OPINION WAHL, Justice. We granted the petition of Quality Fish, a New York corporation, to review a split decision of the court of appeals, the majority of the panel having affirmed the trial court's denial of Quality's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdictions. Bellboy Seafood Corp. v. Kent Trading Corp., 473 N.W.2d 384 (Minn.Ct.App.1991). We reverse. The only issue before this court is whether the contacts between Quality Fish and the State of Minnesota are sufficient to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction over this nonresident defendant. We conclude that they are not. The record demonstrates here but a single sales transaction between a Minnesota seller, Bellboy Seafood Corporation, and the New York purchaser, Quality a transaction negotiated in the first instance by a Florida broker, Kent Trading Corporation. Quality conducts no business activities in this state; it does no advertising or distribution of its product here; it maintains no office and has neither employees nor agents in this state. The trial court and majority of the court of appeals' panel, while recognizing that the quantity of contacts between this state and Quality were not considerable, nevertheless concluded that an "apparent fraudulent inducement of the transaction," id. at 387, is sufficient to support an exercise of personal jurisdiction. Citing Marquette Nat'l Bank v. Norris, 270 N.W.2d 290 (Minn.1978). It is our view that, even assuming the allegation of fraud contained in Bellboy's complaint, the Marquette analysis is both factually and qualitatively distinguishable from the event which gave rise to this action. Instead, in application of the test enunciated in Aftanase v. Economy Baler Co., 343 F.2d 187 (8th Cir.1965), as adopted *797 by this court in Hardrives, Inc. v. City of LaCrosse, 307 Minn. 290, 240 N.W.2d 814 (1976), the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over this nonresident defendant. See also Leoni v. Wells, 264 N.W.2d 646 (Minn.1978); Marshall Egg Transport Co. v. Bender-Goodman Co., 275 Minn. 534, 148 N.W.2d 161 (1967). Reversed. YETKA, Justice (dissenting). I respectfully dissent. The majority opinion mistakenly asserts that it would be unfair to sue appellant, Quality Fish, in Minnesota because it maintains no physical presence here. This assertion is conspicuously contrary to our own and the United States Supreme Court's in personam jurisdiction precedents. Moreover, the majority offhandedly dismisses the lower courts' decisions without any discussion of or regard for the test the majority allegedly applied to conclude that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over the nonresident appellant in this case. In my opinion, application of our precedents to the facts of this case compels the conclusion that the trial court has personal jurisdiction over the nonresident appellant, Quality Fish. The trial court specifically found the following facts for purposes of determining whether Bellboy had made a prima facie showing of Quality Fish's Minnesota-related activities through the complaint and supporting affidavits: 1. Kent Trading Corp. is a broker of food products located in Florida. 2. Quality Fish is a wholesaler/distributor of fish products located in New York. 3. Kent Trading was acting as a broker/agent on behalf of and at the direction of Quality Fish. 4. Quality Fish, through Kent Trading, initiated the transaction and solicited goods from Bellboy. 5. Written confirmation of the order was sent directly to Quality Fish stating the contract terms. 6. Quality Fish never objected to the contract. 7. The contract provided that Minnesota law would govern the transaction. 8. Quality Fish authorized release of its bank references to Bellboy. 9. At the direction of Kent Trading, the goods were shipped to North American Shellfish, an affiliate of Quality Fish. For purposes of a pretrial motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the factual allegations in the complaint and supporting affidavits are taken as true. Marquette Nat'l Bank v. Norris, 270 N.W.2d 290, 292 (Minn.1978). The plaintiff must make a prima facie showing that the defendant has sufficient contacts within the state so that requiring the defendant to litigate in the state does not violate traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Dent-Air, Inc. v. Beech Mountain Air Serv., Inc., 332 N.W.2d 904, 906-07 (Minn.1983) (citing International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945)). In my view, the plaintiff has satisfied its burden in this case. In order for a Minnesota court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, both statutory and constitutional requirements must be met. The requirements of Minn. Stat. § 543.19, subd. 1(b) (1990), Minnesota's "long-arm" statute, are met when a nonresident party "transacting business" within the state has sufficient contacts to justify its being haled into a foreign court without offending due process of law. In other words, the statute reaches only as far as constitutional limitations permit. Kopperud v. Agers, 312 N.W.2d 443, 445 (Minn.1981). In addition, "doubts should be resolved in favor of retention of jurisdiction." Hardrives, Inc. v. City of LaCrosse, Wisconsin, 307 Minn. 290, 296, 240 N.W.2d 814, 818 (1976). Here, Quality Fish's business contact in Minnesota satisfies the requirements of Minnesota's "long-arm" statute because it is constitutionally permissible to require Quality Fish to defend itself in Minnesota. For a court's exercise of personal jurisdiction to be constitutional, it is "essential in each case that there be some act by *798 which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protection of its laws." Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 1240, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958). In contract cases, this means that the contract has a substantial connection with the state and that the nonresident must reasonably be able to anticipate being haled into the state's court. Dent-Air, Inc., 332 N.W.2d at 907. Finally, this court has adopted and reaffirmed in numerous cases a five-factor test for analyzing whether an exercise of personal jurisdiction is constitutional. That test requires consideration of (1) the quantity of the contacts, (2) the nature and quality of the contacts, (3) the source and connection of those contacts to the cause of action, (4) the interest of the forum state, and (5) the convenience of the parties. Real Properties, Inc. v. Mission Ins. Co., 427 N.W.2d 665, 668 n. 1 (Minn.1988). The first three factors are the primary factors with the last two deserving lesser consideration. Dent-Air, 332 N.W.2d at 907. The court of appeals held that a trial court may constitutionally exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant who fraudulently enters a contract with a Minnesota resident. The appeals court held that the "fraudulent inducement of the transaction" was dispositive in determining the sufficiency of Quality Fish's contacts in the state. I agree with the majority that the appeals court need not have announced a rule encompassing a "fraudulent inducement" theory. An inquiry into the merits of the allegations should not determine the jurisdictional question presented in this case. However, I cannot agree with the majority's outright reversal of the decisions below because I believe a finding of in personam jurisdiction is required under the minimum contacts/purposeful availment test, as the trial court held. The quantity of Quality Fish's contacts in Minnesota is not great. Nevertheless, both this court and the United States Supreme Court have held that "even one single, isolated transaction between a nonresident defendant and a resident plaintiff can be a sufficient contact to justify exercising personal jurisdiction under due process standards." Marquette Nat'l Bank, 270 N.W.2d at 295 (citing cases where jurisdiction grounded in a single transaction). Accordingly, "[w]here jurisdiction is thus based on a single transaction contact, the nature and quality of the contact becomes dispositive." Id. (emphasis in original). In Marquette, we held that a crucial factor justifying the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident is whether that defendant has "purposefully solicited contacts with a Minnesota resident or [has] initiated or induced the transaction out of which the cause of action arises * * *." 270 N.W.2d at 296. If the defendant has actively induced a Minnesota resident to enter a transaction to its detriment, the court may exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant under the "purposeful availment of privileges" test in Hanson v. Denckla. Id. at 297. Of course, the third primary factor, the source and connection of the contact to the cause of action, must also weigh in favor of jurisdiction. Here, taking the allegations contained in Bellboy's pleadings as true, as we must at the pretrial stage, I am constrained to conclude that Quality Fish not only solicited contact with Bellboy through its agent, Kent Trading, but also that it actively induced Bellboy to enter into a transaction to its detriment. In my view, this active solicitation is dispositive of the question presented in this case. The court of appeals' analysis is compelling: Appellant's agent, Kent Trading, negotiated a contract between Bellboy and Quality in which Bellboy agreed to deliver fish to Quality. Before Bellboy agreed to ship the fish on credit, it requested credit references from Quality. Quality's president directed its bank to release credit information to Bellboy. Based on the information, Bellboy extended credit and shipped the fish to the address provided by Quality. * * * Although Bellboy sent a confirmation of *799 the order to Quality at its home office in Port Washington, New York, Quality never notified Bellboy that the order was erroneously placed or was not the responsibility of Quality. Only after the fish were delivered to the warehouse in New York and Bellboy sought payment from Quality, did Quality object and deny responsibility for the order. Bellboy Seafood Corp. v. Kent Trading Corp., 473 N.W.2d 384, 387 (Minn.App. 1991). This contact, which is the source of the cause of action here, meets the "purposeful availment" test without resorting to substantive allegations of fraud or breach of contract. Moreover, in determining whether the due process clause is offended by dragging a defendant into a foreign forum, we have required that potential defendants be allowed to "`structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit.'" Real Properties, 427 N.W.2d at 667-68 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 2182, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985)). Under this approach, which also incorporates the five factors noted above, the test is whether the defendant had "fair warning" that it might be sued in the forum state: "[T]he defendant is deemed to have `fair warning' if it has `purposefully directed' its activities at residents of the forum, and if the plaintiff's alleged injuries `arise out of or relate to' those activities." Real Properties, Inc., 427 N.W.2d at 668 (citations omitted). Finally, a contact is not sufficient if it is "fortuitous," "random," or "attenuated." Id. In this case, the defendant had fair warning that it might be sued in this state. Through its agent, Quality Fish "purposefully directed" its activities at a Minnesota resident. Under no circumstances can Quality Fish's contact with Bellboy be considered "fortuitous," "random," or "attenuated." Quality Fish initiated the contact, provided credit references, and did not object to a confirmation of the order Bellboy sent. Quality Fish could not have acted more "purposefully." Finally, it is undisputed that Bellboy's cause of action arises out of and relates to Quality's activities. Accordingly, I would affirm the decisions of the courts below. In my opinion, reversal is not appropriate here because a straightforward minimum contacts/purposeful availment test supports the conclusion that Minnesota courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant in this case.

