Matney v. Boydston
Matney v. Boydston
Opinion of the Court
The following is agreed as being substantially the facts in this cause:
The appellants are now, and at all times herein mentioned, have been, the duly qualified and acting directors of school district number one, which is composed of territory lying in township 55, of range 34, in Buchanan county, and township 54, of range 34, in Platte county, Missouri, and the respondent is a citizen and taxpayer of said school district. At the annual meeting of said school district, held on the first Tuesday of April, 1883, it was determined by said meeting that an eight months’ school should be taught for the ensuing year, which would terminate on the thirtieth day of March, 1884. After the annual meeting of said school district, in 1883, and before the annual meeting in 1884, the time for the commencement of the school year was changed, so that thereafter the school year would commence on the first day of July, instead of the first Tuesday of April, but
It will be noticed that an extra four months’ school was authorized by a vote, at the annual meeting held in April, 1883. At that time, the school year began the first Tuesday in April. Before the next annual meeting, the beginning of the school year was fixed at July 1, by
By section 7029, Revised Statutes, annual meetings are authorized, and section 7031 enumerates the powers of these meetings. It is provided that “the qualified voters assembled at the annual meeting shall have power, by a majority of the votes cast, * * * fourth, to determine the length of time, if any, in excess of four months, that the public schools of the district shall be kept open, and order the proper estimate to be made therefor, provided that the entire estimate for such purposes, shall at nc time exceed one per centum, for any one year, of the assessed valuation of the property subject to taxation within the district.” It is evident that an annual meeting, in this respect, exercises its powers in relation to the then ensuing school year, and none other. The annual meeting of the given year provides for the school of that year, and the length of time it shall be taught. By section 7, article 2, of the constitution, a school, of at least four months’ duration, in each year, is provided for. If, in any year, the people desire a longer school period, they must vote and provide for it at the annual meeting of that year, or a special meeting called for that purpose, after a notice specifying sticTi purpose. Rev. Stat., sect. 7063.
The annual meeting of 1883 voted an extra four months’ school, for that scholastic year. The annual meeting for 1884 did the same for 1884, and, in addition, voted for a school not in that year ; this it could not do. In so stating, we are not taking issue with counsel in their assertion that if there be funds, without exceeding the tax limit, a school may be authorized for the whole year. The school law grants powers to the taxpayers of the district, at specified meetings, to be exer
It is not now necessary to state as to whether or not the months of April, May, and June, 1884, belonged to the school year of 1883, but it is certain they did not form a part of the school year of 1884. If they belonged to the year 1883, a special meeting in that year could have disposed of the matter, and a school kept open during those months. As it is, that period having passed, a future annual meeting may provide for the disposition of this fund, or a special meeting, called for that purpose, may do so. Rev. Stat., sect. 7063.
the judgment is affirmed.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.