State ex rel. Workingmen's Banking Co. v. Edmunds
State ex rel. Workingmen's Banking Co. v. Edmunds
Opinion of the Court
Relator, the Workingmen’s Banking Company of East St. Louis, Illinois, sues defendant Edmunds and his sureties on the bond executed by him as notary public. The breach assigned arises out of the following facts: On the twenty-first of May,-1892, a note for $1,000 maturing on that date, made six months before by C. A. Weber, and payable to the order of Charles E. Blell, at Franklin Bank, of St. Louis, was handed to said notary for protest by the Mechanics Bank of this city. The note was indorsed, to wit: “Charles E. Blell, F. O. Mueller, Glenn Manufacturing Company by F. C. Mueller, treasurer. Pay Mechanics Bank, or order, for collection account Workingmen’s Banking Company at East St. Louis, Illinois. Anthony Isch, cashier.” The note was protested, and notices of its protest addressed to the several indorsers were inclosed in a letter sent by the notary to the relator and received by it in due course of mail. The
Under the record in this case relator’s right of recovery is limited in any view to the costs of this suit, since the evidence shows that it has been paid, pending this litigation, the full amount of damages claimed in the petition to have been suffered by reason of its failure to recover in the suit brought by it against indorser Blell. Whether relator can recover to this extent depends upon the question as to the nature and extent of the duties of a notary public in reference to negotiable paper placed in his hands by the holder. His official duty is fulfilled when the note or bill has been duly presented for acceptance or payment and protested upon its dishonor. It is no part of his offi
Under our statute the certificate of a notary public ■protesting a negotiable instrument is evidence of presentment, refusal and protest. It had the same effect at common law, because under seal. When the certificate also recites notice of dishonor to the parties, the statute makes it evidence of such recitals, if verified by the notary. R. S. 1889, sec. 4880. Neither this provision, nor the other sections of the statute defining the general powers and duties of notaries public and regulating their fees (R. S. 1889, secs. 7108, 5001), add anything to their official duty in the protest of negotiable paper as existing at common law. By the law ■merchant, as well as under our statute, the notary would be liable for neglect in giving notices to indorsers resulting in damage to the holder, if it appeared that he was appointed as the agent of the holder to render such service, or if there was a well established custom, known to the parties, that he should act as the agent of the holder in sending notices of protest to prior indorsers. In this record there is neither evidence •of such agency nor evidence of custom. All that was shown is that the note in question was indorsed and sent • by the nonresident holder to its collecting agent in this city; that the latter handed it upon maturity to the ■defendant, giving him no information as to the residence or address of the indorsers save what was shown
The only conclusion to be drawn from relator’s omission to give notice of protest to all the indorsers is that it was satisfied with the responsibility of .its immediate indorser, Mueller, to whom verbal notice was given. Its failure to give the others notice was not the negligence of defendant; neither was he guilty of any breach of his official duty as notary public under the facts shown in this record. The eases cited by the learned counsel for appellant do not trench upon this conclusion. They refer to the steps required of a notary, or other agent of the holder, to make notice of the dishonor of a note legally effective in fixing the liability of indorsers. They do not warrant the contention that the notary, in the absence of agreement or custom, is bound to take any other steps in the discharge of his official duty than to make due protest of the note and deliver a certificate to that effect to the
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.