§ 559.21

Minnesota Statutes

Source: 2025 Minnesota Statutes. For the official text, see revisor.mn.gov.

Citing Cases (70)

Minnesota Supreme Court

Bank Midwest, Minnesota, Iowa, N.A. v. Lipetzky · 2004 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

In Re Butler · 1996 5 citations

+ 5 more citations in this opinion.

Shields v. Goldetsky · 1996 5 citations

+ 5 more citations in this opinion.

Trondson v. Janikula · 1990 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Rudnitski v. Seely · 1990 3 citations

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

First Trust Co., Inc. v. Leibman · 1989 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

MATTER OF DISCIPLINE OF McCOY · 1988 1 citation

422 N.W.2d 731 (1988) In the Matter of the Application for the DISCIPLINE OF Louis J. McCOY, an Attorney at Law of the State of Minnesota. No. C3-85-27. Supreme Court of Minnesota. May 6, 1988. *732 Kenneth L. Jorgenson, Asst. Director, William J. Wernz, Director, Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility Bd., St. Paul, for appellant. Louis J. McCoy, West St. Paul, for respondent. PER CURIAM. The Director of the Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board filed a petition for revocation of probation and further disciplinary action against respondent, Louis J. McCoy, an attorney licensed to practice law in this state since October 15, 1982. The petition alleges violation of the conditions of probation and further unprofessional conduct by misrepresentations and client neglect and by failure to cooperate with the disciplinary investigation. This matter first came before us in 1985 on a stipulation into which respondent and the Director had entered after respondent admitted that in 1984 he had failed to respond to client inquiries, failed to forward a client's funds promptly, and failed to reply to the Director's request for a response to clients' complaints. On October 18, 1985, we publicly reprimanded respondent and placed him on two years' probation. Among the conditions of respondent's probation were requirements that he abide by the rules of professional conduct, cooperate with any subsequent disciplinary investigation, and maintain office procedure designed to ensure prompt attention to client inquiries and legal matters. In re McCoy, 375 N.W.2d 471 (Minn.1985). On May 12, 1987, the Director filed the current petition for revocation of probation and further disciplinary action. Respondent concedes the truth of the five counts alleged in the petition. A hearing was held for the purpose of considering the imposition of appropriate discipline. We now adopt the referee's recommendation that respondent should be suspended indefinitely from the practice of law without right to apply for reinstatement until 18 months after the date of suspension. The May 12, 1987 petition for disciplinary action contained four counts of allegations concerning neglect of clients' matters accompanied by misrepresentations. The first count arose out of respondent's representation of a prison inmate in a marital dissolution proceeding. Respondent failed to keep an appointment with his client, and he failed to respond to inquiries made on the client's behalf. Respondent neither communicated a proposed stipulation to his client nor replied to opposing counsel. Subsequently, opposing counsel revoked an extension to answer the dissolution petition and placed the matter on the default calendar. Despite notice of the hearing, respondent did not appear. Neither did he tell his client about it, and when the client learned that a default decree of dissolution had issued, respondent falsely told the client that he had not received notice of the hearing. Respondent promised to reopen the proceedings but made no attempt to do so. Eventually the client engaged another attorney, who reopened the dissolution proceedings and secured for the client visitation rights with his minor children. Retained in 1984 to prosecute a dispute with his clients' employer and union over seniority rights, respondent falsely informed his clients that he had noticed a motion for summary judgment, then falsely told them it had been cancelled because of an emergency. Respondent's neglect and misrepresentations caused unnecessary hearings and inconvenienced opposing counsel as well as respondent's clients. The third count arose out of respondent's representation of the vendees in proceedings for cancellation of a contract for deed. In 1983 respondent obtained a temporary restraining order staying the proceedings; but several months later, on February 13, 1984, summary judgment was granted the vendor when respondent failed to submit a promised memorandum in opposition to the vendor's motion. On March 2nd the clients gave respondent a certified check in an amount sufficient to reinstate the contract. Respondent *733 tendered the check to the vendor on March 7 and two days later to vendor's counsel. Tender