OPINION AMDAHL, Chief Justice. This is an appeal from an order compelling the Arrowhead Regional Corrections Board (hereafter ARC) to arbitrate the discharge of its employee, Career Corrections Agent Carl Hammerberg. Following an incident which occurred on October 15, 1982, employee Hammerberg was served with a notice of intent to dismiss on grounds of misconduct. On October 25, AFSCME Local 66 filed a grievance objecting to Hammerberg's dismissal. The employer then informed the AFSCME representative that it was ARC's position that Hammerberg would have to choose between the Veteran's Preference Hearing to which he was entitled, and the grievance process but could not employ both procedures. By letter dated December 8, 1982, Hammerberg requested a Veteran's Preference Hearing. The St. Louis County Civil Service Commission, acting as a Veteran's Preference Board pursuant to a contractual agreement with the ARC, held the hearing on January 10, 1983. The Board upheld Hammerberg's dismissal, finding his misconduct *297 sufficient to justify termination of employment. AFSCME Council 96, "for Itself and on Behalf of its Member Employee Carl Hammerberg," moved the district court for an order compelling arbitration of the dismissal, for a determination that the ARC had engaged in an unfair labor practice by refusing to arbitrate, and for an order requiring that ARC abide by the labor contract as to arbitration. The district court denied the motion for an unfair labor practice determination, but granted the other orders. ARC appeals from those orders. Respondent has not cross-appealed from the unfair labor practice ruling. We are presented with the question of whether a veteran who is given notice of intent to terminate public employment has a right to both a Veteran's Preference Hearing and arbitration pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement. We conclude that a veteran has a statutory right to both procedures that is not precluded by the principles of collateral estoppel and res judicata.[1] Under Minn. Stat. § 197.46 (1982), "No person holding a position by appointment or employment in the several counties * * who is a veteran * * * shall be removed from such position or employment except for incompetency or misconduct shown after a hearing, upon due notice, upon stated charges, in writing." The Public Employment Labor Relations Act (PELRA) mandates that the collective bargaining agreement provide for compulsory binding arbitration to resolve disputes between public employers and their employees. Minn. Stat. § 179.70, subd. 1 (Supp.1983). The collective bargaining agreement between ARC and AFSCME Council 96 accordingly provides, under Article VI, for a series of grievance procedures culminating in an arbitration proceeding which decision "shall be final and binding upon the parties." ARC relies on dicta in General Drivers Local 346 v. Aitkin County Board, 320 N.W.2d 695 (Minn.1982), for its argument that it is not obligated to allow both a hearing under the Veteran's Preference Act and arbitration pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement under PELRA, Minn. Stat. §§ 179.61-179.76 (1982 & Supp. 1983). That court found that a deputy who was improperly terminated was entitled to the protection of both the collective bargaining agreement negotiated subject to PELRA and the Veteran's Preference Act. Since the particular collective bargaining agreement at issue largely incorporated the rights provided by the Veteran's Preference Act, the court found that no separate hearing need be held and the deputy could proceed to utilize the grievance mechanism. 320 N.W.2d at 701. Rather than supporting the ARC's position, General Drivers solidifies the right of veterans to employ both avenues of redress. This court did not say that two separate hearings could not be held nor did it consider whether arbitration need be granted when a Veteran's Preference Hearing has already been held. This language is in clear contrast to a second holding of the General Drivers case, that is, that another terminated deputy not covered by the Veteran's Preference Act could not proceed under both PELRA and the sheriff's civil service system, but had to elect one or the other. 320 N.W.2d at 702. Obviously, the same kind of mandatory election could have been declared to apply to veterans. There are several similarities between Veteran's Preference Hearings and arbitration. First, this court has held repeatedly that the "just cause" standard for which an employee can be discharged under PELRA and the "incompetency or misconduct" standard for discharge under the Veteran's Preference Act are equivalent. See Ekstedt v. Village of New Hope, 292 *298 Minn. 152, 193 N.W.2d 821 (Minn.1972).