Referring us to Minn. Stat. § 645.21 (1986), Ralph contends that the above-quoted disposition in favor of permanency may not be applied to this maintenance order dated June 28, 1985. IÍ is true that 1985 Minn.Laws ch. 266, § 2, which incorporated into section 518.552 the whole of subdivision 3 and the above-quoted references in subdivision 2 to the standard of living established during the marriage and the loss of employment opportunities and benefits, does not specify retroactivity. Nor does the act, approved on May 31, 1985, specify an effective date other than August 1. Minn. Stat. § 645.02 (1986). Nevertheless, the legislature has clearly manifested its unmistakable intention that the 1985 enactment was not intended to change the intent of the statute but only to correct the interpretation. 1985 Minn.Laws ch. 266, § 2 is entitled “An act * * * clarifying factors to consider in awarding maintenance in marriage dissolution actions.” We have previously held that a clarifying act is to be read into statutory law retrospectively. Holman v. All Nation Ins. Co., 288 N.W.2d 244 (Minn.1980). Even more compelling evidence of an intent that the clarification should have retrospective application is found in the legislative history of this amendment to Minn. Stat. § 518.552. 10

Marose v. Maislin Transport · 1987 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Haugen v. Peterson · 1987 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Lovgren v. Peoples Elec. Co., Inc. · 1986 2 citations

Minn. Stat. § 645.21 provides: “No law shall be construed to be retroactive unless clearly and manifestly so intended by the legislature.” To apply the current section 541.051 2-year statute of limitations to claims existing in 1980 under a 6-year statute of limitations is clearly the retroactive application of the law. Furthermore, as this court has stated: “Generally, it is immaterial whether a law alters procedural or substantive rights; the legislature must still express its intention to make it retroactive.” In re Estate of Murphy v. State Department of Public Welfare, 293 Minn. 298, 308, 198 N.W.2d 570, 576 (1972); see also Cooper v. Watson, 290 Minn. 362, 187 N.W.2d 689 (1971). 7 Thus, the issue is whether the legislature clearly and manifestly expressed its intention that section 541.051 be retroactively applied to claims such as Lovgren’s which were existing in 1980 under the 6-year limitations period. It is respondent Peoples Electric’s position *796 that the requisite legislative intent was expressed by the 115-day delay period between the statute effective date and its enactment date.

Bertrand v. API, Inc. · 1985 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Bethune Associates v. County of Hennepin · 1985 1 citation

1. No law shall be construed to be retroactive unless clearly and manifestly so intended by the legislature. Minn. Stat. § 645.21

Duluth Firemen's Relief Ass'n v. City of Duluth · 1985 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Hengemuhle v. Long Prairie Jaycees · 1984 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Krause v. Merickel · 1984 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Kahn v. State, University of Minnesota · 1982 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Lucas v. Grain Belt Brewing Co. · 1982 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Solberg v. FMC Corp., Northern Ordinance Division · 1982 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Buchholz v. Capp Homes, Inc. · 1982 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Calder v. City of Crystal · 1982 2 citations

The city’s position is that when the events giving rise to this lawsuit occurred in June and July of 1978, the city had an inchoate right to contribution or indemnity. It argues that the application of section 541.051, which became effective on August 1,1980, to its cause of action would give the statute retroactive application, 1 contrary to Minn. Stat. § 645.21 (1980). 2 The keystone *841 to the city’s argument is its claim that it had acquired a cause of action prior to the effective date of Minn. Stat. § 541.051 (1980).

BENEDICTINE SISTERS BENEV. ASS'N v. Pettersen · 1980 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Benedictine Sisters Benevolent Ass'n v. Pettersen · 1980 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Klimmek v. Independent School District No. 487 · 1980 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Parish v. Quie · 1980 1 citation

Appellant also argues that although his appointment to the commission preceded the operative date of the amendment, the amendment nonetheless applies. Retroactive applications of statutes, however, are not favored and will be given effect only when such intent is clearly and manifestly shown on the face of the statute. Minn. Stat. § 645.21 (1978); Brugger v. Brugger, 303 Minn. 488, 229 N.W.2d 131 (1975); Cooper v. Watson, 290 Minn. 362, 187 N.W.2d 689 (1971); Ekstrom v. Harmon, 256 Minn. 166, 98 N.W.2d 241 (1959); Chapman v. Davis, 233 Minn. 62, 45 N.W.2d 822 (1951); George Benz Sons, Inc. v. Schenley Distillers Corp., 227 Minn. 249, 35 N.W.2d 436 (1948). We perceive no such intent from the terms of the 1976 amendment.

