 295 Minn. 356, 361, 205 N.W.2d 318, 322 (1973)). Otherwise, the classification fails on equal protection grounds. Noting that a majority of states had upheld the constitutionality of similar statutes on equal protection grounds,4 this court nonetheless determined that the better reasoned position “is embodied in the decisions which hold such statutes to be unconstitutional because they grant an immunity from suit to a certain class of defendants, without there being a reasonable basis for that classification.” Pacific Indem. Co., 260 N.W.2d at 555. In 1980, the Minnesota legislature responded to Pacific Indemnity by amending section 541.051 to add property owners and materials suppliers to the class protected by the statute of repose for claims of design and construction defects. Act of April 7, 1980, ch. 518, §§ 2-4, 1980 Minn. Laws 595-96; see Colder v. City of Crystal, 318 N.W.2d 838, 842-43 (Minn.1982). In the same session, the legislature added what is now section 541.051, subdivision 1(c), excepting claims of negligent maintenance, operation, or inspection against the property owner and other persons in possession from the protection of the statute. Act of April 7, 1980, ch. 518, §§ 2-4, 1980 Minn. Laws 595-96. A later amendment shortened the limitation period to its present duration of 10 years. This brings us to the question at hand. Does the 1980 amendment and our reading of it in Section I create the same classification between construction professionals and owners that was found to be unconstitutional in Pacific Indemnity? We think not. In Pacific Indemnity we held that it was irrational to give statute of repose protection for claims against construction professionals while denying that protection to landowners. We did not conclude that all claims against construction professionals and landowners must be treated identically in order to withstand an equal protection challenge. As discussed above, landowners and other persons in possession of land have historically been liable for claims that arise from their possession in the land; i.e., the obligation to inspect and maintain the premises. Construction professionals who have relinquished control of the land do not have a duty to inspect and maintain the premises. Owners and possessors, not construction professionals, are obligated to inspect and maintain the premises once construction is *884completed. To permit claims for negligent inspection and maintenance to proceed against those in possession while barring such claims against construction professionals not in possession is a natural and reasonable distinction. The legislature made clear this distinction in plain and unambiguous language. We conclude that owners and possessors are not denied equal protection of the law if we hold them liable for their common-law duties to inspect and maintain their real property improvements. Affirmed. ANDERSON, G. BARRY, J„ took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

+ 25 more citations in this opinion.

Vlahos v. R&I Construction of Bloomington, Inc. · 2004 15 citations

+ 15 more citations in this opinion.

Fisher v. County of Rock · 1999 5 citations

+ 5 more citations in this opinion.

Hyland Hill North Condominium Ass'n v. Hyland Hill Co. · 1996 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

City of Willmar v. Short-Elliott-Hendrickson, Inc. · 1994 3 citations

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

Griebel v. Andersen Corp. · 1992 19 citations

+ 19 more citations in this opinion.

80 South Eighth Street Ltd. Partnership v. Carey-Canada, Inc. · 1992 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

City of Willmar v. Short-Elliott-Hendrickson, Inc. · 1991 6 citations

+ 6 more citations in this opinion.

Sartori v. Harnischfeger Corp. · 1988 15 citations

+ 15 more citations in this opinion.

Wittmer v. Ruegemer · 1988 8 citations

+ 8 more citations in this opinion.

Bulau v. Hector Plumbing and Heating Co. · 1987 10 citations

+ 10 more citations in this opinion.

Frederickson v. Alton M. Johnson Co. · 1987 7 citations

+ 7 more citations in this opinion.

Ocel v. City of Eagan · 1987 5 citations

+ 5 more citations in this opinion.

Valley Farmers' Elevator v. Lindsay Bros. · 1987 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Lovgren v. Peoples Elec. Co., Inc. · 1986 4 citations

Lovgren did not begin a personal injury action until more than 2 years and 7 months had elapsed. The statute of limitations then in effect for personal injury claims arising out of defective or unsafe improvements to real property was 2 years from discovery. Minn. Stat. § 541.051 (1976). In Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Thompson-Yaeger, Inc., 260 N.W.2d 548 (Minn.1977), this court ruled section 541.-051 unconstitutional. 1

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Calder v. City of Crystal · 1982 18 citations

This is an appeal from the grant of third-party defendant Schoell’s motion for summary judgment. This motion was based on the ground that the City of Crystal’s cause of action against Sehoell for contribution or indemnification was barred by Minn. Stat. § 541.051 (1980). Only the City of Crystal and Sehoell are parties to this appeal; the other third-party defendants, Hipp and Northern, have agreed to abide by the determination. The original matter is currently pending in district court.

