§ 606.04

County of Washington v. City of Oak Park Heights · 2012 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

In the Matter of the SIRS Appeal of Gary L. Johnson and In the Matter of the SIRS Appeal of Joshawa J. Johnson. · 2016 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Blanding v. Sports & Health Club, Inc. · 1985 4 citations

Minnesota Statutes Chapter 606 (Writs of Certiorari) and Minnesota Statutes Section 480A.60 (Jurisdiction, Court of Appeals) The argument has also been advanced that Minn. Stat. § 606.04 (Supp.1983) confers jurisdiction on this court in addition to the jurisdiction provided in § 480A.06, this court's primary source of jurisdiction. Section 480A.06 confers appellate jurisdiction on this court in the following instances: Subdivision 1. Final decisions. The court of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the trial courts, other than the conciliation courts, of the state of Minnesota, except that it shall not have jurisdiction of criminal appeals in cases in which the defendant has been convicted of murder in the first degree. Subd. 2. Interlocutory decisions. The court of appeals shall have jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals and other matters as may be prescribed in the rules of appellate procedure. Subd. 3. Certiorari review. The court of appeals shall have jurisdiction to review decisions of the commissioner of economic security, pursuant to section 268.10. Subd. 4. Administrative review. The court of appeals shall have jurisdiction to review on the record the validity of administrative rules, as provided in sections 14.44 and 14.45, and the decisions of administrative agencies in contested cases, as provided in sections 14.63 to 14.69. Subd. 5. Ancillary jurisdiction. The court of appeals shall have jurisdiction to issue all writs and orders necessary in aid of its jurisdiction with respect to cases pending before it and for the enforcement of its judgments or orders. Minn. Stat. § 480A.06 (1982). In 1983 the Minnesota legislature amended Chapter 606 by adding "of appeals" after the word "court." Section 606.04 now provides that the "court of appeals may award double costs" to a party "prevailing on a writ of certiorari in any proceeding of a civil nature." Minn. Stat. § 606.04 (Supp.1983). This addition is argued to confer exclusive jurisdiction on the court of appeals for all writs of certiorari. The argument runs that because petitions for certiorari in economic security cases are already specifically dealt with in Minn. Stat. § 268.10 (Supp.1983), then the reference in § 606.04 to the court of appeals awarding of costs in a certiorari proceeding would be redundant and meaningless if it did not refer to some type of certiorari petition other than one in an economic security case. Because "[e]very law shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to all its provisions," Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (1982), section 606.04, should not be construed in such a way as to render it meaningless or superfluous. A construction that would render § 606.04 not meaningless would be to interpret *796 the section as a broad grant of jurisdiction to this court to hear cases presented by certiorari petitions, such as this appeal from the Minneapolis Civil Rights Commission, for which this court has no other source of jurisdiction. The argument fails, however. Such a broad and strained interpretation is not necessary to render § 606.04 meaningful. A number of cases come to this court by petition for writ of certiorari in addition to the economic security cases for which "certiorari" is specified in § 480A.06, subd. 3 (Supp.1983). For example, all of the appeals pursuant to the APA which are referred to in id., subd. 4, are now appealed to this court by petition for writ of certiorari. See Minn. Stat. § 14.63 (Supp.1983). The reference in § 606.04 is meaningful in reference to those certiorari petitions. Additionally, another statute refutes a construction of § 606.04 as an exclusive jurisdiction grant to this court for writs of certiorari, even if jurisdiction could be conferred by such indirect language. The supreme court is given a broad power in Minn. Stat. § 480.04 (1982) to issue writs of certiorari "whether especially provided for by statute or not." The existence of this statute requires that § 606.04 be given its logical reading of allowing costs in writs of certiorari brought before the court of appeals, rather than requiring all writs of certiorari to be brought here. This decision does not leave decisions of local agencies such as the Minneapolis Civil Rights Commission without review. Appropriate review is provided in the district courts pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 484.01 (1982), which gives the district court original jurisdiction in all "special proceedings not exclusively cognizable by some other court or tribunal." Writs of certiorari are special proceedings within the meaning of our statutes. State v. Civil Service Commissioner, 278 Minn. 296, 301, 154 N.W.2d 192, 196 (1967). In dissenting here, I am mindful that the 1985 legislature has amended Section 480A.06, subd. 3, with respect to certiorari review. See Act of May 20, 1985, ch. 165 § 1, 1985 Minn.Sess. Law Serv. 5 (West). In whatever other instances the newly amended statute might be applicable, the law in force at the time review was taken to this court read differently and the new statute does not apply to this case. POPOVICH, Chief Judge (dissenting). 