Minnesota Court of Appeals

In the Matter of Temphy Thompson�s Verified Application for Compensation from the Contractor Recovery Fund. · 2016 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

In re the Marriage of: James Walter Shaw v. Barbara Ann Shaw · 2016 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

In re the Marriage of: Jacob Anthony Pulsifer v. Julie Ann Pulsifer · 2015 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

In Re the Custody of: A. J. O. David Ortiz v. Sarah Judith Un · 2015 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Ivan Ray Vaughan v. Wade Setter, Superintendant, Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension in his official capacity · 2014 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Ruikkie v. Nall · 2011 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Bearder v. State · 2010 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

In Re Individual 35w Bridge Litigation · 2010 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

U.S. Home Corp. v. Zimmerman Stucco & Plaster, Inc. · 2008 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Sletto v. Wesley Construction, Inc. · 2007 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Conaway v. St. Louis County · 2005 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Yeh v. County of Cass · 2005 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. McDonnell · 2004 1 citation

(quotation omitted). But, “[n]o law shall be construed to be retroactive unless clearly and manifestly so intended by the legislature.” Minn. Stat. § 645.21 (2002).

State v. Lilleskov · 2003 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Morton v. DYSTE · 2001 7 citations

+ 7 more citations in this opinion.

Gomon v. Northland Family Physicians, Ltd. · 2001 8 citations

+ 8 more citations in this opinion.

Meyer v. Best Western Seville Plaza Hotel · 1997 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Freundschuh v. Freundschuh · 1997 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State Department of Labor & Industry Ex Rel. Special Compensation Fund v. Wintz Parcel Drivers, Inc. · 1996 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Larson v. Babcock & Wilcox · 1994 1 citation

Larson, Nelson, and Stadem’s claim may stand if it is revived by retroactive application of the 1990 amendment. No law shall be construed as retroactive unless the legislature clearly manifests such an intent. Minn. Stat. § 645.21. (1992). The legislature can constitutionally modify time limitations and thereby divest a party of previously obtained rights. Independent School Dist. No. 197 v. W.R. Grace & Co., 752 F.Supp. 286, 298 (D.Minn.1990). In Grace, the statute clearly stated that it revived or extended *592 asbestos claims that would otherwise be barred. Id.

Doe v. Brainerd International Raceway, Inc. · 1994 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Lassen v. First Bank Eden Prairie · 1994 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Baron v. Lens Crafters, Inc. · 1994 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Geldert v. American National Bank · 1993 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Wenner v. Farm Credit Bank of St. Paul · 1993 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

American Family Mutual Insurance Co. v. Lindsay · 1993 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Lessard v. Milwaukee Insurance Co. · 1993 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

New Creative Enterprises, Inc. v. Dick Hume & Associates, Inc. · 1993 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Marriage of Braatz v. Braatz · 1992 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Midwest Family Mutual Insurance v. Bleick · 1992 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Dear v. Minneapolis Fire Department Relief Ass'n · 1992 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Pirkov-Middaugh Ex Rel. Middaugh v. Gillette Children's Hospital · 1992 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Farm Credit Bank of St. Paul v. Ahrenstorff · 1992 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Ludowese v. Redmann · 1991 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Wschola v. Snyder · 1991 6 citations

+ 6 more citations in this opinion.

Hahn v. Tri-Line Farmers Co-Op · 1991 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Marriage of Dabrowski v. Dabrowski · 1991 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Jlb v. Teb · 1991 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

J.L.B. v. T.E.B. · 1991 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Law Enforcement Labor Services, Inc. v. County of Mower · 1991 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Tessman Seed & Chemical Co. v. State · 1991 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Omdahl v. Hadler · 1990 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

K.E. v. Hoffman · 1990 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

In re the Welfare of S.C.C. · 1990 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

In re Estate of Hanson · 1990 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Borich v. Borich · 1990 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Paulson v. Lapa, Inc. · 1990 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Carlson v. Lilyerd · 1989 4 citations

+ 4 more citations in this opinion.

