Minn. Stat. § 65B.47

Minnesota Statutes

Source: 2025 Minnesota Statutes. For the official text, see revisor.mn.gov.

Citing Cases (70)

Minnesota Supreme Court

Latterell v. Progressive Northern Insurance Co. · 2011 3 citations

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

Mutual Service Casualty Insurance Co. v. League of Minnesota Cities Insurance Trust · 2003 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Stout v. AMCO Insurance Co. · 2002 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Pususta v. State Farm Insurance Companies · 2001 8 citations

632 N.W.2d 549 (2001) Mariah PUSUSTA, Respondent, v. STATE FARM INSURANCE COMPANIES, Petitioner, Appellant. No. C8-99-1068. Supreme Court of Minnesota. July 19, 2001. *550 Robert W. Roe, Thomas J. Lyons & Associates, P.A., St. Paul, for respondent. William M. Hart, Katherine A. McBride, Jenneane L. Jansen, Meagher & Geer, P.L.L.P., Minneapolis, for appellant. Heard, considered, and decided by the court en banc. OPINION ANDERSON, RUSSELL A., Justice. In mandatory arbitration, respondent Mariah Pususta sought no-fault medical expense benefits from her insurance carrier, appellant State Farm Insurance Companies (State Farm), for injuries she sustained in an automobile accident on December 6, 1997. We are asked to review the no-fault arbitrator's legal conclusion, upheld by the district court and affirmed by the court of appeals, that the arbitrator is precluded from considering whether some of the claimed medical expenses were for injuries that resulted from a prior nonautomobile accident, and if so, whether reimbursement for such expenses should be denied. We reverse and remand. Pususta was in an automobile accident on December 6, 1997. At that time, she was receiving chiropractic care for back and neck injuries she sustained five years earlier in a horse-riding accident. In 1994, *551 her chiropractor requested that her health insurance carrier allow 24 chiropractic visits per year to treat the injuries sustained in the horse-riding accident. In 1997, Pususta visited the chiropractor once a month until the automobile accident in December. Following the accident, Pususta's pain worsened and her chiropractor concluded that the auto accident had exacerbated her prior injuries. After the accident, Pususta received more frequent chiropractic care: seven times in December 1997, nine times in January, eight times in February, nine times in March, seven times in April, twice in May, once in June, twice in July, and twice in August. Pususta had a no-fault automobile insurance policy with State Farm. Following the accident, State Farm reimbursed Pususta for the medical care she received for her injuries through February 1998, but State Farm refused to provide further coverage until Pususta submitted to an independent medical exam (IME). Pususta attended an IME on July 16, 1998. The independent medical examiner concluded that some of Pususta's injuries were caused by the earlier horse-riding accident and that chiropractic care for injuries arising out of the auto accident was warranted only through the first week in April 1998. State Farm informed Pususta that on this basis it would provide coverage only for expenses incurred through the first week of April. Pususta sought arbitration of the dispute and coverage for all chiropractic care through September 16, 1998, the date of the arbitration. State Farm argued it should not be required to pay for medical expenses incurred after the first week in April because the remaining medical expenses were due to the horse-riding injury and further treatment for any injuries related to the automobile accident was not reasonable or necessary. State Farm also argued that if it were required to pay for any medical care received after the first week in April, the expenses should be apportioned based on the degree to which the automobile accident caused the injuries. Specifically, State Farm asked that it not be required to pay for the 24 chiropractic visits per year that the chiropractor requested for the injuries that existed before the auto accident. The arbitrator awarded Pususta all of her medical expenses through August 1998. In his written conclusions, the arbitrator stated that the facts of the case "would call for apportionment, based upon the prior accident," but that our decision in Great West Casualty Co. v. Northland Ins. Co., 548 N.W.2d 279 (Minn.1996), precluded him from doing so. State Farm appealed. The district court upheld the award, and the court of appeals affirmed, concluding that under Great West, it was not clear that that the arbitrator erred by refusing to apportion medical expenses. See Pususta v. State Farm Ins. Cos., No. C8-99-1068, 1999 WL 1101388 (Minn.App.1999). We granted review to consider the no-fault arbitrator's conclusion that he was precluded by our decision in Great West from considering whether a portion of the claimed medical expenses resulted from injuries caused by the horse-riding accident and whether reimbursement for such expenses should be denied. No-fault arbitrators are limited to deciding questions of fact and their legal determinations are subject to de novo review by the courts. Weaver v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 609 N.W.2d 878, 882 (Minn.2000). The issue before us is a legal determination, which we review de novo. Nathe Bros., Inc. v. Am. Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 615 N.W.2d 341, 344 (Minn.2000). We begin our analysis of the issue by examining the provisions of the Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance *552 Act[1] (No-Fault Act) relating to reimbursement of medical expenses. Our primary objective in interpreting statutory language is to give effect to the legislature's intent as expressed in the language of the statute. Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2000). The No-Fault Act provides that an injured person, such as Pususta, is entitled to medical expense reimbursement "for all loss suffered through injury arising out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle * * *." Minn. Stat. § 65B.44, subd. 1 (2000) (emphasis added). The term "loss" is defined as economic detriment, which includes medical expenses "resulting from the accident causing the injury." Minn. Stat. § 65B.43, subd. 7 (2000) (emphasis added). The statutory language thus incorporates the element of causation into the determination of what losses are reimbursable. The question that the trier of fact, in this case the arbitrator, must determine under the No-Fault Act is whether the medical expenses Pususta claims result from injuries arising out of, or caused by, the use or maintenance of a motor vehicle; that is, whether the medical expenses claimed are for injuries caused by the automobile accident. We have set forth three general considerations for determining whether an injury arose out of the use of a motor vehicle. See Cont'l W. Ins. Co. v. Klug, 415 N.W.2d 876, 878 (Minn.1987). In the case of this car accident, we are concerned only with the first consideration, which is the extent of causation between the automobile and the injury. Id.