1. I respectfully dissent on several grounds. However, I totally agree with this court's assumption of jurisdiction. In County of Hennepin v. Civil Rights Commission of Minneapolis, 355 N.W.2d 458 (Minn.Ct.App.1984), this court considered whether the district court had jurisdiction in an appeal from the Minneapolis Civil Rights Commission and affirmed a district court decision dismissing a petition for review for lack of jurisdiction. There were no dissents. County of Hennepin is a well-reasoned opinion which concludes jurisdiction in this court is grounded upon a legislative grant of power. A recent appeal made directly to this court from a Minneapolis Civil Rights Commission decision was also affirmed without dissent. See Potter v. LaSalle Sports & Health Club, 368 N.W.2d 413 (Minn.Ct. App.1985). A dissent now on jurisdictional grounds denies precedent and is unwarranted. 2. There exists no constitutional right to homosexual activity, private or public. As recently as 1985, in Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, reh'g en banc denied, 746 F.2d 1579 (D.C.Cir.1984), it was held that private, consensual, homosexual conduct is not constitutionally protected. The court stated: More to the point, the Court in Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney for Richmond, 425 U.S. 901 [96 S.Ct. 1489, 47 L.Ed.2d 751] (1976), summarily affirmed a district court judgment, 403 F.Supp. 1199 (E.D.Va.1975), upholding a Virginia statute making it a criminal offense to engage in private consensual homosexual conduct. The district court in Doe had found that the right to privacy did not extend to private homosexual conduct because *797 the latter bears no relation to marriage, procreation, or family life. 403 F.Supp. at 1200. The Supreme Court's summary disposition of a case constitutes a vote on the merits; as such, it is binding on lower federal courts. * * * * * * * * * The Court has listed as illustrative of the right of privacy such matters as activities relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and education. It need hardly be said that none of these covers a right to homosexual conduct. * * * We would find it impossible to conclude that a right to homosexual conduct is "fundamental" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" * * *. * * * * * * * * * We have no guidance from the Constitution or, as we have shown with respect to the case at hand, from articulated Supreme Court principle. If courts of appeals should, in such circumstances, begin to create new rights freely, the volume of decisions would mean that many would evade Supreme Court review, a great body of judge-made law would grow up, and we would have "preexempt[ed] for [ourselves] another part of the governance of the country without express constitutional authority." If the revolution in sexual mores that appellant proclaims is in fact ever to arrive, we think it must arrive through the moral choices of the people and their elected representatives, not through the ukase of this court. Turning from the decided cases, which we do not think provide even an ambiguous warrant for the constitutional right he seeks, appellant offers arguments based upon a constitutional theory. Though that theory is obviously untenable, it is so often heard that it is worth stating briefly why we reject it. Appellant denies that morality can ever be the basis for legislation or, more specifically, for a naval regulation, and asserts two reasons why that is so. The first argument is: "if the military can defend its blanket exclusion of homosexuals on the ground that they are offensive to the majority or to the military's view of what is socially acceptable, then no rights are safe from encroachment and no minority is protected against discrimination." Appellant's Opening Brief on Appeal at 11-12. Passing the inaccurate characterization of the Navy's position here, it deserves to be said that this argument is completely frivolous. The Constitution has provisions that create specific rights. These protect, among others, racial, ethnic, and religious minorities. If a court refuses to create a new constitutional right to protect homosexual conduct, the court does not thereby destroy established constitutional rights that are solidly based in constitutional text and history. Appellant goes further, however, and contends that the existence of moral disapproval for certain types of behavior is the very fact that disables government from regulating it. He says that as a matter of general constitutional principle, "it is difficult to understand how an adult's selection of a partner to share sexual intimacy is not immune from burden by the state as an element of constitutionally protected privacy. That the particular choice of partner may be repugnant to the majority argues for its vigilant protection — not its vulnerability to sanction." Appellant's Opening Brief on Appeal at 13. This theory that majority morality and majority choice is always made presumptively invalid by the Constitution attacks the very predicate of democratic government. When the Constitution does not speak to the contrary, the choices of those put in authority by the electoral process or those who are accountable to such persons, come before us not as suspect because majoritarian but as conclusively valid for that very reason. We stress, because the possibility of being misunderstood is so great, that this deference to democratic choice does not apply where the Constitution removes the choice from majorities. *798 Appellant's theory would, in fact, destroy the basis for much of the most valued legislation our society has. It would, for example, render legislation about civil rights, worker safety, the preservation of the environment, and much more, unconstitutional. In each of these areas, legislative majorities have made moral choices contrary to the desires of minorities. It is to be doubted that very many laws exist whose ultimate justification does not rest upon the society's morality. For these reasons, appellant's argument will not withstand examination. Id. at 1391-97 (citations omitted) (footnote omitted). It seems clear that when an antidiscrimination ordinance conflicts with the first amendment's freedom of religion, the first amendment should prevail. In addition, it should be noted that sodomy is still a crime in Minnesota. Minn. Stat. § 609.293 (1984). 