§ 609.364

Minnesota Statutes

Source: 2025 Minnesota Statutes. For the official text, see revisor.mn.gov.

Citing Cases (7)

Minnesota Supreme Court

State v. Becker · 1984 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Minnesota Court of Appeals

State v. Cook · 2000 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Shamp · 1988 2 citations

Sexual abuse includes prohibited sexual penetration and prohibited sexual contact or touching as those prohibited acts are defined and will be throughout these instructions. The term "sexual abuse" is not defined under Minn. Stat. §§ 609.341-609.351. Defining the term is complicated because first degree criminal sexual conduct focuses upon penetration of the victim, and because under other parts of Minn. Stat. § 609.342 an actor may be found guilty for only one act of penetration. See, e.g., Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(g). Under subdivision 1(h)(v), however, there must be a significant relationship, penetration, and multiple acts over an extended period of time. The resulting question is whether the focus of Minn. Stat. § 609.342 on penetration carries over to multiple instances of sexual abuse under subdivision 1(h)(v), thus requiring multiple acts of penetration. The objective of statutory construction is to follow legislative intent. Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (1986). When the statutory language is not explicit, legislative intent may be ascertained by considering the former law, or laws upon similar subjects. Id. § 645.16(5). Originally, the language of Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(h)(v) was codified separately as first degree intrafamilial sexual abuse. See Minn. Stat. § 609.3641 (Supp.1981). The first degree intrafamilial sexual abuse statute later was repealed and consolidated with the statutes covering criminal sexual conduct. See 1985 Minn. laws ch. 286, §§ 14-18. The intrafamilial sexual abuse statute was similar to the present statute. It provided that a person violated the statute if that person had a familial relationship with a child, engaged in sexual penetration with that child, and "the intrafamilial sex abuse involved multiple acts committed over an extended period of time." Minn. Stat. § 609.3641, subd. 1(2)(e) (Supp. 1981) (emphasis added). The term "intrafamilial sex abuse" was specifically defined as "sexual contact or sexual penetration, or both." Minn. Stat. § 609.364, subd. 10 (Supp.1981) (emphasis added). The statute did not require multiple acts of penetration. If an actor had committed one act of sexual penetration, the actor could be found guilty of first degree intrafamilial sex abuse upon a showing of multiple acts of either type (or both) of the two types of sexual abuse, sexual contact or sexual penetration. The words and phrases of Minnesota statutes are construed according to their common and approved usage. Minn. Stat. § 645.08(1) (1986). Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(h)(v) only requires multiple acts of *525 "sexual abuse," and does not specifically require multiple acts of penetration. If the legislature had intended to require multiple acts of penetration, such language could have been inserted in subdivision 1(h)(v). In a separate statutory section, Minnesota's mandatory reporting of maltreatment of minors statute, "sexual abuse" is defined as "any act which constitutes a violation of section 609.342, 609.343, 609.344, or 609.345." Minn. Stat. § 626.556, subd. 2(a) (1986). Thus, other statutory sections have defined sexual abuse in a broad manner, defining it to include sexual contact other than penetration. Appellant claims the trial court has created a hybrid crime, consisting of a cross between first and second degree criminal sexual conduct. However, Minn. Stat. § 609.342 requires penetration for first degree criminal sexual conduct, whereas second degree criminal sexual conduct under Minn. Stat. § 609.343 requires only sexual contact, which relates primarily to the touching of intimate bodily parts. See Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd. 11. The trial court's instructions closely followed the elements necessary for first degree criminal sexual conduct as set out in Minn. Stat. § 609.342. The record indicates the trial court clearly explained the difference between sexual penetration and sexual contact, as well as the relation of these elements to the crime of first degree sexual conduct. Viewing the instructions as a whole, the legislative history, prior statutes, and language of Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(h)(v), we find the trial court's instructions fail to constitute reversible error. 