[2] The causal connection is established if "the injury is a natural and reasonable incident or consequence of the use of the vehicle." N. River Ins. Co. v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 346 N.W.2d 109, 114 (Minn.1984) (quoting Tlougan v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 310 N.W.2d 116, 117 (Minn.1981)). As applied to this case, the arbitrator appeared to question whether all of the medical expenses Pususta claimed resulted from injuries caused by the car accident, but he declined to answer the question, referring to such a determination as an "apportionment" of expenses caused by the horse-riding accident and expenses caused by the auto accident. The arbitrator determined that the facts of this case called for such an apportionment, but he interpreted our decision in Great West to prohibit the apportionment of damages where two separate accidents contributed to an injury. See 548 N.W.2d at 281.[3] In Great West, the insured injured his shoulder in 1988 in an accident that arose out of the use of a motor vehicle while he was working. Id. at 279. At the time he was insured by and received no-fault benefits from Northland Insurance Company. Id. In June 1991, the insured re-injured his shoulder, again arising out of use of a *553 motor vehicle. Id. At that time, Great West was his insurance carrier and it promptly provided coverage for his economic losses related to the injury. Id. at 279-80. By May 1992, Great West had paid more than $15,000 in no-fault benefits for the shoulder injury. Id. at 280. Great West brought a subrogation and contribution action against Northland under Minn. Stat. § 65B.47 (2000), which establishes the priority for coverages available when the loss results from use of a vehicle for employment. For example, the statute provides that if a person is insured in a vehicle provided by his employer, basic economic loss benefits are to be provided by the insurance carrier covering the vehicle, or, if none, the carrier covering the injured person. Minn. Stat. § 65B.47, subd. 1 (2000). The statute provides that where two or more obligations to pay benefits are applicable, the reparation obligor against whom a claim is asserted must pay the claim as if wholly responsible, but that obligor may bring an action for contribution against other obligors. Id., subd. 5. The statute also allows for an action in subrogation. Id., subd. 6. Great West claimed that the injury for which it paid benefits was partially caused by the June 1988 accident when the claimant was insured by Northland and sought reimbursement under Minn. Stat. § 65B.47 from Northland for a portion of the benefits Great West paid its insured. Great West, 548 N.W.2d at 280. We were asked whether under section 65B.47, a no-fault carrier may by subrogation or contribution obtain reimbursement from another no-fault carrier for paid benefits that it contends were for injuries resulting from an earlier car accident, when the claimant was insured by the other carrier. We noted that subrogation in the no-fault context is purely a creature of statute and that the definition of "loss" under Minn. Stat. § 65B.43, subd. 7, implies that, for purposes of subrogation and contribution under section 65B.47, only one accident can be deemed the cause of an injury. Great West, 548 N.W.2d at 280-81. We concluded that the authorization for actions for subrogation and contribution in Minn. Stat. § 65B.47 does not apply to a multiple accident situation. Great West, 548 N.W.2d at 281. Great West is distinguishable from the case at bar because Great West involved subrogation and contribution claims under section 65B.47, which establishes priorities between insurers for a single accident. See Scheibel v. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co., 615 N.W.2d 34, 37 (Minn.2000) ("[O]ur holding in Great West only addressed whether an insurer has a right of subrogation under the no-fault act."). Here we deal with a more elementary and basic concern: whether the trier of fact, in this instance the arbitrator, may consider whether the medical expenses for which reimbursement is sought are for injuries caused by an earlier nonautomobile accident, in this instance a fall from a horse. Pususta nonetheless relies on language in Great West indicating that attribution of medical expenses to prior accidents or injuries is improper in the no-fault context. In explaining the imposition of the entire expense on Great West, we stated: Great West accepted [the claimant] as an insured with whatever physical condition he may have had at that time, and it is not for Great West to either refuse payment of benefits for that portion of his disability caused by a previous injury or is it to seek subrogation from Northland therefore. 548 N.W.2d at 281 (emphasis added).[4] The implication of this ruling in Great *554 West arose in Scheibel, where the claimant was injured in a March 1996 collision for which the insurer paid $3,558 in medical expenses. Less than two months later the claimant again injured his back in an auto accident requiring medical care. The insurer, the same for both accidents, attributed all medical expenses to coverage for the second accident, exhausting the $20,000 limit and leaving the claimant with approximately $6,500 in unpaid medical expenses. Scheibel, 615 N.W.2d at 36 n. 1. In Scheibel we noted that our statement in Great West regarding attributing benefits to a previous injury was "not a part of our holding." Scheibel, 615 N.W.2d at 38. We nonetheless relied on this language to require the insurer in Scheibel to pay the maximum policy limit for injuries "regardless of the extent to which each accident contributed to the injuries." 615 N.W.2d at 39. Thus, the question presented is whether our decisions in Great West and Scheibel, to the extent they reject attributing medical expenses to previous accidents, apply where the previous accident is not an automobile accident.[5] We stated in Scheibel: [The insurer] does not dispute that if Scheibel had been in two accidents and suffered distinct and separable injuries, medical expenses from each injury would have been separately compensable up to the policy maximum of $20,000 for each accident. We see no reason why the same principles should not apply when the second accident exacerbates an injury sustained in an earlier accident. It would be an absurd result to cut off recovery for an injury from the first accident merely because an intervening accident aggravates the same injury. 615 N.W.2d at 38-39.[6] Applying the same rationale used in Scheibel to these facts, *555 there can be no dispute that if Pususta had injured her foot in the horse-riding accident and injured her shoulder in the auto accident, medical expenses for the foot injury would not be attributable to the no-fault auto carrier. To hold the insurer liable for medical expenses resulting from a nonautomobile accident conflicts with the statutory language limiting the definition of loss to injuries "arising out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle * * *." Minn. Stat. § 65B.44, subd. 1.