[2] Secondly, the Veteran's Preference Hearing Board has the same power to fashion alternative remedies (i.e., progressive discipline) as the arbitrator does. In Leininger v. City of Bloomington, 299 N.W.2d 723 (Minn.1980), the court held that neither the City of Bloomington's Home Rule Charter, nor anything in section 197.46 contemplate that the Veteran's Preference Hearing Board serve merely as a body that reviews findings and approves or disapproves recommendations, but that its function is also to decide for itself what penalty, if any, is justified. 299 N.W.2d at 729. Despite the equivalence of the two hearing procedures, when both are properly conducted, there are strong public policies which dictate allowing a veteran to elect both hearings. The legislature has clearly manifested its intent that veterans enjoy security in public employment, protected from "the ravages and insecurity of a political spoils system." Johnson v. Village of Cohasset, 263 Minn. 425, 435, 116 N.W.2d 692, 699 (1962). That the statute contains a penalty of a misdemeanor for wilful violation of the Veteran's Preference Act is further indication of this legislative support. Minn. Stat. § 197.46 (1982). This court has also expressed such support in General Drivers by holding that the Veteran's Preference Act, PELRA, and the optional sheriff's civil service system all take precedence over section 387.14, which gives sheriffs and county boards the power to appoint and remove deputies and other employees.[3] 320 N.W.2d at 700. There are practical as well as statutory and public policy reasons for allowing a veteran to employ both avenues of redress. The veteran who requests a preference hearing must either be suspended with pay or be allowed to continue in employment until after the hearing.[4] The arbitration process provides no such umbrella. Unions generally will not represent employees at the Veteran's Preference Hearing or on appeal.[5] The employee who loses at the preference hearing may not be able to afford counsel and so may wish to have union representation at the grievance hearings first. The employee who loses at the Veteran's Preference Hearing and thinks the board was not impartial may wish to test that thought on a neutral arbitrator prior to taking an appeal. The employee who again loses may conclude the employer has just cause for termination *299 and may drop the appeal. The goals of orderly, speedy, and inexpensive dispute resolution will thus be attained. ARC contends that dual hearings will violate the principles of collateral estoppel and res judicata. Hammerberg correctly points out that multiple recourse mechanisms are common in the administrative law context, especially in public sector labor matters. One author has characterized this as an "overabundance of forums in which rights may be asserted." Public Sector Grievance Procedures, Due Process, and the Duty of Fair Representation, 89 Harv.L.Rev. 752, 753 (1976) (citing H. Wellington & R. Winter, The Unions and the Cities, 158-59 (1970) for extreme examples of multiple administrative hearings over the same just cause dismissal issue). While we recognize the need to streamline dismissal procedures, we cannot do so in the face of statutorily granted rights. We have said that res judicata applies "in spirit at least" where an agency acts in a judicial or quasi judicial capacity. See Souden v. Hopkins Motor Sales, Inc., 289 Minn. 138, 146, 182 N.W.2d 668, 672 (1971), and McKee v. County of Ramsey, 310 Minn. 192, 194 n. 1, 245 N.W.2d 460, 462 n. 1 (1976). However, "[n]either collateral estoppel nor res judicata is rigidly applied. Both rules are qualified or rejected when their application would contravene an overriding public policy * * *." Tipler v. E.I. duPont deNemours and Co., 443 F.2d 125, 128 (6th Cir.1971). Furthermore, "[a]bsent a special consideration, a determination arising solely under one statute should not automatically be binding when a similar question arises under another statute." Id. at 128-29. We decline to apply res judicata to either veteran's preference hearing determinations or arbitration decisions on the question of "just cause" for termination of a public employee who is a veteran. Although we hold that the legislature has entitled veterans to have dismissal actions heard by both a Veteran's Preference Board and an arbitrator, we are mindful that problems may arise from such duplicative efforts. The Veteran's Preference Hearing and arbitration may produce conflicting results, as apparently happened when Hammerberg was terminated once before. We suggest that the following procedures may help to reduce the confusion which may arise. If possible, Veteran's Preference Hearings should take place prior to arbitration. When an appeal from the Veteran's Preference Hearing has been filed, the district court may wish to stay the appeal pending the outcome of arbitration.