§ 611.14

Minnesota Statutes

Source: 2025 Minnesota Statutes. For the official text, see revisor.mn.gov.

Citing Cases (13)

Minnesota Supreme Court

State v. Randolph · 2011 5 citations

+ 5 more citations in this opinion.

In Re the Welfare of J.B. · 2010 5 citations

+ 5 more citations in this opinion.

State v. Jones · 2009 2 citations

I. Jones contends that his May 5, 2006, and February 14, 2007 applications for a public defender were improperly denied.[1] Although the right to counsel is constitutional, U.S. Const. amend. VI; Minn. Const. art. I, § 6, the right to representation by a public defender is statutory, Minn. Stat. § 611.14 (2008). A defendant entitled to representation by a public defender under section 611.14 is eligible for public defender services only if he or she is financially unable to afford or obtain counsel. Minn. Stat. § 611.15 (2008); Minn. R.Crim. P. 5.02, subd. 1(2). The district court shall not appoint counsel for a defendant who is financially able to retain private counsel but refuses to do so. Minn. Stat. § 611.17(b) (2008); Minn. R.Crim. P. 5.02, subd. 1(2). The district court must screen any request for a public defender using the following standard: A defendant is financially unable to obtain counsel if: (1) the defendant, or any dependent of the defendant who resides in the same household as the defendant, receives means-tested governmental benefits; or (2) the defendant, through any combination of liquid assets and current income, would be unable to pay the reasonable costs charged by private counsel in that judicial district for a defense of the same matter. Minn. Stat. § 611.17(a) (2008); Minn. R.Crim. P. 5.02, subd. 3. The district court must make "appropriate inquiry into the financial circumstances of the [defendant]," including the defendant's assets and liabilities, the liquidity of real property and other assets, and any transfer of assets since the date of the alleged offense.[2] Minn. Stat. § 611.17(b); Minn. R.Crim. P. 5.02, subd. 4. In such an inquiry, the burden is on the defendant to show that "he or she is financially unable to afford counsel." Minn. R.Crim. P. 5.02, subd. 4. The defendant must also provide the information necessary to determine eligibility and has a continuing duty to disclose any relevant changes to his or her financial circumstances. Minn. Stat. § 611.17(b). If the court determines that a defendant meets the stated requirements, then it must appoint a public defender to represent the defendant. Minn. Stat. § 611.18 (2008). Both parties agree that we should apply the abuse of discretion standard of review from In re Stuart, 646 N.W.2d 520, 523 (Minn.2002), to the district court's determination of eligibility. Jones first contends that his May 5, 2006 application was wrongly denied because the district court should have considered only his income and not that of his girlfriend when deciding his eligibility. *503 The district court is required to make its decision based on "the financial circumstances of the applicant," but neither the statutes nor the rules of criminal procedure state that the inquiry must be limited to only the defendant's liquid assets and current income. The district court's duty, however, is to make a broad inquiry into the defendant's financial circumstances that "might be relevant to the applicant's eligibility for a public defender." Minn. Stat. § 611.17(b). The income of a live-in girlfriend is information that might be relevant to a defendant's eligibility, especially when the defendant does not dispute including the income. See State v. Vincent, 883 P.2d 278, 283 n. 6 (Utah 1994) (considering the income of both persons in "a domestic unit, without regard to whether they are legally married"). The burden to show financial eligibility for a public defender is on the defendant, and Jones did not argue that Shannon was unwilling to help him retain counsel or that her income was otherwise inaccessible to him. Based on the information in the May 5, 2006 application, the district court decided that Jones did not qualify for a public defender. Jones did not provide any additional information to show that he was financially unable to afford counsel. On this record, the district court did not abuse its discretion.[3] Jones also contends that his February 14, 2007 application was wrongly denied because the district court limited its inquiry to the fact that Jones's income was higher than 125% of the federal poverty guidelines. Jones argues that the poverty guidelines only measure indigency and should not be used as a proxy for the comprehensive inquiry required under Minn. Stat. § 611.17. Again, the district court must consider all available information about the defendant's financial circumstances that "might be relevant to the applicant's eligibility for a public defender." We have held that a "district court must exercise its discretion to determine whether [a defendant] has met his burden of establishing that through any combination of liquid assets and current income he would be unable to pay the reasonable costs charged by private counsel for defense of a case." In re Stuart, 646 N.W.2d at 527. In this case, the record reflects that the district court considered more than just the federal poverty guidelines. The district court's discussion with Jones about his financial circumstances on February 14, 2007, spanned 13 pages of the transcript. His family situation, his and his girlfriend's income, his current cost of child support, and his ability to post bond and retain counsel in Dakota County were all discussed. The application for public defender services also included significant detail about his income sources, assets, and expenses. Jones's argument depends on a very narrow reading of the record that because the court collector only referred to the federal poverty guidelines as a reason for denying Jones's eligibility, nothing else was considered. Given the context of the entire record, including but not limited to the inquiry by the district court, we agree with the court of appeals that the court conducted a thorough investigation into Jones's particular financial situation. We conclude that the district court did not fail to exercise its discretion or rely solely on the federal poverty guidelines.[4]

