The trial court granted summary judgment for HFA and Davies, holding that the amended complaints did not relate back under Minn.R.Civ.P. 15.03 1 , so that the claims against them were barred by the two-year statute of limitations. Minn. Stat. § 541.07(1) (1990). The court of appeals affirmed as to Davies, but held that service on HFA related back under Minn.R.Civ.P. 15.03 on the grounds that HFA and HCMC shared an identity of interest. HFA appeals from that decision.

McDaniel v. United Hardware Distributing Co. · 1991 3 citations

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

Larson v. Dunn · 1990 2 citations

II. The Rigenhagens lived in Minnesota in 1980 when the alleged tort occurred, but have been living in California since 1982. We believe the trial court and the appellate court correctly denied their motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. *43 Personal jurisdiction is properly exercised if the nonresident's contacts satisfy our long-arm statute and constitutional concerns. Sherburne County Social Servs. v. Kennedy, 426 N.W.2d 866, 867 (Minn.1988). Larson bears the burden of proving sufficient forum contacts exist when jurisdiction is challenged. Hardrives, Inc. v. City of LaCrosse, 307 Minn. 290, 293, 240 N.W.2d 814, 816 (1976). Under Minnesota's long-arm statute, Minn. Stat. § 543.19, subd. 1 (1988), personal jurisdiction may be exercised over a nonresident who: (a) Owns, uses, or possesses any real or personal property situated in this state, or * * * * * * (c) Commits any act in Minnesota causing injury or property damage, or (d) Commits any act outside Minnesota causing injury or property damage in Minnesota, subject to the following exceptions when no jurisdiction shall be found: (1) Minnesota has no substantial interest in providing a forum; or (2) the burden placed on the defendant by being brought under the state's jurisdiction would violate fairness and substantial justice; or (3) the cause of action lies in defamation or privacy. Larson alleges that while still in Minnesota, the Rigenhagens aided in the abduction and concealment of Jessica. The Rigenhagens allege that their daughter asserts she acted alone. Larson's allegations, however, must be viewed as true for purposes of determining whether he has made a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction. Hunt v. Nevada State Bank, 285 Minn. 77, 82, 172 N.W.2d 292, 296-97 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1010, 90 S.Ct. 1239, 25 L.Ed.2d 423 (1970). Thus, personal jurisdiction may be properly asserted over the Rigenhagens since the alleged cause of action arose in Minnesota. The Rigenhagens contend this basis for long-arm jurisdiction is improper because the statute of limitations has run on any acts committed while they were Minnesota residents. The Larson panel found this argument meritless, noting "[a]lthough some interplay exists between these two legal doctrines * * *, whether a claim is time barred is an issue separate from the issue of personal jurisdiction." 449 N.W.2d at 759. We agree. Further, because "fraudulent concealment of th[e] cause of action will prevent the running of the statute of limitations," Kopperud v. Agers, 312 N.W.2d 443, 446 (Minn.1981); see also Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(6) (1988) (fraud action does not accrue until discovered), the statute of limitations had not run when suit was filed January 4, 1989. See Minn. Stat. § 541.07(1) (1988) (two year limitation period). Personal jurisdiction also is proper since the Rigenhagens' allegedly tortious conduct continued after they moved to California. See Minn. Stat. § 543.19, subd. 1(d) (out-state act causing in-state injury). The United States Supreme Court held that personal jurisdiction properly could be exercised over nonresident media when the effects of their intentional conduct were felt in the forum state. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 787 n. 6 & 790, 104 S.Ct. 1482, 1485 n. 6 & 1487, 79 L.Ed.2d 804 (1984) (construing California's long-arm statute). The Rigenhagens' alleged acts were at least indirectly aimed at depriving Larson of his custody rights and the effects of these acts clearly harmed Larson in Minnesota. Due process requires the nonresident defendant "have certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend `traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945) (citation omitted). In analyzing these constitutional parameters, we examine five factors: (1) the quantity of contacts with the state, (2) the nature and quality of those contacts, (3) the connection or relationship between the contacts and the cause of action, (4) the state's interest in providing a forum, and *44 (5) the relative convenience of the parties. Factors (4) and (5) are considered secondary. Kennedy, 426 N.W.2d at 868 (citation omitted). Under this analysis, the nonresident's contacts must be "such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." Kennedy, 426 N.W.2d at 870 (citation omitted); see also Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 1239, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958) (purposeful availment); West Am. Ins. Co. v. Westin, Inc., 337 N.W.2d 676, 679 (Minn.1983). In a similar context, personal jurisdiction was challenged in an action by a father against his nonresident former in-laws for allegedly conspiring to intentionally deprive him of custody. Stangel v. Rucker, 398 N.W.2d 602, 604 (Minn.App.1986), pet. for rev. denied (Minn., March 13 & 25, 1987; June 29, 1988). The panel there held the following forum contacts by the nonresidents were insufficient: paying legal fees to a Minnesota firm in connection with the dissolution proceeding; providing care for the minor child after they knew he had been abducted; and lying about the child's whereabouts in a phone conversation initiated by the father. Id. at 605-06. The forum contacts here, however, present a stronger case for finding personal jurisdiction. The Rigenhagens allegedly denied Larson access to Jessica in 1980 and aided in Jessica's abduction and concealment during the two years they remained Minnesota residents. Franklin Rigenhagen maintained a post office box in Minnesota after moving to California, by which he offered to act as a "go between" for Larson and his daughter. These direct contacts actually gave rise to the cause of action and are such that the Rigenhagens reasonably could have expected to be haled into court here. Further, the Rigenhagens owned real property in Minnesota until March 1985, when they conveyed it into a trust and they apparently remain trustees of this property. They also owned and operated a car dealership in Minnesota until 1984. Although these property contacts are unrelated, they indicate the Rigenhagen's purposeful availment of Minnesota privileges. Minnesota has an interest in providing a forum for this dispute. The subject custody order was issued by a Minnesota court, over which Minnesota retains continuing jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA). Minn. Stat. § 518A.03, subd. 1(a)(2) (1988). Minnesota also is interested in protecting the custodial rights of its citizens. See Minn. Stat. §§ 518A.01, subd. 1(b) & 518A.02(e) (1988) (UCCJA provisions designed to deter abductions and preventing forum shopping). The parties are residents of Minnesota, California and Washington, and these states likely will be the site of witnesses and evidence. While Minnesota may not be the only appropriate forum, we hold the Rigenhagens had sufficient minimum contacts with this state such that our exercise of personal jurisdiction over them does not offend constitutional due process nor statutory requirements.

