632 N.W.2d 549 (2001) Mariah PUSUSTA, Respondent, v. STATE FARM INSURANCE COMPANIES, Petitioner, Appellant. No. C8-99-1068. Supreme Court of Minnesota. July 19, 2001. *550 Robert W. Roe, Thomas J. Lyons & Associates, P.A., St. Paul, for respondent. William M. Hart, Katherine A. McBride, Jenneane L. Jansen, Meagher & Geer, P.L.L.P., Minneapolis, for appellant. Heard, considered, and decided by the court en banc. OPINION ANDERSON, RUSSELL A., Justice. In mandatory arbitration, respondent Mariah Pususta sought no-fault medical expense benefits from her insurance carrier, appellant State Farm Insurance Companies (State Farm), for injuries she sustained in an automobile accident on December 6, 1997. We are asked to review the no-fault arbitrator's legal conclusion, upheld by the district court and affirmed by the court of appeals, that the arbitrator is precluded from considering whether some of the claimed medical expenses were for injuries that resulted from a prior nonautomobile accident, and if so, whether reimbursement for such expenses should be denied. We reverse and remand. Pususta was in an automobile accident on December 6, 1997. At that time, she was receiving chiropractic care for back and neck injuries she sustained five years earlier in a horse-riding accident. In 1994, *551 her chiropractor requested that her health insurance carrier allow 24 chiropractic visits per year to treat the injuries sustained in the horse-riding accident. In 1997, Pususta visited the chiropractor once a month until the automobile accident in December. Following the accident, Pususta's pain worsened and her chiropractor concluded that the auto accident had exacerbated her prior injuries. After the accident, Pususta received more frequent chiropractic care: seven times in December 1997, nine times in January, eight times in February, nine times in March, seven times in April, twice in May, once in June, twice in July, and twice in August. Pususta had a no-fault automobile insurance policy with State Farm. Following the accident, State Farm reimbursed Pususta for the medical care she received for her injuries through February 1998, but State Farm refused to provide further coverage until Pususta submitted to an independent medical exam (IME). Pususta attended an IME on July 16, 1998. The independent medical examiner concluded that some of Pususta's injuries were caused by the earlier horse-riding accident and that chiropractic care for injuries arising out of the auto accident was warranted only through the first week in April 1998. State Farm informed Pususta that on this basis it would provide coverage only for expenses incurred through the first week of April. Pususta sought arbitration of the dispute and coverage for all chiropractic care through September 16, 1998, the date of the arbitration. State Farm argued it should not be required to pay for medical expenses incurred after the first week in April because the remaining medical expenses were due to the horse-riding injury and further treatment for any injuries related to the automobile accident was not reasonable or necessary. State Farm also argued that if it were required to pay for any medical care received after the first week in April, the expenses should be apportioned based on the degree to which the automobile accident caused the injuries. Specifically, State Farm asked that it not be required to pay for the 24 chiropractic visits per year that the chiropractor requested for the injuries that existed before the auto accident. The arbitrator awarded Pususta all of her medical expenses through August 1998. In his written conclusions, the arbitrator stated that the facts of the case "would call for apportionment, based upon the prior accident," but that our decision in Great West Casualty Co. v. Northland Ins. Co., 548 N.W.2d 279 (Minn.1996), precluded him from doing so. State Farm appealed. The district court upheld the award, and the court of appeals affirmed, concluding that under Great West, it was not clear that that the arbitrator erred by refusing to apportion medical expenses. See Pususta v. State Farm Ins. Cos., No. C8-99-1068, 1999 WL 1101388 (Minn.App.1999). We granted review to consider the no-fault arbitrator's conclusion that he was precluded by our decision in Great West from considering whether a portion of the claimed medical expenses resulted from injuries caused by the horse-riding accident and whether reimbursement for such expenses should be denied. No-fault arbitrators are limited to deciding questions of fact and their legal determinations are subject to de novo review by the courts. Weaver v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 609 N.W.2d 878, 882 (Minn.2000). The issue before us is a legal determination, which we review de novo. Nathe Bros., Inc. v. Am. Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 615 N.W.2d 341, 344 (Minn.2000). We begin our analysis of the issue by examining the provisions of the Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance *552 Act[1] (No-Fault Act) relating to reimbursement of medical expenses. Our primary objective in interpreting statutory language is to give effect to the legislature's intent as expressed in the language of the statute. Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2000). The No-Fault Act provides that an injured person, such as Pususta, is entitled to medical expense reimbursement "for all loss suffered through injury arising out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle * * *." Minn. Stat. § 65B.44, subd. 1 (2000) (emphasis added). The term "loss" is defined as economic detriment, which includes medical expenses "resulting from the accident causing the injury." Minn. Stat. § 65B.43, subd. 7 (2000) (emphasis added). The statutory language thus incorporates the element of causation into the determination of what losses are reimbursable. The question that the trier of fact, in this case the arbitrator, must determine under the No-Fault Act is whether the medical expenses Pususta claims result from injuries arising out of, or caused by, the use or maintenance of a motor vehicle; that is, whether the medical expenses claimed are for injuries caused by the automobile accident. We have set forth three general considerations for determining whether an injury arose out of the use of a motor vehicle. See Cont'l W. Ins. Co. v. Klug, 415 N.W.2d 876, 878 (Minn.1987). In the case of this car accident, we are concerned only with the first consideration, which is the extent of causation between the automobile and the injury. Id.