+ 15 more citations in this opinion.

Capitol Supply Co. v. City of St. Paul · 1982 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Minnesota Court of Appeals

Vill. Lofts At St. Anthony Falls Ass'n v. Hous. Partners Iii-Lofts LLC · 2019 7 citations

+ 7 more citations in this opinion.

Great Northern Insurance Co. v. Honeywell International, Inc. · 2017 13 citations

+ 13 more citations in this opinion.

Simon McCullough v. City of Red Wing · 2016 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

· 2015 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Carol Quinn v. William G. Johnson · 2015 11 citations

+ 11 more citations in this opinion.

Doug Blaine v. City of Sartell, County of Stearns · 2015 5 citations

+ 5 more citations in this opinion.

· 2015 9 citations

+ 9 more citations in this opinion.

Gregory Monson v. Jeff Suck · 2014 5 citations

+ 5 more citations in this opinion.

· 2014 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Rosso v. Hallmark Homes of Minneapolis, Inc. · 2014 9 citations

+ 9 more citations in this opinion.

In Re Individual 35w Bridge Litigation · 2010 10 citations

+ 10 more citations in this opinion.

In Re Individual 35w Bridge Litigation · 2010 16 citations

+ 16 more citations in this opinion.

Miller v. Lankow · 2009 2 citations [Dissent]