3. I respectfully disagree with the determination that the Club does not have standing to assert the free exercise clause as a defense to the claims of discrimination. The Club is a closely held corporation. The owners and operators, Arthur Owen, Mark Crevier and Forrest Larson, are all bornagain Christians whose fundamentalist religious convictions "require them to act in accordance with the teachings of Jesus Christ and the will of God in their business as well as in their personal lives." State ex rel. McClure v. Sports & Health Club, Inc., 370 N.W.2d 844 (Minn.1985). If their religious practices conflict with state requirements, their closely held corporation must be able to assert their free exercise rights as defense. Otherwise, these three men would be effectively precluded from entering the marketplace. Can it be said that a professional person who incorporates a sole professional corporation loses all constitutional rights because of the incorporation? Such a result would be absurd. Individuals of strong religious convictions do not live in a vacuum or practice their faith only on their days of worship. Religious values should and do permeate a person's daily activities. The distinction between institutional rights of free exercise and a corporation's assertion of the free exercise rights of its principals is a distinction without a difference when a corporation is closely held. While such a distinction might be pertinent under different factual circumstances, it is unimportant here. The Club operates as a reflection of its principals' religious beliefs. In order for Owens, Crevier and Larson's free exercise rights to be protected, the Club must be able to assert those rights. 4. I also disagree with that portion of the decision that makes a finding with regard to Owens' religious beliefs. Such a finding must be made by the administrative body. Our role is to review the finding, if requested, to determine whether it is supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, I would remand for further findings. It should be noted that courts are not arbitrators of scriptural interpretation. The application and interpretation of religious beliefs and teachings "is not within the judicial function and judicial competence." Thomas v. Review Board of Indiana Employement Security Division, 450 U.S. 707, 716, 101 S.Ct. 1425, 1431, 67 L.Ed.2d 624 (1981). 5. I finally disagree with the award of damages. After Loso observed Blanding's dance, he told Blanding it was "disruptive" or "wrong" and he was in risk of losing his membership. Blanding's membership was not terminated until after he refused to talk about the situation with management. Compensatory damages were $7500, punitive damages $6000, attorney's fees and costs $4500, for a total award of $18,000. This seems excessive as I view the Health Club's conduct as being more of elementary rudeness. The basis for the award, that Blanding will incur additional charges in the next 30 years, is speculative. There are dozens of health facilities of various kinds in the Twin Cities area available to him. The punitive damages statute was aimed at serious, wanton, and malicious conduct of a degree higher than is found in this case. *799 Even if the Club is wrong in their claim that they were exercising a religious right, their action was based upon a sincere defense based upon their religious principles. There should have been solid findings of fact that the act was egregious and proven malicious. There was no evidence that because Blanding was no longer a member of the Health Club that he lost any friends, suffered any private or public embarrassment, was prevented from getting a job, was hindered in advancing in any way, or suffered any direct or indirect economic loss. Blanding's refusal to talk exacerbated an otherwise small incident which in itself did not result in a loss of Club membership. Thus, his refusal to discuss the situation constitutes a proper defense for the Club. While I have the deepest compassion for those discriminated against in any way, I must apply the law as I interpret it to be. NOTES [1] In Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 103 S.Ct. 2017, 76 L.Ed.2d 157 (1983), the Supreme Court assumed that an institution could have a sincere religious belief and thus standing to assert the free-exercise clause. Because the issue was apparently never raised and was not discussed in the opinion, we note that the existence or nonexistence of institutional rights of free exercise has been called a "perplexing legal question." Brown v. Dade Christian Schools, Inc., 556 F.2d 310, 313 (5th Cir. 1977). In First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 55 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978), the Supreme Court did not address the "abstract question whether corporations have the full measure of rights that individuals enjoy under the First Amendment." Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 777, 98 S.Ct. at 1416. However, the Court offered guidance for determining which constitutional rights a corporation may assert:

