§ 609.16

Minnesota Statutes

Source: 2025 Minnesota Statutes. For the official text, see revisor.mn.gov.

Citing Cases (4)

Minnesota Supreme Court

State v. Rourke · 2009 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

State v. Rodriguez · 2008 2 citations

. The sentencing proceeding at issue in Adams was an "extended sentence hearing" under Minn. Stat. § 609.16 (1978) (repealed 1978, effective May 1, 1980), which provided for the imposition of an "extended term of imprisonment” for a defendant who had previously been convicted of a felony.

*685 IV. The final issue before us is whether the district court erred in relying, in part, on appellant's possession of the handgun to support its upward sentencing departure. We review a district court's departure from the presumptive sentence under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines for an abuse of discretion. State v. Losh, 721 N.W.2d 886, 895 (Minn.2006). "We have ... held that conduct underlying one conviction for which a defendant was sentenced cannot be used to support an upward sentencing departure for a separate conviction." State v. Osborne, 715 N.W.2d 436, 446 (Minn.2006) (citing State v. McIntosh, 641 N.W.2d 3, 9 (Minn.2002)). The district court indicated that it relied, in part, on appellant's possession of the handgun for its upward sentencing departure, explaining that it "believe[d] that [appellant's] provision (or sale) of cocaine to juveniles, including his own 17-year-old step-daughter, and his importation of approximately 13 ounces of cocaine into Minnesota with a possibly stolen semi-automatic pistol, while his step-daughter was present, justifie[d] the double upward durational departure imposed." (Emphasis added.) Because appellant's possession of the handgun constituted conduct underlying his felon in possession conviction, the district court erred in relying on appellant's possession of the handgun to support the upward sentencing departure for his conspiracy to commit controlled substance crime offense. "If the reasons given [for departure] are improper or inadequate, but there is sufficient evidence in the record to justify the departure, the departure will be affirmed." Losh, 721 N.W.2d at 896 (quoting McIntosh, 641 N.W.2d at 8); see also State v. Thompson, 720 N.W.2d 820, 829-31 (Minn.2006). The sentencing jury's findings that appellant's conspiracy involved an attempted or actual sale or transfer of controlled substances in quantities substantially larger than for personal use and that it involved a high degree of sophistication or planning, occurred over a lengthy period of time, or involved a broad geographic area of disbursement support the finding of the major controlled substance offense aggravating factor under Minn. Sent. Guidelines II.D.2.b(5). Because the record contains sufficient evidence to justify the departure, we affirm appellant's sentence. Affirmed. MAGNUSON, C.J., not having been a member of this court at the time of the argument and submission, took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. ANDERSON, PAUL H., Justice (concurring). I join the majority opinion with one exception. I would remand for resentencing in light of our opinion rather than simply affirm on the ground that the record contains sufficient evidence to justify the district court's significant upward sentencing departure. The appellant, Pedro Maldono Rodriguez, Jr., has committed some very bad acts and made some unwise choices for which the district court has sentenced him to serve 338 months (28.17 years) in prison. This sentence is a significant upward departure from what the sentencing guidelines require.