[2] The causal connection is established if "the injury is a natural and reasonable incident or consequence of the use of the vehicle." N. River Ins. Co. v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 346 N.W.2d 109, 114 (Minn.1984) (quoting Tlougan v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 310 N.W.2d 116, 117 (Minn.1981)). As applied to this case, the arbitrator appeared to question whether all of the medical expenses Pususta claimed resulted from injuries caused by the car accident, but he declined to answer the question, referring to such a determination as an "apportionment" of expenses caused by the horse-riding accident and expenses caused by the auto accident. The arbitrator determined that the facts of this case called for such an apportionment, but he interpreted our decision in Great West to prohibit the apportionment of damages where two separate accidents contributed to an injury. See 548 N.W.2d at 281.[3] In Great West, the insured injured his shoulder in 1988 in an accident that arose out of the use of a motor vehicle while he was working. Id. at 279. At the time he was insured by and received no-fault benefits from Northland Insurance Company. Id. In June 1991, the insured re-injured his shoulder, again arising out of use of a *553 motor vehicle. Id. At that time, Great West was his insurance carrier and it promptly provided coverage for his economic losses related to the injury. Id. at 279-80. By May 1992, Great West had paid more than $15,000 in no-fault benefits for the shoulder injury. Id. at 280. Great West brought a subrogation and contribution action against Northland under Minn. Stat. § 65B.47 (2000), which establishes the priority for coverages available when the loss results from use of a vehicle for employment. For example, the statute provides that if a person is insured in a vehicle provided by his employer, basic economic loss benefits are to be provided by the insurance carrier covering the vehicle, or, if none, the carrier covering the injured person. Minn. Stat. § 65B.47, subd. 1 (2000). The statute provides that where two or more obligations to pay benefits are applicable, the reparation obligor against whom a claim is asserted must pay the claim as if wholly responsible, but that obligor may bring an action for contribution against other obligors. Id., subd. 5. The statute also allows for an action in subrogation. Id., subd. 6. Great West claimed that the injury for which it paid benefits was partially caused by the June 1988 accident when the claimant was insured by Northland and sought reimbursement under Minn. Stat. § 65B.47 from Northland for a portion of the benefits Great West paid its insured. Great West, 548 N.W.2d at 280. We were asked whether under section 65B.47, a no-fault carrier may by subrogation or contribution obtain reimbursement from another no-fault carrier for paid benefits that it contends were for injuries resulting from an earlier car accident, when the claimant was insured by the other carrier. We noted that subrogation in the no-fault context is purely a creature of statute and that the definition of "loss" under Minn. Stat. § 65B.43, subd. 7, implies that, for purposes of subrogation and contribution under section 65B.47, only one accident can be deemed the cause of an injury. Great West, 548 N.W.2d at 280-81. We concluded that the authorization for actions for subrogation and contribution in Minn. Stat. § 65B.47 does not apply to a multiple accident situation. Great West, 548 N.W.2d at 281. Great West is distinguishable from the case at bar because Great West involved subrogation and contribution claims under section 65B.47, which establishes priorities between insurers for a single accident. See Scheibel v. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co., 615 N.W.2d 34, 37 (Minn.2000) ("[O]ur holding in Great West only addressed whether an insurer has a right of subrogation under the no-fault act."). Here we deal with a more elementary and basic concern: whether the trier of fact, in this instance the arbitrator, may consider whether the medical expenses for which reimbursement is sought are for injuries caused by an earlier nonautomobile accident, in this instance a fall from a horse. Pususta nonetheless relies on language in Great West indicating that attribution of medical expenses to prior accidents or injuries is improper in the no-fault context. In explaining the imposition of the entire expense on Great West, we stated: Great West accepted [the claimant] as an insured with whatever physical condition he may have had at that time, and it is not for Great West to either refuse payment of benefits for that portion of his disability caused by a previous injury or is it to seek subrogation from Northland therefore. 548 N.W.2d at 281 (emphasis added).[4] The implication of this ruling in Great *554 West arose in Scheibel, where the claimant was injured in a March 1996 collision for which the insurer paid $3,558 in medical expenses. Less than two months later the claimant again injured his back in an auto accident requiring medical care. The insurer, the same for both accidents, attributed all medical expenses to coverage for the second accident, exhausting the $20,000 limit and leaving the claimant with approximately $6,500 in unpaid medical expenses. Scheibel, 615 N.W.2d at 36 n. 1. In Scheibel we noted that our statement in Great West regarding attributing benefits to a previous injury was "not a part of our holding." Scheibel, 615 N.W.2d at 38. We nonetheless relied on this language to require the insurer in Scheibel to pay the maximum policy limit for injuries "regardless of the extent to which each accident contributed to the injuries." 615 N.W.2d at 39. Thus, the question presented is whether our decisions in Great West and Scheibel, to the extent they reject attributing medical expenses to previous accidents, apply where the previous accident is not an automobile accident.[5] We stated in Scheibel: [The insurer] does not dispute that if Scheibel had been in two accidents and suffered distinct and separable injuries, medical expenses from each injury would have been separately compensable up to the policy maximum of $20,000 for each accident. We see no reason why the same principles should not apply when the second accident exacerbates an injury sustained in an earlier accident. It would be an absurd result to cut off recovery for an injury from the first accident merely because an intervening accident aggravates the same injury. 615 N.W.2d at 38-39.[6] Applying the same rationale used in Scheibel to these facts, *555 there can be no dispute that if Pususta had injured her foot in the horse-riding accident and injured her shoulder in the auto accident, medical expenses for the foot injury would not be attributable to the no-fault auto carrier. To hold the insurer liable for medical expenses resulting from a nonautomobile accident conflicts with the statutory language limiting the definition of loss to injuries "arising out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle * * *." Minn. Stat. § 65B.44, subd. 1.