[7] Both Scheibel and Great West must be read in the context in which they arosea dispute over which no-fault policy the losses should be attributed to, where some of the losses arguably resulted from a prior auto accident. Great West stands for the proposition that where the legislature has not provided for contribution or subrogation between insurers in this context, we will not read such a right into the statute. 548 N.W.2d at 281. Scheibel stands for the proposition that an insurer cannot minimize its exposure by attributing all losses to one policy, and that within the no-fault context, the overriding principle is that an injured party be fully compensated to the limits of mandated insurance. 615 N.W.2d at 38-39. Neither Great West nor Scheibel prohibits an arbitrator from determining whether the medical expenses for which the insured is seeking reimbursement from the no-fault carrier result from injuries that arise out of the car accident, that is, the use or maintenance of a motor vehicle. In contrast to Great West and Scheibel, here we apparently have some medical expenses arising within the no-fault system and some arising outside that system. Within the no-fault system, i.e., where there are multiple auto accidents involved, imposing liability solely on the insurer at the time of the most recent accident to the extent such coverage fully compensates the claimant serves the legislative goals of ensuring prompt payment of expenses and minimizing litigation. Minn. Stat. § 65B.42 (2000); Scheibel, 615 N.W.2d at 37. Where, as here, one cause of injury arises within the no-fault system and one outside that system, our focus is on whether the loss arose out of the use of an automobile and whether reimbursement is for only those medical expenses resulting from injuries caused by the use or maintenance of an automobile. *556 Pususta relies on the above-quoted language in Great West in arguing that State Farm must pay for all of her medical expenses because the insurer must take the insured with whatever condition she had at the time of the accident. See Great West, 548 N.W.2d at 281. However, there is no indication in the No-Fault Act that the legislature intended to modify the well-settled concept from tort law that damages are those attributable to a particular injury and the aggravation of a pre-existing physical condition. See Phelps v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 537 N.W.2d 271, 275 n. 2 (Minn.1995) (stating compensatory damages are the "natural, necessary and usual result of the * * * occurrence in question."); Leubner v. Sterner, 493 N.W.2d 119, 122 (Minn.1992) (stating aggravation damages ensure that defendant pays only for the harm he causes, not the harm plaintiff already had); Nelson v. Twin City Motor Bus Co., 239 Minn. 276, 280, 58 N.W.2d 561, 563 (1953). Requiring compensation for any aggravation of a pre-existing condition is what is meant by accepting the insured with any conditions she had at the time.[8] Accepting the insured with the conditions she had does not mean that the insurer is liable for the expenses that the pre-existing condition, "running its normal course, would itself have caused if there had been no aggravation * * *." Nelson, 239 Minn. at 280, 58 N.W.2d at 563. The insurer is liable for the expenses related to injuries caused or aggravated by the automobile accident. Limiting damages in this way insures that the insurer will pay only for the damages caused by the accident and not for the pre-existing physical condition. Leubner, 493 N.W.2d at 122. Applied to a no-fault case, the limitation ensures that a no-fault insurer pays only medical expenses for injuries arising out of the use of an automobile and not medical expenses for injuries caused by a nonautomobile accident.[9] Thus, we reverse and remand and instruct the arbitrator to award those reasonable medical expenses for treatment of injuries caused by, or aggravated by, the automobile accident. The arbitrator must determine the extent to which the medical expense relates to an injury that was a natural and reasonable incident or consequence of the use of the vehicle. North River, 346 N.W.2d at 114. Medical expenses for injuries caused solely by the horse-riding accident shall be denied. Reversed and remanded. *557 GILBERT, Justice (dissenting). I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion and would affirm the court of appeals. The majority opinion is based on equitable apportionment, which is an approach that we have specifically rejected for subrogation claims to determine medical expense benefits provided for in the Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act (No-Fault Act). Great West Cas. Co. v. Northland Ins. Co., 548 N.W.2d 279 (Minn.1996). The no-fault system was designed to eliminate this type of dispute on minor claims once a compensable loss occurs, and we have so held in other contexts. In fact, recently we stated "we disagree with the court's apportioning of PIP benefits, and we consider them payable by the insurer when the insured incurs a loss." Id. at 281 n. 4. The majority decision now reverses this directive and ignores the facts supporting the arbitrator's and trial court's ultimate decisions, awarding benefits in this case. Here, the district court confirmed the medical expenses awarded in arbitration. It found that notwithstanding some comments made by the arbitrator relating to legal issues that "[a]ny allusion by the arbitrator to case law regarding apportionment was secondary to the facts which he had already decided. While defendant asserts that [the arbitrator] exceeded his powers, it has failed to make a clear showing that that was, in fact, the case." The trial court reasoned "[t]he arbitrator clearly decided that Plaintiff had been injured in the auto accident of December 6, 1997, and that she received chiropractic care related to that accident." Two experts were called upon in the arbitration hearing to give their opinion on the reasonable and necessary medical treatment required because of this automobile accident. Valerie Hoffman, D.C., offered an opinion on behalf of Pususta that the rehabilitation services being performed were for neck and upper back, not her lower back that was being treated before the automobile accident. David Olson, D.C., on behalf of State Farm, rendered an opinion authorizing paying the bills for medical rehabilitation through the beginning of April 1998, but none after that because that is when Pususta reached preaccident status. Accordingly, there was conflicting medical testimony, one opinion requiring additional treatment and the other terminating the treatment. The court of appeals affirmed the arbitrator's decision considering the guidance provided the supreme court in Great West and could not say that the arbitrator and the district court erred in refusing to apportion the respondent's