was refused on the ground that the time provided in Minn. Stat. § 559.21 had expired. Respondent did not tell his clients that the vendor had refused to accept payment. In May 1985, on respondent's advice, the clients requested respondent to institute bankruptcy proceedings and gave respondent money to pay the filing fee. Respondent did not file the bankruptcy petition until six months later. In the meantime the vendor had secured a judicial declaration that the contract for deed was terminated and initiated an unlawful detainer action. Although the bankruptcy proceedings stayed the unlawful detainer, the respondent failed to file objections and the bankruptcy court dismissed the adversary proceeding. The vendor brought a second unlawful detainer proceeding. After assuring the clients that the bankruptcy took care of the matter, respondent failed to appear at the unlawful detainer hearing, and in September the clients were evicted from their home without further notice. From September through December 1985 respondent repeatedly assured the clients that he would get them back into their home within 30 days. He prepared a letter notifying the landlord that the clients would vacate their apartment by January 1, 1986, and he falsely told the clients that he had arranged for a moving van to return them to their home on December 21st. The clients packed their belongings but the truck did not arrive. When the clients called respondent's office, they were informed that respondent was on vacation. Respondent had neither made moving arrangements nor taken any action to return the clients to the home from which they had been evicted. As a result of these events the clients lost approximately $23,000 equity in their home and a substantial portion of their household goods. The fourth matter of client neglect a failure in 1984 to perfect an appeal was also compounded by false representations to the client on at least two occasions that the appeal had been taken. These several incidents of neglect and misrepresentation constitute violations of the rules of professional conduct. Those incidents which took place prior to July 1, 1985 variously violated DR 1-102(A)(4), (5), and (6); DR 6-101(A)(3); DR 7-101(A)(2) and (3); DR 7-106(A), MCPR. The incidents which occurred on or after July 1, 1985 involved violations of Rules 1.3, 1.4, 4.1, 4.4, and 8.4., MRPC. Of course, those incidents which took place after October 18, 1985 also violated the terms of respondent's probation. The petition contained a fifth count alleging non-cooperation with the Director's investigation of one complaint of client neglect. Respondent's failure to respond to three written requests for information regarding the complaint violated Rule 8.1(a)(3), MRPC, and Rule 25, RLPR (non-cooperation with director), and the terms of respondent's probation. From these undisputed facts, it is apparent that respondent's neglect and misrepresentations have injured his clients. Respondent's only excuse is overwork. While it may well be that this young lawyer was assigned more work than he could handle effectively an unfortunate but not unique circumstance overwork does not excuse, or even explain, the repeated disregard of the duties owed his clients and also of the duties owed this court and the officials charged with enforcing the rules of professional responsibility. The purpose of disciplinary proceedings is not punishment of the respondent, but protection of the public from future harm. In re Jensen, 418 N.W.2d 721 (Minn.1988); In re Franke, 345 N.W.2d 224, 228 (Minn. 1984). Respondent informs us that he is no longer associated with a law firm and that as a sole practitioner he can control the amount of legal business he takes on and can refer to other lawyers those matters in which he lacks experience, and on that ground requests continued probation rather than suspension. It is apparent, however, that probation has been an ineffective rehabilitation measure in this case. Although the neglect and misrepresentations cited in the 1987 petition began before respondent *734 was placed on probation, the pattern of misconduct continued unabated throughout the period of probation and other misrepresentations frustrated attempts to monitor compliance with the terms of probation. We have carefully reviewed the nature of the misconduct and considered the cumulative weight of the violations of disciplinary rules and of the terms of probation, the harm to the public, and the harm to the legal profession, In re Rockne, 375 N.W.2d 28, 30 (Minn.1985), and we conclude that we have no choice except to order suspension. It is, therefore, the judgment of this court: 1. Respondent is indefinitely suspended from the practice of law, effective immediately, and 2. Respondent may not petition for reinstatement pursuant to Rule 18, Minn. R. Lawyers Prof.Resp., until at least 18 months have elapsed from the date of filing of this opinion. IT IS SO ORDERED. *735