KLAPHAKE, Judge (dissenting). Minnesota requires that “spoliation notice must reasonably notify the recipient of a breach or a claim.” Hoffman, 587 N.W.2d at 70. In the context of construction litigation, such notice affords the potential adverse party the opportunity to correct any defect, prepare for negotiation and litigation, and safeguard against stale claims. Id. Here, appellant provided respondents with the notice required by Hoffman, but the majority insists that in addition to providing notice of a potential claim, appellant was also required to “inform respondents of appellant’s plan to remediate the moisture and mold problems.” This additional requirement adds an additional component to the claim notice required by Hoffman and is wholly unsupported in the law. In addition, respondents have not shown that they were prejudiced by appellant’s remediation actions. Therefore, the district court’s exclusion of appellant’s evidence as a spoliation sanction was an abuse of discretion, and I would reverse. *742The chronology of events shows that respondents were properly notified of appellant’s potential claim between September 2005, when appellant discovered the ongoing water and mold problem, and early 2007, when appellant began removing the water- and mold-damaged walls of his home. In October 2005, a potential buyer of appellant’s home opted out of the purchase after receiving a moisture analysis report obtained at the buyer’s request. When appellant received the report and apparently sought another moisture analysis that also revealed the presence of mold and water infiltration in his home, appellant and a friend who owned a residential construction business cut a hole in the drywall under a window on the inside wall of appellant’s home. They discovered in the area, which had been previously repaired, “moisture actually coming down the inside part of the wall” and “frost on the chipboard.” According to appellant, he then telephoned the contractors who had done the previous repair work, respondents Donnelly Brothers and Total Service Company, informed them of the problem, and told them that it would have to be fixed immediately. Mark Donnelly and Jeff Agness of Total Service Company visited appellant’s home for a 45-minute meeting, where, according to appellant, they were shown the hole that had been cut in the wall, and “they both agreed that there was moisture in the wall again.” During that meeting, the contractors stated that they had repaired only limited areas of the home as per the direction of the prior homeowners, and when asked “what they could do for” appellant, Mark Donnelly offered him a “fairly good price” to repair the problem, and Jeff Agness said nothing. Agness stated in his deposition that he, Mark Donnelly, and the prior homeowners met soon after the meeting with appellant, and “[t]he purpose of the meeting was to make us aware that there may be a lawsuit on this, and for the people that were involved in that to ... take a look at what does that mean, why are we being sued, what are the issues here.” On December 27, 2005, appellant’s counsel sent each of the contractors a letter to provide them with “written notification of potential construction defects” in the home. The letter included a copy of the moisture analysis report, which revealed the continuing mold and water infiltration problem, and discussed the discovery of “work which was done inappropriately by your companies causing the problems to continue.” The letter concluded by stating: It is my hope that between your companies, the previous owner, and my client, we will be able to resolve this issue amicably and without much legal cost. As such, please contact me at your convenience if you wish to inspect the property and discuss possible resolutions. However, if I do not hear from you by January 9, 2006,1 will presume that you do not wish to work on a resolution and I will put the matter into suit. Thank you and look forward to speaking with you. Appellant also sent a very similar notice letter to the former homeowners. Thereafter, only Mark Donnelly visited the home, and, according to his affidavit, his total investigation consisted of viewing “a cut [made] on the inside wall prior to my visit.” Despite appellant’s allegation that moisture was “actually coming down the inside part of the wall” that Donnelly had repaired earlier, Donnelly did nothing after twice visiting the house to investigate the problem, did not inquire further about the extent of the damage or condition of the house, did not have an expert evaluate the problem, and did nothing to otherwise *743protect himself in the event of an adverse claim. Donnelly admits in his affidavit that appellant showed him the cut in the interior wall during his visit, but his affidavit omits to mention what Donnelly saw from viewing the cut or any conclusions he reached from this “investigation.” In Hoffman, we said that notice was inadequate for purposes of spoliation analysis when a new car owner whose vehicle had burned in his garage did not give the ear dealership proper notice of a possible breach or claim and merely contacted the dealership by telephone to tell them that his vehicle had started on fire, to cancel a service appointment, and to request paperwork on the car. Id. at 70-71. Here, by contrast, appellant made several contacts with respondents over the course of a year and several months, and during this period he pinpointed respondents’ actions as the source of the problem, encouraged them to inspect the problem, and eventually threatened suit when they took no action. Jeff Agness’s admission that he and respondents met soon after the first meeting with appellant to discuss their legal exposure clearly shows that they were notified of a potential claim by appellant. The fact that appellant may not have specifically informed respondents until March 2007 that he intended to remove the exterior stucco, when he had actually conducted stucco removal work during the early part of 2007, is irrelevant — by 2007 respondents had repeatedly received notice but had taken no action to correct the construction repair defects, prepare for negotiation or litigation, or safeguard against stale claims. See id. at 70. It is also noteworthy that appellant had only a two-year window from the time he received notice of the problem in which to assert a claim, because the statute of limitations for such claims is two years from the date of discovery of the “injury.” Minn. Stat. § 541.051, subd. 1 (2008) (setting forth two-year statute of limitations for tort claims arising out of construction defects); see also Minn. Stat. § 327A.08 (2008) (stating that statutory warranties for home improvements apply only when the party providing a home improvement is given notice of a defect within six months of discovery of a work defect). Respondents may have had little motivation to respond during the period that appellant attempted to notify them of the continuation of the mold and water problem, but their dilatory tactics should not give them a legitimate spoliation claim. Further, sanctioning a party for destruction of evidence “is only appropriate if the unavailability of the evidence results in prejudice to the opposing party.” Foss v. Kincade, 766 N.W.2d 317, 323 (Minn.2009); see Patton v. Newmar Corp., 538 N.W.2d 116, 119 (Minn.1995) (stating that spoliation sanction should be tailored to address “the impact of spoliation — the prejudice to the opposing party”). In crafting a spoliation sanction, the court must “examine the nature of the item lost in the context of the claims asserted and the potential for remediation of the prejudice.” Foss, 766 N.W.2d at 323 (quoting Patton, 538 N.W.2d at 119). In Foss, the supreme court ruled that homeowners’ disposal of a bookcase that had fallen on a visiting child did not merit a discovery sanction in a negligence action brought against the homeowners, because the bookcase had no evidentiary value and its disposal did not prejudice the plaintiffs. Foss, 766 N.W.2d at 324. Here, neither Donnelly nor the other respondents have shown that they were unable to determine the nature of appellant’s claims or their response to them because of any lack of evidence in the record. As in Foss, they have not shown that they suffered prejudice as the *744result of appellant’s 2007 repair work to his home. In addition, the record includes 21 photographs taken of the exterior of appellant’s home in 2007 after the stucco was removed that, while black and white, clearly show the condition of the walls, including the presence of mold, and the record also includes the observations of various witnesses who observed the condition of the home. Under these circumstances, the sanction of exclusion of appellant’s evidence resulting in dismissal of his claim against all parties was simply wrong. Of particular concern is the court’s dismissal of appellant’s misrepresentation and warranty claims against the previous homeowners, which were independent of any dispute regarding workmanship of the contractors. The threat of a spoliation sanction encourages an injured party to inform an alleged tortfeasor of a possible claim in order to enable the tortfeasor to defend against such a claim. Respondents were given that opportunity here, and the district court abused its discretion by imposing a spoliation sanction that extinguished appellant’s claim.