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Rykoff-Sexton, Inc. v. American Appraisal Associates, Inc. · 1991 2 citations

Rykoff-Sexton, Inc. (Rykoff) appeals from the court of appeals’ order dismissing its complaint based on the absence of personal jurisdiction. The court of appeals held that because the state long arm statute, Minn. Stat. § 543.19, subd. 3 (1990), which authorizes the exercise of jurisdiction only when the cause of action arises out of forum contacts, was not satisfied, personal jurisdiction over respondent American Appraisal Associates, Inc. (American Appraisal), a foreign corporation licensed to do business in Minnesota, was improper. We reverse.

Larson v. Dunn · 1990 4 citations

II. The Rigenhagens lived in Minnesota in 1980 when the alleged tort occurred, but have been living in California since 1982. We believe the trial court and the appellate court correctly denied their motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. *43 Personal jurisdiction is properly exercised if the nonresident's contacts satisfy our long-arm statute and constitutional concerns. Sherburne County Social Servs. v. Kennedy, 426 N.W.2d 866, 867 (Minn.1988). Larson bears the burden of proving sufficient forum contacts exist when jurisdiction is challenged. Hardrives, Inc. v. City of LaCrosse, 307 Minn. 290, 293, 240 N.W.2d 814, 816 (1976). Under Minnesota's long-arm statute, Minn. Stat. § 543.19, subd. 1 (1988), personal jurisdiction may be exercised over a nonresident who: (a) Owns, uses, or possesses any real or personal property situated in this state, or * * * * * * (c) Commits any act in Minnesota causing injury or property damage, or (d) Commits any act outside Minnesota causing injury or property damage in Minnesota, subject to the following exceptions when no jurisdiction shall be found: (1) Minnesota has no substantial interest in providing a forum; or (2) the burden placed on the defendant by being brought under the state's jurisdiction would violate fairness and substantial justice; or (3) the cause of action lies in defamation or privacy. Larson alleges that while still in Minnesota, the Rigenhagens aided in the abduction and concealment of Jessica. The Rigenhagens allege that their daughter asserts she acted alone. Larson's allegations, however, must be viewed as true for purposes of determining whether he has made a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction. Hunt v. Nevada State Bank, 285 Minn. 77, 82, 172 N.W.2d 292, 296-97 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1010, 90 S.Ct. 1239, 25 L.Ed.2d 423 (1970). Thus, personal jurisdiction may be properly asserted over the Rigenhagens since the alleged cause of action arose in Minnesota. The Rigenhagens contend this basis for long-arm jurisdiction is improper because the statute of limitations has run on any acts committed while they were Minnesota residents. The Larson panel found this argument meritless, noting "[a]lthough some interplay exists between these two legal doctrines * * *, whether a claim is time barred is an issue separate from the issue of personal jurisdiction." 449 N.W.2d at 759. We agree. Further, because "fraudulent concealment of th[e] cause of action will prevent the running of the statute of limitations," Kopperud v. Agers, 312 N.W.2d 443, 446 (Minn.1981); see also Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(6) (1988) (fraud action does not accrue until discovered), the statute of limitations had not run when suit was filed January 4, 1989. See Minn. Stat. § 541.07(1) (1988) (two year limitation period). Personal jurisdiction also is proper since the Rigenhagens' allegedly tortious conduct continued after they moved to California. See Minn. Stat. § 543.19, subd. 1(d) (out-state act causing in-state injury). The United States Supreme Court held that personal jurisdiction properly could be exercised over nonresident media when the effects of their intentional conduct were felt in the forum state. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 787 n. 6 & 790, 104 S.Ct. 1482, 1485 n. 6 & 1487, 79 L.Ed.2d 804 (1984) (construing California's long-arm statute). The Rigenhagens' alleged acts were at least indirectly aimed at depriving Larson of his custody rights and the effects of these acts clearly harmed Larson in Minnesota. Due process requires the nonresident defendant "have certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend `traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945) (citation omitted). In analyzing these constitutional parameters, we examine five factors: (1) the quantity of contacts with the state, (2) the nature and quality of those contacts, (3) the connection or relationship between the contacts and the cause of action, (4) the state's interest in providing a forum, and *44 (5) the relative convenience of the parties. Factors (4) and (5) are considered secondary. Kennedy, 426 N.W.2d at 868 (citation omitted). Under this analysis, the nonresident's contacts must be "such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." Kennedy, 426 N.W.2d at 870 (citation omitted); see also Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 1239, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958) (purposeful availment); West Am. Ins. Co. v. Westin, Inc., 337 N.W.2d 676, 679 (Minn.1983). In a similar context, personal jurisdiction was challenged in an action by a father against his nonresident former in-laws for allegedly conspiring to intentionally deprive him of custody. Stangel v. Rucker, 398 N.W.2d 602, 604 (Minn.App.1986), pet. for rev. denied (Minn., March 13 & 25, 1987; June 29, 1988). The panel there held the following forum contacts by the nonresidents were insufficient: paying legal fees to a Minnesota firm in connection with the dissolution proceeding; providing care for the minor child after they knew he had been abducted; and lying about the child's whereabouts in a phone conversation initiated by the father. Id. at 605-06. The forum contacts here, however, present a stronger case for finding personal jurisdiction. The Rigenhagens allegedly denied Larson access to Jessica in 1980 and aided in Jessica's abduction and concealment during the two years they remained Minnesota residents. Franklin Rigenhagen maintained a post office box in Minnesota after moving to California, by which he offered to act as a "go between" for Larson and his daughter. These direct contacts actually gave rise to the cause of action and are such that the Rigenhagens reasonably could have expected to be haled into court here. Further, the Rigenhagens owned real property in Minnesota until March 1985, when they conveyed it into a trust and they apparently remain trustees of this property. They also owned and operated a car dealership in Minnesota until 1984. Although these property contacts are unrelated, they indicate the Rigenhagen's purposeful availment of Minnesota privileges. Minnesota has an interest in providing a forum for this dispute. The subject custody order was issued by a Minnesota court, over which Minnesota retains continuing jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA). Minn. Stat. § 518A.03, subd. 1(a)(2) (1988). Minnesota also is interested in protecting the custodial rights of its citizens. See Minn. Stat. §§ 518A.01, subd. 1(b) & 518A.02(e) (1988) (UCCJA provisions designed to deter abductions and preventing forum shopping). The parties are residents of Minnesota, California and Washington, and these states likely will be the site of witnesses and evidence. While Minnesota may not be the only appropriate forum, we hold the Rigenhagens had sufficient minimum contacts with this state such that our exercise of personal jurisdiction over them does not offend constitutional due process nor statutory requirements.

