Minn. Stat. § 65B.53

Fernow v. Gould · 2013 2 citations

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United Prairie Bank-Mountain Lake v. Haugen Nutrition & Equipment, LLC · 2012 1 citation

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Nelson v. American Family Insurance Group · 2002 6 citations

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State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Great West Casualty Co. · 2001 10 citations

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Nodak Mutual Insurance Co. v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co. · 2000 1 citation

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Metropolitan Property & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Metropolitan Transit Commission · 1995 8 citations

Appellant, Metropolitan Transit Commission (“MTC”), and respondent, Metropolitan Property & Casualty Insurance Co. (“Metropolitan”), ask this court to determine the date of accrual of a no-fault insurer’s right of indemnity under the Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act, Minn. Stat. § 65B.41-.71 (1992). MTC appeals from a court of appeals decision holding that a no-fault insurer’s right of indemnity under Minn. Stat. § 65B.53, subd. 1 (1992) accrues when the insurer actually pays on its insured’s claim. Because we believe that the legislature did not clearly intend to amend the common law rules for the accrual of indemnity with the enactment of Minn. Stat. § 65B.53, subd. 1 (1992), we affirm.

Appellant, Metropolitan Transit Commission (“MTC”), and respondent, Metropolitan Property & Casualty Insurance Co. (“Metropolitan”), ask this court to determine the date of accrual of a no-fault insurer’s right of indemnity under the Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act, Minn. Stat. § 65B.41-.71 (1992). MTC appeals from a court of appeals decision holding that a no-fault insurer’s right of indemnity under Minn. Stat. § 65B.53, subd. 1 (1992) accrues when the insurer actually pays on its insured’s claim. Because we believe that the legislature did not clearly intend to amend the common law rules for the accrual of indemnity with the enactment of Minn. Stat. § 65B.53, subd. 1 (1992), we affirm.

Appellant, Metropolitan Transit Commission (“MTC”), and respondent, Metropolitan Property & Casualty Insurance Co. (“Metropolitan”), ask this court to determine the date of accrual of a no-fault insurer’s right of indemnity under the Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act, Minn. Stat. § 65B.41-.71 (1992). MTC appeals from a court of appeals decision holding that a no-fault insurer’s right of indemnity under Minn. Stat. § 65B.53, subd. 1 (1992) accrues when the insurer actually pays on its insured’s claim. Because we believe that the legislature did not clearly intend to amend the common law rules for the accrual of indemnity with the enactment of Minn. Stat. § 65B.53, subd. 1 (1992), we affirm.

+ 5 more citations in this opinion.

Rowe v. St. Paul Ramsey Medical Center · 1991 2 citations

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American Family Mutual Insurance Co. v. Vanman · 1990 1 citation

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Aufderhar v. Data Dispatch, Inc. · 1990 2 citations

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Regie De L'Assurance Automobile Du Quebec v. Jensen · 1987 1 citation

. Appellant Jensen likewise contends that the Regie is prohibited from maintaining the subro-gation action by provision of the Minnesota No-Fault Act. See, e.g., Minn. Stat. § 65B.53, subd. 2, 3; Minn. Stat. § 65B.51. See also, M. Steenson, Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance, 23 (1982). Because we have adjudicated the case on other grounds, we do not address this issue.

Milbrandt v. American Legion Post of Mora · 1985 1 citation

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Dahle v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Insurance Co. · 1984 1 citation

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National Indemnity Co. v. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. · 1984 2 citations

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Short v. Dairyland Insurance Co. · 1983 1 citation

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Flanery v. Total Tree, Inc. · 1983 1 citation

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Miller v. Astleford Equipment Co., Inc. · 1983 2 citations

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Langenberger v. Dahl · 1983 8 citations

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Tuenge v. Konetski · 1982 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Great American Insurance Co. v. Spoden · 1982 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

National Indemnity Co. v. Mutual Service Casualty Co. · 1981 4 citations

This is an appeal by plaintiff National Indemnity Company from a summary judgment in favor of Mutual Service Casualty *857 Company. The issues raised are whether Minn. Stat. § 65B.53, subd. 1 (1978), which permits indemnity for economic loss benefits paid, from the insurer of a commercial vehicle, denies equal protection of the laws, and whether Minn. Stat. § 65B.53, subd. 4 (1980), which requires arbitration of such indemnity claims, denies a jury trial in violation of the Minnesota Constitution. We reject both claims and, accordingly, we affirm.

This is an appeal by plaintiff National Indemnity Company from a summary judgment in favor of Mutual Service Casualty *857 Company. The issues raised are whether Minn. Stat. § 65B.53, subd. 1 (1978), which permits indemnity for economic loss benefits paid, from the insurer of a commercial vehicle, denies equal protection of the laws, and whether Minn. Stat. § 65B.53, subd. 4 (1980), which requires arbitration of such indemnity claims, denies a jury trial in violation of the Minnesota Constitution. We reject both claims and, accordingly, we affirm.

This is an appeal by plaintiff National Indemnity Company from a summary judgment in favor of Mutual Service Casualty *857 Company. The issues raised are whether Minn. Stat. § 65B.53, subd. 1 (1978), which permits indemnity for economic loss benefits paid, from the insurer of a commercial vehicle, denies equal protection of the laws, and whether Minn. Stat. § 65B.53, subd. 4 (1980), which requires arbitration of such indemnity claims, denies a jury trial in violation of the Minnesota Constitution. We reject both claims and, accordingly, we affirm.

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Pfeffer v. State Automobile & Casualty Underwriters Insurance Co. · 1980 3 citations

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Fernow v. Gould · 2012 3 citations

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State Farm v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. · 2004 10 citations

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State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Great West Casualty Co. · 2000 8 citations

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Nodak Mutual Insurance Co. v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co. · 1999 1 citation

+ 1 more citation in this opinion.