In re the Discipline of McCoy · 1988 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Doerr v. Clayson · 1985 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Hilltop Development v. Miller Hill Manor Co. · 1984 1 citation

*348 When Hilltop exercised this option according to its terms, an executory contract of sale arose between the parties. See City of Shakopee, 295 N.W.2d at 497; Shaughnessy, 222 Minn. at 146, 23 N.W.2d at 366. If Miller Hill then felt that Hilltop was in default, it was required to comply with the statutory procedures governing the cancellation of such contracts. Minn. Stat. § 559.21, subd. 2 (1982), provides that “[wjhen default is made in the conditions of any contract for the conveyance of real estate or any interest therein executed, on or after May 1,1980,” the seller must serve notice of default upon the buyer. The seller must inform the buyer that the contract will terminate 30 days after notice if, as here, the buyer has paid less than 10% of the purchase price. Because Miller Hill admittedly failed to comply with these procedures, the parties remain bound by an executory contract of sale, and Miller Hill is presently in default of its obligation to sell. We therefore reverse the district court and remand this case for an order directing the parties to conclude this transaction in accordance with the terms of the option agreement dated January 12, 1980.

Karim v. Werner · 1983 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Conley v. Downing · 1982 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Romain v. Pebble Creek Partners · 1981 6 citations

+ 6 more citations in this opinion.

Aune v. Bona · 1981 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Minnesota Court of Appeals

First & First, LLC, a Minnesota limited liability company v. Chadco of Duluth, LLC, a Minnesota ... · 2023 6 citations

+ 6 more citations in this opinion.

Hammes West, LLC v. Dorothy Lyons · 2016 3 citations

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

Ronald D. Van Riper v. Bonnie L. Roy · 2016 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Micke-Pokel Farms TRF v. Viona Rieden · 2014 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Dimke v. Farr · 2011 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

NC Properties, LLC v. Lind · 2011 4 citations

+ 4 more citations in this opinion.

Glenwood Investment Properties, L.L.C. v. Carroll A. Britton Family Trust · 2009 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Sitek v. Striker · 2009 3 citations

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

Brickner v. ONE LAND DEVELOPMENT COMPANY · 2007 11 citations

+ 11 more citations in this opinion.

Fraser v. Fraser · 2005 4 citations

+ 4 more citations in this opinion.

Loppe v. Steiner · 2005 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

TNT Properties, Ltd. v. Tri-Star Developers LLC · 2004 10 citations

+ 10 more citations in this opinion.

Edina Development Corporation v. Hurrle · 2003 10 citations

+ 10 more citations in this opinion.

Lambert v. Bongard · 2002 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Fraser v. Fraser · 2002 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Coddon v. Youngkrantz · 1997 4 citations

+ 4 more citations in this opinion.

American Family Mutual Insurance Co. v. Staeheli · 1994 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Summit House Co. v. Gershman · 1993 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Resolution Trust Corp. v. Kahn · 1993 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Boehm's Inc. v. Wachholz · 1993 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Jones v. Amoco Oil Co. · 1992 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Mehralian v. Riverview Tower Homeowners Ass'n · 1990 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Bly v. Bublitz · 1990 7 citations

+ 7 more citations in this opinion.

Harbal v. Federal Land Bank of St. Paul · 1989 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Rudnitski v. Seely · 1989 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Extraordinary Learning & Educational Complex/Minneapolis Communiversity, Inc. v. New Bethel Baptist Church · 1988 1 citation

