In a claim for underinsured motorist benefits, the trial court applied the collateral source provision in Minn. Stat. § 548.36 (1994) to reduce the aggregate damage award before subtracting the amount associated with the claimant’s comparative fault, as determined in an earlier jury trial. The court of appeals affirmed, and we reverse.

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Folstad v. Eder · 1991 8 citations

+ 8 more citations in this opinion.

Imlay v. City of Lake Crystal · 1990 14 citations

+ 14 more citations in this opinion.

Keenan v. Hydra-Mac, Inc. · 1989 11 citations

+ 11 more citations in this opinion.

Johnson v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc. · 1988 3 citations

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

Minnesota Court of Appeals

Engfer v. General Dynamics Advanced Information System, Inc. · 2014 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Do v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co. · 2008 7 citations

This appeal arises out of a claim by appellant injured party against his automobile-insurance carrier for no-fault and underinsurance benefits. Appellant asserts that the district court erred in relying on the collateral-source rule to offset the amount recovered in his prior settlement with the tortfeasor’s liability insurer against a jury award of damages. Because the prior settlement is a collateral source under Minn. Stat. § 548.36 (2006) and was for general unspecified damages, the district court did not err in deducting it from the ultimate jury award in appellant’s action, and we affirm.

+ 4 more citations in this opinion.

Rush v. Jostock · 2006 8 citations

+ 8 more citations in this opinion.

Tezak v. Bachke · 2005 7 citations

+ 7 more citations in this opinion.

Kahnke v. Green · 2005 6 citations

The district court reduced appellant’s jury award pursuant to the collateral-source provisions of Minn. Stat. § 548.36 (2004). The district court included payments made to appellant by her healthcare insurer in its collateral-source reduction, based on its determination that the insurer did not properly assert its subro-gation rights. Because we conclude that the insurer’s subrogation rights were reasonably and timely asserted, we reverse and remand for recalculation of the award.

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

In Re Approval of Settlement & Distribution of Wrongful Death Proceeds for the Next of Kin of Markuson · 2004 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

American Family Insurance Group v. Kiess · 2004 4 citations

+ 4 more citations in this opinion.

Heine v. Simon · 2004 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Pemberton v. Theis · 2003 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Leamington Co. v. Nonprofits' Insurance Ass'n · 2003 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

VanLandschoot v. Walsh · 2003 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Lee v. Hunt · 2002 11 citations

+ 11 more citations in this opinion.

Braginsky v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. · 2001 3 citations

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

Illinois Farmers Insurance Co. v. Schmuckler · 1999 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Smith v. American States Insurance Co. · 1998 4 citations

+ 4 more citations in this opinion.

Schmuckler v. Creurer · 1998 3 citations

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

Suchy v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co. · 1998 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Wertish v. Salvhus · 1997 2 citations

1. Does the ten-day limit on filing a motion for determination of collateral sources, under Minn. Stat. § 548.36, apply to a motion for an offset of no-fault benefits, under Minn. Stat. § 65B.51, subd. 1?

Kroning v. State Farm Automobile Insurance Co. · 1996 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Koch v. Mork Clinic, P.A. · 1995 6 citations

+ 6 more citations in this opinion.

Katzner v. Kelleher Construction · 1995 1 citation

Minn. Stat. § 548.36, subds. 2, 3(a) (1992). The statute includes workers’ compensation benefits in its definition of collateral sources. Id., subd. 1(1). The statute is designed to prevent plaintiffs from enjoying a windfall recovery at the expense of defendants. Buck v. Schneider, 413 N.W.2d 569, 572 (Minn.App.1987).

Banks v. Grant · 1995 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Ray v. City of Maple Grove · 1994 4 citations

+ 4 more citations in this opinion.

Duluth Steam Cooperative Ass'n v. Ringsred · 1994 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Midway National Bank v. Estate of Bollmeier · 1993 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Rogers v. Ponti-Peterson Post 1720 Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States of America, Inc. · 1993 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Krutsch v. Walter H. Collin GmBh Verfahrenstechnik Und Maschinenfabric · 1993 4 citations

+ 4 more citations in this opinion.

Austin v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance · 1992 5 citations

+ 5 more citations in this opinion.

Gohman v. Stavrum · 1992 4 citations

+ 4 more citations in this opinion.

Kohn v. La Manufacture Francaise Des Pneumatiques Michelin · 1991 4 citations

+ 4 more citations in this opinion.