In Re Estate of Edhlund · 1989 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Olsen v. Special School Dist. No. 1 · 1988 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Amer. Fam. Ins. v. Metro. Transit Com'n · 1988 1 citation

ANALYSIS In reviewing a summary judgment, this court must determine whether any genuine issues of material fact exist and whether the trial court erred in its application of the law. Betlach v. Wayzata Condominium, 281 N.W.2d 328, 330 (Minn.1979). Because the operative facts of this litigation are not disputed, the standard of review is limited to a determination of whether the trial court erred in its application of the law. See A.J. Chromy Construction Company v. Commercial Mechanical Services, Inc., 260 N.W.2d 579, 581 (Minn. 1977). Because this issue is purely legal in nature, this court need not give deference to the decision of the trial court. Frost-Benco Electric Association v. Minnesota Public Utilities Commission, 358 N.W.2d 639, 642 (Minn.1984). The Minnesota Legislature specified that the 1986 amendment to Minnesota Statute § 65B.47, subd. 1 was to have an effective date of March 26, 1986. 1986 Minn. Laws ch. 455 § 95. The reason for this dispute, however, is that the legislature did not expressly state whether the amendment would apply prospectively to all future claims for basic economic loss benefits or simply to all future accidents. There is no dispute that at the date of the accident, MTC was the primary provider of no-fault benefits to Ms. Vincent. MTC argues that the background and purpose of the No-Fault Act generally, as well as the specific statutory provisions, reveal that the legislature intended this amendment to apply retroactively to accidents which occurred prior to this amendment. In Minnesota no statute shall be construed to be applied retroactively unless "clearly and manifestly so intended by the legislature." Minn. Stat. § 645.21 (1986). In following this legislative mandate, the supreme court has held that before a statute will be afforded retroactive application, there must exist clear evidence that the legislature intended retroactive application, "such as mention of the word `retroactive'." Duluth Firemen's Relief Association v. City of Duluth, 361 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn.1985). In attempting to ascertain whether the legislature intended that a statute be retroactively applied, the supreme court has stated, "it is immaterial in this state whether a law alters procedural or substantive rights; the legislature still must express its intention to make it [the statute in question] retroactive." In re Estate of Murphy v. State Department of Public Welfare, 293 Minn. 298, 308, 198 N.W.2d 570, 576 (1972). "Retroactive applications of statutes, however, are not favored and will be given effect only when such intent is clearly and manifestly shown on the face of the statute." Andros v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co., 359 N.W.2d 46, 47 (Minn.Ct.App. 1984), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 12, 1985) (quoting Parish v. Quie, 294 N.W.2d 317, 318 (Minn.1980)) (emphasis added). No such intent is shown by this legislation. Further, we are of the opinion that MTC's interpretation of the retroactive application of the statute does not comport with basic contract law. An insurance policy, like any other contract, is customarily governed by the law in effect at the time the policy is issued or the contract is made. Amco Insurance Co. v. Lang, 420 N.W.2d 895, 898 (Minn.1988). Since a statute operates prospectively unless the legislative language clearly indicates that it should apply retrospectively, a statute enacted during the term of an insurance *828 policy does not usually apply to that policy until the policy is renewed. Id. See also Hauer v. Integrity Mutual Insurance Co., 352 N.W.2d 406, 408 (Minn.1984) (underinsured motorist coverage will not be read into policies renewed after date of repeal of mandatory offer). As a practical matter, the No-Fault Act when first adopted was to apply only to accidents occuring after its effective date. 1974 Minn. Laws ch. 408 § 35. With few exceptions, amendments to the No-Fault Act have been prospective in nature, fixing the date of loss and the rights and obligations of the parties as of the date of accident or injury. MTC further contends an insurer's obligation under the entire Minnesota No-Fault Act is premised on when loss accrues. Minn. Stat. § 65B.54, governing a "reparation obligor's duty to respond to claims" provides: Basic economic loss benefits are payable monthly as loss accrues. Loss accrues not when injury occurs, but as income loss, replacement services loss, survivor's economic loss, survivor's replacement service loss, or a medical or funeral expense is incurred. Minn. Stat. § 65B.54, subd. 1 (1986). Respondent maintains that the significant event for interpreting the no-fault benefit payment provisions of the Act is when the claim for basic economic loss benefits arises, not when the accident causing