medical expenses. Pususta v. State Farm Ins. Cos., No. C8-99-1068, 1999 WL 1101388 (Minn.App.1999). Now, without calling the relief on remand apportionment, the majority reverses both of the lower courts with an order that the arbitrator must determine the extent to which the medical expenses relate to the use of a motor vehicle and "medical expenses for injuries caused by the horse riding accident shall be denied." This directive obviously calls for apportionment between accidents, which the arbitrator also determined was appropriate, but he felt constrained by our precedent in Great West. However, adopting the principle of apportionment severely interferes with the statutory framework that is "to govern the effect of advance payments prior to final settlement of liability" once a compensable loss occurs. Minn. Stat. § 65B.42, subd. 5 (2000). The facts in this case highlight the problems that would be created by the majority's opinion. Pususta was 18 years old at the time of the automobile accident, which occurred on December 6, 1997. Before *558 authorizing any medical payments for that accident, State Farm ordered an independent medical examination. State Farm then decided to pay medical bills incurred through February 1998, but then stopped any further payments. Five months went by with no further payments and no denial of benefits. In the meantime, medical expenses had been incurred by an 18-year-old woman totaling more than $4,000. An independent medical examination was completed July 16, 1998, and an opinion rendered on July 23, 1998, 7 months after the automobile accident. Then, retroactively, Dr. Olson decided no further medical bills should be paid beyond the beginning of April of 1998. Now, the majority opinion will compel an independent medical examination whenever there is a preexisting no-auto-related accident case with resulting expense, uncertainty and delays now being thrust into every decision on payment. In most cases, this will lead to retroactive approval or denial of medical expenses incurred to treat in a timely fashion injuries arising from an automobile accident. This result will occur even though it is undisputed that early and proper rehabilitation treatment usually tends to mitigate everybody's damages. This is not to say that medical reimbursement would continue forever because there are statutory dollar limits applied to every policy and an arbitrator still would have the ability to terminate payments for medical expenses when pre-accident condition status has been reached. The No-Fault Act provides for such a determination now and that is why apportionment principles should be rejected for the same reason we rejected those principles for subrogation claims. In Great West, we reasoned that a subrogation right must be found, if at all in the No-Fault Act, in that we do not recognize a separate common law right of subrogation in the no-fault context. 548 N.W.2d at 281. This interpretation was reacknowledged in Scheibel v. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co., 615 N.W.2d 34, 37 (Minn.2000), and the reasoning should be followed in this case. In Great West, we disallowed a subrogation claim against Northland brought by Great West who insured an individual injured in an automobile accident 3 years after the first automobile accident. 548 N.W.2d at 281. The majority attempts to distinguish this case from Great West depending on whether some of the medical expenses arose within or outside the no-fault system. Great West involved a multiple auto accident and the aggravation of a preexisting condition that resulted in a dispute between different insurance companies involved at the time of the two accidents, one in June 1988 and the second in June 1991. 548 N.W.2d at 279-80. We held that "[t]he clear implication is that only one accident can be deemed to be the cause of an injury for purposes of subrogation under section 65B.47." Id. at 281. This "one accident" precedent from Great West is even more compelling in this case. As stated by the legislature, the purpose of the No-Fault Act is to relieve the severe economic distress of uncompensated victims of automobile accidents without regard to whose fault caused the accident and to encourage appropriate medical and rehabilitation treatment by assuring prompt payment for the treatment. Minn. Stat. § 65B.42. It is undisputed that the respondent has suffered a compensable loss in an automobile accident, is an injured person, and is entitled to reasonable medical expense benefits and the assurance of prompt payment. Minnesota Statutes § 65B.44, subdivision 2, provides for the reimbursement of "all reasonable expenses for necessary * * * medical * * * and rehabilitative services * * *." It is also undisputed that the respondent has a preexisting chronic medical injury due to a horse-riding accident. *559 The majority opinion deviates from the stated purpose of the Act and holds that the statutory language defining loss incorporates the elements of causation into the determination of what medical expense benefits are reimbursable. The majority opinion relies on two of our cases on causation between the use of an automobile and an injury. In Continental Western, we found that there was the requisite degree of causation between injuries and the use of a car when a gun was fired out of a moving vehicle causing injury to another party. Cont'l W. Ins. Co. v. Klug, 415 N.W.2d 876, 878 (Minn.1987). North River involved an injury from a trailer attached to a motor vehicle. N. River Ins. Co. v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 346 N.W.2d 109, 114 (Minn.1984). However, these cases are not helpful because they do not involve PIP benefits and, in this case, it is undisputed that the second injury arose out of the use of an automobile. Although our decision in Great West involved a subrogation claim between insurers for an injury caused by more than one auto accident, the legal principles, which support the denial of a subrogation claim, apply equally as well to the facts in this case. The majority's decision in this case has the same * * * potential to trigger precisely what the legislature appears to have attempted to avoid in adopting the term "the accident"-finger pointing among insurers claiming that another carrier was responsible for some portion of the insured's disability. Further, as we noted above, it introduces the fault-based concept of subrogation into allocation of loss independent of fault, a step we are unwilling to take without explicit statutory authority notably absent here. That the entire responsibility for Neulieb's disability caused by the accident occurring while Great West was on the policy should fall on Great West is neither unfair nor unjust. Great West accepted Neulieb as an insured with whatever physical condition he may have had at the time, and it is not for Great West to either refuse payments of benefits for that portion of his disability caused by a previous injury or is it to seek subrogation from Northland therefore.