Great West Casualty Co. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. · 1999 9 citations

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LeBeau v. John Deere Insurance Co. · 1998 4 citations

ANALYSIS An occupant of a motor vehicle that is insured pursuant to the no-fault act is entitled to collect basic economic loss benefits from an insurer, even if the accident occurs in another state. Minn. Stat. § 65B.46, subd. 2 (1990). Basic economic loss benefits include payments for medical expenses. Minn. Stat. § 65B.44, subds. 1, 2 (1990). Basic economic loss benefits are payable when an expense is incurred. Minn. Stat. § 65B.54 subd. 1 (1990). Because LeBeau's accident occurred in Wisconsin, John Deere ordinarily would be entitled to assert subrogation[1] rights against LeBeau after paying a claim for medical expenses, if that payment were to result in double recovery by LeBeau. Minn. Stat. § 65B.53, subd. 2 (1990). But LeBeau settled the tort action before he incurred additional medical expenses for his daughter's surgery. LeBeau claims that he is entitled to recover from John Deere any medical expenses incurred after the settlement, and that a no-fault insurer has no subrogation rights under Minn. Stat. § 65B.53 in the situation where basic economic loss accrues after a tort settlement. The parties cite Ferguson v. Illinois Farmers Ins. Group Co., 348 N.W.2d 730 (Minn.1984). There, the supreme court held that when an insured recovers a judgment against a tortfeasor, the insured's expected medical expenses may not be deducted from the judgment and assigned to the no-fault carrier. Rather, the insured should receive the entire judgment from the tortfeasor, less the costs of collection, including reasonable attorney fees. Then, after the insured has exhausted the damages allocated for medical expenses, the insured may recover any additional medical expenses from the no-fault insurer. Id. at 730. LeBeau argues that critical to Ferguson was the fact that the insured received a judgment that included a specific identifiable recovery allocated to future medical expenses. But here, although LeBeau did not receive a judgment against Larson, he did agree to a settlement which, like the judgment in Ferguson, allocated a specific amount for expected medical expenses.[2] Therefore, applying Ferguson, to avoid double recovery, LeBeau must first exhaust the amount of the settlement allocated for expected medical expenses, less costs of collection and reasonable attorney fees, before he is entitled to recover any medical expenses from John Deere. The total amount of LeBeau's settlement was $25,000, including $9,000 for expected medical expenses. From the $25,000, the district court deducted $2,755, or 11.02%, for costs of collection and reasonable attorney *86 fees. When the amount of $9,000 is similarly reduced by the 11.02% costs of collection and attorney fees, the resultant $8,008.20 represents the net amount of future medical expenses that LeBeau must exhaust pursuant to Ferguson before he may recover no-fault benefits from John Deere. The actual cost of the surgery was $8,508.25. Because this amount exceeds $8,008.20, LeBeau has in fact exhausted the amount of future medical expenses attributable to the settlement and has stated a proper claim against John Deere for the balance of $500.05. LeBeau did not include the above calculations in his briefs to this court, and he apparently made a tactical decision not to do so. However, undisputed evidence in the record supports our calculations, and in response to questioning by this court at oral argument, the parties fully addressed the issue to our satisfaction. Therefore, in the interest of judicial economy,[3] we hold that when either a judgment against or a settlement with a tortfeasor includes a designated amount for expected medical expenses, that amount must be reduced proportionally by the total costs of collection, including reasonable attorney fees, and that net amount must be exhausted before the insured seeks to recover any additional medical expenses from the no-fault carrier. We note that if the district court had required John Deere to pay LeBeau's claim for the surgery, such payment would result in a double recovery to the extent of $8,008.20, triggering John Deere's subrogation rights and bringing the case again before the court. The district court's decision to instead resolve the parties' entire dispute is supported by an overriding purpose of the no-fault act, which is to avoid "[t]he detrimental impact of automobile accidents * * * upon the orderly and efficient administration of justice in this state[.]" Minn. Stat. § 65B.42; accord Minn. Stat. § 65B.42(4) (reiterating this purpose by stating that the no-fault act is intended "[t]o speed the administration of justice, [and] to ease the burden of litigation on the courts of this state").

ANALYSIS An occupant of a motor vehicle that is insured pursuant to the no-fault act is entitled to collect basic economic loss benefits from an insurer, even if the accident occurs in another state. Minn. Stat. § 65B.46, subd. 2 (1990). Basic economic loss benefits include payments for medical expenses. Minn. Stat. § 65B.44, subds. 1, 2 (1990). Basic economic loss benefits are payable when an expense is incurred. Minn. Stat. § 65B.54 subd. 1 (1990). Because LeBeau's accident occurred in Wisconsin, John Deere ordinarily would be entitled to assert subrogation[1] rights against LeBeau after paying a claim for medical expenses, if that payment were to result in double recovery by LeBeau. Minn. Stat. § 65B.53, subd. 2 (1990). But LeBeau settled the tort action before he incurred additional medical expenses for his daughter's surgery. LeBeau claims that he is entitled to recover from John Deere any medical expenses incurred after the settlement, and that a no-fault insurer has no subrogation rights under Minn. Stat. § 65B.53 in the situation where basic economic loss accrues after a tort settlement. The parties cite Ferguson v. Illinois Farmers Ins. Group Co., 348 N.W.2d 730 (Minn.1984). There, the supreme court held that when an insured recovers a judgment against a tortfeasor, the insured's expected medical expenses may not be deducted from the judgment and assigned to the no-fault carrier. Rather, the insured should receive the entire judgment from the tortfeasor, less the costs of collection, including reasonable attorney fees. Then, after the insured has exhausted the damages allocated for medical expenses, the insured may recover any additional medical expenses from the no-fault insurer. Id. at 730. LeBeau argues that critical to Ferguson was the fact that the insured received a judgment that included a specific identifiable recovery allocated to future medical expenses. But here, although LeBeau did not receive a judgment against Larson, he did agree to a settlement which, like the judgment in Ferguson, allocated a specific amount for expected medical expenses.[2] Therefore, applying Ferguson, to avoid double recovery, LeBeau must first exhaust the amount of the settlement allocated for expected medical expenses, less costs of collection and reasonable attorney fees, before he is entitled to recover any medical expenses from John Deere. The total amount of LeBeau's settlement was $25,000, including $9,000 for expected medical expenses. From the $25,000, the district court deducted $2,755, or 11.02%, for costs of collection and reasonable attorney *86 fees. When the amount of $9,000 is similarly reduced by the 11.02% costs of collection and attorney fees, the resultant $8,008.20 represents the net amount of future medical expenses that LeBeau must exhaust pursuant to Ferguson before he may recover no-fault benefits from John Deere. The actual cost of the surgery was $8,508.25. Because this amount exceeds $8,008.20, LeBeau has in fact exhausted the amount of future medical expenses attributable to the settlement and has stated a proper claim against John Deere for the balance of $500.05. LeBeau did not include the above calculations in his briefs to this court, and he apparently made a tactical decision not to do so. However, undisputed evidence in the record supports our calculations, and in response to questioning by this court at oral argument, the parties fully addressed the issue to our satisfaction. Therefore, in the interest of judicial economy,[3] we hold that when either a judgment against or a settlement with a tortfeasor includes a designated amount for expected medical expenses, that amount must be reduced proportionally by the total costs of collection, including reasonable attorney fees, and that net amount must be exhausted before the insured seeks to recover any additional medical expenses from the no-fault carrier. We note that if the district court had required John Deere to pay LeBeau's claim for the surgery, such payment would result in a double recovery to the extent of $8,008.20, triggering John Deere's subrogation rights and bringing the case again before the court. The district court's decision to instead resolve the parties' entire dispute is supported by an overriding purpose of the no-fault act, which is to avoid "[t]he detrimental impact of automobile accidents * * * upon the orderly and efficient administration of justice in this state[.]" Minn. Stat. § 65B.42; accord Minn. Stat. § 65B.42(4) (reiterating this purpose by stating that the no-fault act is intended "[t]o speed the administration of justice, [and] to ease the burden of litigation on the courts of this state").

