Harris v. Silverman
Opinion of the Court
This action was originally brought on six promissory notes, negotiable in form, executed by the defendant, L. B. Silverman, and M. B. Oshinsky, and payable to the order of I. Harris. The petition contained six counts. Plaintiff dismissed as to the second, third and fourth counts before the trial. A trial was had on the remaining counts before a jury which returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff on the fifth and sixth counts for the principal sum of $3500. Defendant has appealed.
The' petition was in the usual form, alleging the execution, maturity and nompayment of the notes. The answer contained, first, a general denial, and second, a plea of payment as to each of the notes in the fifth and sixth counts. There was no affidavit filed in the case denying the execution of the notes. The reply was a general denial.
On the trial, the testimony was voluminous on the question of payment. The verdict of the jury on that issue was against the appellant and no point is made in this court on that issue.
The only question presented for our consideration and on which the stress of the appeal is thrown, is as to whether I. Harris, the plaintiff, was the real party in interest so as to enable her to maintain the action.
At the trial, the plaintiff introduced the notes and rested. Defendant then called to the stand one Henry Harris who, on being asked if his name was I. Harris, answered that he was the husband of I. Harris; that I. Harris was the plaintiff and had brought suit on these
A prolonged discussion is not necessary to a determination of this case. It will be remembered that appellant placed Henry Harris on the stand and elicited the answers on which appellant bases his objection to the regularity of the judgment. Viewed from the standpoint of the substantial rights of the parties, seemingly this appeal is an effort to escape by the technicality route the payment of notes which appellant confessedly executed and for which he received full value and which the jury found have not been paid. At the very outset, appellant’s witness, Henry Harris, stated that I. Harris was his wife, and that it was her suit, and that he was transacting the business as the agent of his wife, I. Harris. Whether or not this was true is not our function to decide; it was evidence brought into the record by the appellant. We have no doubt, after reading the evidence, that defendant thought he was dealing with the man whom he knew and had done business with as I. Harris.. Henry Harris testified as to the ownership of the notes in suit as follows: “Q. You said it belonged to you? A. I said nothing of the kind. Q. Who did you say it belonged to? A. I. Harris.” And he stated that I. Harris was his wife for whom he acted as agent. There was no testimony that Henry Harris owned the notes.
Within the meaning of the law, Henry Harris was a privy to the suit, and he is as conclusively bound by the judgment as though he had been made an actual party to
Indeed, a very casual examination of the record emphasizes the importance and wisdom of our statute (Sec. 2082, R. S. 1909) prohibiting appellate courts from reversing judgments unless error materially affecting the merits of the action is made to appear. Finding no material error, the judgment is affirmed.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.