2. The admission of evidence rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, and will be upheld unless there is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Ture, 353 N.W.2d 502, 515 (Minn.1984). Evidence of prior sexual misconduct in cases involving crimes of sexual misconduct against minors is admissible to show a common scheme pursuant to Minn.R.Evid. 404(b). The Minnesota Supreme Court has determined that in order for Spreigl evidence to be admissible, the trial court must determine that (1) there is "clear and convincing" evidence that the defendant participated in the bad acts sought to be admitted; (2) the evidence of the bad acts is relevant and material; and (3) the probative value of the evidence outweighs the potential for unfair prejudice. State v. Doughman, 384 N.W.2d 450, 454 (Minn. 1986). Appellant contends that the testimony of alleged sexual misconduct with his younger sister should not have been admitted because the evidence was not clear and convincing, was irrelevant, and was too prejudicial. First, the Minnesota Supreme Court has defined the "clear and convincing" evidence standard as requiring "more than a preponderance of the evidence but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt." Weber v. Anderson, 269 N.W.2d 892, 895 (Minn.1978). Clear and convincing evidence is demonstrated when the truth of the facts sought to be admitted is "highly probable." Id. Although there were inconsistencies in M.S.'s testimony, the trial court was in the best position to weigh the credibility of the testimony and evidence presented. Further, appellant admitted to committing criminal sexual conduct with both girls, and was convicted of the crimes against S.S. in February of 1987. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the evidence of prior sexual misconduct was clear and convincing. Second, the greater the similarity of a crime with the crime charged in terms of time, place, or modus operandi, the greater the chance the crime will be found relevant. State v. Matteson, 287 N.W.2d 408, 411 (Minn.1979). This court frequently has upheld the use of Spreigl evidence in cases of criminal sexual misconduct which demonstrated the defendant engaged in similar sexual misconduct with other victims. See State v. McCoy, 400 N.W.2d 807 (Minn.Ct. App.1987); State v. Spencer, 366 N.W.2d 656 (Minn.Ct.App.1985); State v. Danielski, 374 N.W.2d 322 (Minn.Ct.App.1985). The similarities in this case involve abuse beginning when both girls were 6 or 7, and *526 continued until their early teens. The instances of sexual misconduct also occurred over roughly the same time periods. Both girls testified they were fondled, penetrated, and threatened with death if they told anyone about the abuse. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the sexual misconduct with S.S. was relevant. Finally, the trial court has broad discretion in determining if the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. State v. Filippi, 335 N.W.2d 739, 744 (Minn.1983). The trial court gave specific cautionary instructions regarding the Spreigl evidence. We find the trial court did not abuse its broad discretion in finding the probative value of the Spreigl evidence outweighed any potential for unfair prejudice. 3. Appellant also contends the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions. Upon review of a claim of insufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court must determine whether, given the facts in the record and the legitimate inferences which may be drawn from those facts, a jury reasonably could conclude that the defendant was guilty of the offense charged. State v. Merrill, 274 N.W.2d 99, 111 (Minn.1978). If the jury, acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence and the need to show guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably have found the defendant guilty, the verdict will not be reversed. Id. The testimony of a complainant in a criminal sexual conduct case need not be corroborated. Minn. Stat. § 609.347, subd. 1 (1986). Corroboration of a child's allegations is required "only if the evidence otherwise adduced is insufficient to sustain conviction." State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604, 608 (Minn.1984). M.S. testified in significant detail. Her testimony not only was corroborated by appellant's confession, but by the testimony of her aunt, and the testimony of M.S.'s best friend, who stated that M.S. had told her of the sexual abuse long before it was reported. Although appellant claims the girls gave inconsistent, vague testimony in direct contrast to his testimony, it is the exclusive function of the jury to weigh witness credibility. State v. Pieschke, 295 N.W.2d 580, 584 (Minn.1980). In addition, "sexual penetration" is defined by Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd. 12 (1986) as "any intrusion however slight into the genital or anal openings of the complainant's body of any part of the actor's body." M.S. testified that when appellant touched her genital area, he would rub his fingers between the folds of skin over her vagina, but not insert his fingers "all the way." We find there was sufficient evidence for the jury to reasonably find penetration. As to appellant's claim that evidence of the date of the last instance was insufficient, M.S. testified the last act occurred when she was in fifth or sixth grade. Count II of the complaint alleged the last act occurred "on about 1985 through June 1986." M.S. was in the sixth grade during the 1985-86 school year. The jury reasonably could have concluded that appellant committed the offense on the dates listed in the complaint. 