[6] Then the two proceedings could be consolidated under Rule 42.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.[7] A complication arises, whether the proceedings are consolidated or heard separately, from the fact that the standards of review differ between the review of a decision of the Veteran's Preference Board and an appeal from an arbitrator's award. In the former, the standard is whether the decision was arbitrary and capricious and without substantial support in the record while in the latter, an award will be vacated only upon proof of one or more of the grounds stated in Minn. Stat. § 572.19 (1982),[8] and not because the court disagrees *300 with the decision on the merits. Children's Hospital, Inc. v. Minnesota Nurses Association, 265 N.W.2d 649, 652 (Minn.1978). If the application for a motion to confirm, modify, correct, or vacate the arbitration award and the appeal from the Veteran's Preference Hearing are consolidated, the district court can determine the issues by applying the appropriate review standard to each administrative determination.[9] Affirmed. WAHL, Justice, concurring. I concur in the opinion of the Chief Justice not because of the wisdom of the procedure but because it is what the legislature permits. SIMONETT, Justice (concurring specially). The public employee-veteran has a right to a Veteran's Preference hearing. He also has a right under the collective bargaining contract to have the union contest his proposed discharge in grievance arbitration. There is no reason, however, why the employee should have the right to pursue both remedies. He can weigh the tactical advantages and disadvantages of each forum and then choose the procedure he prefers. We need not, however, decide in this case whether the employee's choosing of a Veteran's Preference hearing should constitute a waiver of any right to arbitration because the union also has some rights here. The collective bargaining contract grants the right to invoke the steps of the grievance-arbitration procedure to the respondent union. Presumably, the union insisted on this contract right not only because it represents the employee but because it represents the entire employee unit and, as the exclusive bargaining agent, has an interest in how the labor contract which it negotiated is administered. Cf. Bowen v. United States Postal Service, 459 U.S. 212, 103 S.Ct. 588, 74 L.Ed.2d 402 (1983); Eisen v. State, 352 N.W.2d 731 (Minn.1984) (a public employee has no right to appeal an unfavorable arbitration award in a discharge case where the union has decided not to appeal the award to district court). In other words, the union has a kind of dual interest, which is why it brings this lawsuit "for Itself and on Behalf of Its Member Employee Carl Hammerberg." Hammerberg is not, it might be noted, a named party to this proceeding. Consequently, even though Hammerberg has requested and received his Veteran's Preference hearing, it seems to me that the union is not precluded from pursuing its contract right to grievance-arbitration.[1] *301 The result is that Hammerberg gets two bites of the apple. The result, it seems to me, is wasteful and confusing. There is no need to have two separate, independent discharge proceedings. The basic issue involved, regardless of which hearing is held, is whether the public employer has just cause to discharge the employee. The public employer should not be required to prove its case twice. Even respondent in its brief says, "employees and unions are no more anxious to go through repeated procedures than are employers." It should be possible to devise a legislative solution that both preserves the employee's right to choose his remedy for seeking reinstatement and recognizes the union's interest, without having duplicative procedures. But under the wording of this collective bargaining contract and as the law now reads, it seems to me respondent is entitled to an arbitration hearing and, therefore, I concur in the result reached by the majority opinion. PETERSON, Justice (concurring specially). I join in the special concurrence of Justice Simonett. KELLEY, Justice (concurring specially). I join in the special concurrence of Justice