+ 5 more citations in this opinion.

Johnson v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company · 1996 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Great West Casualty Co. v. Northland Insurance Co. · 1996 3 citations

+ 3 more citations in this opinion.

Meister v. Western National Mutual Insurance · 1992 20 citations

+ 20 more citations in this opinion.

American Family Mutual Insurance Co. v. Vanman · 1990 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Hanson v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co. · 1987 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Rehnelt v. Stuebe · 1986 4 citations

+ 4 more citations in this opinion.

Reed v. Continental Western Insurance Co. · 1985 12 citations

KELLEY, Justice. The primary issue in this case is whether a Minnesota licensed insurer of automobiles owned by nonresidents is liable under the Minnesota No-Fault Reparations Act (Minn. Stat. § 65B.47) for no-fault benefits when one of its insureds sustained personal injuries while in a Minnesota accident at a time she was operating a non-owned vehicle, and at a time one or more of the insured vehicles was not in the State of Minnesota. On motion for summary judgment, the trial judge held that it was. The Court of Appeals affirmed.1 We reverse in part, affirm in part, and remand. On November 25, 1981, at 2:15 p.m., Carmen Reed, a college student who resided with her parents in Chester, Iowa, sustained extensive personal injuries resulting in quadriplegia in a Minnesota accident while driving a vehicle owned by Bernie Leeder, a Wisconsin resident. The Leeder vehicle was insured by Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate). Carmen Reed’s parents, who lived only one mile from the Minnesota-Iowa border, owned three vehicles insured by Continental Western Insurance Company (Continental). Carmen was an “insured” under the definition of the policy. Iowa does not have a no-fault reparation system, and there were no no-fault riders on the policy *438covering the three Reed vehicles. Carmen’s father was a rural mail carrier whose route brought him almost daily into Minnesota. The other members of the family using the insured vehicles traveled frequently in Minnesota. In an affidavit filed with the trial court, Carmen’s father claims that at the time of the accident, he was most likely in Minnesota on his mail route. In a similar affidavit, Carmen’s mother claims that at the same time she was in LeRoy, Minnesota, doing Thanksgiving shopping. The trial court, however, made no finding whether, at the time of Carmen’s accident, one or more of the Reed insured vehicles was in Minnesota. Continental, an Iowa corporation, actively conducts automobile insurance business in Minnesota and has filed its no-fault certification form with the commissioner of commerce. Shortly after the accident Carmen Reed collected $20,000 in medical benefits from Allstate, the insurer of the Leeder vehicle. She then ultimately commenced this action against Continental claiming no-fault benefits under the policy covering her parents’ three vehicles.2 The trial court granted Carmen Reed summary judgment in reliance on Western National Mutual Ins. Co. v. State Farm Ins. Co., 353 N.W.2d 169 (Minn.App.1984) holding that Carmen was an insured at priority level 4(a) of Minn. Stat. § 65B.47 (1984) without making any fact findings with respect to whether any of the Reed vehicles were in the State of Minnesota at the time of Carmen’s accident. It further found that she was entitled to no-fault benefits from Continental in addition to the benefits she had previously received from Allstate. The Court of Appeals affirmed on both issues.3 1. We have held today in Western National Mutual Ins. Co. v. State Farm Ins. Co., 374 N.W.2d 441 (Minn.1985), whether a foreign insurer, which insured vehicles owned and garaged in a state without a no-fault reparations system, licensed to write auto insurance in Minnesota, is liable for no-fault reparation benefits at priority level 4(a) of Minn. Stat. § 65B.47 depends upon whether, at the time of the accident giving rise to the claim, one or more of the nonresident vehicles was in the State of Minnesota. Both the trial court and the majority of the court of appeals panel held that physical presence of an insured automobile in the state was not relevant to Continental’s obligation to furnish no-fault benefits. Accordingly, we reverse those holdings. ' Whether Continental is liable to pay no-fault benefits depends upon whether at the time of Carmen’s accident one or more of the Reed vehicles was in this state. As indicated, the trial judge did not address this issue because he deemed it to be immaterial. However, it is now clear that if one of the Reed vehicles was in the state at the time of the accident, it would trigger Continental’s liability for no-fault benefits under priority level 4(a) of section 65B.47 (1984). Since the trial court made no factual determination on this issue, we remand for findings on this issue.4 2. Even should it ultimately be determined on remand that Continental is *439liable under priority level 4(a), Minn. Stat. § 65B.47 (1984) to pay Carmen no-fault benefits, Continental claims she is not entitled to those benefits because Carmen has accepted no-fault benefits from Allstate. It claims Reed cannot stack benefits because the applicable policies are at different priority levels — i.e., recovery under Minn. Stat. § 65B.47, subd. 4(b) against Allstate, the insurer of the involved vehicle, and level 4(a) against Continental which issued the policy under which Carmen claims coverage under the Minnesota No-Fault Act. Relying on Wasche v. Milbank Mutual Ins. Co., 268 N.W.2d 913, 919 (Minn.1978), Continental claims Reed may not stack across priority levels. We find Wasche, however, to be inapposite. While we did state in Wasche that stacking at the same level was not prohibited, it should be noted that Wasche did not involve the issue presented here. In that case the stacking was at the same priority level. In this case, Reed contends she has not made an election to receive medical pay at level 4(b) from Allstate, but rather that she was compelled to do so because Continental refused to pay no-fault economic loss benefits at level 4(a), and that she was desperately in need of money to pay medical bills. She claims Continental’s liability has existed since the time of the accident, and that Continental denied the claim for those benefits made about one week after the accident.5 She notes that were this court to apply the “voluntary payment doctrine,” the application would run contrary to the purpose of the No-Fault Act because it would discourage primary obligors from providing benefits in the hope that some other carrier, mistakenly or otherwise under statutory compulsion, might pay. Likewise, she argues that Continental’s position runs counter to the purpose of providing prompt payment of benefits, see Minn. Stat. 65B.42(1) (1984), because it discourages lower priority insurers from providing benefits when a claim could be made to a “higher priority insurer.” Finally, double recovery is prevented by granting subrogation rights. See Minn. Stat. § 65B.47, subd. 6 (1984). The issue here is not whether Reed can stack across priorities, but rather whether Reed can recover damages in excess of Continental policy limits from Allstate. Since Reed was rendered quadriplegic, the damages would undoubtedly exceed Continental’s $90,000 exposure; but if Allstate has a subrogation action, any circuity of action is directly attributable to Continental’s refusal to pay. We conclude under the circumstances of this case that if Continental’s policy applies that Carmen Reed is entitled to recover economic loss benefits under its policy insuring the three Reed vehicles. Accordingly, on this issue we affirm the Court of Appeals. COYNE, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

+ 9 more citations in this opinion.

