§ 632.11

State v. Underdahl · 2009 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

State v. Rambahal · 2008 2 citations [Dissent]

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

State v. Barrett · 2005 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Joon Kyu Kim · 1987 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

State v. Abraham · 1983 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Cain · 1988 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Grohoski · 1986 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Aarsvold · 1985 7 citations

I Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 28.04, subd. 1, provides: The prosecuting attorney may appeal as of right to the Court of Appeals: (1) in any case, from any pretrial order of the trial court except an order dismissing a complaint for lack of probable cause to believe the defendant has committed an offense * * *. The parties have not cited any cases construing this rule, nor has our research disclosed any. There are, however, numerous cases interpreting both Minn. Stat. § 632.11[1] and Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 29.03, subd. 1,[2] which superceded Minn. Stat. § 632.11 in 1975 and is the predecessor of the current rule. In State v. Maki, 291 Minn. 427, 192 N.W.2d 811 (1971), the supreme court, construing *520 Minn. Stat. § 632.11, stated that the prosecution has a right to appeal "where the order appealed from effectively defeats or prevents successful prosecutive action against the defendant." Maki, 291 Minn. at 428, 192 N.W.2d at 812. If the State could present the matter to another magistrate with some chance of success, then the order dismissing the complaint would not be appealable. This interpretation continued under Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 29.03. In State v. Shaw, 264 N.W.2d 397 (Minn. 1978), the State appealed from an order dismissing a complaint for lack of probable cause after the trial court suppressed a transcript of an interview with the defendant. The supreme court reasoned as follows: It thus appears that the prosecutor is not prevented from reissuing his complaint in slightly amended form, omitting the transcript of the interview but including references to the content of that interview as recalled by the investigator. Because of this, it is clear that appeal to this court will not lie from the order of dismissal. Rule 29.03, subd. 1, Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides that the state may appeal from any pretrial order except an order dismissing a complaint for lack of probable cause or an order dismissing a complaint pursuant to § 631.21 (which deals with dismissal of cases "in furtherance of justice"). The reason given by the comments for these exceptions to the general rule permitting appeal from pretrial orders is that they "represent situations in which the prosecuting authority does not need the right of appeal since it may reinstate its case by other means." Here it is clear that the prosecutor is free to reissue the complaint, and accordingly the appeal must be dismissed as from a nonappealable order. Shaw, 264 N.W.2d at 398 (citation omitted). This rationale was further applied in two DWI cases. In State v. Wicks, 258 N.W.2d 598 (Minn.1977), the trial court dismissed gross misdemeanor prosecutions under Minn. Stat. § 171.245 (1976) after ruling that the statute only applied to those drivers arrested for driving while intoxicated during the period of ineligibility for a new license. Similarly, in State v. Barutt, 312 N.W.2d 667 (Minn.1981), the trial court dismissed a gross misdemeanor prosecution under Minn. Stat. § 169.129 (1980) after ruling that the statute did not apply to revocations for driving while intoxicated in another state. Significantly, the supreme court held in both cases that the orders dismissing the prosecutions were appealable by the State. The rulings by the trial courts in these cases effectively prevented successful prosecutions against the defendants. The State realistically could not have approached other trial judges and requested those judges to interpret the statutes differently than had their colleagues. Thus, because the orders dismissing prosecutions in Wicks and in Barutt effectively prevented further prosecutions and made reissuing the complaints pointless, the orders were held to be appealable.[3] In the case before us, we cannot comprehend how the State could effectively reinstate the charge of felony murder predicated on sale of cocaine in the face of the trial court's order dismissing that charge. The determination made by the trial court in this case is solely a question of law. The State has no additional evidence to gather which would bolster its prosecution on this count. Because trial judges recognize that it is not their function to overrule the legal rulings of their colleagues, it is highly improbable that the State could successfully *521 bring the complaint to another judge. It is also undesirable to require the State to engage in "judge-shopping" in hopes of finding a judge who disagrees with his or her colleague's ruling. We therefore hold that this order is an appealable order under Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 28.04, subd. 1.

I Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 28.04, subd. 1, provides: The prosecuting attorney may appeal as of right to the Court of Appeals: (1) in any case, from any pretrial order of the trial court except an order dismissing a complaint for lack of probable cause to believe the defendant has committed an offense * * *. The parties have not cited any cases construing this rule, nor has our research disclosed any. There are, however, numerous cases interpreting both Minn. Stat. § 632.11[1] and Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 29.03, subd. 1,[2] which superceded Minn. Stat. § 632.11 in 1975 and is the predecessor of the current rule. In State v. Maki, 291 Minn. 427, 192 N.W.2d 811 (1971), the supreme court, construing *520 Minn. Stat. § 632.11, stated that the prosecution has a right to appeal "where the order appealed from effectively defeats or prevents successful prosecutive action against the defendant." Maki, 291 Minn. at 428, 192 N.W.2d at 812. If the State could present the matter to another magistrate with some chance of success, then the order dismissing the complaint would not be appealable. This interpretation continued under Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 29.03. In State v. Shaw, 264 N.W.2d 397 (Minn. 1978), the State appealed from an order dismissing a complaint for lack of probable cause after the trial court suppressed a transcript of an interview with the defendant. The supreme court reasoned as follows: It thus appears that the prosecutor is not prevented from reissuing his complaint in slightly amended form, omitting the transcript of the interview but including references to the content of that interview as recalled by the investigator. Because of this, it is clear that appeal to this court will not lie from the order of dismissal. Rule 29.03, subd. 1, Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides that the state may appeal from any pretrial order except an order dismissing a complaint for lack of probable cause or an order dismissing a complaint pursuant to § 631.21 (which deals with dismissal of cases "in furtherance of justice"). The reason given by the comments for these exceptions to the general rule permitting appeal from pretrial orders is that they "represent situations in which the prosecuting authority does not need the right of appeal since it may reinstate its case by other means." Here it is clear that the prosecutor is free to reissue the complaint, and accordingly the appeal must be dismissed as from a nonappealable order. Shaw, 264 N.W.2d at 398 (citation omitted). This rationale was further applied in two DWI cases. In State v. Wicks, 258 N.W.2d 598 (Minn.1977), the trial court dismissed gross misdemeanor prosecutions under Minn. Stat. § 171.245 (1976) after ruling that the statute only applied to those drivers arrested for driving while intoxicated during the period of ineligibility for a new license. Similarly, in State v. Barutt, 312 N.W.2d 667 (Minn.1981), the trial court dismissed a gross misdemeanor prosecution under Minn. Stat. § 169.129 (1980) after ruling that the statute did not apply to revocations for driving while intoxicated in another state. Significantly, the supreme court held in both cases that the orders dismissing the prosecutions were appealable by the State. The rulings by the trial courts in these cases effectively prevented successful prosecutions against the defendants. The State realistically could not have approached other trial judges and requested those judges to interpret the statutes differently than had their colleagues. Thus, because the orders dismissing prosecutions in Wicks and in Barutt effectively prevented further prosecutions and made reissuing the complaints pointless, the orders were held to be appealable.[3] In the case before us, we cannot comprehend how the State could effectively reinstate the charge of felony murder predicated on sale of cocaine in the face of the trial court's order dismissing that charge. The determination made by the trial court in this case is solely a question of law. The State has no additional evidence to gather which would bolster its prosecution on this count. Because trial judges recognize that it is not their function to overrule the legal rulings of their colleagues, it is highly improbable that the State could successfully *521 bring the complaint to another judge. It is also undesirable to require the State to engage in "judge-shopping" in hopes of finding a judge who disagrees with his or her colleague's ruling. We therefore hold that this order is an appealable order under Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 28.04, subd. 1.

I Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 28.04, subd. 1, provides: The prosecuting attorney may appeal as of right to the Court of Appeals: (1) in any case, from any pretrial order of the trial court except an order dismissing a complaint for lack of probable cause to believe the defendant has committed an offense * * *. The parties have not cited any cases construing this rule, nor has our research disclosed any. There are, however, numerous cases interpreting both Minn. Stat. § 632.11[1] and Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 29.03, subd. 1,[2] which superceded Minn. Stat. § 632.11 in 1975 and is the predecessor of the current rule. In State v. Maki, 291 Minn. 427, 192 N.W.2d 811 (1971), the supreme court, construing *520 Minn. Stat. § 632.11, stated that the prosecution has a right to appeal "where the order appealed from effectively defeats or prevents successful prosecutive action against the defendant." Maki, 291 Minn. at 428, 192 N.W.2d at 812. If the State could present the matter to another magistrate with some chance of success, then the order dismissing the complaint would not be appealable. This interpretation continued under Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 29.03. In State v. Shaw, 264 N.W.2d 397 (Minn. 1978), the State appealed from an order dismissing a complaint for lack of probable cause after the trial court suppressed a transcript of an interview with the defendant. The supreme court reasoned as follows: It thus appears that the prosecutor is not prevented from reissuing his complaint in slightly amended form, omitting the transcript of the interview but including references to the content of that interview as recalled by the investigator. Because of this, it is clear that appeal to this court will not lie from the order of dismissal. Rule 29.03, subd. 1, Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides that the state may appeal from any pretrial order except an order dismissing a complaint for lack of probable cause or an order dismissing a complaint pursuant to § 631.21 (which deals with dismissal of cases "in furtherance of justice"). The reason given by the comments for these exceptions to the general rule permitting appeal from pretrial orders is that they "represent situations in which the prosecuting authority does not need the right of appeal since it may reinstate its case by other means." Here it is clear that the prosecutor is free to reissue the complaint, and accordingly the appeal must be dismissed as from a nonappealable order. Shaw, 264 N.W.2d at 398 (citation omitted). This rationale was further applied in two DWI cases. In State v. Wicks, 258 N.W.2d 598 (Minn.1977), the trial court dismissed gross misdemeanor prosecutions under Minn. Stat. § 171.245 (1976) after ruling that the statute only applied to those drivers arrested for driving while intoxicated during the period of ineligibility for a new license. Similarly, in State v. Barutt, 312 N.W.2d 667 (Minn.1981), the trial court dismissed a gross misdemeanor prosecution under Minn. Stat. § 169.129 (1980) after ruling that the statute did not apply to revocations for driving while intoxicated in another state. Significantly, the supreme court held in both cases that the orders dismissing the prosecutions were appealable by the State. The rulings by the trial courts in these cases effectively prevented successful prosecutions against the defendants. The State realistically could not have approached other trial judges and requested those judges to interpret the statutes differently than had their colleagues. Thus, because the orders dismissing prosecutions in Wicks and in Barutt effectively prevented further prosecutions and made reissuing the complaints pointless, the orders were held to be appealable.[3] In the case before us, we cannot comprehend how the State could effectively reinstate the charge of felony murder predicated on sale of cocaine in the face of the trial court's order dismissing that charge. The determination made by the trial court in this case is solely a question of law. The State has no additional evidence to gather which would bolster its prosecution on this count. Because trial judges recognize that it is not their function to overrule the legal rulings of their colleagues, it is highly improbable that the State could successfully *521 bring the complaint to another judge. It is also undesirable to require the State to engage in "judge-shopping" in hopes of finding a judge who disagrees with his or her colleague's ruling. We therefore hold that this order is an appealable order under Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 28.04, subd. 1.

+ 4 more citations in this opinion.