McLean v. Burr
McLean v. Burr
Opinion of the Court
delivered the opinion of the court.
Plaintiffs claim that they are beneficiaries under a deed of trust given to secure certain bonds, etc. Defendants are trustees in the deed, Burr being one of the original trustees, and his co-defendants, Snurmacher and Crane, having been substituted in place of trustees who resigned. This action is brought to recover, from the net proceeds of the foreclosure in the hands of the trustees, certain sums advanced during the existence of the mortgage by plaintiffs, for premiums of insurance effected upon the mortgaged premises. The cause was tried without a jury, and there was a finding and judgment for plaintiff.
There was evidence tending to show the following state ■of facts: —
On December 11, 1882, the Atlantic Milling Company, a corporation, executed to William E. Burr, Gerard B. Allen, and John Wahl, a deed of trust upon a lot in the city of St. Louis on which was then being erected a four story steam flour mill. The deed was to secure the payment of one hundred bonds of the company, of $1,000 each, with semiannual coupons of $30 each, attached to each bond. The deed of trust provided that the building and improvements were to be insured during the existence of the deed of trust for at least $100,000, the policies to be assigned to the trustees, and to be satisfactory to them ; and that, in default ■of such insurance, the premiums may, “ in his or their option, be advanced and paid by said party of the third part or assigns, holder or holders of said bonds or coupons ; in which case the sum or sums so advanced and paid shall be a further debt also secured by these presents; and which shall be repaid on demand by said party of the first part, representative, or assigns, to the person or persons advancing the same, together with interest,thereon at the rate of ten per cent per annum from date of such advance until repaid.”
The deed further provides that, on default and foreclos
This deed of trust was foreclosed, and the premises sold by defendants the trustees, on April 4, 1884, for $27,000 cash. Of this sum, after deducting all expenses, etc.,, about $26,500 remained in the hands of the.trustees ; and, at the date of the trial, more than enough of this sum remained in the hands of the trustees to pay plaintiff’s claim and interest in full.
The premises on which the insured property was situated had formerly belonged to Mr. George Bain, who operated there a flour mill called the Atlantic Mills. Afterwards the property was owned and the business conducted by a corporation called the Atlantic Milling Company, of which Bain was president. The mills were being rebuilt, and were nearly completed at the date of the insurance in question. Before that, whilst they were being put up, the improvements were insured for about $30,000, to cover builders’ risks. This insurance expired at the time the new insurance was taken up. Before the fire, the credit of Mr. Bain and of the Atlantic Milling Company was very good. After the fire the credit of Mr. Bain and of the company was very poor.
The plaintiffs had been in business together, at the date of the insurance, as insurance brokers in St. Louis, for about twenty years. They had placed insurance for Mr. Bain during ten years, and knew him well. They owned five bonds of the Atlantic Milling Company. These bonds had the terms of the deed of trust printed on them. Mr.
Defendants asked the following declarations of law, which were refused by the court: —
“1. Under the evidence plaintiffs are not entitled to recover.
£ £ 1. If the court finds from the evidence that plaintiffs were employed by the Atlantic Milling Company as insurance brokers to procure insurance upon the property described in the deed of trust; that, in procuring said insurance, they acted as agents of said milling company, for a compensation ; that when they presented their bill for premiums to the milling company, said milling company proposed to give them its notes for the amount of the premiums ; that plaintiff, thereupon, accepted two notes for the amount due, payable to themselves, and maturing respectively in sixty and ninety days, of all which facts and circumstances, neither the trustees in said deed of trust, nor the other*245 bondholders under said deed of trust, had any knowledge or notice; that, thereupon, plaintiffs delivered the policies of insurance to defendants without notice of any claim for unpaid premiums ; that, afterwards, the Atlantic Milling Company became insolvent, and defaulted in the payment of said notes, then plaintiffs are not entitled to recover in this action, or from these defendants, the amount for which they gave such credit and took said notes, or any part thereof.”
At the instance of plaintiffs, the court gave the following declaration of law: —
“ If it appears from the evidence that plaintiffs, on or about March 1, 1883, being then holders of bonds secured by the deed of trust, on failure of the Atlantic ¿Milling Company to pay the premiums for the insurance when payment was demanded, advanced the money for such premiums, and paid the respective companies, relying upon the security afforded them as bondholders in making such advances by the provisions in the deed of trust, then they are entitled to recover for the amount of such advances not already paid by the Atlantic Milling Company, notwithstanding plaintiffs, before making such advances took from • the Atlantic Milling Company its notes for the amount of said premiums, and, by indorsing and discounting said notes, raised the money advanced by them as aforesaid, said notes being subsequently taken up by plaintiffs on failure of Atlantic Milling Company to pay the same.”
We think that thex*e was evidence that fully warranted the judgment. According to the terms of the deed of trust, the plaintiffs, as bondholders, having advanced money to pay premiums of insurance, and thus diminish the risk and enhance the security to the beneficiaries in the deed of trust, wex’e entitled to a lien for x*epayment, which is prior to that of those who were merely bondholders. There does not seem to have been any concealment or bad faith about the transaction; nor do we see any force in the
We think the judgment should be affirmed. It is so ordered.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.