1 Because it convicted Kangbateh on the greater “benefit-of-a-gang” offenses, the district court erred in also convicting Kangbateh on the lesser-included offenses of second-degree assault and attempted second-degree murder. See Minn. Stat. § 609.04 (2014); State v. Lopez-Rios, 669 N.W.2d 603, 615 (Minn. 2003) (observing that section 609.04 “forbids two convictions of the same offense or one offense and a lesser-included offense on the basis of the same criminal act,” and that “[i]n a crime committed for the benefit of a gang, the underlying crime is an included crime”). However, this error was remedied when the court of appeals reversed Kangbateh’s two convictions on the greater offenses. State v. Kangbateh (Kangbateh I), No. A11–2147, 2012 WL 5990229, at *6 (Minn. App. Dec. 3, 2012).

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Chavarria-Cruz · 2013 5 citations

+ 5 more citations in this opinion.

State v. Cox · 2012 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Riley v. State · 2012 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Hanks · 2012 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Grigsby · 2012 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Sahr · 2012 9 citations

+ 9 more citations in this opinion.

State v. Martinez-Mendoza · 2011 1 citation [Dissent]

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Riley v. State · 2011 3 citations

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

State v. Flowers · 2010 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Prtine · 2010 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

State v. Carufel · 2010 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

State v. Holmes · 2010 3 citations

Minnesota Statutes § 609.04 prohibits a conviction for both the crime charged and an included offense. Minn. Stat. § 609.04, subd. 1 (“Upon prosecution for a crime, the actor may be convicted of either the crime charged or an included offense, but not both.”). This statute “generally forbids two convictions of the same offense or of one offense and a lesser included offense on the basis of the same conduct.” State v. Haase, 341 N.W.2d 879, 881 (Minn.1984). An included offense includes “[a] crime necessarily proved if the crime charged were proved.” Minn. Stat. § 609.04, subd. 1(4). But Minn. Stat. § 609.585 specifically provides that section 609.04’s prohibition against multiple convictions for included offenses does not apply to a conviction for burglary and any crime committed during the burglary. Minn. Stat. § 609.585 (“Notwithstanding section 609.04, a prosecution for or conviction of the crime of burglary is not a bar to conviction of or punishment for any other crime committed on entering or while in the building entered.”).

State v. Fardan · 2009 4 citations

+ 4 more citations in this opinion.

State v. Johnson · 2009 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Cruz-Ramirez · 2009 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Van Keuren · 2008 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

State v. Caine · 2008 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Spann v. State · 2007 3 citations

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

State v. Reed · 2007 1 citation

Trimble-Smith was indicted and charged with first-degree murder in connection with Officer Sackett’s death. State ex rel. Trimble v. Redman, 291 Minn. 442, 444, 192 N.W.2d 432, 434 (1971). She was tried and acquitted. Reed asserts that the mere fact that he and Trimble-Smith were each charged with the same crime establishes that she is an accomplice, but we are not persuaded by this conclusory assertion. An acquittal of a crime is a bar to further prosecution of any included offense. Minn. Stat. § 609.04, subd. 2 (2006). Trim-ble-Smith therefore can no longer fear *583 prosecution by the state for first-degree murder. Furthermore, there is no separate criminal liability for a crime committed by another person, State v. Britt, 279 Minn. 260, 263, 156 N.W.2d 261, 263 (1968), so she need not fear prosecution for aiding and abetting Sackett’s killer. It follows that the state could not influence Trimble-Smith’s testimony with promises of leniency in relation to those charges.

Fields v. State · 2007 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Goodloe · 2006 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Osborne · 2006 5 citations

+ 5 more citations in this opinion.

Pierson v. State · 2006 3 citations

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

State v. Bertsch · 2006 9 citations

+ 9 more citations in this opinion.

State v. Hannon · 2005 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Earl · 2005 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

State v. Dahlin · 2005 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Lee · 2004 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Richardson · 2003 4 citations

+ 4 more citations in this opinion.