[7] Both Scheibel and Great West must be read in the context in which they arosea dispute over which no-fault policy the losses should be attributed to, where some of the losses arguably resulted from a prior auto accident. Great West stands for the proposition that where the legislature has not provided for contribution or subrogation between insurers in this context, we will not read such a right into the statute. 548 N.W.2d at 281. Scheibel stands for the proposition that an insurer cannot minimize its exposure by attributing all losses to one policy, and that within the no-fault context, the overriding principle is that an injured party be fully compensated to the limits of mandated insurance. 615 N.W.2d at 38-39. Neither Great West nor Scheibel prohibits an arbitrator from determining whether the medical expenses for which the insured is seeking reimbursement from the no-fault carrier result from injuries that arise out of the car accident, that is, the use or maintenance of a motor vehicle. In contrast to Great West and Scheibel, here we apparently have some medical expenses arising within the no-fault system and some arising outside that system. Within the no-fault system, i.e., where there are multiple auto accidents involved, imposing liability solely on the insurer at the time of the most recent accident to the extent such coverage fully compensates the claimant serves the legislative goals of ensuring prompt payment of expenses and minimizing litigation. Minn. Stat. § 65B.42 (2000); Scheibel, 615 N.W.2d at 37. Where, as here, one cause of injury arises within the no-fault system and one outside that system, our focus is on whether the loss arose out of the use of an automobile and whether reimbursement is for only those medical expenses resulting from injuries caused by the use or maintenance of an automobile. *556 Pususta relies on the above-quoted language in Great West in arguing that State Farm must pay for all of her medical expenses because the insurer must take the insured with whatever condition she had at the time of the accident. See Great West, 548 N.W.2d at 281. However, there is no indication in the No-Fault Act that the legislature intended to modify the well-settled concept from tort law that damages are those attributable to a particular injury and the aggravation of a pre-existing physical condition. See Phelps v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 537 N.W.2d 271, 275 n. 2 (Minn.1995) (stating compensatory damages are the "natural, necessary and usual result of the * * * occurrence in question."); Leubner v. Sterner, 493 N.W.2d 119, 122 (Minn.1992) (stating aggravation damages ensure that defendant pays only for the harm he causes, not the harm plaintiff already had); Nelson v. Twin City Motor Bus Co., 239 Minn. 276, 280, 58 N.W.2d 561, 563 (1953). Requiring compensation for any aggravation of a pre-existing condition is what is meant by accepting the insured with any conditions she had at the time.[8] Accepting the insured with the conditions she had does not mean that the insurer is liable for the expenses that the pre-existing condition, "running its normal course, would itself have caused if there had been no aggravation * * *." Nelson, 239 Minn. at 280, 58 N.W.2d at 563. The insurer is liable for the expenses related to injuries caused or aggravated by the automobile accident. Limiting damages in this way insures that the insurer will pay only for the damages caused by the accident and not for the pre-existing physical condition. Leubner, 493 N.W.2d at 122. Applied to a no-fault case, the limitation ensures that a no-fault insurer pays only medical expenses for injuries arising out of the use of an automobile and not medical expenses for injuries caused by a nonautomobile accident.[9] Thus, we reverse and remand and instruct the arbitrator to award those reasonable medical expenses for treatment of injuries caused by, or aggravated by, the automobile accident. The arbitrator must determine the extent to which the medical expense relates to an injury that was a natural and reasonable incident or consequence of the use of the vehicle. North River, 346 N.W.2d at 114. Medical expenses for injuries caused solely by the horse-riding accident shall be denied. Reversed and remanded. *557 GILBERT, Justice (dissenting). I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion and would affirm the court of appeals. The majority opinion is based on equitable apportionment, which is an approach that we have specifically rejected for subrogation claims to determine medical expense benefits provided for in the Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act (No-Fault Act). Great West Cas. Co. v. Northland Ins. Co., 548 N.W.2d 279 (Minn.1996). The no-fault system was designed to eliminate this type of dispute on minor claims once a compensable loss occurs, and we have so held in other contexts. In fact, recently we stated "we disagree with the court's apportioning of PIP benefits, and we consider them payable by the insurer when the insured incurs a loss." Id. at 281 n. 4. The majority decision now reverses this directive and ignores the facts supporting the arbitrator's and trial court's ultimate decisions, awarding benefits in this case. Here, the district court confirmed the medical expenses awarded in arbitration. It found that notwithstanding some comments made by the arbitrator relating to legal issues that "[a]ny allusion by the arbitrator to case law regarding apportionment was secondary to the facts which he had already decided. While defendant asserts that [the arbitrator] exceeded his powers, it has failed to make a clear showing that that was, in fact, the case." The trial court reasoned "[t]he arbitrator clearly decided that Plaintiff had been injured in the auto accident of December 6, 1997, and that she received chiropractic care related to that accident." Two experts were called upon in the arbitration hearing to give their opinion on the reasonable and necessary medical treatment required because of this automobile accident. Valerie Hoffman, D.C., offered an opinion on behalf of Pususta that the rehabilitation services being performed were for neck and upper back, not her lower back that was being treated before the automobile accident. David Olson, D.C., on behalf of State Farm, rendered an opinion authorizing paying the bills for medical rehabilitation through the beginning of April 1998, but none after that because that is when Pususta reached preaccident status. Accordingly, there was conflicting medical testimony, one opinion requiring additional treatment and the other terminating the treatment. The court of appeals affirmed the arbitrator's decision considering the guidance provided the supreme court in Great West and could not say that the arbitrator and the district court erred in refusing to apportion the respondent's medical expenses. Pususta v. State Farm Ins. Cos., No. C8-99-1068, 1999 WL 1101388 (Minn.App.1999). Now, without calling the relief on remand