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Wiggin v. Apple Valley Medical Clinic, Ltd. · 1990 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Sorenson v. St. Paul Ramsey Medical Center · 1990 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Levin v. C.O.M.B. Co. · 1989 3 citations

Levin commenced this action in October 1986. C.O.M.B. moved for summary judgment on alternative grounds: Levin’s claim was barred by the two-year limitation set by Minn. Stat. § 541.07(5) (1988), and the parties rescinded the commission element of Levin’s employment contract in 1982. Levin argued that his claim was not barred, relying in part on the exception contained in section 541.07(5) extending the limitation period to three years for willful nonpayment of wages. He also disputed the claimed rescission. The trial court ruled that Levin’s cause of action had accrued not later than August 1984 and that it was barred by the two-year limitation provided by section 541.07(5). The trial court ruled, in the alternative, that the commission element of the contract had been rescinded. Concluding that, as a matter of law, C.O.M.B.’s conduct was not “willful” within the meaning of section 541.07(5), the court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s determination that Levin’s claim was barred by the two-year limitation and declined to address the question of rescission.

Schneider v. Buckman · 1988 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Plath v. Plath · 1988 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Offerdahl v. University of Minnesota Hospitals & Clinics · 1988 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Tackleson v. Abbott-Northwestern Hospital, Inc. · 1987 6 citations

+ 6 more citations in this opinion.

Portlance v. Golden Valley State Bank · 1987 5 citations

+ 5 more citations in this opinion.

Leaon v. Washington County · 1986 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

DeRogatis Ex Rel. DeRogatis v. Mayo Clinic · 1986 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Advanced Training Systems Inc. v. Caswell Equipment Co. · 1984 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Capitol Supply Co. v. City of St. Paul · 1982 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Minnesota Court of Appeals

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+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Mark Schaefer v. Cargill Kitchen Solutions, Inc. · 2016 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Teresa McDonald v. Allina Health System d/b/a United Hospital · 2015 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Toyota-Lift of Minnesota, Inc. v. American Warehouse Systems, LLC, and third party v. Les Nielsen, third party · 2015 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Yvette Ford v. Minneapolis Public Schools · 2014 8 citations

+ 8 more citations in this opinion.

Sipe v. STS Manufacturing, Inc. · 2012 6 citations

+ 6 more citations in this opinion.

John Doe 76C v. Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis · 2011 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Curtis v. Altria Group, Inc. · 2010 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Hamann v. Park Nicollet Clinic · 2010 3 citations

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

Semler v. Klang · 2007 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Christiansen v. University of Minnesota Board of Regents · 2007 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

McClure v. Davis Engineering, L.L.C. · 2006 6 citations

+ 6 more citations in this opinion.

Hans Hagen Homes, Inc. v. City of Minnetrista · 2006 2 citations [Concurrence]

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Wenigar v. Johnson · 2006 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Murphy v. Allina Health System · 2003 5 citations

+ 5 more citations in this opinion.

Broek v. Park Nicollet Health Services · 2003 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Wollan v. Jahnz · 2003 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Scott v. Forest Lake Chrysler-Plymouth Dodge · 2002 4 citations

+ 4 more citations in this opinion.

Morton v. DYSTE · 2001 3 citations

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

D.M.S. v. Barber · 2001 4 citations

+ 4 more citations in this opinion.

Gomon v. Northland Family Physicians, Ltd. · 2001 7 citations

+ 7 more citations in this opinion.

Morton v. Dyste · 2000 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Doyle v. Kuch · 2000 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Henderson v. Allina Health System · 2000 5 citations

+ 5 more citations in this opinion.