Simonett. COYNE, Justice (concurring specially). I join in the special concurrence of Justice Simonett. NOTES [1] While the parties have argued in their briefs the issue of whether due process was afforded to Hammerberg at his Veteran's Preference Hearing, we note that a separate appeal to the district court is pending on that issue and we decline to address it. [2] "The cause must be one which specifically relates to and affects the administration of the office, and must be restricted to something of a substantial nature directly affecting the rights and interests of the public. The cause must be one touching the qualifications of the officer or his performance of its duties, showing that he is not a fit or proper person to hold the office." 292 Minn. at 162, 193 N.W.2d at 828. [3] Numerous Minnesota attorneys general have expressed the opinion that probation officers are excluded from the protections of the Veteran's Preference Act. See Op.Atty.Gen. 104-B-8, July 24, 1969. The following language is considered dispositive: "Nothing in section 197.455 or this section shall be construed to apply to * * any person holding a strictly confidential relation to the appointing officer." Minn. Stat. § 197.46 (1982). They reason that probation officers are appointed by judges with whom they then hold confidential relationships. While some probation officers are appointed by judges, see Minn. Stat. § 260.311, subd. 1 (1982), others are not. In the case at bar, the exclusion does not apply because Hammerberg is employed by the ARC. At any rate, the appointing officer has the burden of establishing a confidential relationship. Minn. Stat. § 197.46 (1982); State ex rel. Sawyer v. Mangni, 231 Minn. 457, 464, 43 N.W.2d 775, 779 (1950). Moreover, this court has held that the PELRA definition of "employer" as the governing body having final budgetary approval authority, Minn. Stat. § 179.63, subd. 4, "operates to make the county board the sole employer for the purpose of negotiating [collective bargaining agreements] under PELRA * * *." General Drivers, 320 N.W.2d at 700. The same reasoning applies to probation officers for the purposes of Veteran's Preference Hearings. [4] The law dictates that a veteran who is suspended pending discharge proceedings must be kept on the payroll pending his Veteran's Preference Hearing. Kurtz v. City of Apple Valley, 290 N.W.2d 171, 173 (Minn.1980). See also Mitlyng v. Wolff, 342 N.W.2d 120 (Minn.1984). There is no evidence in the record as to whether Hammerberg was or was not paid a salary up to the time of the hearing. [5] Respondent's brief at 3. [6] "The veteran may appeal from the decision of the board upon the charges to the district court by causing written notice of appeal, stating the grounds thereof, to be served upon the governmental subdivision or officer making the charges within 15 days after notice of the decision and by filing the original notice of appeal with proof of service thereof in the office of the clerk of the district court within ten days after service thereof." Minn. Stat. § 197.46 (1982). [7] "When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay." Minn.R.Civ.P. 42.01. [8] Minn. Stat. § 572.19 (1982) provides in part:

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298 N.W.2d 27 (1980) In the Matter of the Arbitration between Finley W. MARKLEY, Thomas Benham, Raymond M. Lukes and Medical Incorporated. No. 51080. Supreme Court of Minnesota. May 23, 1980. Bale & Baker, Minneapolis, Beehler, Mochabee, Arant & Jagger, Los Angeles, Cal., for appellant. Dorsey, Windhorst, Hannaford, Whitney & Halladay, Minneapolis, for respondent. Considered and decided by the court en banc without oral argument. PER CURIAM. Appellant Medical Incorporated appeals from the decision of the Hennepin County District Court confirming an arbitration award and denying its motion to vacate that award. We remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. This action centers upon a contract executed by the parties whereby the respondents-licensors were to furnish expertise and "technology" to the appellant-licensee for the latter's use in the manufacture and marketing of hemodialyzers. A dispute arose in connection with a provision of the agreement entitling the respondents to royalty payments in the amount of 2% of the net sales of devices utilizing the contractually-defined "technology." Unable to resolve these differences of contract interpretation, the matter was submitted to arbitration in accordance with the standard arbitration clause contained in the original contract. An arbitration award was formalized directing specified