Minn. Stat. § 97A.231

State v. Sorenson · 1989 2 citations

III. The court of appeals frames the issue presented by this case as whether, under Minn. Stat. § 97A.205(2), conservation officers need probable cause prior to making warrantless searches on private land. Sorenson, 430 N.W.2d at 233. The court of appeals determined that appellant lacked standing to object to the search and did not discuss further the applicability of section 97A.205(2). Minn. Stat. § 97A.205(2) provides: "An enforcement officer is authorized to: * * * enter any land to carry out the duties and functions of the division." The state maintains that this statute gives conservation officers broad power to enter onto private land in connection with their duties. The state's primary argument is that, unless conservation officers are given the power to enter onto private lands even when probable cause of wrongdoing does not exist, enforcement of the state's game and fish laws would be virtually impossible. Of course, a statute cannot confer rights on law enforcement officers that the U.S. Constitution denies. While the duties of conservation officers may require that they have access to certain private lands, Minn. Stat. § 97A.205(2) is not the mechanism by which this access is given. Conservation officers, like other law enforcement officers, are subject to the requirements of the fourth amendment and other constitutional provisions. See State v. Richards, 284 N.W.2d 549 (Minn.1979). Searches by conservation officers are no less intrusive than police searches and the same possibilities exist for abuse. The legislature's recognition of this is demonstrated by another provision in chapter 97A, Minn. Stat. § 97A.231 (1988), which provides for the issuance of search warrants to state conservation officers upon a showing of probable cause that a state game law has been violated. *460 We need not look to section 97A.205(2) as the means of allowing state conservation officers access to private lands because the open-fields doctrine is broad enough to provide sufficient access. The term "open field" has been construed to apply not only to an open field in a literal sense, but also to wooded areas, deserts, vacant lots in urban areas, open beaches, reservoirs and open waters. 1 W. LaFave, Search & Seizure § 2.4(a), at 425-26 (2d ed. 1987). This broad definition, along with the expansion of the doctrine in Oliver, appears to permit government intrusion anywhere except homes, the curtilage of homes and other areas in which a reasonable expectation of privacy can be proven. Clearly, the open-fields doctrine permits a conservation officer to enter almost any area in order to enforce the state's game and fish laws. Accordingly, while searches and seizures by conservation officers are subject to constitutional guidelines, the record in this case compels affirmance of the trial court and the decision of the court of appeals for the reasons outlined. KELLEY, J., specially concurs. KELLEY, Justice (concurring specially): I concur in the majority opinion. I write only to note that, in my opinion, even had the appellant timely raised the issue in the trial court relative to the alleged applicability of article I, section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution, the claim would nonetheless have been meritless. As the majority noted, article I, section 10 is virtually identical to the applicable portion of the fourth amendment to the U.S. Constitution. In such case, this court will not lightly reject a Supreme Court interpretation of identical, or substantially similar language, nor "cavalierly construe our constitution more expansively than the United States Supreme Court has considered the federal constitution." State v. Gray, 413 N.W.2d 107, 111 (Minn.1987). The court historically has not, nor should it, absent unique or distinctive Minnesota conditions, depart from the general principle favoring unanimity merely because of its philosophical rejection of a particular constitutional interpretation emanating from the federal Supreme Court. See, e.g. Galie, The Other Supreme Courts: Judicial Activism Among State Supreme Courts, 33 Syracuse L.Rev. 731 (1982); Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions — Away from a Reactionary Approach, 9 Hastings Const.L.Q. 1 (1981); Developments in the Law — The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 Harv.L.Rev. 1324, 1359 (1982). NOTES [1] Article I, section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution is virtually identical to the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution and provides:

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