Minnesota Statutes Chapter 606 (Writs of Certiorari) and Minnesota Statutes Section 480A.60 (Jurisdiction, Court of Appeals) The argument has also been advanced that Minn. Stat. § 606.04 (Supp.1983) confers jurisdiction on this court in addition to the jurisdiction provided in § 480A.06, this court's primary source of jurisdiction. Section 480A.06 confers appellate jurisdiction on this court in the following instances: Subdivision 1. Final decisions. The court of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the trial courts, other than the conciliation courts, of the state of Minnesota, except that it shall not have jurisdiction of criminal appeals in cases in which the defendant has been convicted of murder in the first degree. Subd. 2. Interlocutory decisions. The court of appeals shall have jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals and other matters as may be prescribed in the rules of appellate procedure. Subd. 3. Certiorari review. The court of appeals shall have jurisdiction to review decisions of the commissioner of economic security, pursuant to section 268.10. Subd. 4. Administrative review. The court of appeals shall have jurisdiction to review on the record the validity of administrative rules, as provided in sections 14.44 and 14.45, and the decisions of administrative agencies in contested cases, as provided in sections 14.63 to 14.69. Subd. 5. Ancillary jurisdiction. The court of appeals shall have jurisdiction to issue all writs and orders necessary in aid of its jurisdiction with respect to cases pending before it and for the enforcement of its judgments or orders. Minn. Stat. § 480A.06 (1982). In 1983 the Minnesota legislature amended Chapter 606 by adding "of appeals" after the word "court." Section 606.04 now provides that the "court of appeals may award double costs" to a party "prevailing on a writ of certiorari in any proceeding of a civil nature." Minn. Stat. § 606.04 (Supp.1983). This addition is argued to confer exclusive jurisdiction on the court of appeals for all writs of certiorari. The argument runs that because petitions for certiorari in economic security cases are already specifically dealt with in Minn. Stat. § 268.10 (Supp.1983), then the reference in § 606.04 to the court of appeals awarding of costs in a certiorari proceeding would be redundant and meaningless if it did not refer to some type of certiorari petition other than one in an economic security case. Because "[e]very law shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to all its provisions," Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (1982), section 606.04, should not be construed in such a way as to render it meaningless or superfluous. A construction that would render § 606.04 not meaningless would be to interpret *796 the section as a broad grant of jurisdiction to this court to hear cases presented by certiorari petitions, such as this appeal from the Minneapolis Civil Rights Commission, for which this court has no other source of jurisdiction. The argument fails, however. Such a broad and strained interpretation is not necessary to render § 606.04 meaningful. A number of cases come to this court by petition for writ of certiorari in addition to the economic security cases for which "certiorari" is specified in § 480A.06, subd. 3 (Supp.1983). For example, all of the appeals pursuant to the APA which are referred to in id., subd. 4, are now appealed to this court by petition for writ of certiorari. See Minn. Stat. § 14.63 (Supp.1983). The reference in § 606.04 is meaningful in reference to those certiorari petitions. Additionally, another statute refutes a construction of § 606.04 as an exclusive jurisdiction grant to this court for writs of certiorari, even if jurisdiction could be conferred by such indirect language. The supreme court is given a broad power in Minn. Stat. § 480.04 (1982) to issue writs of certiorari "whether especially provided for by statute or not." The existence of this statute requires that § 606.04 be given its logical reading of allowing costs in writs of certiorari brought before the court of appeals, rather than requiring all writs of certiorari to be brought here. This decision does not leave decisions of local agencies such as the Minneapolis Civil Rights Commission without review. Appropriate review is provided in the district courts pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 484.01 (1982), which gives the district court original jurisdiction in all "special proceedings not exclusively cognizable by some other court or tribunal." Writs of certiorari are special proceedings within the meaning of our statutes. State v. Civil Service Commissioner, 278 Minn. 296, 301, 154 N.W.2d 192, 196 (1967). In dissenting here, I am mindful that the 1985 legislature has amended Section 480A.06, subd. 3, with respect to certiorari review. See Act of May 20, 1985, ch. 165 § 1, 1985 Minn.Sess. Law Serv. 5 (West). In whatever other instances the newly amended statute might be applicable, the law in force at the time review was taken to this court read differently and the new statute does not apply to this case. POPOVICH, Chief Judge (dissenting). 