injury occurs. MTC's argument is without merit. There is no single purpose behind the Minnesota No-Fault Act. Minn. Stat. § 65B.42 (1986) recognizes and expressly states several specific purposes. See Galle v. Excalibur Insurance Co., 317 N.W.2d 368 (Minn.1982) (the supreme court used the purpose section to emphasize that the coverage was to be tied to automobile accidents). In addition, Minn. Stat. § 65B.54 is an enforcement provision and imposes a 15% interest penalty upon a reparation obligor who has failed to timely pay benefits. The date of loss as defined in Minn. Stat. § 65B.54 relates to the date of imposition of the penalty, not the date to determine priority of payment between conflicting reparation obligors. In Hoben v. City of Minneapolis, 324 N.W.2d 161 (Minn.1982), the supreme court dealt with reparation security statutes, Minn. Stat. §§ 65B.48, subd. 4 (1980) and 65B.61, subd. 2 (1980), as they apply to an employee injured in an automobile collision in the course of his employment. The supreme court held that: (1) Minn. Stat. § 65B.48 requires that municipalities provide reparation security for economic loss benefits arising out of the use of municipally owned motor vehicles; and (2) under statute pertaining to automobile insurance, Minn. Stat. § 56B.54, it was the intent of the legislature to deal prospectively with future payments of all basic economic loss benefits, regardless of when the incident giving rise to the claim occurred. Id. at 162 and 163. This case is quite different. In Hoben, the supreme court determined that the amendment in question was merely a clarification of the intent of the statute. "[T]here is little doubt but that the legislature's prompt reaction to our construction of the applicable statutes indicates not a change in legislative policy but a disagreement with our understanding of the legislative intent in initially adopting the statutes, it is not a question of retroactivity but more nearly akin to a clarification." Id. at 163 (emphasis added). In the present case the amendment is far from being a mere clarification. The amendment shifts the burden of responsibility for injuries sustained while on an MTC bus. There is nothing in the language of the amendment itself which indicates it is merely a clarification. MTC also claims that since the amendment is remedial in nature it should be liberally construed for the benefit of the MTC. MTC fails to demonstrate, however, that this idea of statutory construction evades the strong disfavor of retroactive legislation. Generally, adoption of an amendment creates a presumption that the *829 legislature intended to change pre-existing law. State by Spannaus v. Coin Wholesalers, Inc., 311 Minn. 346, 353-54, 250 N.W.2d 583, 587 (1976). When the language of an amendment is intended to clarify rather than enlarge the powers of the original statute, the presumption is rebutted. Id. at 354, 250 N.W.2d at 588. This is not the case here. American Family claims that retroactive application of the 1986 amendment to Minn. Stat. § 65B.47, subd. 1 would result in an unconstitutional impairment of contract rights in violation of article 1, section 10, clause 1 of the United States Constitution and of article 1, section 11 of the Minnesota Constitution. Because this court finds that the 1986 amendment applies prospectively, it need not address the constitutional analysis advanced by the appellant. An elementary principle of statutory construction is that the court will not determine the constitutionality of a statute unless it is absolutely necessary to determine the merits of the suit. See Midland Glass Company, Inc. v. City of Shakopee, 303 Minn. 134, 138, 226 N.W.2d 324, 326 (1975); Baugh v. Norman County, 140 Minn. 465, 467, 168 N.W. 348, 349 (1918).

LaVan Ex Rel. LaVan v. Community Clinic of Wabasha · 1988 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

American Family Insurance v. Metropolitan Transit Commission · 1988 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Keating v. Philip Morris, Inc. · 1987 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Tibbetts v. Crossroads, Inc. · 1987 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Voss v. Duerscherl · 1987 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Hegg · 1987 1 citation

. The delay in resolving appellant’s motion was unreasonable. Sentencing matters should be promptly resolved by the trial court. See, as to original sentencing hearings, Minn. Stat. § 244.-10, subd. 1 (1986) and Minn.R.Crim.P. 27.03, subd. 1(F) (order to be entered within 20 days after the sentencing hearing). The correction motion here was pursuant to Minn.R.Crim.P. 27.03, subd. 9. The silence of this provision on the time for a decision does not warrant delay such as occurred here. It is evident that the delay here was prompted by the trial court’s interest in a prospective change in guidelines policy on the effective date of modifications. However, any such change would not likely have retroactive application. ' See generally Minn. Stat. § 645.21 (1986).