OPINION FOLEY, Judge. This appeal is from a judgment in an unlawful detainer action ordering issuance of a writ of restitution in favor of respondent Extraordinary Learning and Educational Complex/Minneapolis Communiv-ersity, Inc. We affirm. FACTS On April 30, 1979, appellant New Bethel Baptist Church and respondent executed a contract for deed for the sale of property owned by respondent for the sum of $85,-000. The property involved was registered land. Among other provisions the contract required that it be “accompanied by an abstract evidencing good title in [respondent] at the date hereof.” Also the contract specified monthly payments of $681.50 through April 27, 1984, at which time a balloon payment of $49,080 was due. *186Appellant did not make the balloon payment but continued to make the specified monthly payments through July 1987. Appellant then discontinued all payments. On September 5,1987, respondent served a notice of cancellation of contract for deed on appellant. The balance due on that date was $39,938.63. Under Minn. Stat. § 559.21, subd. lc (1986) appellant then had 60 days to tender all amounts due. It is conceded this 60 day period expired on November 4, 1987. On November 4, 1987, appellant attempted to finalize a loan for the payment of the contract for deed. Appellant learned it would be necessary to determine the marketability of title in order to secure the loan. Several calls were made to respondent’s attorney in an attempt to discuss the matter. Appellant was unable to reach respondent’s attorney, but appellant did learn that the attorney’s office closed at 5 p.m. Prior to the time of expiration, appellant did not ask to examine title documents or request that respondent supply a warranty deed to the property. At approximately 5:15 p.m. on November 4, 1987, appellant attempted to deliver a letter and photocopies of two cashier’s checks to respondent’s attorney. As his office was closed, appellant gave these documents to a security guard in the building. On November 5, 1987, respondent’s attorney actually received the letter and photocopies of the checks. The letter from appellant’s attorney indicated that payment of these checks was conditioned upon examination of title. The photocopies of the checks showed that the checks were made payable to both respondent and appellant. Also on November 5, 1987, appellant filed the actual checks with the district court and obtained an ex parte , order restraining the cancellation of the contract. The district court dissolved the restraining order on November 10, 1987, when it determined that the statutory redemption period had run and that it lacked jurisdiction to restrain the contract cancellation. On November 6, 1987, respondent prepared a notice of non-payment and filed it with the Registrar of Titles. When appellant refused to vacate the premises, respondent filed a complaint in unlawful detainer. The trial court, sitting without a jury, found appellant had not properly tendered payment during the redemption period and ordered immediate issuance of a writ of restitution in favor of respondent. ISSUE Did the trial court err in finding appellant had failed to make proper tender within the redemption period? ANALYSIS Where a trial judge sits without a jury, the standard of review varies with the character of the evidence. In Re Trust Known As Great Northern Iron Ore Properties, 308 Minn. 221, 225-226, 243 N.W.2d 302, 305, cert. den. sub. nom., Arms v. Watson, 429 U.S. 1001, 97 S.Ct. 530, 50 L.Ed.2d 612 (1976). Where the evidence is partly oral and the balance written, and the written evidence does not render the credibility of the oral testimony extremely doubtful, the appellate court should defer to the trial court’s assessment of the evidence unless clearly erroneous. Bloomington Electric Co. v. Freeman’s, Inc., 394 N.W.2d 605, 607 (Minn.Ct.App.1986), pet. for rev. denied (Minn.Dec. 17, 1986) (citing Great Northern Iron Ore Properties, 308 Minn. at 225-226, 243 N.W. 2d at 305). Appellant argues the trial court erred in finding that proper tender of payment was not made within the redemption period. The trial court’s conclusion was not clearly erroneous where appellant’s November 4, 1987 letter contained a future conditional offer to pay, the checks were non-negotiable, and the tender was untimely- Appellant argues that it tendered payment in its letter of November 4, 1987. The letter stated in part: I am enclosing a copy of the certified checks in this particular matter and once we have had an opportunity to examine *187the title, we would tender this check to you. Tender conditioned upon delivery of a warranty deed and marketable title has been held proper to preclude cancellation of a contract for deed. Hjelm v. Bergman, 275 N.W.2d 568 (Minn.1978). Under the facts of Hjelm, the supreme court found these conditions were concurrent contractual obligations the vendor had to satisfy in order to receive final payment. Hjelm is distinguishable from the present case. In Hjelm, the buyer never received an abstract of title or any legal description of the property before the closing date. Later, the buyer requested that a warranty deed and abstract of title be furnished. In the present case, the contract provided that title be marketable on the date of the contract. Further, appellant was furnished an abstract for examination on the date the contract was entered into. We are cited to no evidence suggesting title was unmarketable either on the date the contract was entered into or during the life of the contract. In addition, the property in this case was registered and appellant could have checked the marketability of title with the Registrar of Titles during the time for redemption. Here, respondent is under no concurrent obligation to prove marketable title. Neither the statute nor the contract require this. In Bell v. Olson, 424 N.W.2d 829 (Minn.Ct.App.1988), performance was not tendered when the buyer’s offer to pay was conditioned on the vendor first providing an abstract. The language of the contract in Bell required the vendor to provide a warranty deed and abstract of title only upon full performance by the purchaser. Here, the letter of tender of November 4, 1987 is conditional on the purchaser examining title. A warranty deed was to be provided upon performance by the purchaser. Under Bell, appellant’s letter is not sufficient to tender performance. Furthermore, appellant did not tender negotiable and unconditional checks within the redemption period. In Hjelm, the buyer deposited a negotiable cashier’s check with the clerk of court within the redemption period.. In this case appellant left photocopies of cashier’s checks at the respondent’s office building after the office had closed. Appellant did not deposit with the court the original checks, still payable to both parties, until the day after the redemption period expired. Negotiability of the payment is a prerequisite to proper tender. Valletta v. Recksiedler, 355 N.W.2d 314 (Minn.Ct.App.1984). Appellant furnished respondent with non-negotiable photocopies of the checks. The checks also were non-negotiable because they were made payable to both respondent and appellant and were conditioned upon examination of the abstract. See id. at 318. Appellant’s improper tender of payment cannot be cured by filing the checks with the court after the expiration of the redemption period. The cancellation statute is absolute and at the end of the prescribed time all rights of the parties under the contract cease. Olson v. Northern Pacific Railroad Co., 126 Minn. 229, 232, 148 N.W. 67, 68-9 (1914); International Realty and Securities Corp. v. Vanderpoel, 127 Minn. 89, 92, 148 N.W. 895, 896 (1914). The redemption period is fixed by the legislature and should not be enlarged by the court. The purpose of the statute is to provide purchasers with notice and an opportunity to cure a default. Graceville State Bank v. Hofsckild, 166 Minn. 58, 62, 206 N.W. 948, 949 (1926). Appellant has had ample time to cure the default. There are no equities in this case to excuse the appellant’s improper tender in order to save the contract. DECISION AFFIRMED.

