§ 626.90

State v. Davis · 2009 4 citations

+ 4 more citations in this opinion.

State v. Manypenny · 2004 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Thompson · 2019 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. LaRose · 2004 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Manypenny · 2003 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Mille Lacs Band of Ojibwe v. County of Mille Lacs, Minnesota · 2023 22 citations

+ 22 more citations in this opinion.

Mille Lacs Band of Ojibwe v. County of Mille Lacs, Minnesota · 2022 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Mille Lacs Band of Ojibwe v. County of Mille Lacs, Minnesota · 2020 4 citations

+ 4 more citations in this opinion.

Hester v. Redwood County · 2012 4 citations

+ 4 more citations in this opinion.

Davis v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians · 1998 2 citations

The Band and Genia move for dismissal of this action on two grounds. First, the moving defendants argue that Davis failed to exhaust tribal remedies and that such a failure is a bar to the Court’s review of tribal court jurisdiction. Next, the moving defendants claim that even if Davis had exhausted her tribal remedies, the tribal court correctly determined it possessed jurisdiction over Davis’s claim. Davis concedes that she failed to exhaust tribal remedies but opposes the Band and Genia’s motion for dismissal by arguing that her failure to exhaust was excused because the tribal court was biased against her and exhaustion was futile, the Band had expressly waived its immunity in Minn. Stat. § 626.90, and the defendants and the court asserted tribal court jurisdiction in bad faith. “[CJonsiderations of comity direct that tribal remedies be exhausted before the question [of tribal court jurisdiction] is addressed by the District Court.” Iowa Mutual Ins. Co., 480 U.S. at 15, 107 S.Ct. 971. The exhaustion requirement encourages the Federal Government’s policy of tribal self-government, ensures that “a full record is developed in the Tribal Court before either the merits or any question concerning appropriate relief is addressed,” and provides an opportunity for the tribal court system to explain its basis for asserting jurisdiction. See Duncan Energy, 27 F.3d at 1299-1300. Once tribal remedies are exhausted, a federal court may then review the tribal court’s decision regarding jurisdiction. If jurisdiction was proper in the tribal court, “proper deference ... precludes relitigation of issues raised and resolved in the tribal court.” Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 19, 107 S.Ct. 971. Thus, the Court must answer only the following questions to resolve the pending motion: 1) was Davis’s failure to exhaust her tribal remedies excused; and 2) if her failure to exhaust was excused, did the Tribal Court have jurisdiction over Davis’s action. “At a minimum, exhaustion of tribal remedies means that tribal appellate courts must have the opportunity to review the determinations of the lower tribal court.” LaPlante, 480 U.S. at 17, 107 S.Ct. 971. However, a party’s failure to exhaust tribal remedies may be excused where: an assertion of tribal jurisdiction is motivated by a desire to harass or is conducted in bad faith, or where the action is patently violative of express jurisdictional prohibitions, or where exhaustion would be futile because of the lack of an adequate opportunity to challenge the [tribal] court’s jurisdiction. National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 856 n. 21, 105 S.Ct. 2447, 85 L.Ed.2d 818 (1985). Davis alleges that her failure to exhaust tribal remedies is excused on the grounds of bias and bad faith. There is no evidence in the record, however, to support either of these claims. Davis’s response to the pending motion brings to mind the quote by Louis