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Great West Casualty Co. v. Northland Insurance · 1995 1 citation

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Metropolitan Property & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Metropolitan Transit Commission · 1995 11 citations

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Mueller v. Theis · 1994 1 citation

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Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. National Family Insurance Co. · 1991 2 citations

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Principal Financial Group v. Allstate Insurance Co. · 1991 14 citations

+ 14 more citations in this opinion.

Farmers Insurance Group v. General Casualty Companies · 1989 5 citations

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American Family Mutual Insurance Co. v. Vanman · 1989 1 citation

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Preferred Risk Mutual Insurance Co. v. Pagel · 1989 2 citations

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Gruman v. Hendrickson · 1987 10 citations

OPINION A. PAUL LOMMEN, Judge. Respondent Gruman’s personal injury claim against Hendrickson and Burlington Northern was submitted to arbitration. Appellant no-fault carrier moved to intervene, but that motion was denied. Following the arbitration award, appellant, again attempted to intervene and vacate the arbitration award. Appellant further requested, upon judgment entered in favor of Gru-man, it receive the amount of no-fault benefits paid to Gruman. The trial court denied appellant’s motion and this appeal followed. Appellant argues the trial court erred because (1) appellant has met the four-part test for intervention as a matter of right, (2) the arbitration award does' not reflect appellant’s statutorily protected subrogation claim, and (3) the arbitrator erred by deducting the value of no-fault benefits paid to plaintiff from the award. We affirm. FACTS Respondent Thelma Gruman (Gruman) initiated a lawsuit against defendants Ralph Hendrickson (Hendrickson) and Burlington Northern Railroad (Burlington Northern). Gruman alleged to have sustained personal injuries while a passenger in a motor vehicle owned and operated by Hendrickson. Hendrickson was operating his automobile over railroad tracks owned by Burlington Northern. Gruman’s injuries occurred when Hendrickson’s vehicle struck allegedly defective tracks of Burlington Northern. On the date of the accident, Gruman was insured by appellant, Western Fire Insurance Company. Appellant paid Gruman medical expense benefits totaling $2,951.41 and wage loss replacement service benefits of $6,052.33, for a total no-fault benefit payment of $9,003.74. In order to protect its subrogation claim, appellant made a motion to intervene. On January 31, 1986, the trial court issued an order denying appellant’s request for intervention on the basis the motion was premature and that appellant had no subrogation claim for basic economic loss benefits. On March 27, 1987, the case proceeded to arbitration pursuant to rule 5 of the Special Rules of Practice for the Fourth Judicial District. An award filed April 7, 1987 gave judgment for Gruman against Hendrickson and Burlington Northern for $12,000 jointly and severally. Hendrickson was assessed 15% at fault and Burlington Northern 85%. The award expressly provided that while all parties stipulated to amounts paid, Hendrickson and Burlington Northern contested the propriety or reasonableness of the payments. The award also specifically provided it was a net award and did not include basic economic loss benefits paid to date. No request for a trial de novo was made on behalf of any party and judgment was entered May 8, 1987. By motion and amended motion dated May 1, 1987 and June 5, 1987, appellant renewed its motion to intervene and requested the arbitration award and judgment be vacated or amended to reflect appellant’s subrogation claim. By order filed June 25, 1987, the trial court denied appellant’s motion and amended motion. The trial court found appellant’s cause of action, if any, was against Gruman and that appellant’s claim for sub-rogation had not arisen because there had been no double recovery by Gruman. This appeal followed. ISSUES 1. Did the trial court err in refusing to allow appellant to intervene in this suit as a matter of right? 2. Did the trial court err in refusing to vacate the arbitration award? ANALYSIS 1. Appellant argues the trial court erred in denying appellant’s motion to in*500tervene. Appellant’s intervention was sought pursuant to Rule 24.01, which provides: Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant’s interest is adequately represented by existing parties. Minn.R.Civ.P. 24.01. In reviewing orders concerning intervention as of right, this court will independently assess the appropriateness of the order. Norman v. Refsland, 383 N.W.2d 673, 676 (Minn.1986). We are not held to a standard of review requiring a clear abuse of discretion before we may reverse a trial court’s denial of a motion to intervene as a matter of right. Id. Rule 24.01 establishes a four-part test a nonparty must meet before being allowed to intervene as a matter of right: (1) a timely application for intervention; (2) an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action; (3) circumstances demonstrating the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the party’s ability to protect that interest; and (4) a showing the party is not adequately represented by the existing parties. Minneapolis Star & Tribune v. Schumacher, 392 N.W.2d 197, 207 (Minn.1986). The spirit behind Rule 24 is to encourage all legitimate interventions, and the rule is to be liberally applied. Engelrup v. Potter, 302 Minn. 157, 166, 224 N.W.2d 484, 489 (1974). Rule 24 is designed to protect nonparties from having their interests adversely affected by litigation conducted without their participation. Erickson v. Bennett, 409 N.W.2d 884, 887 (Minn.Ct.App.1987). Appellant argues it has met all four tests of Rule 24.01 and therefore should have been allowed to intervene. We agree. The Minnesota Supreme Court has held a subrogation claim is sufficient to support intervention. Miller v. Astleford Equipment Co., Inc., 332 N.W.2d 653, 654 (Minn.1983). Miller involved a fact situation very similar to this case in which the supreme court concluded the deduction of the value of basic economic loss benefits from any recovery could destroy the asserted subro-gation right. Id. at 655. The supreme court recognized the insurer’s interest would only be adequately protected by intervention. Id. Again in Milbrandt v. American Legion Post of Mora, 372 N.W.2d 702 (Minn.1985), the supreme court stated the appellant insurance company should have been allowed to intervene when it claimed a subrogation interest in the suit. Id. at 704 n. 1. We conclude appellant should have been allowed to intervene in this suit. However, that right of intervention is only for the purposes of protecting appellant’s statutory right of subrogation, if and when it arises. Respondent argues an insurer paying basic economic loss benefits to its insured under the No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act has a subrogation right only against its insured and only when the recovery represents in some measure a duplication of those benefits. According to the No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act: A reparation obligor paying or obligated to pay basic economic loss benefits is subrogated to a claim based on an intentional tort, strict or statutory liability, or negligence other than negligence in the maintenance, use, or operation of a motor vehicle. This right of subrogation exists only to the extent that basic economic loss benefits are paid or payable and only to the extent that recovery on the claim absent subrogation would produce a duplication of benefits or reimbursement of the same loss. Minn. Stat. § 65B.53, subd. 3 (1986). In Milbrandt, the supreme court affirmed a summary judgment against an insurer who brought a subrogation claim to recover basic economic loss benefits. The court stated: *501Although subdivision 3 indicates that the legislature intended reparation obligors to recover from tortfeasors basic economic loss benefits paid to insureds, the legislature clearly limited this right