Western National Mutual Insurance Co. v. State Farm Insurance Co. · 1985 12 citations

KELLEY, Justice. Dorothy Archiletti owned an automobile(s) licensed, garaged, and insured in Missouri. State Farm Insurance Company (State Farm) insured the Archiletti vehicle(s) in Missouri, a state which does not have an automobile no-fault reparations act. State Farm was licensed to write automobile insurance policies in Minnesota, but did not collect any premiums for no-fault coverage on the Archiletti policy. On September 30,1980, Dorothy Archiletti sustained personal injuries in a motor vehicle accident that occurred in Minnesota. At the time of the accident, she was an occupant of a motor vehicle licensed and garaged in Minnesota and insured by Western National Mutual Insurance Company (Western). Western paid Archiletti basic economic benefits pursuant to the Minnesota No-Fault Act.1 In an attempt to recoup these payments, Western commenced this subrogation action against State Farm. Western claimed that State Farm’s obligation took precedence over Western’s obligation, at priority level 4(a) of Minn. Stat. § 65B.47, because State Farm was licensed to sell automobile insurance in Minnesota. The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment. The court of appeals affirmed. Western National Mutual Insurance Co. v. State Farm Insurance, 353 N.W.2d 169 (Minn.App.1984). We reverse. Prior to the accident, Dorothy Archiletti traveled to Minnesota from Missouri by commercial airline and left her automobile(s) at her residence. She sustained her injuries in the Minnesota accident while riding as a passenger in a vehicle owned by John and LaVonne Wefel. The Wefels are Minnesota residents. The trial court and a divided court of appeals held that the Minnesota No-Fault Act obligates State Farm to provide no-fault basic economic benefits to its Missouri insured. Both courts reached this conclusion, notwithstanding that: (1) the insured automobile(s) was not in Minnesota at the time of the accident; (2) Missouri, where the Archiletti vehicle(s) was garaged and insured, did not have a no-fault reparations act; and (3) Archiletti never paid a premium for no-fault benefits. Integral to both courts’ reasoning was the assumption *443that Petty v. Allstate Ins. Co., 290 N.W.2d 763 (Minn.1980) limited construction of Minnesota’s “certification” statute, Minn. Stat. § 65B.50 (1982). See Western National Mutual Ins. Co., 353 N.W.2d at 171. Both parties, on appeal, rely on the Petty decision. Western contends, and a majority of the court of appeals’ panel agreed, that the Petty decision stands for the proposition that the presence of the out-of-state insured’s vehicle in the state is insignificant with respect to an out-of-state insurer’s obligation. On the other hand, State Farm asserts that the Petty opinion’s reference to the presence of the Pettys’ insured vehicle was determinative. In Petty, Mr. and Mrs. Petty drove one of their two automobiles from California into the State of Minnesota. Petty, 290 N.W.2d at 764. While in Minnesota, the two California residents were injured in an automobile accident within this state. At the time of the accident, however, the Pet-tys were occupants of a Minnesota vehicle owned by the Pettys’ daughter. The Pet-tys’ two automobiles were registered and garaged in California and were insured by Allstate under a policy written and issued in California. The Pettys did not pay no-fault premiums because California at that time did not have a no-fault reparations act. Under those circumstances, we held that the Pettys could stack no-fault benefits under Minnesota law. Id. at 766. Our holding that a nonresident insured could stack out-of-state coverage does not compel acceptance of either argument now before us. The sole issue presented in Petty was “whether nonresident owners of more than one vehicle insured in a state which does not provide no-fault benefits are entitled to stack benefits under applicable Minnesota statutes.” Id. at 765. The initial question of Allstate’s obligation to pay no-fault benefits was not there at issue. Indeed, as we stated in Petty, “Allstate acknowledged its obligation to provide nonresident policyholders with the minimum security as provided by Minn. Stat. § 65B.49 (1978) (emphasis added).” Id.2 Moreover, unlike the present situation, the Pettys had driven one of their vehicles into the State of Minnesota and it was physically present in Minnesota at the time of the accident. Allstate’s concession in Petty is irrelevant in addressing the issue in the present appeal.3 Having found that the Petty decision does not compel a conclusion either way, resolution of the issue in the case depends upon the interpretation of Minn. Stat. § 65B.50 (1984).4 Western, relying *444solely on Minn. Stat. § 65B.50, Subd. 1 (1984), claims that all insurers licensed to write automobile insurance in Minnesota agree, as a condition of doing business in Minnesota, to provide no-fault benefits to out-of-state insureds involved in Minnesota accidents. It claims that subdivision 2 of the statute does not contradict its contention because subdivisions 1 and 2 deal with two distinct situations. In its view, subdivision 1 has the effect of creating a continuous implied coverage once a licensed insurer’s nonresident insured comes into the State of Minnesota. It further maintains that subdivision 2 merely provides that nonlicensed insurers must provide no-fault benefits only when a vehicle it insured comes within the borders of Minnesota. While conceding that the legislature cannot govern nonresident coverage of vehicles not in Minnesota, Western argues that the required nonresident coverage is a separate obligation imposed, having no relevance to obligations imposed upon licensed insurers under Minn. Stat. § 65B.50, subd. 1. It attempts to buttress this argument by noting that Minn. Stat. § 65B.50 only references Minn. Stat. § 65B.49, which only deals with requirements imposed upon insurers. On the other hand, State Farm contends that resolution of the issue depends upon a close review of several interrelated provisions in the No-Fault Act. It argues that both subdivisions of Minn. Stat. § 65B.50 support its position that the out-of-state vehicle must be in Minnesota before the out-of-state insurer is obligated to provide no-fault benefits. It contends this interpretation is reasonable because it supports the policy of the No-Fault Act. For example, in this case State Farm’s