Lalor v. McDonald's Administrator
Lalor v. McDonald's Administrator
Opinion of the Court
This is an action in assumpsit to recover for services rendered by the plaintiff to James S. McDonald, deceased, from the first day of January, 1876, to the eighth day of October, 1888. The action was in the form as for a quantum meruit, in which the work or service was placed at the sum of $2,340. Credits to the amount of $500 were admitted, leaving a balance of $1,840, for which the plaintiff prayed judgment.
The answer of the administrator was a general denial, and a counterclaim for board, etc., of the alleged value of $236.50, for which a judgment was asked. The jury returned a verdict in the plaintiff’s favor for $1,423.85, and the court entered judgment accordingly.
On this appeal the defendant complains of the admission of incompetent evidence ; the giving of an erroneous instruction on the plaintiff’s application; and, lastly, that the verdict and judgment are excessive.
Before we proceed to the discussion of the assignments, it will be necessary to a proper understanding of what we may have to say to state briefly the substance of the evidence adduced at the trial. The plaintiff entered the defendant’s service as early as 1866. The latter, at that time and up to the date of his death, was the owner of rock quarries, and was chiefly engaged in furnishing macadam for streets, highways and other
On the other hand the plaintiff’s evidence tended to prove that, from January, 1876, until January, 1886, the plaintiff was to receive for his work the sum of $30 per month, and that, after 1886, $15 per month was agreed on-The plaintiff’s sister testified that she received all money paid on account of her brother’s work, and that during the time he did not receive to exceed $500; that her brother was able to, and did during the whole time, render the deceased good service, except for a short time after his return in 1887; that she was present when the $15 was paid, and that it was received on account only, and not in settlement of all demands. The plaintiff then introduced several witnesses, who testified that they knew that the plaintiff had been in McDonald’s employ, and that his services were reasonably worth from $15 to $30 per month.
“5148 Easton Avenue, St. Louis, Mo., )
July 1, 1887. j
“ G. David, Esq.
“Dear Sir: — Your favor of the twenty-ninth ultimo to hand. In reply to your inquiries, desire to say Wm. Lalor’s contract to supply material for cellars and roads has not been less than $1,000 to $1,500 clear. When the news came that he was injured for life on the steamer, these contracts were given to other parties to Lalor’s great loss, as it was the only means by which he could make a living, and a sufficient ground to lay claim for damages against the company.
“ I remain yours truly,
“Jas. S. McDonald.”
“P. S. — Lalor had a thorough knowledge of this business, and is a perfectly reliable man. I forgot telling you we received your letter and one from Mr.-.
We leave all in your hands ; do not go to law, if possible.”
This letter requires some explanation. There is an intimation in the record that McDonald was accustomed to secure his own contracts in Lalor’s name, and that he (McDonald) would act as bondsman. We assume that those were the contracts referred to in the letter. The plaintiff was injured on a steamer, and the letter was written with the view of securing substantial damages from the steamship company. The defendant’s counsel objected to the introduction of this letter in evidence, and the action of the court in permitting it to be read to the jury constitutes the first assignment.
It is earnestly argued that the contents of this letter were entirely immaterial and irrelevant to any issue in the case, and only tended to prejudice the jury against the deceased. Counsel may be right to some extent in the last statement, but we are not prepared to concur in the first. The testimony of Mrs. McDonald
The next assignment pertains to the plaintiff’s first instruction, which reads:
“If the jury believe from the evidence that the plaintiff performed labor and services for James McDonald, and at his instance and request, then in the absence of any contract or agreement between said McDonald and plaintiff to the contrary, the law will imply a promise from said James McDonald to pay the plaintiff for such work and labor what the same are reasonably worth. And if you further find from the evidence that the plaintiff, between the first of January, 1876, and the first of October, 1888, did perform labor and services for the said McDonald, and that there was no contract or agreement between said McDonald and plaintiff that said services should not be paid for, or that a certain agreed price should be paid therefor, then you will find a verdict for the plaintiff for such an amount, as the evidence in the case satisfies you such labor and services were reasonably worth, less any amount you may find from the evidence was paid by the said McDonald to the plaintiff on account of such labor and services.”
If we rightly understand the objection made to this instruction, it is that it was error for the court to assume, as it did in the instruction, that the plaintiff’s services were not intended as a gratuity, because the plaintiff was a first cousin of the deceased, and made his
Lastly, it is claimed that the judgment is excessive. The judgment was for several hundred dollars less than the amount claimed. As there was direct- conflict in the evidence on all material issues, it is impossible for us to say and demonstrate that the jury erred as to the amount of their finding. The plaintiff’s sister said that only $500 had been paid. We must confess, that to us her evidence on this point is not very clear and satisfactory ; and we freely admit that the testimony of Mrs. McDonald on the same subject is far more satisfactory ; but the credibility of these witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony were questions for the jury. We are powerless to review such questions.
The judgment of the circuit court will be affirmed.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.