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Buscher v. MONTAG DEVELOPMENT, INC. · 2009 6 citations

+ 6 more citations in this opinion.

Christian v. Birch · 2009 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Siewert v. Northern States Power Co. · 2008 5 citations

+ 5 more citations in this opinion.

U.S. Home Corp. v. Zimmerman Stucco & Plaster, Inc. · 2008 17 citations

+ 17 more citations in this opinion.

Gomez v. David A. Williams Realty & Construction, Inc. · 2007 15 citations

+ 15 more citations in this opinion.

Sletto v. Wesley Construction, Inc. · 2007 8 citations

+ 8 more citations in this opinion.

Nelson v. Short-Elliot-Hendrickson, Inc. · 2006 19 citations

+ 19 more citations in this opinion.

Lake Superior Center Authority v. Hammel, Green & Abrahamson, Inc. · 2006 7 citations

+ 7 more citations in this opinion.

Brink v. Smith Companies Construction, Inc. · 2005 30 citations

+ 30 more citations in this opinion.

State Farm Fire & Casualty v. Aquila Inc. · 2005 50 citations

+ 50 more citations in this opinion.

Weston v. McWilliams & Associates, Inc. · 2005 26 citations

+ 26 more citations in this opinion.

Willhite v. Cass County Board of Supervisors · 2005 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Merritt v. Mendel · 2005 6 citations

+ 6 more citations in this opinion.

Allianz Insurance Co. v. PM Services of Eden Prairie, Inc. · 2005 12 citations

+ 12 more citations in this opinion.

Jensen-Re Partnership v. Superior Shores Lakehome Ass'n · 2004 10 citations

+ 10 more citations in this opinion.

Taney v. Independent School District No. 624 · 2004 7 citations

+ 7 more citations in this opinion.

Olmanson v. Le Sueur County · 2004 23 citations

+ 23 more citations in this opinion.

Nolan and Nolan v. City of Eagan · 2003 12 citations

+ 12 more citations in this opinion.

Independent School District No. 775 v. Holm Bros. Plumbing & Heating, Inc. · 2003 5 citations

+ 5 more citations in this opinion.

Vlahos v. R & I Construction of Bloomington, Inc. · 2003 7 citations

Appellants initiated this lawsuit against R & I on April 23, 2001. Appellants spent $3.8 million for remodeling, of which they attributed $1.118 million to the water damages. R & I asserted third-party claims against Kleve Heating and other subcontractors. Respondents contended that appellants’ lawsuit was barred by Minn. Stat. § 541.051 (2002), a statute of limitations limiting claims against entities involved in providing an improvement to real property to two-years from “discovery of the injury.”

+ 4 more citations in this opinion.

Dakota County v. BWBR Architects, Inc. · 2002 4 citations

+ 4 more citations in this opinion.

Twinco Romax Automotive Warehouse, Inc. v. Olson General Contractors, Inc. · 2002 6 citations

+ 6 more citations in this opinion.

Koes v. Advanced Design, Inc. · 2001 12 citations

+ 12 more citations in this opinion.

Citizens for a Safe Grant v. Lone Oak Sportsmen's Club, Inc. · 2001 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Rhee v. Golden Home Builders, Inc. · 2000 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Oreck v. Harvey Homes, Inc. · 1999 9 citations

+ 9 more citations in this opinion.

Fisher v. County of Rock · 1998 10 citations

+ 10 more citations in this opinion.

Brandt v. Hallwood Management Co. · 1997 19 citations

+ 19 more citations in this opinion.

Red Wing Motel Investors v. Red Wing Fire Department · 1996 7 citations

+ 7 more citations in this opinion.

Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. M.A. Mortenson Companies · 1996 11 citations

+ 11 more citations in this opinion.

HYLAND HILL NO. CONDO ASS'N v. Hyland · 1995 7 citations

+ 7 more citations in this opinion.

Hyland Hill North Condominium Ass'n v. Hyland Hill Co. · 1995 7 citations

+ 7 more citations in this opinion.

Boyum v. Main Entree, Inc. · 1995 4 citations

+ 4 more citations in this opinion.