to cases where insureds recover duplicate benefits from tortfeasors. Milbrandt, 372 N.W.2d at 705. The court went on to state in strong language: The statute * * * means exactly what it says: a reparation obligor may assert a subrogation claim to recover basic economic loss benefits paid only when the insured has received a double recovery. Because the insurer’s right to recover benefits paid its insured exists only when the insured obtains double recovery, the right of recovery recognized in subdivision 3 may be asserted only against the insured. When seeking to recover under subdivision 3, the burden is on the insurer to show that the insured has been overcompensated. Id. (footnote omitted). The court noted the right of the insurer against the insured arises only in the event of a double recovery by the insured, not by reason of tort. Id. n. 2. The reference to the right of recovery as a subrogation right is a statutorily created right and is not true subrogation. Id.; see Miller v. Astleford Equipment Co., Inc., 378 N.W.2d 820, 822 (Minn.Ct.App.1985), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 14, 1986). Respondent argues appellant’s statutory right of subrogation is not against Burlington Northern and Hendrickson because subrogation in terms of a claim against the tortfeasor does not exist in Minnesota. Therefore, an insurance company can only recover benefits paid when the insured obtains double recovery. Milbrandt, 372 N.W.2d at 705; Peters v. B.P. & E., Inc., 397 N.W.2d 449, 451 (Minn.Ct.App.1986). Because there has been no double recovery by Gruman, respondent argues appellant has no subrogation claim. We agree. In light of the fact appellant’s statutory subrogation right never arose under Minn. Stat. § 65B.53, subd. 3, we conclude the trial court did not commit reversible error by refusing to allow intervention. 2. Appellant argues the trial court erred in refusing to vacate the arbitration award or judgment because the arbitrator erred in its application of the law. Appellant maintains the arbitrator erred by deducting the value of no-fault benefits paid to respondent from the award. Appellant claims it is entitled to relief pursuant to Minn.R.Civ.P. 60.02(1) and (6). A party seeking to vacate a judgment under rule 60.02 must show: (1) a reasonable claim on the merits; (2) a reasonable excuse for the neglect; (3) due diligence after notice of entry of judgment; and (4) that no substantial prejudice will result to the opponent. Hinz v. Northland Milk & Ice Cream Co., 237 Minn. 28, 30, 53 N.W.2d 454, 456 (1952). Appellant argues it has complied with Rule 60.02 in all these respects. Appellant further argues the sub-rogation provision, Minn. Stat. § 65B.53, subd. 3, not the offset provision, Minn. Stat. § 65B.51, subd. 1, should control this case because Burlington Northern’s negligence was negligence other than negligence in the maintenance, use, or operation of a motor vehicle. Appellant contends the arbitrator relied on Minn. Stat. § 65B.51, subd. 1 to deduct the no-fault benefits paid. Appellant argues the arbitrator should have used Minn. Stat. § 65B.53, subd. 3 because section 65B.51 deals with actions limited to some type of motor vehicle use. Appellant maintains Burlington Northern’s negligence is not connected to motor vehicle use. Appellant’s reliance on Rule 60.02 as a means to vacate the arbitration award is misplaced. The Special Rules of Practice for the Fourth Judicial District specifically provide judgment entered upon an arbitration award may not be attacked or set aside except as provided in Rule 5.11(d) (1986): A party against whom a judgment is entered pursuant to an arbitration award may, within six months after its entry, move to vacate the judgment on the ground that the arbitrator was subject to a disqualification not disclosed before the hearing and of which the arbitrator was *502then aware, or upon one of the grounds set forth in the Uniform Arbitration Act, Chapter 572, Minnesota Statutes, and upon no other grounds. The motion shall be heard by the court upon notice to the adverse parties and to the arbitrator, and may be granted only upon clear and convincing evidence that the grounds alleged are true, and that the motion was made as soon as practicable after the moving party learned of the existence of those grounds. Id. Furthermore, the chapter 572 provisions for vacating an arbitration award provide in part: Upon application of a party, the court shall vacate an award where: (1) The award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means; (2) There was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral or corruption in any of the arbitrators or misconduct prejudicing the rights of any party; (3) The arbitrators exceeded their powers; (4) The arbitrators refused to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause being shown therefor or refused to hear evidence material to the controversy or otherwise so conducted the hearing, contrary to the provisions of Section 5, as to prejudice substantially the rights of a party; or (5) There was no arbitration agreement and the issue was not adversely determined in proceedings under Section 572.09 and the party did not participate in the arbitration hearing without raising the objection. But the fact that the relief was such that it could not or would not be granted by a court of law or equity is not ground for vacating or refusing to confirm the award. Minn. Stat. § 572.19, subd. 1 (1986). Respondent asserts subdivision 1 does not allow the vacation of a judgment based upon an alleged error of law committed in the arbitration award. Grudem Brothers Co. v. Great Western Piping Corp., 297 Minn. 313, 316, 213 N.W.2d 920, 922-23 (1973). According to the supreme court: The arbitrators make the final determination of all questions submitted to them whether legal or factual. The court will not overturn these conclusions even if it believes the arbitrators made an incorrect conclusion. Id. at 316-17, 213 N.W.2d at 922-23. It is well established that an arbitration award “will be vacated only upon proof of one or more of the grounds stated in Minn. Stat. § 572.19 and not because the court disagrees with the decision on the merits.” AFSCME Council 96 v. Arrowhead Regional Corrections Board, 356 N.W.2d 295, 299-300 (Minn.1984). Thus, the applicable standard of review is determined from the grounds upon which a party seeks to vacate the award. Koranda v. Austin Mutual Insurance Co., 397 N.W.2d 357, 360 (Minn.Ct.App.1986), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 13, 1987). Respondent argues there was no error of law committed by the arbitrator. The award was clear the no-fault benefits paid by appellant to the insured were deducted. Respondent admits intervention may protect a subrogation claim for basic economic loss benefits, but maintains an insurer is limited to a recovery of no-fault benefits paid from the insured, not the tortfeasor, and such recovery is limited to amounts that represent a duplicate recovery to the insured. We agree. The facts of this case show the insured did not receive a double recovery. The arbitration award clearly excluded no-fault benefits paid to the insured from the award. Therefore, appellant’s subrogation right never matured. Appellant contends there is no incentive on the part of the insured to litigate once no-fault benefits are paid. Thus appellant feels it should be able to intervene to protect its subrogation right. Under the no-fault act, however, appellant has a duty to pay basic economic loss benefits to its insured without regard to fault. The very intent of the no-fault *503act results in the reparation obligor, not the tortfeasor, compensating the insured for his injuries. Home Mutual Insurance Co. v. Dean, 367 N.W.2d 568, 569 (Minn.Ct.App.1985). Appellant has not met its burden of proof to set aside the arbitration award. However, given the deference afforded arbitrators, we will not vacate the award. DECISION In light of the supreme court decision in Miller, the trial court erred in refusing to allow appellant to intervene. However, because there was no double recovery, appellant’s subrogation right did not mature and the trial court did not commit reversible error. The trial court did not err in refusing to vacate the arbitration award given the deference afforded arbitrators. Affirmed. HUSPENI, J., dissents.