Extraordinary Learn. & Ed. v. BAPTIST CH. · 1988 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Covington v. Pritchett · 1988 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Bell v. Olson · 1988 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Hoffman v. Halter · 1988 8 citations

This is an appeal from an action initiated for injunctive relief following the termination of a contract for deed. Appellants Alfred and Donna Hoffman claim the con *749 tract could not be terminated following their failure to cure a default within the 60-day time limitation under Minn. Stat. § 559.21, subd. 2a (1986) because the notice of cancellation served upon them did not follow the proper statutory form. We affirm.

+ 5 more citations in this opinion.

O'MEARA v. Olson · 1987 10 citations

+ 10 more citations in this opinion.

Hollywood Dairy, Inc. v. Timmer · 1987 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Tran v. Estate of Ditzler · 1987 5 citations

+ 5 more citations in this opinion.

GILBERT BUILDERS v. COM. BANK OF DePERE · 1987 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Gilbert Builders, Inc. v. Community Bank of Depere · 1987 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Patterson v. Stover · 1987 2 citations

In mid-December respondent was contacted by an attorney appellants retained after entering into the purchase agreement. The attorney expressed concern about whether the earnest money check respondent had provided constituted adequate consideration for an enforceable purchase agreement, but said nothing about the consent of the lienholders. In January, appellants and their attorney told respondent that they were not willing to go forward with the sale. Appellants’ attorney testified that he cautioned appellants that in order to effectively cancel the purchase agreement they were required to give notice under Minn. Stat. § 559.21 (1978), but that appellants chose to walk away from the agreement and see what happened.

Kosbau v. Dress · 1987 6 citations

+ 6 more citations in this opinion.

Miller v. Anderson · 1986 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Fort Dodd Partnership v. Trooien · 1986 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Thomey v. Stewart · 1986 4 citations

+ 4 more citations in this opinion.

Brunsoman v. Lexington-Silverwood · 1986 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Gallager v. Nelson · 1986 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Cole v. Paulson · 1986 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Hommerding v. Peterson · 1985 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Johnson Building Co. v. River Bluff Development Co. · 1985 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Smith v. Spitzenberger · 1985 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Brown v. Muetzel · 1984 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

W.M., R.W., & T.R. Bowler v. TMG Partnership · 1984 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Haluptzok v. Peyton · 1984 3 citations

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

Valletta v. Recksiedler · 1984 3 citations

In May of 1982, the respondents (Reck-siedlers) cancelled a contract for deed assigned to the appellant (Valletta). In November of 1982, Valletta commenced an action seeking reinstatement of the contract. Both Recksiedlers and Valletta moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted Recksiedlers’ motion, denying reinstatement and ordering judgment for Recksiedlers for tenants’ security deposits held by Valletta. Valletta claims the trial court erred in concluding: (1) that notice of cancellation of the contract for deed complied with the statutory requirements of Minn. Stat. § 559.21 (1982); and (2) that equitable relief was inappropriate. We affirm.

D.J. Enterprises of Garrison, Inc. v. Blue Viking, Inc. · 1984 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

U.S. District Court, D. Minnesota

Culligan International Co. v. Culligan Water Conditioning of Carver County, Inc. · 1983 2 citations

. An analogous case is presented by the cancellation of a contract for deed. Under Minn. Stat. § 559.21, a party cancelling a contract for deed must state with particularity the amount due. The purpose of such a statutory notice procedure is to give vendees notice of the impending cancellation and a reasonable period of time in which to redeem their interest. Conley v. Downing, 321 N.W.2d 36 (Minn. 1982).

U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Bankr. D. Minnesota

Sullivan v. Welsh (In Re Lumbar) · 2011 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

In re Edina Development Corp. · 2007 8 citations

+ 8 more citations in this opinion.

In Re G-N Partners · 1985 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Kampf v. First National Bank of Minnetonka (In Re Henrickson) · 1981 8 citations

+ 8 more citations in this opinion.