royalty payments to be made to the respondents. Appellant's motion to the panel, pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 572.16 (1978) for a correction, modification or clarification of the award, resulted in an expansion of the original award in favor of the respondents. The jurisdiction of the district court was invoked when the respondents moved for an order confirming the award and directing the entry of judgment pursuant thereto. In response, the appellant alternatively moved the court to vacate the award or to modify or correct it. The appellant's motion was denied and the award confirmed by order of the district court, and this appeal followed. The focal and preliminary issue presented is whether, in the absence of specific findings from the district court, this court may effectively review that judicial determination. Where the issue of arbitrability itself is raised, the Uniform Arbitration Act, Minn. Stat. ch. 572, authorizes a party to the agreement to seek judicial relief either in *28 proceedings to compel or stay arbitration pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 572.09 (1978) or, after an award is issued, in proceedings to vacate the award upon the basis that the arbitrators exceeded the scope of their authority. Minn. Stat. § 572.19, subd. 1(3) (1978). In State v. Berthiaume, 259 N.W.2d 904 (Minn.1977) we first addressed the question of arbitrability in judicial proceedings to vacate an award on the ground that the arbitrator exceeded his authority in deciding the merits of the dispute and concluded that, as in questions raised pursuant to § 572.09, the issue requires an initial independent judicial resolution. To that end, the district court would necessarily conduct a de novo proceeding authorizing the presentation of evidence in addition to that considered by the arbitration panel in support of the objecting party's position that the award is invalid. See also United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Fruchtman, 263 N.W.2d 66 (Minn.1978). Effective and comprehensive appellate review of the decision of the trial court in this regard is most optimally accomplished when the court issues detailed findings relating to the scope of authority granted to the arbitration panel by the agreement of the parties and to the court's determination as to whether that authority was exceeded. The absence of those findings and a memorandum of the district court dictates that the appeal in this matter be stayed and the case remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Remanded with instructions.

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Minnesota Court of Appeals

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Gruman v. Hendrickson · 1987 4 citations

OPINION A. PAUL LOMMEN, Judge. Respondent Gruman’s personal injury claim against Hendrickson and Burlington Northern was submitted to arbitration. Appellant no-fault carrier moved to intervene, but that motion was denied. Following the arbitration award, appellant, again attempted to intervene and vacate the arbitration award. Appellant further requested, upon judgment entered in favor of Gru-man, it receive the amount of no-fault benefits paid to Gruman. The trial court denied appellant’s motion and this appeal followed. Appellant argues the trial court erred because (1) appellant has met the four-part test for intervention as a matter of right, (2) the arbitration award does' not reflect appellant’s statutorily protected subrogation claim, and (3) the arbitrator erred by deducting the value of no-fault benefits paid to plaintiff from the award. We affirm. FACTS Respondent Thelma Gruman (Gruman) initiated a lawsuit against defendants Ralph Hendrickson (Hendrickson) and Burlington Northern Railroad (Burlington Northern). Gruman alleged to have sustained personal injuries while a passenger in a motor vehicle owned and operated by Hendrickson. Hendrickson was operating his automobile over railroad tracks owned by Burlington Northern. Gruman’s injuries occurred when Hendrickson’s vehicle struck allegedly defective tracks of Burlington Northern. On the date of the accident, Gruman was insured by appellant, Western Fire Insurance Company. Appellant paid Gruman medical expense benefits totaling $2,951.41 and wage loss replacement service benefits of $6,052.33, for a total no-fault benefit payment of $9,003.74. In order to protect its subrogation claim, appellant made a motion to intervene. On January 31, 1986, the trial court issued an order denying appellant’s request for intervention on the basis the motion was premature and that appellant