State v. Pippitt · 2002 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Hoelzel · 2002 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Lindsey · 2001 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

State v. Johnson · 2000 3 citations

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

State v. Nystrom · 1999 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Pflepsen · 1999 9 citations

+ 9 more citations in this opinion.

State v. Brocks · 1998 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

State v. Dimmick · 1998 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Whittaker · 1997 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

State v. Gisege · 1997 5 citations

+ 5 more citations in this opinion.

State v. Spaeth · 1996 1 citation

. Pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 609.04 (1994), Spaeth was not sentenced for the assault conviction.

State v. Grayson · 1996 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Cole · 1996 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

State v. Wilson · 1995 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Pettee · 1995 6 citations

+ 6 more citations in this opinion.

State v. Gaitan · 1995 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

State v. Hackler · 1995 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Bolte · 1995 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Hoagland v. State · 1994 2 citations

This case arises from the postconviction court’s denial, in part, of defendant Leland Mark Hoagland’s 1991 petition for postcon-vietion relief under Minn. Stat. ch. 590 (1992). In his petition, Hoagland sought to have his convictions reversed outright or to be granted a new trial based on the following grounds: first, the destruction of the trial court reporter’s notes made review of the legality of his convictions impossible; second, the evidence presented at trial was legally insufficient for conviction for first degree murder; and third, his constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the United States Constitution and corresponding provisions of the Minnesota Constitution were violated. The petition also alleged ineffective assistance of counsel and made general allegations of a denial of due process. Finally, Hoagland sought to have one of his life sentences for first degree murder vacated under Minn. Stat. § 609.04. The court granted defendant’s petition with respect to vacating one of his sentences under Minn. Stat. § 609.04 and denied the petition in all other respects. We hold that because Hoagland has been deprived of a meaningful review of his conviction he is entitled to a new trial, provided that a new trial would not unduly prejudice the state. Because the postconviction court did not reach the question of whether a new trial would be unduly prejudicial to the state, we vacate the postconviction court’s denial of a new trial. We remand this case to the post-conviction court for a determination of whether a new trial would be unduly prejudicial to the state.

State v. Robinson · 1994 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Wipper · 1994 3 citations

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

State v. Shepherd · 1991 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Nielsen · 1991 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Folley · 1989 3 citations

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

State v. Mitjans · 1987 1 citation

The Court of Appeals relied on Minn. Stat. § 609.04, subd. 1(4) (1986), which codifies the so-called Blockburger rule. 4 The Blockburger rule basically is that, absent legislative intent to the con *835 trary, if one offense is necessarily included in another, then only a single conviction is allowed. State v. Dudrey, 330 N.W.2d 719, 721-22 (Minn.1983). See Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 105 S.Ct. 2407, 85 L.Ed.2d 764 (1985), for a recent example of the United States Supreme Court’s application of the rule. The rule does not prohibit conviction for two offenses if the greater offense is against one victim and the included offense is committed against a different victim. A multiple-victim exception is set out in both section 609.04 and section 609.035 (which generally prohibits imposition of more than one sentence when a defendant commits more than one offense as part of a single behavioral incident). See State v. Hodges, 386 N.W.2d 709 (Minn.1986). Even if the only predicate felony for the murder conviction was the assault of Froiland, the Blockburger rule does not apply. The ultimate crime for which defendant was convicted, felony murder, was the killing of Chapman. Thus, we are satisfied that there were separate crimes against two different people, the felony murder conviction for the murder of Chapman and the assault conviction for the assault of Froiland. Accordingly, under Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines and Commentary II.F.2 (1986) (as well as under the multiple-victim exception to Minn. Stat. § 609.035 (1986)), permissive consecutive sentencing was available as an option to the trial court.

State v. Harris · 1987 1 citation

Appellant Curtis E. Harris appeals from his March 9, 1986, conviction of first degree murder for violation of Minn. Stat. §■ 609.185(3) (1984) (causing death with intent while committing or attempting to commit aggravated robbery), and of second degree murder for violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.19(2) (1986) (causing death without intent while committing or attempting to commit a felony offense). The trial court sentenced him to the mandatory term of life imprisonment for first degree murder, and Harris appealed. We affirm the conviction for first degree murder and vacate the conviction of second degree murder under Minn. Stat. § 609.04 (1986).