OPINION A. PAUL LOMMEN, Judge. Respondent Gruman’s personal injury claim against Hendrickson and Burlington Northern was submitted to arbitration. Appellant no-fault carrier moved to intervene, but that motion was denied. Following the arbitration award, appellant, again attempted to intervene and vacate the arbitration award. Appellant further requested, upon judgment entered in favor of Gru-man, it receive the amount of no-fault benefits paid to Gruman. The trial court denied appellant’s motion and this appeal followed. Appellant argues the trial court erred because (1) appellant has met the four-part test for intervention as a matter of right, (2) the arbitration award does' not reflect appellant’s statutorily protected subrogation claim, and (3) the arbitrator erred by deducting the value of no-fault benefits paid to plaintiff from the award. We affirm. FACTS Respondent Thelma Gruman (Gruman) initiated a lawsuit against defendants Ralph Hendrickson (Hendrickson) and Burlington Northern Railroad (Burlington Northern). Gruman alleged to have sustained personal injuries while a passenger in a motor vehicle owned and operated by Hendrickson. Hendrickson was operating his automobile over railroad tracks owned by Burlington Northern. Gruman’s injuries occurred when Hendrickson’s vehicle struck allegedly defective tracks of Burlington Northern. On the date of the accident, Gruman was insured by appellant, Western Fire Insurance Company. Appellant paid Gruman medical expense benefits totaling $2,951.41 and wage loss replacement service benefits of $6,052.33, for a total no-fault benefit payment of $9,003.74. In order to protect its subrogation claim, appellant made a motion to intervene. On January 31, 1986, the trial court issued an order denying appellant’s request for intervention on the basis the motion was premature and that appellant had no subrogation claim for basic economic loss benefits. On March 27, 1987, the case proceeded to arbitration pursuant to rule 5 of the Special Rules of Practice for the Fourth Judicial District. An award filed April 7, 1987 gave judgment for Gruman against Hendrickson and Burlington Northern for $12,000 jointly and severally. Hendrickson was assessed 15% at fault and Burlington Northern 85%. The award expressly provided that while all parties stipulated to amounts paid, Hendrickson and Burlington Northern contested the propriety or reasonableness of the payments. The award also specifically provided it was a net award and did not include basic economic loss benefits paid to date. No request for a trial de novo was made on behalf of any party and judgment was entered May 8, 1987. By motion and amended motion dated May 1, 1987 and June 5, 1987, appellant renewed its motion to intervene and requested the arbitration award and judgment be vacated or amended to reflect appellant’s subrogation claim. By order filed June 25, 1987, the trial court denied appellant’s motion and amended motion. The trial court found appellant’s cause of action, if any, was against Gruman and that appellant’s claim for sub-rogation had not arisen because there had been no double recovery by Gruman. This appeal followed. ISSUES 1. Did the trial court err in refusing to allow appellant to intervene in this suit as a matter of right? 2. Did the trial court err in refusing to vacate the arbitration award? ANALYSIS 1. Appellant argues the trial court erred in denying appellant’s motion to in*500tervene. Appellant’s intervention was sought pursuant to Rule 24.01, which provides: Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant’s interest is adequately represented by existing parties. Minn.R.Civ.P. 24.01. In reviewing orders concerning intervention as of right, this court will independently assess the appropriateness of the order. Norman v. Refsland, 383 N.W.2d 673, 676 (Minn.1986). We are not held to a standard of review requiring a clear abuse of discretion before we may reverse a trial court’s denial of a motion to intervene as a matter of right. Id. Rule 24.01 establishes a four-part test a nonparty must meet before being allowed to intervene as a matter of right: (1) a timely application for intervention; (2) an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action; (3) circumstances demonstrating the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the party’s ability to protect that interest; and (4) a showing the party is not adequately represented by the existing parties. Minneapolis Star & Tribune v. Schumacher, 392 N.W.2d 197, 207 (Minn.1986). The spirit behind Rule 24 is to encourage all legitimate interventions, and the rule is to be liberally applied. Engelrup v. Potter, 302 Minn. 157, 166, 224 N.W.2d 484, 489 (1974). Rule 24 is designed to protect nonparties from having their interests adversely affected by litigation conducted without their participation. Erickson v. Bennett, 409 N.W.2d 884, 887 (Minn.Ct.App.1987). Appellant argues it has met all four tests of Rule 24.01 and therefore should have been allowed to intervene. We agree. The Minnesota Supreme Court has held a subrogation claim is sufficient to support intervention. Miller v. Astleford Equipment Co., Inc., 332 N.W.2d 653, 654 (Minn.1983). Miller involved a fact situation very similar to this case in which the supreme court concluded the deduction of the value of basic economic loss benefits from any recovery could destroy the asserted subro-gation right. Id. at 655. The supreme court recognized the insurer’s interest would only be adequately protected by intervention. Id. Again in Milbrandt v. American Legion Post of Mora, 372 N.W.2d 702 (Minn.1985), the supreme court stated the appellant insurance company should have been allowed to intervene when it claimed a subrogation interest in the suit. Id. at 704 n. 1. We conclude appellant should have been allowed to intervene in this suit. However, that right of intervention is only for the purposes of protecting appellant’s statutory right of subrogation, if and when it arises. Respondent argues an insurer paying basic economic loss benefits to its insured under the No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act has a subrogation right only against its insured and only when the recovery represents in some measure a duplication of those benefits. According to the No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act: A reparation obligor paying or obligated to pay basic economic loss benefits is subrogated to a claim based on an intentional tort, strict or statutory liability, or negligence other than negligence in the maintenance, use, or operation of a motor vehicle. This right of subrogation exists only to the extent that basic economic loss benefits are paid or payable and only to the extent that recovery on the claim absent subrogation would produce a duplication of benefits or reimbursement of the same loss. Minn. Stat. § 65B.53, subd. 3 (1986). In Milbrandt, the supreme court affirmed a summary judgment against an insurer who brought a subrogation claim to recover basic economic loss benefits. The court stated: *501Although subdivision 3 indicates that the legislature intended reparation obligors to recover from tortfeasors basic economic loss benefits paid to insureds, the legislature clearly limited this right to cases where insureds recover duplicate benefits from tortfeasors. Milbrandt, 372 N.W.2d at 705. The court went on to state in strong language: The statute * * * means exactly what it says: a reparation obligor may assert a subrogation claim to recover basic economic loss benefits paid only when the insured has received a double recovery. Because the insurer’s right to recover benefits paid its insured exists only when the insured obtains double recovery, the right of recovery recognized in subdivision 3 may be asserted only against the insured. When