[1] We have now held that the *686 sentencing fact-finding jury properly found that there were aggravating factors that support an upward departure in Rodriguez's sentence. But, we have also concluded that there were errors, albeit harmless errors, that were part of the process used in reaching this result. It is possible that upon remand the district court may still impose the same sentence notwithstanding these errors, and I conclude that if it did so such a sentence would be legal under our decision. Nevertheless, I am not convinced that upon remand, the district court would reimpose the same sentence or should do so. Therefore, in light of the district court's substantial upward departure and the errors that occurred during sentencing, I would remand for resentencing in light of our holding, rather than affirm the court's sentence. PAGE, Justice (concurring). I join in the concurrence of Justice Paul H. Anderson. NOTES [1] In a subsequent interview with Deputy Sondrol on May 10, 2004, McGee said that he had given appellant only $6,000 and that appellant provided the other $6,000 to purchase the drugs. McGee also stated that his two prior trips to Texas with appellant occurred in January and September of 2003. According to McGee, appellant claimed to have picked up 30 pounds of marijuana on the January trip and appellant returned from the September trip with almost 5 ounces of cocaine and a gun. [2] Only two of these findings were necessary for the conspiracy to constitute "a major controlled substance offense" under Minn. Sent. Guidelines II.D.2.b(5). [3] We previously granted respondent's motion to strike section III of appellant's brief and deferred respondent's motion to strike section II pending consideration of the appeal on the merits. Respondent's motion to strike section II of appellant's brief is granted. [4] The Court defined "`statutory maximum' for Apprendi purposes" as "the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant." Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303, 124 S.Ct. 2531. [5] Because we interpret the Confrontation Clause of the Minnesota Constitution identically to the Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution, State v. Dukes, 544 N.W.2d 13, 19 (Minn. 1996), the Confrontation Clause of the Minnesota Constitution applies in jury sentencing trials as well. [6] The sentencing proceeding at issue in Adams was an "extended sentence hearing" under Minn. Stat. § 609.16 (1978) (repealed 1978, effective May 1, 1980), which provided for the imposition of an "extended term of imprisonment" for a defendant who had previously been convicted of a felony. [7] Appellant also objected to the admission of his own recorded police statement as irrelevant, but he now acknowledges that his statement was properly admitted. [8] We also note that Minn. R. Evid. 1101 was adopted in 1977, long before the Supreme Court rendered its decisions in Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435, and Blakely, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403. Accordingly, a jury sentencing trial is not a sentencing proceeding as contemplated when Minn. R. Evid. 1101 was adopted. [9] Minnesota Statutes § 634.04 and the accompanying accomplice corroboration instruction requirement provide defendants greater protection than did the common law requirement that courts give "a cautionary instruction concerning the weight of [accomplice] testimony." State v. Armstrong, 257 Minn. 295, 307, 101 N.W.2d 398, 406 (1960). The applicability of the common law rule in jury sentencing trials is an issue that is not properly before us. [1] The 120-month upward durational departure imposed in this case is substantially greater than the upward durational departures imposed by other district courts in cases involving the major controlled substance crime aggravating sentencing factor. See State v. Osborne, 715 N.W.2d 436, 439 (Minn. 2006) (imposing a 225-month sentence, which was a 67-month upward departure from the presumptive 158-month sentence); State v. McIntosh, 641 N.W.2d 3, 8 (Minn. 2002) (imposing a 122-month sentence, which was a 24-month upward departure from the presumptive 98-month sentence).