Nizer that “When a man points a finger at someone else, he should remember that four of his fingers are pointing at himself.” Davis strives to excuse her failure to timely appeal the Tribal Court’s Final Judgment by alleging that the Special Magistrate and the Tribal Appellate Court were biased and failed to provide a fair and just forum for her action. However, Davis’s attorney conceded that his failure to file a timely appeal from the Final Judgment was due to his neglect and unfamiliarity with tribal court rules. Plaintiff has presented no evidence, beyond her bare allegations, that she was treated unfairly by the tribal court system and the i-ecord actually reflects the opposite. On several occasions the Special Magistrate granted Davis special consideration, for example, by allowing Davis to orally amend her complaint and considering arguments in Davis’s favor that she had failed to raise for herself. A review of the summary judgment order written by the Special Magistrate evidences only thoughtful and careful review of the issues in Davis’s action. Davis’s claim that the Tribal Appel*1179late Court treated her unfairly are also without basis. The Appellate Court ruled against Davis on the issue of her late appeal, an understandable decision that reflects no bias. In addition, the Appellate Court disbarred Davis’s attorney because of his failure to monitor Davis’s case and abide by the Court of Central Jurisdiction’s rules. Such an act was clearly within the Appellate Court’s discretion, and does not reflect bias toward Davis or her legal position. Similarly, Davis’s claim of bad faith is based only on Davis’s allegations, and is unsupported by the record. Davis’s failure to exhaust tribal remedies is, standing alone, sufficient grounds for granting the pending motion. However, even if Davis had exhausted her tribal remedies, there is no question the Tribal Court had jurisdiction over Davis’s claims. Davis is a member of the Band, and the Defendants are tribal entities. Davis’s claims involve the Band’s police department, and occurred on the Band’s reservation. Tribal Courts possess exclusive jurisdiction over a suit between members of its Tribe arising on its reservation. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 79 S.Ct. 269, 3 L.Ed.2d 251 (1959); see also Felix S. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law at 342 (1982); A-1 Contractors v. Strate, 76 F.3d 930, 934-35 (8th Cir.1996). Thus, the tribal court properly exercised jurisdiction over this action and principles of comity and deference preclude this Court from further review of the tribal court’s ruling. See Iowa Mutual Ins. Co., 480 U.S. at 19, 107 S.Ct. 971. Finally, given the disposition of the Band and Genia’s motion to dismiss with prejudice, the Court is unaware of any compelling reason why Davis’s claims against Bankey should remain before the Court at this time. Thus, the Court will order Davis to show cause why the action against Bankey should not be dismissed without prejudice. Davis shall have until December 4,1998 to respond to the Order to show cause. Accordingly, upon review of the files, motions, and proceedings herein. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED That: 1. Defendants Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians and James Genia’s motion to dismiss with prejudice is GRANTED and the action is DISMISSED with prejudice as to the Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians and James Genia; 2. Plaintiff Gina Davis show cause to the Court why her claims against defendant R. James Bankey should not be dismissed without prejudice. Such a showing shall be filed with the Court on or before December 4, 1998, and if good cause is not shown by such date, plaintiffs claim against defendant R. James Bankey shall be dismissed without prejudice.