apportionment, the majority reverses both of the lower courts with an order that the arbitrator must determine the extent to which the medical expenses relate to the use of a motor vehicle and "medical expenses for injuries caused by the horse riding accident shall be denied." This directive obviously calls for apportionment between accidents, which the arbitrator also determined was appropriate, but he felt constrained by our precedent in Great West. However, adopting the principle of apportionment severely interferes with the statutory framework that is "to govern the effect of advance payments prior to final settlement of liability" once a compensable loss occurs. Minn. Stat. § 65B.42, subd. 5 (2000). The facts in this case highlight the problems that would be created by the majority's opinion. Pususta was 18 years old at the time of the automobile accident, which occurred on December 6, 1997. Before *558 authorizing any medical payments for that accident, State Farm ordered an independent medical examination. State Farm then decided to pay medical bills incurred through February 1998, but then stopped any further payments. Five months went by with no further payments and no denial of benefits. In the meantime, medical expenses had been incurred by an 18-year-old woman totaling more than $4,000. An independent medical examination was completed July 16, 1998, and an opinion rendered on July 23, 1998, 7 months after the automobile accident. Then, retroactively, Dr. Olson decided no further medical bills should be paid beyond the beginning of April of 1998. Now, the majority opinion will compel an independent medical examination whenever there is a preexisting no-auto-related accident case with resulting expense, uncertainty and delays now being thrust into every decision on payment. In most cases, this will lead to retroactive approval or denial of medical expenses incurred to treat in a timely fashion injuries arising from an automobile accident. This result will occur even though it is undisputed that early and proper rehabilitation treatment usually tends to mitigate everybody's damages. This is not to say that medical reimbursement would continue forever because there are statutory dollar limits applied to every policy and an arbitrator still would have the ability to terminate payments for medical expenses when pre-accident condition status has been reached. The No-Fault Act provides for such a determination now and that is why apportionment principles should be rejected for the same reason we rejected those principles for subrogation claims. In Great West, we reasoned that a subrogation right must be found, if at all in the No-Fault Act, in that we do not recognize a separate common law right of subrogation in the no-fault context. 548 N.W.2d at 281. This interpretation was reacknowledged in Scheibel v. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co., 615 N.W.2d 34, 37 (Minn.2000), and the reasoning should be followed in this case. In Great West, we disallowed a subrogation claim against Northland brought by Great West who insured an individual injured in an automobile accident 3 years after the first automobile accident. 548 N.W.2d at 281. The majority attempts to distinguish this case from Great West depending on whether some of the medical expenses arose within or outside the no-fault system. Great West involved a multiple auto accident and the aggravation of a preexisting condition that resulted in a dispute between different insurance companies involved at the time of the two accidents, one in June 1988 and the second in June 1991. 548 N.W.2d at 279-80. We held that "[t]he clear implication is that only one accident can be deemed to be the cause of an injury for purposes of subrogation under section 65B.47." Id. at 281. This "one accident" precedent from Great West is even more compelling in this case. As stated by the legislature, the purpose of the No-Fault Act is to relieve the severe economic distress of uncompensated victims of automobile accidents without regard to whose fault caused the accident and to encourage appropriate medical and rehabilitation treatment by assuring prompt payment for the treatment. Minn. Stat. § 65B.42. It is undisputed that the respondent has suffered a compensable loss in an automobile accident, is an injured person, and is entitled to reasonable medical expense benefits and the assurance of prompt payment. Minnesota Statutes § 65B.44, subdivision 2, provides for the reimbursement of "all reasonable expenses for necessary * * * medical * * * and rehabilitative services * * *." It is also undisputed that the respondent has a preexisting chronic medical injury due to a horse-riding accident. *559 The majority opinion deviates from the stated purpose of the Act and holds that the statutory language defining loss incorporates the elements of causation into the determination of what medical expense benefits are reimbursable. The majority opinion relies on two of our cases on causation between the use of an automobile and an injury. In Continental Western, we found that there was the requisite degree of causation between injuries and the use of a car when a gun was fired out of a moving vehicle causing injury to another party. Cont'l W. Ins. Co. v. Klug, 415 N.W.2d 876, 878 (Minn.1987). North River involved an injury from a trailer attached to a motor vehicle. N. River Ins. Co. v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 346 N.W.2d 109, 114 (Minn.1984). However, these cases are not helpful because they do not involve PIP benefits and, in this case, it is undisputed that the second injury arose out of the use of an automobile. Although our decision in Great West involved a subrogation claim between insurers for an injury caused by more than one auto accident, the legal principles, which support the denial of a subrogation claim, apply equally as well to the facts in this case. The majority's decision in this case has the same * * * potential to trigger precisely what the legislature appears to have attempted to avoid in adopting the term "the accident"-finger pointing among insurers claiming that another carrier was responsible for some portion of the insured's disability. Further, as we noted above, it introduces the fault-based concept of subrogation into allocation of loss independent of fault, a step we are unwilling to take without explicit statutory authority notably absent here. That the entire responsibility for Neulieb's disability caused by the accident occurring while Great West was on the policy should fall on Great West is neither unfair nor unjust. Great West accepted Neulieb as an insured with whatever physical condition he may have had at the time, and it is not for Great West to either refuse payments of benefits for that portion of his disability caused by a previous injury or is it to seek subrogation from Northland therefore.