had no subrogation claim for basic economic loss benefits. On March 27, 1987, the case proceeded to arbitration pursuant to rule 5 of the Special Rules of Practice for the Fourth Judicial District. An award filed April 7, 1987 gave judgment for Gruman against Hendrickson and Burlington Northern for $12,000 jointly and severally. Hendrickson was assessed 15% at fault and Burlington Northern 85%. The award expressly provided that while all parties stipulated to amounts paid, Hendrickson and Burlington Northern contested the propriety or reasonableness of the payments. The award also specifically provided it was a net award and did not include basic economic loss benefits paid to date. No request for a trial de novo was made on behalf of any party and judgment was entered May 8, 1987. By motion and amended motion dated May 1, 1987 and June 5, 1987, appellant renewed its motion to intervene and requested the arbitration award and judgment be vacated or amended to reflect appellant’s subrogation claim. By order filed June 25, 1987, the trial court denied appellant’s motion and amended motion. The trial court found appellant’s cause of action, if any, was against Gruman and that appellant’s claim for sub-rogation had not arisen because there had been no double recovery by Gruman. This appeal followed. ISSUES 1. Did the trial court err in refusing to allow appellant to intervene in this suit as a matter of right? 2. Did the trial court err in refusing to vacate the arbitration award? ANALYSIS 1. Appellant argues the trial court erred in denying appellant’s motion to in*500tervene. Appellant’s intervention was sought pursuant to Rule 24.01, which provides: Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant’s interest is adequately represented by existing parties. Minn.R.Civ.P. 24.01. In reviewing orders concerning intervention as of right, this court will independently assess the appropriateness of the order. Norman v. Refsland, 383 N.W.2d 673, 676 (Minn.1986). We are not held to a standard of review requiring a clear abuse of discretion before we may reverse a trial court’s denial of a motion to intervene as a matter of right. Id. Rule 24.01 establishes a four-part test a nonparty must meet before being allowed to intervene as a matter of right: (1) a timely application for intervention; (2) an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action; (3) circumstances demonstrating the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the party’s ability to protect that interest; and (4) a showing the party is not adequately represented by the existing parties. Minneapolis Star & Tribune v. Schumacher, 392 N.W.2d 197, 207 (Minn.1986). The spirit behind Rule 24 is to encourage all legitimate interventions, and the rule is to be liberally applied. Engelrup v. Potter, 302 Minn. 157, 166, 224 N.W.2d 484, 489 (1974). Rule 24 is designed to protect nonparties from having their interests adversely affected by litigation conducted without their participation. Erickson v. Bennett, 409 N.W.2d 884, 887 (Minn.Ct.App.1987). Appellant argues it has met all four tests of Rule 24.01 and therefore should have been allowed to intervene. We agree. The Minnesota Supreme Court has held a subrogation claim is sufficient to support intervention. Miller v. Astleford Equipment Co., Inc., 332 N.W.2d 653, 654 (Minn.1983). Miller involved a fact situation very similar to this case in which the supreme court concluded the deduction of the value of basic economic loss benefits from any recovery could destroy the asserted subro-gation right. Id. at 655. The supreme court recognized the insurer’s interest would only be adequately protected by intervention. Id. Again in Milbrandt v. American Legion Post of Mora, 372 N.W.2d 702 (Minn.1985), the supreme court stated the appellant insurance company should have been allowed to intervene when it claimed a subrogation interest in the suit. Id. at 704 n. 1. We conclude appellant should have been allowed to intervene in this suit. However, that right of intervention is only for the purposes of protecting appellant’s statutory right of subrogation, if and when it arises. Respondent argues an insurer paying basic economic loss benefits to its insured under the No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act has a subrogation right only against its insured and only when the recovery represents in some measure a duplication of those benefits. According to the No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act: A reparation obligor paying or obligated to pay basic economic loss benefits is subrogated to a claim based on an