State v. Adams · 1980 18 citations

295 N.W.2d 527 (1980) STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. John Lewis ADAMS, Appellant. No. 48819. Supreme Court of Minnesota. June 27, 1980. *529 C. Paul Jones, Public Defender, and Gregory A. Gaut, Asst. Public Defender, Minneapolis, for appellant. Warren Spannaus, Atty. Gen., St. Paul, Thomas L. Johnson, County Atty., Vernon E. Bergstrom, Asst. County Atty., Chief, App. Division, David W. Larson, Asst. County Atty. and Thomas A. Weist, Minneapolis, for respondent. Heard before ROGOSHESKE, PETERSON, and KELLY, JJ., and considered and decided by the court en banc. KELLY, Justice. Defendant John Lewis Adams appeals his conviction of murder in the third degree and his sentence as a dangerous offender pursuant to Minn. Stat. §§ 609.155 and 609.16 (1978). Defendant challenges his conviction on the grounds that his request for a lesser included offense instruction was denied and accomplice testimony was not sufficiently corroborated. Defendant challenges his *530 sentence as a dangerous offender on the ground that Minn. Stat. § 609.16 (1978) is unconstitutionally vague. He argues additionally that hearsay is inadmissible at such a sentencing hearing and that the trial court's findings of dangerousness and the necessity of extended imprisonment pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 609.16 (1978) are clearly erroneous. We affirm defendant's conviction and sentence. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, State v. Hawkins, 260 N.W.2d 150 (Minn.1977), the facts of this case are as follows. On June 30, 1977, Richard Prantner, a drug dealer, was shot and killed during the course of an attempted robbery. The attempted robbery occurred after a group including Patrick Staples, David Parent, Robert Adams, Carol Sue Morrow, and Duane Clark made several visits to the victim's apartment where they procured marijuana and LSD. After the second visit to the victim's apartment the group decided to rob the victim of his drugs. Because they needed a gun, Parent suggested involving Lenny Clyde White in the plan. White told the group he did not have a gun but knew where to procure one. The group, including White, proceeded to the apartment of Denise Bass, defendant's fiancee. White and Parent went inside to discuss the plan with defendant while the rest of the group, including Carol Sue Morrow, waited outside. When defendant, White and Parent emerged, defendant showed the group the gun. Lenny White and defendant drove defendant's car to within a few blocks of the victim's apartment. Parent, Morrow, Rob Adams and Clark rode in a crew pickup truck and all but Morrow joined White and defendant in defendant's car to discuss the plan's details. Lenny White would drive defendant's getaway car. Rob Adams, Duane Clark and defendant would go upstairs and subdue the occupants of Prantner's apartment. The rest of the group would then go upstairs to locate and abscond with the drugs. After this discussion Staples and Parent got out of defendant's car and drove to within one-half block of Prantner's apartment. Pat Staples then got out of the truck and walked away. Defendant, Rob Adams and Duane Clark went up the back stairs to the victim's apartment. Defendant crouched on the step below Clark and Adams. The victim's girlfriend answered the door. When she moved away to call Prantner, defendant moved up one stair with Rob Adams and Duane Clark to the side of him. The victim came to the door and defendant said either "give me your dope" or "hold it." Prantner moved toward the gun held by defendant and the gun fired hitting him in the chest. The three men ran down the back stairs through an alley and into an adjoining parking lot where Lenny White waited in defendant's car. Defendant was arrested on August 17, 1977, and later charged with felony murder pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 609.195 (subd. 2) (1978). During the course of his trial, the trial court ruled that Duane Clark, Robert Adams, and David Parent were accomplices as a matter of law. He ruled that due to Carol Morrow's age, she was not an accomplice as a matter of law. She was 13 years of age at the time. Finally, he ruled that Patrick Staples' status as an accomplice was a question of fact within the province of the jury on the theory that by leaving the truck prior to the murder and going to the police on July 16, 1977, with a partial story of what occurred on June 30, 1977, he may have withdrawn from the conspiracy to rob the victim. The jury found defendant guilty of felony murder on December 19, 1977. A sentencing hearing was held on January 16, 1978, for the purpose of determining whether defendant should be sentenced to a term of 40 years as a dangerous offender pursuant to Minn. Stat. §§ 609.155 and 609.16 (1978). The court received documentary evidence of three prior felony convictions; simple robbery, conspiracy to commit simple robbery and aggravated robbery. The court received into evidence various affidavits as well as the presentence investigation. Defendant objected to the admission of the affidavits as hearsay and as a violation *531 of due process. Several police officers testified that defendant was a suspect in two uncharged robberies. Defendant objected to "some of the testimony" as hearsay and challenged the sentencing statute as void for vagueness. The court found that defendant was convicted of one or more prior crimes as required by Minn. Stat. § 609.16 (subd. 3) (1978) and concluded he was predisposed to commit violent crimes and that an extended term of imprisonment was necessary for the public's safety. Defendant was sentenced to a 40-year term of imprisonment.

+ 15 more citations in this opinion.

Minnesota Court of Appeals

State v. Kimmons · 1993 2 citations

We note, initially, that Minn. Stat. § 609.16 (1978) (repealed 1978) 1 , an earlier enhancement statute, which required the court to find that “an extended term of imprisonment is required for [the defendant’s] rehabilitation or for the public safety,” has been held constitutional under a void-for-vagueness challenge. See, e.g., State v. Adams, 295 N.W.2d 527, 536 (Minn.1980); State v. Michaud, 276 N.W.2d 73, 77 (Minn.1979). No definitions or standards were provided under section 609.16.