seeking to recover under subdivision 3, the burden is on the insurer to show that the insured has been overcompensated. Id. (footnote omitted). The court noted the right of the insurer against the insured arises only in the event of a double recovery by the insured, not by reason of tort. Id. n. 2. The reference to the right of recovery as a subrogation right is a statutorily created right and is not true subrogation. Id.; see Miller v. Astleford Equipment Co., Inc., 378 N.W.2d 820, 822 (Minn.Ct.App.1985), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 14, 1986). Respondent argues appellant’s statutory right of subrogation is not against Burlington Northern and Hendrickson because subrogation in terms of a claim against the tortfeasor does not exist in Minnesota. Therefore, an insurance company can only recover benefits paid when the insured obtains double recovery. Milbrandt, 372 N.W.2d at 705; Peters v. B.P. & E., Inc., 397 N.W.2d 449, 451 (Minn.Ct.App.1986). Because there has been no double recovery by Gruman, respondent argues appellant has no subrogation claim. We agree. In light of the fact appellant’s statutory subrogation right never arose under Minn. Stat. § 65B.53, subd. 3, we conclude the trial court did not commit reversible error by refusing to allow intervention. 2. Appellant argues the trial court erred in refusing to vacate the arbitration award or judgment because the arbitrator erred in its application of the law. Appellant maintains the arbitrator erred by deducting the value of no-fault benefits paid to respondent from the award. Appellant claims it is entitled to relief pursuant to Minn.R.Civ.P. 60.02(1) and (6). A party seeking to vacate a judgment under rule 60.02 must show: (1) a reasonable claim on the merits; (2) a reasonable excuse for the neglect; (3) due diligence after notice of entry of judgment; and (4) that no substantial prejudice will result to the opponent. Hinz v. Northland Milk & Ice Cream Co., 237 Minn. 28, 30, 53 N.W.2d 454, 456 (1952). Appellant argues it has complied with Rule 60.02 in all these respects. Appellant further argues the sub-rogation provision, Minn. Stat. § 65B.53, subd. 3, not the offset provision, Minn. Stat. § 65B.51, subd. 1, should control this case because Burlington Northern’s negligence was negligence other than negligence in the maintenance, use, or operation of a motor vehicle. Appellant contends the arbitrator relied on Minn. Stat. § 65B.51, subd. 1 to deduct the no-fault benefits paid. Appellant argues the arbitrator should have used Minn. Stat. § 65B.53, subd. 3 because section 65B.51 deals with actions limited to some type of motor vehicle use. Appellant maintains Burlington Northern’s negligence is not connected to motor vehicle use. Appellant’s reliance on Rule 60.02 as a means to vacate the arbitration award is misplaced. The Special Rules of Practice for the Fourth Judicial District specifically provide judgment entered upon an arbitration award may not be attacked or set aside except as provided in Rule 5.11(d) (1986): A party against whom a judgment is entered pursuant to an arbitration award may, within six months after its entry, move to vacate the judgment on the ground that the arbitrator was subject to a disqualification not disclosed before the hearing and of which the arbitrator was *502then aware, or upon one of the grounds set forth in the Uniform Arbitration Act, Chapter 572, Minnesota Statutes, and upon no other grounds. The motion shall be heard by the court upon notice to the adverse parties and to the arbitrator, and may be granted only upon clear and convincing evidence that the grounds alleged are true, and that the motion was made as soon as practicable after the moving party learned of the existence of those grounds. Id. Furthermore, the chapter 572 provisions for vacating an arbitration award provide in part: Upon application of a party, the court shall vacate an award where: (1) The award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means; (2) There was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral or corruption in any of the arbitrators or misconduct prejudicing the rights of any party; (3) The arbitrators exceeded their powers; (4) The arbitrators refused to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause being shown therefor or refused to hear evidence material to the controversy or otherwise so conducted the hearing, contrary to the provisions of Section 5, as to prejudice substantially the rights of a party; or (5) There was no arbitration agreement and the issue was not adversely determined in proceedings under Section 572.09 and the party did not participate in the arbitration hearing without raising the objection. But the fact that the relief was such that it could not or would not be granted by a court of law or equity is not ground for vacating or refusing to confirm the award. Minn. Stat. § 572.19, subd. 1 (1986). Respondent asserts subdivision 1 does not allow the vacation of a judgment based upon an alleged error of law committed in the arbitration award. Grudem Brothers Co. v. Great Western Piping Corp., 297 Minn. 313, 316, 213 N.W.2d 920, 922-23 (1973). According to the supreme court: The arbitrators make the final determination of all questions submitted to them whether legal or factual. The court will not overturn these conclusions even if it believes the arbitrators made an incorrect conclusion. Id. at 316-17, 213 N.W.2d at 922-23. It is well established that an arbitration award “will be vacated only upon proof of one or more of the grounds stated in Minn. Stat. § 572.19 and not because the court disagrees with the decision on the merits.” AFSCME Council 96 v. Arrowhead Regional Corrections Board, 356 N.W.2d 295, 299-300 (Minn.1984). Thus, the applicable standard of review is determined from the grounds upon which a party seeks to vacate the award. Koranda v. Austin Mutual Insurance Co., 397 N.W.2d 357, 360 (Minn.Ct.App.1986), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 13, 1987). Respondent argues there was no error of law committed by the arbitrator. The award was clear the no-fault benefits paid by appellant to the insured were deducted. Respondent admits intervention may protect a subrogation claim for basic economic loss benefits, but maintains an insurer is limited to a recovery of no-fault benefits paid from the insured, not the tortfeasor, and such recovery is limited to amounts that represent a duplicate recovery to the insured. We agree. The facts of this case show the insured did not receive a double recovery. The arbitration award clearly excluded no-fault benefits paid to the insured from the award. Therefore, appellant’s subrogation right never matured. Appellant contends there is no incentive on the part of the insured to litigate once no-fault benefits are paid. Thus appellant feels it should be able to intervene to protect its subrogation right. Under the no-fault act, however, appellant has a duty to pay basic economic loss benefits to its insured without regard to fault. The very intent of the no-fault *503act results in the reparation obligor, not the tortfeasor, compensating the insured for his injuries. Home Mutual Insurance Co. v. Dean, 367 N.W.2d 568, 569 (Minn.Ct.App.1985). Appellant has not met its burden of proof to set aside the arbitration award. However, given the deference afforded arbitrators, we will not vacate the award. DECISION In light of the supreme court decision in Miller, the trial court erred in refusing to allow appellant to intervene. However, because there was no double recovery, appellant’s subrogation right did not mature and the trial court did not commit reversible error. The trial court did not err in refusing to vacate the arbitration award given the deference afforded arbitrators. Affirmed. HUSPENI, J., dissents.

