Walden v. American Bankers' Assurance Co.
Opinion of the Court
This is a suit on an express contract to recover a stipulated salary of $50 per week for personal services. Plaintiff recovered and defendant prosecutes the appeal. .
Defendant is an incorporated company, engaged in the business of insuring bank deposits, and it appears that plaintiff pursues the avocation of a solicitor of such insurance. On May 24, 1911, defendant employed plaintiff to represent it in the matter of soliciting applications for insurance. The contract of employment is in writing and conditioned to the effect that plaintiff agreed to devote his ‘ ‘ entire working time thereunder.” It stipulated, too, his compensation at the rate of $50 per week together with actual traveling expenses. By the concluding clause of the contract, it is provided the arrangement shall continue in effect while mutually satisfactory, with the understanding that either plaintiff or the company may terminate it by giving to the other party'thirty days’ notice by letter of a desire to do so. As before said, the petition sets out the terms of this written contract, and avers “That plaintiff since the 24th day of May, 1911, did devote all his working time to the business of defendant, and to and including the 28th day of October, 1911,” wherefore he sues for $650.
It appears from plaintiff’s evidence, for he personally so testifies, that he entered upon the employment in May and pursued it constantly until the first day of August, 1911, when he discontinued the service. Plaintiff testifies that he was paid in full for all services rendered under the contract until August first of that year, and the suit here proceeds for his agreed compensation at $50 per week from and after August first to and including October 28, 1911. Touching the matter of quitting the service on August first, the following questions directed to and answers by plaintiff appear: “Q. Well, what happened then? A. Well, I discontinued services at that time. Q. What do you
It is true the contract stipulates for thirty days’ notice to be given by either party to the other, with a view of its discontinuance, and considerable stress is laid upon this requirement because no such notice was ever given by either party. But obviously this provision may not be invoked by plaintiff if it appears, as it does, that he abandoned the contract, for
Here, plaintiff says he, of his own volition, discontinued the employment and service of defendant upon hearing of the receivership proceedings on August first and procured employment with another company on a commission basis. It is true, upon learning that defendant had survived the receivership, plaintiff proffered his services to it on August 14th and requested instructions as to what to do. No instructions were ever issued to plaintiff, and he says he performed no service for defendant thereafter. In this sriit plaintiff seeks to recover for the two weeks’ time intervening between August first and August fourteenth as well as for all of the time thereafter until and including October 28,1911, and, indeed, by the finding and judg
Touching the receivership, nothing appears save that a controversy existed among the officers of defendant, and a receiver was appointed, who seems to have continued for but a short time and was discharged about August fourteenth. However, there is no suggestion that defendant was insolvent at the time, or that it became so thereafter. The mere fact of the receivership did not operate a rescission of the contract on the part of defendant so as to enable plaintiff to abandon its further performance, as he did on August first, and thereafter sue thereon as for a breach because defendant neglected to instruct him to commence work again after the receiver was discharged. [See Bird v. Austin, 40 Super. (N. Y.) J. & S. 109. See, also, Smith on Receivership, Sec. 17, page 51; Cox v. Volkert, 86 Mo. 505.] Especially is this true in view of the fact it appears plaintiff entered the employ of another.
The judgment should be reversed. It is so ordered.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.