Brett v. Watts · 1999 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Wallin v. Minnesota Department of Corrections · 1999 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Bertram v. Poole · 1999 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Paulos v. Johnson · 1999 3 citations

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

Cole v. Star Tribune · 1998 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Manteuffel v. City of North St. Paul · 1997 9 citations

+ 9 more citations in this opinion.

D.A.B. v. Brown · 1997 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Femrite v. Abbott Northwestern Hospital · 1997 8 citations

+ 8 more citations in this opinion.

Bigay v. Garvey · 1997 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Scheffler v. Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis · 1997 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Berres v. Anderson · 1997 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Maloney v. Dakota County Receiving Center, Inc. · 1997 5 citations

+ 5 more citations in this opinion.

Zagaros v. Erickson · 1997 4 citations

+ 4 more citations in this opinion.

Rothmeier v. Investment Advisers, Inc. · 1996 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Sarafolean v. Kauffman · 1996 1 citation

The abuse alleged by appellant took place between 1974 and 1979. Any intentional tort claims arising from such abuse first became time-barred on March 2, 1983, one year after appellant reached age 18. See Minn. Stat. §§ 541.07(1) (1982) (two-year statute of limitation for battery and other torts), 541.15(1) (1982) (limitations period extended until one year after reaching age 18). In May 1989, the legislature changed the statute of limitations for sexual abuse actions, enacting the “delayed discovery” rule:

Bliss v. Stevens · 1996 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Larson v. New Richland Care Center · 1995 8 citations

+ 8 more citations in this opinion.

Winkler v. Magnuson · 1995 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Humphrey v. $1109 in United States Currency · 1995 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Lab v. Pn · 1995 2 citations

OPINION HARVEY A. HOLTAN, Judge. Appellant L.A.B. commenced a medical malpractice action against her former psychiatrist P.N. and her former psychiatric care clinic, respondent H.C. The clinic moved for summary judgment by reason of expiration of the two-year statute of limitations. See Minn. Stat. § 541.07(1). L.A.B. contended that her disability of insanity suspended running of the statutory limitation period. See Minn. Stat. § 541.15(a)(2). The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the clinic, and L.A.B. appealed. We affirm.

L.A.B. v. P.N. · 1995 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

M.L. v. Magnuson · 1995 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Estate of Riedel Ex Rel. Mirick v. Life Care Retirement Communities, Inc. · 1993 3 citations

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

Fabio v. Bellomo · 1992 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Snesrud v. Instant Web, Inc. · 1992 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State, Department of Public Safety v. $6,276 in United States Currency · 1991 3 citations

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

Rademacher v. Tountas · 1991 6 citations

+ 6 more citations in this opinion.

Johnson v. Husebye · 1991 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Sherek v. Independent School District No. 699 · 1990 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

McGovern v. Cargill, Inc. · 1990 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Willette v. the Mayo Foundation · 1990 7 citations

Mayo brought a motion to dismiss, asserting that under the “termination of treatment rule” the two-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims began to run in 1983 and had expired. See Minn. Stat. § 541.07(1) (Supp.1989). Respondents argued the termination of treatment rule is unconstitutional and asked the court to adopt a “discovery rule” under which the two-year statute of limitations would begin to run when Patrick discovered he had cancer in 1987. The trial court denied Mayo’s motion to dismiss, concluding that application of the judicially created termination of treatment rule would be a complete bar to respondents’ common-law claim in violation of Article I, § 8 of the Minnesota Constitution. This court granted Mayo’s petition for discretionary review pursuant to Minn.R.Civ.App.P. 105.01.

+ 4 more citations in this opinion.

Radloff v. First American National Bank of St. Cloud, N.A. · 1990 7 citations

+ 7 more citations in this opinion.

K.E. v. Hoffman · 1990 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Larson v. State · 1990 3 citations

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

Francis v. Hansing · 1989 4 citations

+ 4 more citations in this opinion.

McGaa v. Glumack · 1989 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Berg v. Groschen · 1989 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Sigurdson v. Isanti County · 1989 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

St. Aubin v. Burke · 1989 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Chizmadia v. Smiley's Point Clinic · 1988 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Stowman v. Carlson Companies, Inc. · 1988 2 citations

2. Did the trial court err in concluding that Stowman’s claims were barred by the two-year statute of limitations in Minn. Stat. § 541.07(5)?

Rap v. Bjp · 1988 4 citations

+ 4 more citations in this opinion.

R.A.P. v. B.J.P. · 1988 4 citations

+ 4 more citations in this opinion.

LaVan Ex Rel. LaVan v. Community Clinic of Wabasha · 1988 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Kletschka v. Abbott-Northwestern Hospital, Inc. · 1988 2 citations

Respondent argues this claim is barred by the two-year statute of limitations set forth in Minn. Stat. § 541.07(5) (1980). In Portlance v. Golden Valley State Bank, 405 N.W.2d 240 (Minn.1987), the Minnesota Supreme Court held:

Tackleson v. Abbott-Northwestern Hospital, Inc. · 1987 8 citations

+ 8 more citations in this opinion.