insured is covered by the insurance covering the vehicle involved in the accident, Minn. Stat. § 65B.47(4)(b) — coverage for which Western collected a premium, but for which State Farm did not.5 State Farm further notes that Minn. Stat. § 65B.50, subd. 1, references section 65B.49 with respect to the scope of benefits that must be provided to nonresident policyholders including a provision requiring insurers to provide nonresident basic economic loss benefits. Moreover, State Farm notes that section 65B.49 provides that subdivision 1 is “subject to the provisions of section 65B.41 to 65B.71.” One of those latter provisions is Minn. Stat. § 65B.48(1), the compulsory reparation security section, which plainly requires a nonresident to maintain no-fault coverage only while his vehicle is within the state. Thus, State Farm maintains that the plain language of the certification statute, and the corresponding statutes to which it refers, indicates that the legislature did not intend to require no-fault insurance on a nonresident’s automobile not being used in Minnesota. Accordingly, it argues that the general rule that no-fault benefits “follow the individual” expressed in Minn. Stat. § 65B.47(4)(a) does not here apply. Rather, it claims, the applicable priority level is Minn. Stat. § 65B.47(4)(b) — the security covering the vehicle involved in the accident. Our examination of the applicable sections of the No-Fault Act confirms that the statutory language does not explicitly address the issue in this case. We, therefore, proceed to ascertain the intent of the legislature by considering, inter alia, the consequences of a particular interpretation. See Minn. Stat. § 645.16(6) (1984). In doing so, we conclude the legislature did not intend the consequences that would ensue should the construction urged by Western be sustained. Western’s proposed interpretation would impose on an insurer of vehicles owned and garaged by nonresidents in foreign states an unreasonable and economically heavy burden of being compelled to attempt to adjust premiums to reflect the highly unpredictable likelihood that the nonresident might be entitled to benefits under the Minnesota No-Fault Act even if they entered this state by public transportation having no nexus with the operation of the insured vehicle. *445The public policy reflected in the No-Fault Reparations Act impliedly recognizes that it is advantageous to Minnesota automobile owners to have the benefit of competition for premium costs and coverages from as broad a pool of automobile insurers as possible. To adopt Western’s proposed interpretation would tend to discourage those out-of-state insurers, licensed to do business in Minnesota,, from continued licensure and certification if the number of policies written in Minnesota was small, thereby reducing the pool. This result would be antipathetic to the goals of the No-Fault Act. See, e.g., Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Battaglia, 410 A.2d 1017 (Del. 1980). State Farm’s construction not only furthers the overall purpose of our No-Fault Act, but is also more consistent with related no-fault provisions. Its contention is consonant with other sections of the Act, in contradistinction to Western’s construction, which essentially views Minn. Stat. § 65B.50 in isolation. We find it important and persuasive to look to related provisions in construing our No-Fault Act.6 Therefore, we conclude that physical presence of a nonresident’s automobile within the state, at the time the automobile accident giving rise to the nonresident claim occurred, is a prerequisite for imposing liability on the nonresident’s Minnesota licensed automobile insurer for economic loss benefits under Minn. Stat. § 65B.47. Because no automobile owned by the Archi-lettis was in the state at the time Mrs. Archiletti sustained her injuries, economic losses sustained by her in the accident were compensable from the insurer of the Minnesota vehicle in which she was riding. That was Western. It follows that Western’s subrogation action fails. Reversed. COYNE, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. I dissent. I simply cannot follow the logic of the majority opinion. It attempts to justify the decision on the grounds of *446our case of Petty v. Allstate Insurance Company, 290 N.W.2d 763 (Minn.1980). I cannot agree. It seems Petty is directly in point. In Petty, two California residents were injured in a Minnesota automobile accident. There were two vehicles registered in California and insured by. Allstate, written and issued in California. One of those California vehicles was present in Minnesota, but was parked and was not in anyway involved in the collision. The insureds were driving a Minnesota vehicle owned by their daughter at the time of the injury. The majority decision appears to make a distinction between having a vehicle insured in another state in Minnesota at the time of the accident and not having a vehicle here in the state. I will present merely one example of how ridiculous that distinction is. Appellant admits that if the claimants here had had one of their vehicles in Minnesota at the time of the accident, even though that vehicle was parked and was in no way involved in the collision, the policy on that vehicle would provide protection to Dorothy Archiletti, who sustained the personal injuries here. Let us suppose, for example, that the people she was visiting, John and LaVonne Wefel, lived near the Minnesota-Iowa border. Let us suppose that the Archilettis allowed one of the Wef-els’ friends to drive the Archiletti vehicle while Dorothy Archiletti was in the Wefel vehicle, as she was in this case. If one of the Wefels’ friends driving the Archiletti vehicle happened to be in Minnesota at the time of the accident and the injury to Dorothy Archiletti, it is admitted that the Archi-letti insurance policy written by State Farm would cover Dorothy Archiletti. Yet, if 5 minutes before that, even though the vehicle had been in Minnesota, it had crossed the line into Iowa, there’d be no such coverage. I simply cannot understand why it makes any difference whether they should be recovering in the two instances. That is why this court has historically held that insurance follows the person, not the vehicle. Following the vehicle could lead to ridiculous results as I think the result is in this case. That is why I would affirm both the trial court and the Minnesota Court of Appeals in this case.