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317 N.W.2d 368 (1982) Jerry GALLE, et al., Appellants, v. EXCALIBUR INSURANCE CO., Respondent. Robert STANDFIELD, Respondent, v. EXCALIBUR INSURANCE CO., Appellant. Nos. 81-264, 81-343. Supreme Court of Minnesota. May 26, 1982. Lommen, Nelson, Sullivan & Cole and Mark N. Stageberg, Minneapolis, for Excalibur Ins. Co. Peterson Bell & Converse, Willard L. Converse and David S. Anderson, St. Paul, *369 for appellants in 81-264 and respondent in 81-243. Considered and decided by the court en banc without oral argument. OTIS, Justice. These appeals involve claims under Minn. Stat. § 65B.44 (1980) of the Minnesota No-Fault Insurance Act for injuries sustained while unloading vehicles. Plaintiffs in case # 81-264, Jerry Galle and Frank Schroedl, brought suit individually against their employer's no-fault insurer, Excalibur Insurance Co. The cases were consolidated for hearing before the district court, which granted defendant Excalibur's motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs Galle and Schroedl appeal from that order. Robert Standfield, plaintiff in case # 81-343, sued to recover no-fault benefits. Summary judgment was granted in his favor, from which order defendant Excalibur appeals. We affirm in both cases. Galle and Schroedl were employed as truck drivers, picking up and delivering freight on assigned city routes. Schroedl injured his back on February 27, 1976, when he attempted to lift a heavy wooden crate from the floor of his truck. He was standing inside the vehicle, which was parked at the loading dock. Galle was injured on November 29, 1978, when he attempted to lift a heavy box. He too was standing inside a stationary trailer, unloading cargo onto the loading dock. Robert Standfield was employed by Advance United to drive a delivery truck, loading and unloading freight at Twin City area locations. On May 5, 1976, he had finished his route and parked his truck at the loading dock. He went to the rear of the trailer intending to open the door and retrieve his two wheel dolly from inside. As the door opened a cable broke, jamming the door and causing Standfield to fall forward and injure himself. All three men have received workers' compensation benefits for lost income due to disabilities sustained and now seek additional no-fault compensation. Minn. Stat. § 65B.44, subd. 1 (1980), states that "basic economic loss benefits shall provide reimbursement for all losses suffered through injury arising out of maintenance or use of a motor vehicle * * *." The material facts regarding the three accidents are not in dispute. Galle and Schroedl were both engaged in loading and unloading heavy boxes inside of stationary vehicles.[1] Standfield was injured when he opened the rear door of his truck to unload his dolly at the end of his delivery route. The only issue on appeal is whether plaintiffs' injuries arose out of the "maintenance or use of a motor vehicle," the definition of which is set forth in Minn. Stat. § 65B.43, subd. 3 (1980): "Maintenance or use of a motor vehicle" means maintenance or use of a motor vehicle as a vehicle, including, incident to its maintenance or use as a vehicle, occupying, entering into, and alighting from it. Maintenance or use of a motor vehicle does not include * * * (2) conduct in the course of loading and unloading the vehicle unless the conduct occurs while occupying, entering into or alighting from it.