OPINION A. PAUL LOMMEN, Judge. Respondent Gruman’s personal injury claim against Hendrickson and Burlington Northern was submitted to arbitration. Appellant no-fault carrier moved to intervene, but that motion was denied. Following the arbitration award, appellant, again attempted to intervene and vacate the arbitration award. Appellant further requested, upon judgment entered in favor of Gru-man, it receive the amount of no-fault benefits paid to Gruman. The trial court denied appellant’s motion and this appeal followed. Appellant argues the trial court erred because (1) appellant has met the four-part test for intervention as a matter of right, (2) the arbitration award does' not reflect appellant’s statutorily protected subrogation claim, and (3) the arbitrator erred by deducting the value of no-fault benefits paid to plaintiff from the award. We affirm. FACTS Respondent Thelma Gruman (Gruman) initiated a lawsuit against defendants Ralph Hendrickson (Hendrickson) and Burlington Northern Railroad (Burlington Northern). Gruman alleged to have sustained personal injuries while a passenger in a motor vehicle owned and operated by Hendrickson. Hendrickson was operating his automobile over railroad tracks owned by Burlington Northern. Gruman’s injuries occurred when Hendrickson’s vehicle struck allegedly defective tracks of Burlington Northern. On the date of the accident, Gruman was insured by appellant, Western Fire Insurance Company. Appellant paid Gruman medical expense benefits totaling $2,951.41 and wage loss replacement service benefits of $6,052.33, for a total no-fault benefit payment of $9,003.74. In order to protect its subrogation claim, appellant made a motion to intervene. On January 31, 1986, the trial court issued an order denying appellant’s request for intervention on the basis the motion was premature and that appellant had no subrogation claim for basic economic loss benefits. On March 27, 1987, the case proceeded to arbitration pursuant to rule 5 of the Special Rules of Practice for the Fourth Judicial District. An award filed April 7, 1987 gave judgment for Gruman against Hendrickson and Burlington Northern for $12,000 jointly and severally. Hendrickson was assessed 15% at fault and Burlington Northern 85%. The award expressly provided that while all parties stipulated to amounts paid, Hendrickson and Burlington Northern contested the propriety or reasonableness of the payments. The award also specifically provided it was a net award and did not include basic economic loss benefits paid to date. No request for a trial de novo was made on behalf of any party and judgment was entered May 8, 1987. By motion and amended motion dated May 1, 1987 and June 5, 1987, appellant renewed its motion to intervene and requested the arbitration award and judgment be vacated or amended to reflect appellant’s subrogation claim. By order filed June 25, 1987, the trial court denied appellant’s motion and amended motion. The trial court found appellant’s cause of action, if any, was against Gruman and that appellant’s claim for sub-rogation had not arisen because there had been no double recovery by Gruman. This appeal followed. ISSUES 1. Did the trial court err in refusing to allow appellant to intervene in this suit as a matter of right? 2. Did the trial court err in refusing to vacate the arbitration award? ANALYSIS 1. Appellant argues the trial court erred in denying appellant’s motion to in*500tervene. Appellant’s intervention was sought pursuant to Rule 24.01, which provides: Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant’s interest is adequately represented by existing parties. Minn.R.Civ.P. 24.01. In reviewing orders concerning intervention as of right, this court will independently assess the appropriateness of the order. Norman v. Refsland, 383 N.W.2d 673, 676 (Minn.1986). We are not held to a standard of review requiring a clear abuse of discretion before we may reverse a trial court’s denial of a motion to intervene as a matter of right. Id. Rule 24.01 establishes a four-part test a nonparty must meet before being allowed to intervene as a matter of right: (1) a timely application for intervention; (2) an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action; (3) circumstances demonstrating the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the party’s ability to protect that interest; and (4) a showing the party is not adequately represented by the existing parties. Minneapolis Star & Tribune v. Schumacher, 392 N.W.2d 197, 207 (Minn.1986). The spirit behind Rule 24 is to encourage all legitimate interventions, and the rule is to be liberally applied. Engelrup v. Potter, 302 Minn. 157, 166, 224 N.W.2d 484, 489 (1974). Rule 24 is designed to protect nonparties from having their interests adversely affected by litigation conducted without their participation. Erickson v. Bennett, 409 N.W.2d 884, 887 (Minn.Ct.App.1987). Appellant argues it has met all four tests of Rule 24.01 and therefore should have been allowed to intervene. We agree. The Minnesota Supreme Court has held a subrogation claim is sufficient to support intervention. Miller v. Astleford Equipment Co., Inc., 332 N.W.2d 653, 654 (Minn.1983). Miller involved a fact situation very similar to this case in which the supreme court concluded the deduction of the value of basic economic loss benefits from any recovery could destroy the asserted subro-gation right. Id. at 655. The supreme court recognized the insurer’s interest would only be adequately protected by intervention. Id. Again in Milbrandt v. American Legion Post of Mora, 372 N.W.2d 702 (Minn.1985), the supreme court stated the appellant insurance company should have been allowed to intervene when it claimed a subrogation interest in the suit. Id. at 704 n. 1. We conclude appellant should have been allowed to intervene in this suit. However, that right of intervention is only for the purposes of protecting appellant’s statutory right of subrogation, if and when it arises. Respondent argues an insurer paying basic economic loss benefits to its insured under the No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act has a subrogation right only against its insured and only when the recovery represents in some measure a duplication of those benefits. According to the No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act: A reparation obligor paying or obligated to pay basic economic loss benefits is subrogated to a claim based on an intentional tort, strict or statutory liability, or negligence other than negligence in the maintenance, use, or operation of a motor vehicle. This right of subrogation exists only to the extent that basic economic loss benefits are paid or payable and only to the extent that recovery on the claim absent subrogation would produce a duplication of benefits or reimbursement of the same loss. Minn. Stat. § 65B.53, subd. 3 (1986). In Milbrandt, the supreme court affirmed a summary judgment against an insurer who brought a subrogation claim to recover basic economic loss benefits. The court stated: *501Although subdivision 3 indicates that the legislature intended reparation obligors to recover from tortfeasors basic economic loss benefits paid to insureds, the legislature clearly limited this right to cases where insureds recover duplicate benefits from tortfeasors. Milbrandt, 372 N.W.2d at 705. The court went on to state in strong language: The statute * * * means exactly what it says: a reparation obligor may assert a subrogation claim to recover basic economic loss benefits paid only when the insured has received a double recovery. Because the insurer’s right to recover benefits paid its insured exists only when the insured obtains double recovery, the right of recovery recognized in subdivision 3 may be asserted only against the insured. When seeking to recover under