1. I respectfully dissent on several grounds. However, I totally agree with this court's assumption of jurisdiction. In County of Hennepin v. Civil Rights Commission of Minneapolis, 355 N.W.2d 458 (Minn.Ct.App.1984), this court considered whether the district court had jurisdiction in an appeal from the Minneapolis Civil Rights Commission and affirmed a district court decision dismissing a petition for review for lack of jurisdiction. There were no dissents. County of Hennepin is a well-reasoned opinion which concludes jurisdiction in this court is grounded upon a legislative grant of power. A recent appeal made directly to this court from a Minneapolis Civil Rights Commission decision was also affirmed without dissent. See Potter v. LaSalle Sports & Health Club, 368 N.W.2d 413 (Minn.Ct. App.1985). A dissent now on jurisdictional grounds denies precedent and is unwarranted. 2. There exists no constitutional right to homosexual activity, private or public. As recently as 1985, in Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, reh'g en banc denied, 746 F.2d 1579 (D.C.Cir.1984), it was held that private, consensual, homosexual conduct is not constitutionally protected. The court stated: More to the point, the Court in Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney for Richmond, 425 U.S. 901 [96 S.Ct. 1489, 47 L.Ed.2d 751] (1976), summarily affirmed a district court judgment, 403 F.Supp. 1199 (E.D.Va.1975), upholding a Virginia statute making it a criminal offense to engage in private consensual homosexual conduct. The district court in Doe had found that the right to privacy did not extend to private homosexual conduct because *797 the latter bears no relation to marriage, procreation, or family life. 403 F.Supp. at 1200. The Supreme Court's summary disposition of a case constitutes a vote on the merits; as such, it is binding on lower federal courts. * * * * * * * * * The Court has listed as illustrative of the right of privacy such matters as activities relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and education. It need hardly be said that none of these covers a right to homosexual conduct. * * * We would find it impossible to conclude that a right to homosexual conduct is "fundamental" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" * * *. * * * * * * * * * We have no guidance from the Constitution or, as we have shown with respect to the case at hand, from articulated Supreme Court principle. If courts of appeals should, in such circumstances, begin to create new rights freely, the volume of decisions would mean that many would evade Supreme Court review, a great body of judge-made law would grow up, and we would have "preexempt[ed] for [ourselves] another part of the governance of the country without express constitutional authority." If the revolution in sexual mores that appellant proclaims is in fact ever to arrive, we think it must arrive through the moral choices of the people and their elected representatives, not through the ukase of this court. Turning from the decided cases, which we do not think provide even an ambiguous warrant for the constitutional right he seeks, appellant offers arguments based upon a constitutional theory. Though that theory is obviously untenable, it is so often heard that it is worth stating briefly why we reject it. Appellant denies that morality can ever be the basis for legislation or, more specifically, for a naval regulation, and asserts two reasons why that is so. The first argument is: "if the military can defend its blanket exclusion of homosexuals on the ground that they are offensive to the majority or to the military's view of what is socially acceptable, then no rights are safe from encroachment and no minority is protected against discrimination." Appellant's Opening Brief on Appeal at 11-12. Passing the inaccurate characterization of the Navy's position here, it deserves to be said that this argument is completely frivolous. The Constitution has provisions that create specific rights. These protect, among others, racial, ethnic, and religious minorities. If a court refuses to create a new constitutional right to protect homosexual conduct, the court does not thereby destroy established constitutional rights that are solidly based in constitutional text and history. Appellant goes further, however, and contends that the existence of moral disapproval for certain types of behavior is the very fact that disables government from regulating it. He says that as a matter of general constitutional principle, "it is difficult to understand how an adult's selection of a partner to share sexual intimacy is not immune from burden by the state as an element of constitutionally protected privacy. That the particular choice of partner may be repugnant to the majority argues for its vigilant protection — not its vulnerability to sanction." Appellant's Opening Brief on Appeal at 13. This theory that majority morality and majority choice is always made presumptively invalid by the Constitution attacks the very predicate of democratic government. When the Constitution does not speak to the contrary, the choices of those put in authority by the electoral process or those who are accountable to such persons, come before us not as suspect because majoritarian but as conclusively valid for that very reason. We stress, because the possibility of being misunderstood is so great, that this deference to democratic choice does not apply where the Constitution removes the choice from majorities. *798 Appellant's theory would, in fact, destroy the basis for much of the most valued legislation our society has. It would, for example, render legislation about civil rights, worker safety, the preservation of the environment, and much more, unconstitutional. In each of these areas, legislative majorities have made moral choices contrary to the desires of minorities. It is to be doubted that very many laws exist whose ultimate justification does not rest upon the society's morality. For these reasons, appellant's argument will not withstand examination. Id. at 1391-97 (citations omitted) (footnote omitted). It seems clear that when an antidiscrimination ordinance conflicts with the first amendment's freedom of religion, the first amendment should prevail. In addition, it should be noted that sodomy is still a crime in Minnesota. Minn. Stat. § 609.293 (1984). 