intentional tort, strict or statutory liability, or negligence other than negligence in the maintenance, use, or operation of a motor vehicle. This right of subrogation exists only to the extent that basic economic loss benefits are paid or payable and only to the extent that recovery on the claim absent subrogation would produce a duplication of benefits or reimbursement of the same loss. Minn. Stat. § 65B.53, subd. 3 (1986). In Milbrandt, the supreme court affirmed a summary judgment against an insurer who brought a subrogation claim to recover basic economic loss benefits. The court stated: *501Although subdivision 3 indicates that the legislature intended reparation obligors to recover from tortfeasors basic economic loss benefits paid to insureds, the legislature clearly limited this right to cases where insureds recover duplicate benefits from tortfeasors. Milbrandt, 372 N.W.2d at 705. The court went on to state in strong language: The statute * * * means exactly what it says: a reparation obligor may assert a subrogation claim to recover basic economic loss benefits paid only when the insured has received a double recovery. Because the insurer’s right to recover benefits paid its insured exists only when the insured obtains double recovery, the right of recovery recognized in subdivision 3 may be asserted only against the insured. When seeking to recover under subdivision 3, the burden is on the insurer to show that the insured has been overcompensated. Id. (footnote omitted). The court noted the right of the insurer against the insured arises only in the event of a double recovery by the insured, not by reason of tort. Id. n. 2. The reference to the right of recovery as a subrogation right is a statutorily created right and is not true subrogation. Id.; see Miller v. Astleford Equipment Co., Inc., 378 N.W.2d 820, 822 (Minn.Ct.App.1985), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 14, 1986). Respondent argues appellant’s statutory right of subrogation is not against Burlington Northern and Hendrickson because subrogation in terms of a claim against the tortfeasor does not exist in Minnesota. Therefore, an insurance company can only recover benefits paid when the insured obtains double recovery. Milbrandt, 372 N.W.2d at 705; Peters v. B.P. & E., Inc., 397 N.W.2d 449, 451 (Minn.Ct.App.1986). Because there has been no double recovery by Gruman, respondent argues appellant has no subrogation claim. We agree. In light of the fact appellant’s statutory subrogation right never arose under Minn. Stat. § 65B.53, subd. 3, we conclude the trial court did not commit reversible error by refusing to allow intervention. 2. Appellant argues the trial court erred in refusing to vacate the arbitration award or judgment because the arbitrator erred in its application of the law. Appellant maintains the arbitrator erred by deducting the value of no-fault benefits paid to respondent from the award. Appellant claims it is entitled to relief pursuant to Minn.R.Civ.P. 60.02(1) and (6). A party seeking to vacate a judgment under rule 60.02 must show: (1) a reasonable claim on the merits; (2) a reasonable excuse for the neglect; (3) due diligence after notice of entry of judgment; and (4) that no substantial prejudice will result to the opponent. Hinz v. Northland Milk & Ice Cream Co., 237 Minn. 28, 30, 53 N.W.2d 454, 456 (1952). Appellant argues it has complied with Rule 60.02 in all these respects. Appellant further argues the sub-rogation provision, Minn. Stat. § 65B.53, subd. 3, not the offset provision, Minn. Stat. § 65B.51, subd. 1, should control this case because Burlington Northern’s negligence was negligence other than negligence in the maintenance, use, or operation of a motor vehicle. Appellant contends the arbitrator relied on Minn. Stat. § 65B.51, subd. 1 to deduct the no-fault benefits paid. Appellant argues the arbitrator should have used Minn. Stat. § 65B.53, subd. 3 because section 65B.51 deals with actions limited to some type of motor vehicle use. Appellant maintains Burlington Northern’s negligence is not connected to motor vehicle use. Appellant’s reliance on Rule 60.02 as a means to vacate the arbitration award is misplaced. The Special Rules of Practice for the Fourth Judicial District specifically provide judgment entered upon an arbitration award may not be attacked or set aside except as provided in Rule 5.11(d) (1986): A party against whom a judgment is entered pursuant to an arbitration award may, within six months after its entry, move to vacate the judgment on the ground that the arbitrator was subject to a disqualification not disclosed