subdivision 3, the burden is on the insurer to show that the insured has been overcompensated. Id. (footnote omitted). The court noted the right of the insurer against the insured arises only in the event of a double recovery by the insured, not by reason of tort. Id. n. 2. The reference to the right of recovery as a subrogation right is a statutorily created right and is not true subrogation. Id.; see Miller v. Astleford Equipment Co., Inc., 378 N.W.2d 820, 822 (Minn.Ct.App.1985), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 14, 1986). Respondent argues appellant’s statutory right of subrogation is not against Burlington Northern and Hendrickson because subrogation in terms of a claim against the tortfeasor does not exist in Minnesota. Therefore, an insurance company can only recover benefits paid when the insured obtains double recovery. Milbrandt, 372 N.W.2d at 705; Peters v. B.P. & E., Inc., 397 N.W.2d 449, 451 (Minn.Ct.App.1986). Because there has been no double recovery by Gruman, respondent argues appellant has no subrogation claim. We agree. In light of the fact appellant’s statutory subrogation right never arose under Minn. Stat. § 65B.53, subd. 3, we conclude the trial court did not commit reversible error by refusing to allow intervention. 2. Appellant argues the trial court erred in refusing to vacate the arbitration award or judgment because the arbitrator erred in its application of the law. Appellant maintains the arbitrator erred by deducting the value of no-fault benefits paid to respondent from the award. Appellant claims it is entitled to relief pursuant to Minn.R.Civ.P. 60.02(1) and (6). A party seeking to vacate a judgment under rule 60.02 must show: (1) a reasonable claim on the merits; (2) a reasonable excuse for the neglect; (3) due diligence after notice of entry of judgment; and (4) that no substantial prejudice will result to the opponent. Hinz v. Northland Milk & Ice Cream Co., 237 Minn. 28, 30, 53 N.W.2d 454, 456 (1952). Appellant argues it has complied with Rule 60.02 in all these respects. Appellant further argues the sub-rogation provision, Minn. Stat. § 65B.53, subd. 3, not the offset provision, Minn. Stat. § 65B.51, subd. 1, should control this case because Burlington Northern’s negligence was negligence other than negligence in the maintenance, use, or operation of a motor vehicle. Appellant contends the arbitrator relied on Minn. Stat. § 65B.51, subd. 1 to deduct the no-fault benefits paid. Appellant argues the arbitrator should have used Minn. Stat. § 65B.53, subd. 3 because section 65B.51 deals with actions limited to some type of motor vehicle use. Appellant maintains Burlington Northern’s negligence is not connected to motor vehicle use. Appellant’s reliance on Rule 60.02 as a means to vacate the arbitration award is misplaced. The Special Rules of Practice for the Fourth Judicial District specifically provide judgment entered upon an arbitration award may not be attacked or set aside except as provided in Rule 5.11(d) (1986): A party against whom a judgment is entered pursuant to an arbitration award may, within six months after its entry, move to vacate the judgment on the ground that the arbitrator was subject to a disqualification not disclosed before the hearing and of which the arbitrator was *502then aware, or upon one of the grounds set forth in the Uniform Arbitration Act, Chapter 572, Minnesota Statutes, and upon no other grounds. The motion shall be heard by the court upon notice to the adverse parties and to the arbitrator, and may be granted only upon clear and convincing evidence that the grounds alleged are true, and that the motion was made as soon as practicable after the moving party learned of the existence of those grounds. Id. Furthermore, the chapter 572 provisions for vacating an arbitration award provide in part: Upon application of a party, the court shall vacate an award where: (1) The award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means; (2) There was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral or corruption in any of the arbitrators or misconduct prejudicing the rights of any party; (3) The arbitrators exceeded their powers; (4) The arbitrators refused to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause being shown therefor or refused to hear evidence material to the controversy or otherwise so conducted the hearing, contrary to the provisions of Section 5, as to prejudice substantially the rights of a party; or (5) There was no arbitration agreement and the issue was not adversely determined in proceedings under Section 572.09 and the party did not participate in the arbitration hearing without raising the objection. But the fact that the relief was such that it could not or would not be granted by a court of law or equity is not ground for vacating or refusing to confirm the award. Minn. Stat. § 572.19, subd. 1 (1986). Respondent asserts subdivision 1 does not allow the vacation of a judgment based upon an alleged error of law committed in the arbitration award. Grudem Brothers Co. v. Great Western Piping Corp., 297 Minn. 313, 316, 213 N.W.2d 920, 922-23 (1973). According to the supreme court: The arbitrators make the final determination of all questions submitted to them whether legal or factual. The court will not overturn these conclusions even if it believes the arbitrators made an incorrect conclusion. Id. at 316-17, 213 N.W.2d at 922-23. It is well established that an arbitration award “will be vacated only upon proof of one or more of the grounds stated in Minn. Stat. § 572.19 and not because the court disagrees with the decision on the merits.” AFSCME Council 96 v. Arrowhead Regional Corrections Board, 356 N.W.2d 295, 299-300 (Minn.1984). Thus, the applicable standard of review is determined from the grounds upon which a party seeks to vacate the award. Koranda v. Austin Mutual Insurance Co., 397 N.W.2d 357, 360 (Minn.Ct.App.1986), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 13, 1987). Respondent argues there was no error of law committed by the arbitrator. The award was clear the no-fault benefits paid by appellant to the insured were deducted. Respondent admits intervention may protect a subrogation claim for basic economic loss benefits, but maintains an insurer is limited to a recovery of no-fault benefits paid from the insured, not the tortfeasor, and such recovery is limited to amounts that represent a duplicate recovery to the insured. We agree. The facts of this case show the insured did not receive a double recovery. The arbitration award clearly excluded no-fault benefits paid to the insured from the award. Therefore, appellant’s subrogation right never matured. Appellant contends there is no incentive on the part of the insured to litigate once no-fault benefits are paid. Thus appellant feels it should be able to intervene to protect its subrogation right. Under the no-fault act, however, appellant has a duty to pay basic economic loss benefits to its insured without regard to fault. The very intent of the no-fault *503act results in the reparation obligor, not the tortfeasor, compensating the insured for his injuries. Home Mutual Insurance Co. v. Dean, 367 N.W.2d 568, 569 (Minn.Ct.App.1985). Appellant has not met its burden of proof to set aside the arbitration award. However, given the deference afforded arbitrators, we will not vacate the award. DECISION In light of the supreme court decision in Miller, the trial court erred in refusing to allow appellant to intervene. However, because there was no double recovery, appellant’s subrogation right did not mature and the trial court did not commit reversible error. The trial court did not err in refusing to vacate the arbitration award given the deference afforded arbitrators. Affirmed. HUSPENI, J., dissents.

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