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North Star Mutual Insurance Co v. Midwest Family Mutual Insurance Co. · 2001 1 citation

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Khawaja v. State Farm Insurance Companies · 2001 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Loven v. City of Minneapolis · 2001 3 citations

Appellants brought an action in district court seeking basic economic loss benefits from the respondent city of Minneapolis pursuant to the no-fault insurance act. Minn. Stat. § 65B.44 (1998). The district court ruled that the limits in the municipal tort liability law, Minn. Stat. § 466.04 (1998), applied to recovery of no-fault benefits from the city. Because we conclude as a matter of law that these limits do not apply, we reverse.

Braginsky v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. · 2001 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Karels v. State Farm Insurance Co. · 2000 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Roquemore v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. · 2000 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Arbitration Between Racine v. AMCO Insurance Co. · 2000 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Thunder · 2000 3 citations

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Sankey · 2000 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Simpson v. American Family Insurance Co. · 2000 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

American Family Insurance Group v. Schroedl · 1999 11 citations

+ 11 more citations in this opinion.

Steinfeldt v. AMCO Insurance Co. · 1999 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Spartz · 1999 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Tillery v. League General Insurance Co. · 1998 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

State v. Tenerelli · 1998 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Norwest Bank Minnesota, N.A. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. · 1998 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

LeBeau v. John Deere Insurance Co. · 1998 2 citations

ANALYSIS An occupant of a motor vehicle that is insured pursuant to the no-fault act is entitled to collect basic economic loss benefits from an insurer, even if the accident occurs in another state. Minn. Stat. § 65B.46, subd. 2 (1990). Basic economic loss benefits include payments for medical expenses. Minn. Stat. § 65B.44, subds. 1, 2 (1990). Basic economic loss benefits are payable when an expense is incurred. Minn. Stat. § 65B.54 subd. 1 (1990). Because LeBeau's accident occurred in Wisconsin, John Deere ordinarily would be entitled to assert subrogation[1] rights against LeBeau after paying a claim for medical expenses, if that payment were to result in double recovery by LeBeau. Minn. Stat. § 65B.53, subd. 2 (1990). But LeBeau settled the tort action before he incurred additional medical expenses for his daughter's surgery. LeBeau claims that he is entitled to recover from John Deere any medical expenses incurred after the settlement, and that a no-fault insurer has no subrogation rights under Minn. Stat. § 65B.53 in the situation where basic economic loss accrues after a tort settlement. The parties cite Ferguson v. Illinois Farmers Ins. Group Co., 348 N.W.2d 730 (Minn.1984). There, the supreme court held that when an insured recovers a judgment against a tortfeasor, the insured's expected medical expenses may not be deducted from the judgment and assigned to the no-fault carrier. Rather, the insured should receive the entire judgment from the tortfeasor, less the costs of collection, including reasonable attorney fees. Then, after the insured has exhausted the damages allocated for medical expenses, the insured may recover any additional medical expenses from the no-fault insurer. Id. at 730. LeBeau argues that critical to Ferguson was the fact that the insured received a judgment that included a specific identifiable recovery allocated to future medical expenses. But here, although LeBeau did not receive a judgment against Larson, he did agree to a settlement which, like the judgment in Ferguson, allocated a specific amount for expected medical expenses.[2] Therefore, applying Ferguson, to avoid double recovery, LeBeau must first exhaust the amount of the settlement allocated for expected medical expenses, less costs of collection and reasonable attorney fees, before he is entitled to recover any medical expenses from John Deere. The total amount of LeBeau's settlement was $25,000, including $9,000 for expected medical expenses. From the $25,000, the district court deducted $2,755, or 11.02%, for costs of collection and reasonable attorney *86 fees. When the amount of $9,000 is similarly reduced by the 11.02% costs of collection and attorney fees, the resultant $8,008.20 represents the net amount of future medical expenses that LeBeau must exhaust pursuant to Ferguson before he may recover no-fault benefits from John Deere. The actual cost of the surgery was $8,508.25. Because this amount exceeds $8,008.20, LeBeau has in fact exhausted the amount of future medical expenses attributable to the settlement and has stated a proper claim against John Deere for the balance of $500.05. LeBeau did not include the above calculations in his briefs to this court, and he apparently made a tactical decision not to do so. However, undisputed evidence in the record supports our calculations, and in response to questioning by this court at oral argument, the parties fully addressed the issue to our satisfaction. Therefore, in the interest of judicial economy,[3] we hold that when either a judgment against or a settlement with a tortfeasor includes a designated amount for expected medical expenses, that amount must be reduced proportionally by the total costs of collection, including reasonable attorney fees, and that net amount must be exhausted before the insured seeks to recover any additional medical expenses from the no-fault carrier. We note that if the district court had required John Deere to pay LeBeau's claim for the surgery, such payment would result in a double recovery to the extent of $8,008.20, triggering John Deere's subrogation rights and bringing the case again before the court. The district court's decision to instead resolve the parties' entire dispute is supported by an overriding purpose of the no-fault act, which is to avoid "[t]he detrimental impact of automobile accidents * * * upon the orderly and efficient administration of justice in this state[.]" Minn. Stat. § 65B.42; accord Minn. Stat. § 65B.42(4) (reiterating this purpose by stating that the no-fault act is intended "[t]o speed the administration of justice, [and] to ease the burden of litigation on the courts of this state").

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Sullivan v. City of Minneapolis · 1997 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Lenz v. Depositors Insurance Co. · 1997 8 citations

+ 8 more citations in this opinion.

Medicine Lake Bus Co. v. Smith · 1996 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Thomas v. Western National Insurance Group · 1996 3 citations

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

Anderson v. AMCO Insurance Co. · 1995 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Kern v. Auto Owners Insurance Co. · 1995 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Benike v. Dairyland Insurance Co. · 1994 2 citations