before the hearing and of which the arbitrator was *502then aware, or upon one of the grounds set forth in the Uniform Arbitration Act, Chapter 572, Minnesota Statutes, and upon no other grounds. The motion shall be heard by the court upon notice to the adverse parties and to the arbitrator, and may be granted only upon clear and convincing evidence that the grounds alleged are true, and that the motion was made as soon as practicable after the moving party learned of the existence of those grounds. Id. Furthermore, the chapter 572 provisions for vacating an arbitration award provide in part: Upon application of a party, the court shall vacate an award where: (1) The award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means; (2) There was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral or corruption in any of the arbitrators or misconduct prejudicing the rights of any party; (3) The arbitrators exceeded their powers; (4) The arbitrators refused to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause being shown therefor or refused to hear evidence material to the controversy or otherwise so conducted the hearing, contrary to the provisions of Section 5, as to prejudice substantially the rights of a party; or (5) There was no arbitration agreement and the issue was not adversely determined in proceedings under Section 572.09 and the party did not participate in the arbitration hearing without raising the objection. But the fact that the relief was such that it could not or would not be granted by a court of law or equity is not ground for vacating or refusing to confirm the award. Minn. Stat. § 572.19, subd. 1 (1986). Respondent asserts subdivision 1 does not allow the vacation of a judgment based upon an alleged error of law committed in the arbitration award. Grudem Brothers Co. v. Great Western Piping Corp., 297 Minn. 313, 316, 213 N.W.2d 920, 922-23 (1973). According to the supreme court: The arbitrators make the final determination of all questions submitted to them whether legal or factual. The court will not overturn these conclusions even if it believes the arbitrators made an incorrect conclusion. Id. at 316-17, 213 N.W.2d at 922-23. It is well established that an arbitration award “will be vacated only upon proof of one or more of the grounds stated in Minn. Stat. § 572.19 and not because the court disagrees with the decision on the merits.” AFSCME Council 96 v. Arrowhead Regional Corrections Board, 356 N.W.2d 295, 299-300 (Minn.1984). Thus, the applicable standard of review is determined from the grounds upon which a party seeks to vacate the award. Koranda v. Austin Mutual Insurance Co., 397 N.W.2d 357, 360 (Minn.Ct.App.1986), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 13, 1987). Respondent argues there was no error of law committed by the arbitrator. The award was clear the no-fault benefits paid by appellant to the insured were deducted. Respondent admits intervention may protect a subrogation claim for basic economic loss benefits, but maintains an insurer is limited to a recovery of no-fault benefits paid from the insured, not the tortfeasor, and such recovery is limited to amounts that represent a duplicate recovery to the insured. We agree. The facts of this case show the insured did not receive a double recovery. The arbitration award clearly excluded no-fault benefits paid to the insured from the award. Therefore, appellant’s subrogation right never matured. Appellant contends there is no incentive on the part of the insured to litigate once no-fault benefits are paid. Thus appellant feels it should be able to intervene to protect its subrogation right. Under the no-fault act, however, appellant has a duty to pay basic economic loss benefits to its insured without regard to fault. The very intent of the no-fault *503act results in the reparation obligor, not the tortfeasor, compensating the insured for his injuries. Home Mutual Insurance Co. v. Dean, 367 N.W.2d 568, 569 (Minn.Ct.App.1985). Appellant has not met its burden of proof to set aside the arbitration award. However, given the deference afforded arbitrators, we will not vacate the award. DECISION In light of the supreme court decision in Miller, the trial court erred in refusing to allow appellant to intervene. However, because there was no double recovery, appellant’s subrogation right did not mature and the trial court did not commit reversible error. The trial court did not err in refusing to vacate the arbitration award given the deference afforded arbitrators. Affirmed. HUSPENI, J., dissents.

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