Casper v. City of Stacy · 1991 3 citations

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

Bruwelheide v. Garvey · 1991 9 citations

Appellant Dennis Bruwelheide challenges the trial court’s reduction of a jury award for his past wage loss by the amount of his paid sick leave as a collateral source under Minn. Stat. § 548.36 (1988). We reverse.

+ 6 more citations in this opinion.

Kersting v. Royal-Milbank Insurance · 1990 7 citations

Following issuance of the award, the Kerstings commenced an action pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 572.18 (1988) seeking trial court confirmation of the arbitrators’ award and post-award interest on that amount through the time of entry of judgment. Royal-Milbank brought a cross-motion opposing allowance of post-award interest and seeking confirmation of the award subject to reductions, including a collateral source reduction of $8,990 pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 548.36 (1988). The trial court denied both the reduction and the request for post-award interest.

+ 4 more citations in this opinion.

Erickson Ex Rel. Bunker v. American Honda Motor Co. · 1990 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Imlay v. City of Lake Crystal · 1989 6 citations

+ 6 more citations in this opinion.

Murphy v. Milbank Mutual Insurance Co. · 1989 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Jewett v. Deutsch · 1989 3 citations

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

Keenan v. Hydra-Mac, Inc. · 1988 3 citations

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

Pulkrabek v. Johnson · 1988 2 citations

FACTS On April 1, 1985, Pulkrabek was petting Johnson's labrador retriever when the dog suddenly bit his upper left lip. Pulkrabek was then a sixteen-year-old high school student, and he was visiting Johnson's son. Since Johnson admitted liability, trial was on damages only. Pulkrabek did not seek or introduce evidence of special damages, which he claims were $1,288, because of the collateral source statute. Minn. Stat. § 548.36 (1986). The following evidence was offered on the issue of general damages. After being bitten, Pulkrabek was taken to a hospital, where a plastic surgeon repaired his lip by administering local anesthesia and suturing the upper lip to the skin. Dr. Lamb, another plastic surgeon, testified the laceration went entirely through the lip, creating a horizontal, oval-shaped defect, approximately two and one half by two centimeters, where the upper *515 lip meets the skin. Pulkrabek described the missing piece as being the size of a quarter, and his father testified it was about the size of a thumbnail. The wound required local care over the next several months. It healed but left a "defect": a thinning of the lip and a scar. In October 1986, Dr. Lamb successfully performed a surgical revision of the defect to improve the lip's appearance. A lump on the inside of the upper lip was reduced and the outer lip realigned. Dr. Lamb performed follow-up treatments over the next nine months. He believes "the result was quite satisfactory but [Pulkrabek] still has a scar that is conspicuous or slightly conspicuous of the left upper lip." Dr. Lamb defined a conspicuous scar as one "that would be readily observed to casual observation at a conversational distance of about three feet." Dr. Lamb believed Pulkrabek would not have trouble with his lip's functioning if he doesn't require "special use" of it, but he may have a "little bit of numbness in the midline" of the lip. Pulkrabek testified his lip felt numb when it was bit and he did not start to feel pain until the novocaine wore off after the first treatment. He continued to have pain, swelling and difficulty eating and sleeping for two weeks after the bite. Pulkrabek had about the same amount of difficulties after the surgical revision. He can still feel a lump on the inside of his lip with his tongue. He does not feel pain or have difficulty eating now. During the school year after the bite, before the surgical revision, he felt "somewhat" self-conscious of the scar. His classmates and parents would stare at it, making him uncomfortable. Since the revision, Pulkrabek feels that when he meets strangers they focus on the scar, and that his parents do so as well. His father testified the scar bothers Pulkrabek and he often subconsciously puts his hand to his lip. His mother testified that he now smiles self-consciously. The jury awarded Pulkrabek $1000 in damages for past embarrassment, emotional distress, pain and disfigurement. It awarded him no future damages. Pulkrabek moved for additur or a new trial. The trial court denied the motion for new trial conditioned on Johnson's accepting additur of $4000 in past damages, which he did. The court explained its reasoning in a memorandum: Court agrees with counsel for the plaintiff that the jury verdict herein was conservative although the Court can understand the jury's reasoning that plaintiff had a good recovery and the remaining small scar on plaintiff's upper lip is not particularly disfiguring. One could speculate that had the plaintiff been a female, the jury perhaps would have been a bit more generous. The Court is in effect substituting its judgment for that of the jury by granting additur and given the lack of definitive guidelines to determine damages, admittedly the Court's values are the product of guesswork the same as the jury's. Judgment for $5000 was entered for Pulkrabek. He appeals from the judgment and seeks a new trial on damages. Johnson noticed review, seeking reversal of the additur and reinstatement of the verdict.