ANALYSIS On appeal from summary judgment, we must determine: (1) whether there are any genuine issues of material fact; and (2) whether the district court erred in its application of the law. State by Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 4 (Minn.1990). Whether an accident arises out of the use or maintenance of a motor vehicle is a legal question and each case must turn on the particular facts presented. Hanson v. Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance, 422 N.W.2d 288, 289 (Minn.App. 1988), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. June 29, 1988) (quoting Continental Western Ins. v. Klug, 415 N.W.2d 876, 877-78 (Minn.1987)). A predominant goal of Minnesota's NoFault Automobile Insurance Act is to allocate the costs of injuries causally resulting from motoring activities to the automobile insurance system. Marklund v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins., 400 N.W.2d 337, 341 (Minn.1987). The No-Fault Act provides for basic economic loss benefits for "all loss suffered through injury arising out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle." Minn. Stat. § 65B.44, subd. 1 (1990). The phrase "maintenance or use of a motor vehicle" is defined as: [M]aintenance or use of a motor vehicle as a vehicle, including, incident to its maintenance or use as a vehicle, occupying, entering into, and alighting from it. Minn. Stat. § 65B.43, subd. 3 (1990). The statute does not require that the injuries arise out of the injured party's maintenance or use of a motor vehicle. Instead, the injuries may arise out of another person's use or maintenance of a motor vehicle. See, e.g., Nadeau v. Austin Mut. Ins., 350 N.W.2d 368, 372 (Minn.1984) (finding no-fault coverage where pedestrian was injured in attempting to avoid an oncoming car); Holzemer v. Millers' Mut. Ins., 359 N.W.2d 291, 292 (Minn.App.1984) (finding pedestrian was entitled to no-fault coverage because he was struck by an automobile and thus his injuries arose out of the use of a motor vehicle). *467 Dairyland contends that coverage does not exist in light of Haagenson v. National Farmers Union Property & Casualty, 277 N.W.2d 648 (Minn.1979). We disagree. In Haagenson, the plaintiff received injuries from downed power lines after investigating the scene of an automobile accident. The supreme court concluded the plaintiff was entitled to no-fault coverage because the evidence supported a finding that he was "entering into" the automobile in which he had arrived. Id. at 651-52. As Nadeau and Holzemer illustrate, however, no-fault coverage is not limited to cases in which the injured party was occupying, entering into, or alighting from an automobile. Thus, although Haagenson is factually similar, we need not deny coverage merely because Benike was not "entering into" an automobile. The supreme court developed general factors to consider in determining whether an injury arose out of the use or maintenance of a motor vehicle. Klug, 415 N.W.2d at 878. First, we must consider the extent of causation between the automobile and the injury. Id. The automobile must be an "active accessory" in causing the injury. Id. (quoting Holm v. Mutual Serv. Casualty Ins., 261 N.W.2d 598, 603 (Minn.1977)). This is "something less than proximate cause in the tort sense and something more than the vehicle being the mere situs of the injury." Tlougan v. Auto-Owners Ins., 310 N.W.2d 116, 117 (Minn.1981). In the tort context, "[p]roximate cause exists if the negligent conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about the injury." Flom v. Flom, 291 N.W.2d 914, 917 (Minn.1980). Because the record indicates that Ohm's conduct was a substantial factor in causing Benike's injuries, we conclude a sufficient causal connection exists between the automobile and Benike's injuries. Second, we must consider whether an act of independent significance occurred, breaking the causal link between the "use" of the vehicle and the injuries inflicted. Klug, 415 N.W.2d at 878. There is no evidence that an intervening act occurred between Ohm's accident and Benike's injuries. Instead, the relationship between the accident and Benike's injuries was "continuous and uninterrupted." See Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Neuville, 465 N.W.2d 432, 434 (Minn.App.1991), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 27, 1991). Finally, we must consider whether the automobile was used for transportation purposes. Klug, 415 N.W.2d at 878. The record indicates that Ohm was using his automobile for transportation purposes until the time of the accident. Because Benike was injured shortly thereafter, we conclude this factor has been satisfied. In light of the predominant goal of no-fault insurance to allocate the costs of motoring injuries to the insurance system, we conclude Benike's injuries arose out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle.

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

LaValley v. National Family Insurance Corp. · 1994 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Kemmerer v. State Farm Insurance Companies · 1994 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Great West Casualty Co. v. Kroning · 1994 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Anderson v. American Casualty Co. of Reading, Pennsylvania · 1993 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Rodgers v. Progressive Specialty Insurance Co. · 1993 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Rotation Engineering & Manufacturing Co. v. Secura Insurance Co. · 1993 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

VanGuilder v. Allstate Insurance Co. · 1993 2 citations

+ 2 more citations in this opinion.

Arbitration of Keim v. Farm Bureau Insurance Co. · 1992 3 citations

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

School Sisters of Notre Dame at Mankato, Minnesota, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. · 1991 4 citations

+ 4 more citations in this opinion.