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Here the risk principally being insured against is the risk of injury to the named insured and his employees in the business. The premium paid to cover this risk takes into account the fact that an employee injured while a passenger or driver in a vehicle furnished by the employer comes within a priority level which disallows stacking. See Minn. Stat. § 65B.47, subd. 2 (1982). It is because the principal risk is a business risk rather than a family risk that the premium is calculated on the degree of the named insured’s business activity as measured by the payroll generated by the business. This premium includes but does not separately reflect the secondary risk of injury to the named insured and members of his household in their family pursuits. In this context, then, it is appropriate to say that there is only a single policy or single coverage for which only a single premium was paid even though several vehicles are involved. Consequently, when an insured under the policy, either a household member or a business employee, is injured, the single payment of benefits does not result in an unearned premium windfall to the insurer. There is nothing to stack because, in the words of Wasche, there is only the single “no-fault coverage applicable to him as an insured.” 268 N.W.2d at 919.

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Meister v. WESTERN NAT. MUT. INS. CO. · 1991 5 citations

*430 ANALYSIS According to the parties' stipulation, there are no genuine issues of material fact and the only issue is whether the trial court correctly applied the law. When the facts are undisputed, the trial court's conclusions of law do not bind this court. A.J. Chromy Constr. Co. v. Commercial Mechanical Servs., Inc., 260 N.W.2d 579, 582 (Minn. 1977). The Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act establishes priorities for payment of "basic economic loss benefits" when automobile accident injuries are covered by two or more insurance policies. It provides: Subdivision 1. In case of injury to the driver or other occupant of a motor vehicle * * * if the accident causing the injury occurs while the vehicle is being used in the business of transporting persons or property, the security for payment of basic economic loss benefits is the security covering the vehicle or, if none, the security under which the injured person is an insured. Subd. 2. In case of injury to an employee * * * if the accident causing the injury occurs while the injured person is driving or occupying a motor vehicle * * * furnished by the employer, the security for payment of basic economic loss benefits is the security covering the vehicle or, if none, the security under which the injured person is an insured. * * * * * * Subd. 4. In all other cases, the following priorities apply: (a) The security for payment of basic economic loss benefits applicable to injury to an insured is the security under which the injured person is an insured. Minn. Stat. § 65B.47 (1988) (emphasis added). The facts are undisputed that the pick-up truck involved in the accident was owned by Gunflint Lodge. Respondents argue that either subdivision 1 or subdivision 2 apply to give the Lodge insurance priority over any family policy under subdivision 4. At the time of the accident, the pick-up truck was transporting business property owned by the lodge. Appellants argue, however, that at the time of the accident, the pick-up truck was being used for the purpose of a side trip to take Michael Meister to the river, not for the business of the employer. Thus, appellants argue, Minn. Stat. § 65B.47, subd. 1, does not apply because the vehicle was not "being used in the business of transporting persons or property." We view the coverage of subdivision 1 as almost certain under these circumstances, but, to avoid whatever question might exist on the applicability of subdivision 1, we choose instead to decide the issue under subdivision 2. The coverage of subdivision 2 is clearly applicable. Michael was an employee in his employer's vehicle. The statute does not require that the vehicle be used in the course of business. The coverage provided under the policy issued by MSI, therefore, must provide the basic economic loss benefits because of subdivision 2. We now turn to the question of whether the additional insurance purchased by David Meister from Western may apply. In 1985, the Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act was amended to include an anti-stacking provision: Unless a policyholder makes a specific election to have two or more policies added together the limit of liability for basic economic loss benefits for two or more motor vehicles may not be added together to determine the limit of insurance coverage available to an injured person for any one accident. An insurer shall notify policyholders that they may elect to have two or more policies added together. See Minn. Stat. § 65B.47, subd. 7 (1988). This amendment has created an entirely new situation. We no longer have traditional stackings. Now, when insureds elect the "added together" coverage allowed under Minn. Stat. § 65B.47, subd. 7, they are not choosing to stack "basic economic loss benefits," as contemplated by pre-1985 *431 stacking cases.[1] Before 1985 stacking occurred by operation of law; now an insurance purchaser chooses to have double coverage; to buy voluntarily another $40,000 of insurance over and above basic economic loss benefits. The No-Fault Act makes explicit what constitutes basic economic loss benefits. Subd. 10. "Basic economic loss benefits" means benefits as described in section 65B.44. Minn. Stat. § 65B.43, subd. 10 (1988). Basic economic loss benefits shall provide reimbursement for all loss suffered through injury arising out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle, subject to any applicable deductibles, exclusions, disqualifications, and other conditions, and shall provide a maximum of $40,000 for loss arising out of the injury of any one person, consisting of: (a) $20,000 for medical expense loss arising out of injury to any one person; and (b) a total of $20,000 for income loss, replacement services loss, funeral expense loss, survivor's economic loss, and survivor's replacement services loss arising out of the injury to any one person. Minn. Stat. § 65B.44, subd. 1 (1988) (emphasis added). Benefits greater than $20,000 medical benefits and $20,000 wage loss benefits are outside this definition. So what is a benefit exceeding the $40,000 maximum? In our view an insured choosing the election of a second policy is choosing to add additional first-party coverage. These are "additional benefits" as provided for in section 65B.49, subdivision 7 (1988),[2] and "optional economic loss benefits" as referred to in sections 65B.53, 65B.58, and 65B.60. Minn. Stat. § 65B.47 establishes the priority of security for payment of "basic economic loss benefits" and no more. That section does not apply to any added benefits that the Meisters purchased. As to the $40,000 of basic economic loss benefits, we go through the priorities and determine which policy will apply. Here the MSI policy. Then, we turn to the personal policy to add whatever "additional" or "optional" protection appellants purchased. Although MSI is liable for the basic economic loss benefits, Western is liable for the additional first-party coverage appellants purchased from it. Under the circumstances of this case, we are not talking about "stacking." We are not stacking the same coverage, rather we are determining first, which policy covers the basic economic loss benefits and, second, giving effect to additional protection that has been purchased by Michael's father, and requiring the insurer to pay the added benefits that it contracted to pay to covered members of the Meister family if seriously injured in an automobile accident. The result below is incongruous. It gives family members protection at twice the statutory minimum at all times except when in a commercial bus, a working truck, or an employer's vehicle. By applying the priority sections only to basic economic protection coverage we give effect at all times to the greater coverage contemplated when the policy was bought, and when it was sold.

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OPINION NORTON, Judge. American Family Insurance appeals a summary judgment awarded in favor of respondent Metropolitan Transit Commission (MTC), wherein the trial court found that the 1986 amendment to Minn. Stat. § 65B.47 of the Minnesota No-Fault Act applies to all claims made after the effective date of the amendment. We reverse.

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State Farm objects to the application of Minn. Stat. § 65B.47, subd. 4(a) (1982), under which the duty to respond to claims for basic economic loss benefits lies with the insurer issuing the policy “under which the injured person is an insured,” here, State Farm. This issue was raised in Western National Mutual Insurance Co. v. State Farm Insurance, 353 N.W.2d 169 (Minn.Ct.App.1984). In Western this court, interpreting the language of Minn. Stat. § 65B.50 (1982) and the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in Petty v. Allstate Insurance Company, 290 N.W.2d 763 (Minn.1980), held that an insurer licensed to do business in Minnesota had to afford basic economic loss benefits to a nonresident policyholder on an accident occurring in Minnesota even though the policyholder’s vehicle was not present in Minnesota at the time of the accident. See Western, 353 N.W.2d at 171-73.

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