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

In Re the Marriage of Schmidt · 1989 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Sherburne County Social Sevices Ex Rel. Pouliot v. Kennedy · 1988 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Erickson v. Coast Catamaran Corp. · 1987 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Schermerhorn v. Hoiland · 1983 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Dent-Air, Inc. v. Beech Mountain Air Service, Inc. · 1983 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Duresky v. Hanson · 1983 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Stonewall Insurance Co. v. Horak · 1982 2 citations

Since defendant Horak did an act in Minnesota causing injury or property damage in Minnesota, our long arm statute, Minn. Stat. § 543.19 (1980), comes into play 1 and provides that a Minnesota court may exercise personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant Horak “in the same manner as if * * * he were a resident of this state.”

Vikse v. Flaby · 1982 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Kopperud v. Agers · 1981 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Schanno Transportation, Inc. v. Smith · 1981 7 citations [Dissent]

+ 7 more citations in this opinion.

McBride v. Bitner · 1981 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Bjordahl v. Bjordahl · 1981 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Ulmer v. O'MALLEY · 1981 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Minnesota Court of Appeals

Michael P. Schaefer v. Archdiocese of St. Paul and Minneapolis, Roman Catholic Diocese of Orange Revocable Trust · 2016 1 citation

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Patterson Dental Supply, Inc. v. Theodore Vlamis · 2016 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

In re the Marriage of: Maria Suljic v. Ibrahim Suljic · 2016 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Newman-Lakka Cancer Foundation v. Christine E. Briggs · 2016 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Ann Dorothy Ruch v. Robbert P. Osterholt · 2015 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Keith Melillo v. Terry Arden Heitland · 2015 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Scott Rilley v. MoneyMutual, LLC · 2015 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Volkman v. Hanover Investments, Inc. · 2014 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Curtis v. Altria Group, Inc. · 2010 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

JL Schwieters Construction, Inc. v. Goldridge Construction, Inc. · 2010 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc. v. FLS Transportation, Inc. · 2009 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Christian v. Birch · 2009 6 citations

+ 6 more citations in this opinion.

Mercer v. Andersen · 2006 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Juelich v. Yamazaki Mazak Optonics Corp. · 2003 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Co. · 2002 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Friday · 2000 4 citations

+ 4 more citations in this opinion.

Marshall v. Inn on Madeline Island · 2000 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Viking Engineering & Development, Inc. v. R.S.B. Enterprises, Inc. · 2000 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Davis v. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co. · 1999 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Giles v. Gageby · 1998 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Hughs on Behalf of Praul v. Cole · 1997 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

STATE BY HUMPHREY v. Granite Gate Resorts · 1997 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Cefis v. Cefis · 1996 3 citations

II. Did the trial court properly exercise personal jurisdiction over Cefis pursuant to Minnesota’s long-arm statute, Minn. Stat. § 543.19 (1994)?