Meister v. WESTERN NAT. MUT. INS. CO. · 1991 1 citation

*430 ANALYSIS According to the parties' stipulation, there are no genuine issues of material fact and the only issue is whether the trial court correctly applied the law. When the facts are undisputed, the trial court's conclusions of law do not bind this court. A.J. Chromy Constr. Co. v. Commercial Mechanical Servs., Inc., 260 N.W.2d 579, 582 (Minn. 1977). The Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act establishes priorities for payment of "basic economic loss benefits" when automobile accident injuries are covered by two or more insurance policies. It provides: Subdivision 1. In case of injury to the driver or other occupant of a motor vehicle * * * if the accident causing the injury occurs while the vehicle is being used in the business of transporting persons or property, the security for payment of basic economic loss benefits is the security covering the vehicle or, if none, the security under which the injured person is an insured. Subd. 2. In case of injury to an employee * * * if the accident causing the injury occurs while the injured person is driving or occupying a motor vehicle * * * furnished by the employer, the security for payment of basic economic loss benefits is the security covering the vehicle or, if none, the security under which the injured person is an insured. * * * * * * Subd. 4. In all other cases, the following priorities apply: (a) The security for payment of basic economic loss benefits applicable to injury to an insured is the security under which the injured person is an insured. Minn. Stat. § 65B.47 (1988) (emphasis added). The facts are undisputed that the pick-up truck involved in the accident was owned by Gunflint Lodge. Respondents argue that either subdivision 1 or subdivision 2 apply to give the Lodge insurance priority over any family policy under subdivision 4. At the time of the accident, the pick-up truck was transporting business property owned by the lodge. Appellants argue, however, that at the time of the accident, the pick-up truck was being used for the purpose of a side trip to take Michael Meister to the river, not for the business of the employer. Thus, appellants argue, Minn. Stat. § 65B.47, subd. 1, does not apply because the vehicle was not "being used in the business of transporting persons or property." We view the coverage of subdivision 1 as almost certain under these circumstances, but, to avoid whatever question might exist on the applicability of subdivision 1, we choose instead to decide the issue under subdivision 2. The coverage of subdivision 2 is clearly applicable. Michael was an employee in his employer's vehicle. The statute does not require that the vehicle be used in the course of business. The coverage provided under the policy issued by MSI, therefore, must provide the basic economic loss benefits because of subdivision 2. We now turn to the question of whether the additional insurance purchased by David Meister from Western may apply. In 1985, the Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act was amended to include an anti-stacking provision: Unless a policyholder makes a specific election to have two or more policies added together the limit of liability for basic economic loss benefits for two or more motor vehicles may not be added together to determine the limit of insurance coverage available to an injured person for any one accident. An insurer shall notify policyholders that they may elect to have two or more policies added together. See Minn. Stat. § 65B.47, subd. 7 (1988). This amendment has created an entirely new situation. We no longer have traditional stackings. Now, when insureds elect the "added together" coverage allowed under Minn. Stat. § 65B.47, subd. 7, they are not choosing to stack "basic economic loss benefits," as contemplated by pre-1985 *431 stacking cases.[1] Before 1985 stacking occurred by operation of law; now an insurance purchaser chooses to have double coverage; to buy voluntarily another $40,000 of insurance over and above basic economic loss benefits. The No-Fault Act makes explicit what constitutes basic economic loss benefits. Subd. 10. "Basic economic loss benefits" means benefits as described in section 65B.44. Minn. Stat. § 65B.43, subd. 10 (1988). Basic economic loss benefits shall provide reimbursement for all loss suffered through injury arising out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle, subject to any applicable deductibles, exclusions, disqualifications, and other conditions, and shall provide a maximum of $40,000 for loss arising out of the injury of any one person, consisting of: (a) $20,000 for medical expense loss arising out of injury to any one person; and (b) a total of $20,000 for income loss, replacement services loss, funeral expense loss, survivor's economic loss, and survivor's replacement services loss arising out of the injury to any one person. Minn. Stat. § 65B.44, subd. 1 (1988) (emphasis added). Benefits greater than $20,000 medical benefits and $20,000 wage loss benefits are outside this definition. So what is a benefit exceeding the $40,000 maximum? In our view an insured choosing the election of a second policy is choosing to add additional first-party coverage. These are "additional benefits" as provided for in section 65B.49, subdivision 7 (1988),[2] and "optional economic loss benefits" as referred to in sections 65B.53, 65B.58, and 65B.60. Minn. Stat. § 65B.47 establishes the priority of security for payment of "basic economic loss benefits" and no more. That section does not apply to any added benefits that the Meisters purchased. As to the $40,000 of basic economic loss benefits, we go through the priorities and determine which policy will apply. Here the MSI policy. Then, we turn to the personal policy to add whatever "additional" or "optional" protection appellants purchased. Although MSI is liable for the basic economic loss benefits, Western is liable for the additional first-party coverage appellants purchased from it. Under the circumstances of this case, we are not talking about "stacking." We are not stacking the same coverage, rather we are determining first, which policy covers the basic economic loss benefits and, second, giving effect to additional protection that has been purchased by Michael's father, and requiring the insurer to pay the added benefits that it contracted to pay to covered members of the Meister family if seriously injured in an automobile accident. The result below is incongruous. It gives family members protection at twice the statutory minimum at all times except when in a commercial bus, a working truck, or an employer's vehicle. By applying the priority sections only to basic economic protection coverage we give effect at all times to the greater coverage contemplated when the policy was bought, and when it was sold.

Erickson v. Great American Insurance Companies · 1991 1 citation

Minn. Stat. § 65B.44, subds. 1, 3 (1988) (emphasis added). An insured’s ability to perform substitute work does not bar recovery of income loss benefits, but it will reduce the amount of such benefits. Latzig v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 412 N.W.2d 329, 333 (Minn.App.1987); see also Prax v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 322 N.W.2d 752, 754 (Minn.1982); 1 M. Steen-son, Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance 81 (1989).

Meister v. Western National Mutual Insurance Co. · 1991 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Engel v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co. · 1990 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Wolf v. State Farm Insurance Co. · 1990 3 citations

Wolf brought this action to compel State Farm to pay medical expense benefits pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 65B.44, subd. 2 (1988).