4. Appellant's fourth contention is that his statement admitting guilt was inadmissible because it was not made of his own free volition. He asserts that the confession was given to save his family after he was told a guilty plea would result only in counseling and therapy. An inculpatory statement only is admissible if it was voluntarily given. State v. Orscanin, 283 N.W.2d 897, 899 (Minn.1979). The prosecution has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that under the circumstances a confession was made freely and voluntarily. State v. Linder, 268 N.W.2d 734, 735-36 (Minn.1978) (per curiam). An appellate court must independently determine, on the basis of all factual findings that are not clearly erroneous, whether or not the confession was voluntary. State v. Anderson, 396 N.W.2d 564, 565 (Minn.1986). Only 30-45 minutes after his arrest, appellant met with the interviewing officer, was informed of the charges, and was read his rights in conformance with *527 Miranda. Appellant waived his rights. The taped interview began with a second Miranda warning, which appellant once again stated he understood and waived. Following the interview, he agreed there had been no threats or promises, and that the statement was given voluntarily. The officer testified that he made appellant no promise of treatment for a guilty plea and confession. Viewing the totality of the circumstances, we find the trial court properly ruled that the state demonstrated by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the statement and waiver of rights was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. 5. Appellant next claims the court impermissibly denied his constitutional right to effectively cross examine M.S. regarding "penetration." On cross examination, defense counsel asked M.S. to define penetration, and then asked her to testify whether she was penetrated by appellant. The trial court refused to allow this line of questioning, holding that the issue of "penetration" ultimately was a fact question for the jury. The court held that M.S. was not at trial to testify as to legal definitions, but merely to testify in the form of facts and observations. The trial court has broad discretion in determining the admissibility of evidence. Ture, 353 N.W.2d at 515. Despite the broad discretion given the trial court, we are disturbed by the trial court's limitation of cross-examination. Counsel traditionally is given considerable leeway in cross examination, short of questions which harass or are repetitive. Here, defense counsel obtained a damaging admission from M.S. that she had not been penetrated. Minn. R. Evid. 704 provides that testimony "is not objectionable because it embraces the ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact." However, given the totality of the evidence, we are unable to rule that the trial court's action constituted reversible error. Appellant's counsel was not prevented from cross examining M.S. about the acts appellant allegedly committed. M.S. was cross examined and testified in detail about the instances of sexual misconduct, including where appellant placed his fingers and penis in relation to M.S.'s body. 6. Appellant's final contention is that the trial court abused its discretion in permitting the state to amend and extend the dates listed in count II of the complaint. Minn.R.Crim.P. 17.05 allows the trial court to amend a complaint "any time before verdict or finding if no additional or different offense is charged and if substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced." Allowing amendments to complaints rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. Gerdes v. State, 319 N.W.2d 710, 712 (Minn.1982). Generally, where the date is not an essential element of the crime, the trial court may allow an amendment of the complaint so that it comports with the evidence presented at trial. State v. McGunn, 208 Minn. 349, 350, 294 N.W. 208, 209 (1940). Minn. Stat. § 609.343, subd. 1(g), does not make a particular time period a material element of second degree criminal sexual conduct. The amendment did not change any elements of the crime or add an offense. Appellant was well aware he was charged with committing sexual misconduct over an extended time period. The trial court did not abuse its broad discretion in allowing the state to amend its complaint.