The Band and Genia move for dismissal of this action on two grounds. First, the moving defendants argue that Davis failed to exhaust tribal remedies and that such a failure is a bar to the Court’s review of tribal court jurisdiction. Next, the moving defendants claim that even if Davis had exhausted her tribal remedies, the tribal court correctly determined it possessed jurisdiction over Davis’s claim. Davis concedes that she failed to exhaust tribal remedies but opposes the Band and Genia’s motion for dismissal by arguing that her failure to exhaust was excused because the tribal court was biased against her and exhaustion was futile, the Band had expressly waived its immunity in Minn. Stat. § 626.90, and the defendants and the court asserted tribal court jurisdiction in bad faith. “[CJonsiderations of comity direct that tribal remedies be exhausted before the question [of tribal court jurisdiction] is addressed by the District Court.” Iowa Mutual Ins. Co., 480 U.S. at 15, 107 S.Ct. 971. The exhaustion requirement encourages the Federal Government’s policy of tribal self-government, ensures that “a full record is developed in the Tribal Court before either the merits or any question concerning appropriate relief is addressed,” and provides an opportunity for the tribal court system to explain its basis for asserting jurisdiction. See Duncan Energy, 27 F.3d at 1299-1300. Once tribal remedies are exhausted, a federal court may then review the tribal court’s decision regarding jurisdiction. If jurisdiction was proper in the tribal court, “proper deference ... precludes relitigation of issues raised and resolved in the tribal court.” Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 19, 107 S.Ct. 971. Thus, the Court must answer only the following questions to resolve the pending motion: 1) was Davis’s failure to exhaust her tribal remedies excused; and 2) if her failure to exhaust was excused, did the Tribal Court have jurisdiction over Davis’s action. “At a minimum, exhaustion of tribal remedies means that tribal appellate courts must have the opportunity to review the determinations of the lower tribal court.” LaPlante, 480 U.S. at 17, 107 S.Ct. 971. However, a party’s failure to exhaust tribal remedies may be excused where: an assertion of tribal jurisdiction is motivated by a desire to harass or is conducted in bad faith, or where the action is patently violative of express jurisdictional prohibitions, or where exhaustion would be futile because of the lack of an adequate opportunity to challenge the [tribal] court’s jurisdiction. National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 856 n. 21, 105 S.Ct. 2447, 85 L.Ed.2d 818 (1985). Davis alleges that her failure to exhaust tribal remedies is excused on the grounds of bias and bad faith. There is no evidence in the record, however, to support either of these claims. Davis’s response to the pending motion brings to mind the quote by Louis Nizer that “When a man points a finger at someone else, he should remember that four of his fingers are pointing at himself.” Davis strives to excuse her failure to timely appeal the Tribal Court’s Final Judgment by alleging that the Special Magistrate and the Tribal Appellate Court were biased and failed to provide a fair and just forum for her action. However, Davis’s attorney conceded that his failure to file a timely appeal from the Final Judgment was due to his neglect and unfamiliarity with tribal court rules. Plaintiff has presented no evidence, beyond her bare allegations, that she was treated unfairly by the tribal court system and the i-ecord actually reflects the opposite. On several occasions the Special Magistrate granted Davis special consideration, for example, by allowing Davis to orally amend her complaint and considering arguments in Davis’s favor that she had failed to raise for herself. A review of the summary judgment order written by the Special Magistrate evidences only thoughtful and careful review of the issues in Davis’s action. Davis’s claim that the Tribal Appel*1179late Court treated her unfairly are also without basis. The Appellate Court ruled against Davis on the issue of her late appeal, an understandable decision that reflects no bias. In addition, the Appellate Court disbarred Davis’s attorney because of his failure to monitor Davis’s case and abide by the Court of Central Jurisdiction’s rules. Such an act was clearly within the Appellate Court’s discretion, and does not reflect bias toward Davis or her legal position. Similarly, Davis’s claim of bad faith is based only on Davis’s allegations, and is unsupported by the record. Davis’s failure to exhaust tribal remedies is, standing alone, sufficient grounds for granting the pending motion. However, even if Davis had exhausted her tribal remedies, there is no question the Tribal Court had jurisdiction over Davis’s claims. Davis is a member of the Band, and the Defendants are tribal entities. Davis’s claims involve the Band’s police department, and occurred on the Band’s reservation. Tribal Courts possess exclusive jurisdiction over a suit between members of its Tribe arising on its reservation. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 79 S.Ct. 269, 3 L.Ed.2d 251 (1959); see also Felix S. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law at 342 (1982); A-1 Contractors v. Strate, 76 F.3d 930, 934-35 (8th Cir.1996). Thus, the tribal court properly exercised jurisdiction over this action and principles of comity and deference preclude this Court from further review of the tribal court’s ruling. See Iowa Mutual Ins. Co., 480 U.S. at 19, 107 S.Ct. 971. Finally, given the disposition of the Band and Genia’s motion to dismiss with prejudice, the Court is unaware of any compelling reason why Davis’s claims against Bankey should remain before the Court at this time. Thus, the Court will order Davis to show cause why the action against Bankey should not be dismissed without prejudice. Davis shall have until December 4,1998 to respond to the Order to show cause. Accordingly, upon review of the files, motions, and proceedings herein. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED That: 1. Defendants Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians and James Genia’s motion to dismiss with prejudice is GRANTED and the action is DISMISSED with prejudice as to the Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians and James Genia; 2. Plaintiff Gina Davis show cause to the Court why her claims against defendant R. James Bankey should not be dismissed without prejudice. Such a showing shall be filed with the Court on or before December 4, 1998, and if good cause is not shown by such date, plaintiffs claim against defendant R. James Bankey shall be dismissed without prejudice.