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Morris v. State · 2009 9 citations

+ 9 more citations in this opinion.

Erickson v. State · 2007 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Tennin · 2004 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

In Re Stuart · 2002 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Pederson · 1999 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Hale v. State · 1997 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Dziubak v. Mott · 1993 2 citations

503 N.W.2d 771 (1993) Richard P. DZIUBAK, Respondent, v. J. Thomas MOTT and James T. Hankes, Petitioners, Appellants. No. C7-91-2517. Supreme Court of Minnesota. August 6, 1993. *772 Hubert H. Humphrey III, Atty. Gen., David T. Schultz, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, for appellants. Richard W. Johnson, Red Wing, for respondent. Heard, considered, and decided by the court en banc. TOMLJANOVICH, Justice. In 1962, the United States Supreme Court recognized the right to counsel as one of the safeguards necessary to insure fundamental human rights when it made obligatory upon the states by the Fourteenth Amendment the Sixth Amendment guarantees of the right to counsel. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1962). [The assistance of counsel] is one of the safeguards of the Sixth Amendment deemed necessary to insure fundamental human rights of life and liberty * * *. The Sixth Amendment stands as a constant *773 admonition that if the constitutional safeguards it provides be lost, justice will not `still be done.' Gideon, 372 U.S. at 343, 83 S.Ct. at 796 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1022, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)). * * * * * * [R]eason and reflection require us to recognize that in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him. Gideon, 335 U.S. at 344, 83 S.Ct. at 796. The Minnesota Legislature responded in 1965 by adopting legislation to create a system of state and district public defenders. Act of May 26, 1965, ch. 869, §§ 1-20, 1965 Minn.Laws 1631-38 (codified as amended at Minn. Stat. §§ 611.14-611.21 (1992)).[1] In 1981 the legislature created the State Board of Public Defense. Act of June 1, 1981, ch. 356, § 360, 1981 Minn. Laws 1982-84 (codified as amended at Minn. Stat. § 611.215 (1992)). Today we are asked to decide whether the state public defenders are immune from suit for malpractice. This appeal arises from respondent Richard P. Dziubak's complaint filed in Ramsey County district court against the petitioners, J. Thomas Mott and James T. Hankes, alleging ten counts of legal malpractice. Mott and Hankes were public defenders appointed to represent Dziubak against charges of second degree murder and first degree manslaughter in the death of Dziubak's mother.[2] Mott and Hankes moved for a dismissal based upon immunity from suit, or for summary judgment based upon collateral estoppel. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, but ruled Dziubak was collaterally estopped from litigating whether Mott and Hankes were negligent for failure to discover the fatal levels of anti-depressants in decedent's blood. The other allegations of negligence were reserved for trial. The court of appeals affirmed. Dziubak v. Mott, 486 N.W.2d 837 (Minn.App.1992). The sole issue on appeal is whether public defenders are immune from suit for legal malpractice. Because we find there are sound public policy reasons favoring immunity, we reverse and hold that public defenders are immune from suit for legal malpractice.

Citing Cases (13)

Minnesota Supreme Court

Minnesota Court of Appeals