§ 602.222

State v. Hough · 1998 2 citations

DECISION Appellant's confession was voluntary and properly admitted into evidence. The doctrine of transferred intent may be used to prove an assault on Julie Staska, but not assaults on the four Staska children. As to the four Staska children, the assault convictions are dismissed. Appellant's sentence must be remanded for resentencing. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. HARTEN, Judge (concurring in part and dissenting in part). I concur with the court's conclusion that appellant's confession was admissible as voluntarily made and that part of the opinion holding inapplicable the doctrine of transferred intent. Because I believe that appellant's five convictions for assaulting Scott Staska's wife, Julie Staska, and each of the *585 four Staska children should stand independent of transferred intent[3] and that the sentences pronounced by the district court are lawful, I respectfully dissent from the court's reversal of appellant's convictions for assaulting the Staska children. As to the court's affirmance of appellant's conviction for assaulting Julie Staska, I concur in the result. Appellant was charged with six counts of second-degree assault pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 602.222, subd. 1 (1996). That statute forbids the assault of another with a dangerous weapon. In material part, the law defines assault as follows: Minn. Stat. § 609.02 DEFINITIONS. Subd. 10. Assault. "Assault" is (1) An act done with intent to cause fear in another of immediate bodily harm or death; (2) * * *. Under subdivision 1 of section 609.222, the state must show that appellant had such intent, which the factfinder may infer. See State v. Soine, 348 N.W.2d 824, 826 (Minn. App.1984) (the state need only introduce evidence from which it may be inferred that the accused had the requisite intent). Here the crimes were complete upon the discharge of the firearm. The split-second merger of the act (firing the rifle) and intent (to cause fear in another of immediate bodily harm or death) completes the crime. One need not look further to the consequences of the firing or the actual effect on the other person or persons who were the primary or secondary victims except insofar as the effect upon others may shed light upon the intent of the actor. See State v. Ott, 291 Minn. 72, 75, 189 N.W.2d 377, 379 (1971) (intent of actor, not effect on victim, is focal point, but ordinary effect on others "may naturally be taken into account to determine intent"). Thus in State v. Abeyta, 328 N.W.2d 443, 444 (Minn.1983), the appellant fired a 12-gauge shotgun in the middle of the night at a couple's house and later claimed that he did so only to startle, not frighten, the couple within. The supreme court saw no merit in appellant's contention that "the state failed to establish that he intended by his act of shooting the gun at the house to put the residents in fear of immediate bodily harm or death." Id. at 445. In the instant case, the following were among the findings of fact made by the district court: 4. * * * [Appellant] obtained a .22 caliber, semi-automatic rifle * * *. 6. [Appellant] and the others subsequently agreed to shoot at the home of the high school principal, Mr. Scott Staska. * * * * 8. [Appellant] proceeded to * * * pick up the rifle, aim it at the left side of the Staska home, and discharge the rifle at the Staska home in a rapid-fire manner, expending seven shots. * * * Nathan Bontjes then quickly drove the vehicle away from the Staska home. 9. The bullet holes were located between two bedrooms on the left side of the home. Three of the bullets went through the outside wall and lodged in the interior of the home, narrowly missing one of the four Staska children. 10. At the time of the shooting, Scott Staska and his wife, Julie Staska, and their four children were sleeping in their respective bedrooms in the vicinity of where the bullets were fired at the home. * * * * 15. * * * [Appellant's] confession to law enforcement authorities provides that he was going to "just shoot somebody or something." * * * [T]he group decided to shoot at the home of the principal of the high school, Scott Staska. [Appellant] and the others drove to the Staska home in a deliberate manner. [Appellant] decided not to shoot at the large picture window, which generally would be where the living room is located, and, instead decided to shoot at the left side of the house, which *586 might logically be the location of other rooms, including bedrooms in which the family would be sleeping at that time of night [about 10:45 p.m.]. 16. * * * [B]y his act of shooting seven bullets into the home of Scott Staska, [appellant] intended to cause Mr. Staska fear of immediate bodily harm or death. * * * * 19. [Appellant] fired seven bullets into the Staska home when the possibility existed that the home contained family members other than Scott Staska [the primary victim]. It was also a highly probable consequence that others in the home would be victims of [appellant's] actions. * * * In this case, physical injury is not an element of the crime of Assault in the Second Degree. Accordingly, no physical injury is necessary for intent to transfer to the other five family members. Thus, [appellant's] intent to assault Scott Staska with a dangerous weapon transfers to the other five family members of the Staska family.

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