State v. Sutherlin · 1986 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Hodges · 1986 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

State v. Roden · 1986 1 citation

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State v. Knowlton · 1986 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Koop · 1986 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Langdon v. State · 1985 1 citation

. The issue of when multiple convictions based on a single act or behavioral incident are permitted is covered by Minn. Stat. § 609.04 (1984), which is not at issue here, since petitioner, by pleading guilty to four burglary charges, in effect conceded that four convictions were proper.

State v. Galvan · 1985 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Coleman · 1985 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Lucas · 1985 1 citation

2. Defendant’s only other contention is that his conspiracy conviction should be vacated because conspiracy to commit first-degree murder is a lesser included offense of first-degree murder and under Minn. Stat. § 609.04 (1984) a defendant may not be convicted of both the crime charged and an included offense. Section 609.04, subd. 1, states that an included offense may be any of the following:

State v. O'BRIEN · 1985 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Campbell · 1985 1 citation

4. There is no merit to defendant’s contention that her conviction for conspiracy to commit first-degree murder while tampering with a witness should be vacated under Minn. Stat. § 609.04 (1984) as a lesser included offense of her conviction for second-degree murder. The approach taken by this court is that “the trial court must look at the statutory definitions rather than the facts in a particular case to determine if a lesser offense is necessarily included.” State v. Gayles, 327 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Minn.1982). Arguably, defendant was convicted of second-degree murder solely because she aided and abetted Kivimaki, and we have never determined whether the relevant statutory definition when one is convicted of an offense because of aiding and abetting is that of the actual offense or that of aiding and abetting. We need not decide that in this instance, however, because under either the definition of second-degree murder in Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1 (1984), or that of aiding and abetting in Minn. Stat. § 609.05 (1984), defendant’s conviction was not for a lesser included offense.

State v. Cermak · 1985 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Jackson · 1985 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Stark · 1985 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Eppler · 1985 2 citations

Defendant was found guilty by a district court jury of three counts of theft of over $150, Minn. Stat. 609.52 (1984), based on a single shoplifting incident in which she took clothes having a total retail market value of $362 from a department store in a shopping center in Roseville. The trial court formally adjudicated defendant guilty of all three counts, stayed imposition of sentence for 5 years, and placed defendant on probation, conditioned on defendant’s making restitution in the amount of $181 and on defendant’s performing 50 hours of community service. On appeal, defendant seeks (1) a new trial on the ground that the trial court erred in admitting eyewitness identification evidence and an exculpatory statement defendant gave to police and in instructing the jury that it is the duty of attorneys to present evidence on behalf of their clients, or (2) the vacation of two of the three convictions pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 609.04 (1984). We hold that defendant received a fair trial and was properly found guilty of theft, but we vacate two of the three convictions pursuant to section 609.04.

State v. Marhoun · 1985 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Specht · 1984 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Johanson · 1984 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Siverhus · 1984 1 citation

Defendant was found guilty by a district court jury of attempted second-degree murder, assault in the first degree, and assault in the second degree, Minn. Stat. §§ 609.11, 609.17, 609.19, 609.221, 609.222 (1982). The trial court sentenced defendant to an executed term of 101½ months in prison, which is the presumptive sentence for attempted second-degree murder by a person with a criminal history score of three. *400 Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines and Commentary IV (1982), Minn. Stat. § 609.17, subd. 4 (1982). The trial court originally adjudicated defendant guilty of all three offenses of which he was found guilty but later vacated the two assault convictions pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 609.04. On this appeal, defendant seeks (1) an outright reversal of his convictions on the ground that the state failed to prove that he did not act in self-defense; (2) a new trial on the ground that the trial court prejudicially erred (a) in admitting a knife in evidence and (b) in refusing to admit certain evidence which defendant contends showed that the victim had a reputation for violence; or. (3) at least a reduction of his conviction to assault on the ground that the state failed to establish that defendant intended to kill the victim. We affirm.