Larson v. Babcock & Wilcox · 1994 4 citations

Appellants Kent Larson, Clifford Nelson, and Hugh Stadem challenge the summary judgment, arguing the district court erroneously determined that Minn. Stat. § 541.051 operates to bar their claim against respondents Detroit Stoker Company and Babcock & Wilcox. Larson, Nelson, and Stadem contend their claim is within a 1990 amendment to the statute that allows claims against suppliers of machinery or equipment. We affirm.

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Williams v. Tweed · 1994 20 citations

+ 20 more citations in this opinion.

City of Willmar v. Short-Elliott-Hendrickson, Inc. · 1993 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Independent School District No. 622 v. Keene Corp. · 1993 4 citations

+ 4 more citations in this opinion.

Kline v. Doughboy Recreational Manufacturing Co. · 1993 27 citations

+ 27 more citations in this opinion.

Wiita v. Potlatch Corp. · 1992 6 citations

+ 6 more citations in this opinion.

Anderson Ex Rel. Anderson v. City of Coon Rapids · 1992 6 citations

+ 6 more citations in this opinion.

Blomgren v. Marshall Management Services, Inc. · 1992 8 citations

+ 8 more citations in this opinion.

Ritter v. Abbey-Etna MacHine Co. · 1992 7 citations

+ 7 more citations in this opinion.

Arden Hills North Homes Ass'n v. Pemtom, Inc. · 1991 11 citations

+ 11 more citations in this opinion.

Matter v. Nelson · 1991 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Housing & Redevelopment Authority for Crookston v. Agassiz Construction, Inc. · 1991 7 citations

+ 7 more citations in this opinion.

Patton v. Yarrington · 1991 4 citations

Appellant Albert Bradford was injured in the fire. He began a personal injury action against Honeywell on July 27, 1989. Honeywell moved for summary judgment, contending the case was barred by the two-year statute of limitations for injuries arising from defects in improvements to real property. Minn. Stat. § 541.051 (1988). The trial court granted Honeywell’s motion, and Bradford appeals.

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Johnson v. Steele-Waseca Cooperative Electric · 1991 27 citations

+ 27 more citations in this opinion.

Minnesota Landmarks v. M.A. Mortenson Co. · 1991 9 citations

+ 9 more citations in this opinion.

TCF Bank & Sav. v. Marshall Truss Sys. · 1991 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Western Lake Superior Sanitary District v. Orfei & Sons, Inc. · 1990 11 citations

+ 11 more citations in this opinion.

Rivers v. Richard Schwartz/Neil Weber, Inc. · 1990 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Willette v. the Mayo Foundation · 1990 1 citation

did not consider a challenge to the rule under Article I, Section 8 of the Minnesota Constitution, its holding under the federal constitution is controlling here. Whether challenged under the remedies clause of the Minnesota Constitution or under the due process clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the *123 United States Constitution, the test for evaluating a law is similar. See Haney v. International Harvester Co., 294 Minn. 375, 385, 201 N.W.2d 140, 145-46 (1972) (common-law right of action may be abrogated without provision of substitute if permissible legislative objective is pursued); Mickelson, The Use and Interpretation of Article I, Section 8 of the Minnesota Constitution 1861-1984, 10 Wm. Mitchell L.Rev. 667, 681 (1984). Furthermore, in Sartori v. Hamischfeger Corp., 432 N.W.2d 448, 454 (Minn.1988), the supreme court upheld a statutory limitation period against a state remedies clause challenge, holding that the legitimate legislative objective of avoiding litigation of stale claims was served by Minn. Stat. § 541.051, subd. 1.

Minnesota Mutual Fire & Casualty Co. v. Retrum · 1990 14 citations

This is an appeal from denial of a motion for new trial. Appellant Minnesota Mutual Fire and Casualty Company challenges the trial court’s refusal to submit nuisance and trespass claims to jury as being barred by two year statute of limitations in Minn. Stat. § 541.051 (1988). In making that challenge, Minnesota Mutual improperly raises legal and factual issues for the first time on appeal. Minnesota Mutual also challenges the trial court’s refusal to inform the jury of a pretrial settlement between respondents Robert and Cheryl Ret-rum and alleged tortfeasor. We affirm.

+ 11 more citations in this opinion.

Nitz v. Nitz · 1990 3 citations

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

Horvath v. Liquid Controls Corp. · 1990 10 citations

+ 10 more citations in this opinion.

Western Lake Superior Sanitary District v. Interpace Corp. · 1990 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. · 1990 4 citations

+ 4 more citations in this opinion.