Behm v. John Nuveen & Co., Inc. · 1996 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

In Re Minnesota Asbestos Litigation · 1996 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Jensen v. RLK & CO. · 1995 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Jenson v. R.L.K. & Co. · 1995 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

VH v. Estate of Birnbaum · 1995 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Welsh v. Takekawa Iron Works Co., Ltd. · 1995 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

TRWL Financial Establishment v. Select International, Inc. · 1995 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Bergherr v. Sommer · 1994 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

H.A.W. v. Manuel · 1994 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Domtar, Inc. v. Niagara Fire Insurance Co. · 1994 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Wicken v. Morris · 1994 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Doe 1-22 v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Fall River · 1993 1 citation

Personal jurisdiction may not be exercised over a nonresident unless minimum contacts satisfying due process exist between the nonresident and Minnesota. Valspar, 495 N.W.2d at 411 (citing International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945)). A nonresident must “purposefully [avail] itself of the privileges of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protection of its laws.” Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 1239, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958), quoted in Dent-Air, 332 N.W.2d at 907. The defendant must be in a position to “reasonably anticipate being haled into court” in the forum state. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297, 100 S.Ct. 559, 567, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980), cited in Dent-Air, 332 N.W.2d at 907. Minn. Stat. § 543.19 (1992), the long-arm statute, is applied to extend jurisdiction as extensively as that allowed under the federal law. Valspar, 495 N.W.2d at 411.

Trident Enterprises International, Inc. v. Kemp & George, Inc. · 1993 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Coons v. St. Paul Companies · 1992 1 citation

The trial court and respondent urge us to treat personal service and mail service interchangeably. However, they are distinct methods of service with distinct requirements. For that reason, we find Stonewall inapplicable to the present case. Stonewall involved personal service of an out-of-state defendant pursuant to Minn.R.Civ.P. 4.03(a) and Minn. Stat. § 543.19 (1980). Stonewall, 325 N.W.2d at 136. In addition, when Minn.R.Civ.P. 4.05 was enacted, the commentary specifically stated, “This rule does not modify the holding in Stonewall.” Minn.R.Civ.P. 4.05 advisory committee note (1985). Stonewall considerations are thus distinct from those raised in cases involving service by mail. Further, the plaintiff in Stonewall had no alternative means to *776 serve the defendant, a serviceman stationed in Germany. Stonewall, 325 N.W.2d at 135. Here, respondent had alternate means and did eventually serve appellant personally.

Amdahl v. Stonewall Insurance Co. · 1992 1 citation

Minnesota’s long-arm statute provides for personal jurisdiction over foreign corporations transacting business within Minnesota. Minn. Stat. § 543.19, subd. 1(b) (1990). Although the trial court did not rule on whether Alabama or Minnesota law applied, historically the proper method for service of process on a foreign corporation has been determined by the law of the forum. Bloom v. American Express Co., 222 Minn. 249, 257, 23 N.W.2d 570, 575 (1946). Because Alabama’s requirements for personal service on a corporation are less stringent than Minnesota’s requirements, if service is effective under Minnesota law, a choice of law analysis is unnecessary. See Ala.R.Civ.P. 4(c)(6) (allowing service on any agent of the corporation).

Miller v. A.N. Webber, Inc. · 1992 2 citations

Where a conflict of law question has not been raised, Minnesota law will govern. Minn. Stat. § 599.07 (1990). Minnesota law provides for personal jurisdiction over a nonresident who “[cjommits any act in Minnesota causing injury or property damage.” Minn. Stat. § 543.19, subd. 1(c) (1982). Minn. Stat. § 543.19, subd. 2 (1988), provides that:

Blaeser and Johnson, PA v. Kjellberg · 1992 3 citations

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

Zoltak v. Walgreen Co. · 1992 16 citations

+ 16 more citations in this opinion.

National City Bank of Minneapolis v. Ceresota Mill Ltd. Partnership · 1991 4 citations

+ 4 more citations in this opinion.

Kohn v. La Manufacture Francaise Des Pneumatiques Michelin · 1991 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Bellboy Seafood Corp. v. Kent Trading Corp. · 1991 4 citations

+ 4 more citations in this opinion.

Stanek v. A.P.I., Inc. · 1991 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.