3. I respectfully disagree with the determination that the Club does not have standing to assert the free exercise clause as a defense to the claims of discrimination. The Club is a closely held corporation. The owners and operators, Arthur Owen, Mark Crevier and Forrest Larson, are all bornagain Christians whose fundamentalist religious convictions "require them to act in accordance with the teachings of Jesus Christ and the will of God in their business as well as in their personal lives." State ex rel. McClure v. Sports & Health Club, Inc., 370 N.W.2d 844 (Minn.1985). If their religious practices conflict with state requirements, their closely held corporation must be able to assert their free exercise rights as defense. Otherwise, these three men would be effectively precluded from entering the marketplace. Can it be said that a professional person who incorporates a sole professional corporation loses all constitutional rights because of the incorporation? Such a result would be absurd. Individuals of strong religious convictions do not live in a vacuum or practice their faith only on their days of worship. Religious values should and do permeate a person's daily activities. The distinction between institutional rights of free exercise and a corporation's assertion of the free exercise rights of its principals is a distinction without a difference when a corporation is closely held. While such a distinction might be pertinent under different factual circumstances, it is unimportant here. The Club operates as a reflection of its principals' religious beliefs. In order for Owens, Crevier and Larson's free exercise rights to be protected, the Club must be able to assert those rights. 4. I also disagree with that portion of the decision that makes a finding with regard to Owens' religious beliefs. Such a finding must be made by the administrative body. Our role is to review the finding, if requested, to determine whether it is supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, I would remand for further findings. It should be noted that courts are not arbitrators of scriptural interpretation. The application and interpretation of religious beliefs and teachings "is not within the judicial function and judicial competence." Thomas v. Review Board of Indiana Employement Security Division, 450 U.S. 707, 716, 101 S.Ct. 1425, 1431, 67 L.Ed.2d 624 (1981). 5. I finally disagree with the award of damages. After Loso observed Blanding's dance, he told Blanding it was "disruptive" or "wrong" and he was in risk of losing his membership. Blanding's membership was not terminated until after he refused to talk about the situation with management. Compensatory damages were $7500, punitive damages $6000, attorney's fees and costs $4500, for a total award of $18,000. This seems excessive as I view the Health Club's conduct as being more of elementary rudeness. The basis for the award, that Blanding will incur additional charges in the next 30 years, is speculative. There are dozens of health facilities of various kinds in the Twin Cities area available to him. The punitive damages statute was aimed at serious, wanton, and malicious conduct of a degree higher than is found in this case. *799 Even if the Club is wrong in their claim that they were exercising a religious right, their action was based upon a sincere defense based upon their religious principles. There should have been solid findings of fact that the act was egregious and proven malicious. There was no evidence that because Blanding was no longer a member of the Health Club that he lost any friends, suffered any private or public embarrassment, was prevented from getting a job, was hindered in advancing in any way, or suffered any direct or indirect economic loss. Blanding's refusal to talk exacerbated an otherwise small incident which in itself did not result in a loss of Club membership. Thus, his refusal to discuss the situation constitutes a proper defense for the Club. While I have the deepest compassion for those discriminated against in any way, I must apply the law as I interpret it to be. NOTES [1] In Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 103 S.Ct. 2017, 76 L.Ed.2d 157 (1983), the Supreme Court assumed that an institution could have a sincere religious belief and thus standing to assert the free-exercise clause. Because the issue was apparently never raised and was not discussed in the opinion, we note that the existence or nonexistence of institutional rights of free exercise has been called a "perplexing legal question." Brown v. Dade Christian Schools, Inc., 556 F.2d 310, 313 (5th Cir. 1977). In First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 55 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978), the Supreme Court did not address the "abstract question whether corporations have the full measure of rights that individuals enjoy under the First Amendment." Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 777, 98 S.Ct. at 1416. However, the Court offered guidance for determining which constitutional rights a corporation may assert:

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

In Re the Placement on Unrequested Leave of Absence of Pinkney · 1984 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.