Criss v. United Railways Co.
Opinion of the Court
Comparing the evidence in the case as set out in thé abstract with the statement as prepared by counsel for respondent, we find the latter statement so concise that we follow it with some additional statements taken from that of counsel for appellant, and a few of our own, with the premise that the accident occurred in the city of St. Louis and within what is designated as the central district, the speed in which is not to exceed ten miles per hour, and that the streets referred to are streets of that city.
Eleventh street runs north and south. Chouteau avenue runs east and west. The next street south of Chouteau is Hickory street. Between Hickory street
On the 24th of October, 1911, at about half past one o’clock in the afternoon, the day being clear, plaintiff was driving his wagon from the premises of the American Manufacturing Company out of the alley north of the building of that company and along that alley, intending to go to a scale west of Eleventh street. The wagon was drawn by two horses and was loaded with what are called “patches.” With its load the wagon weighed between 12,000 and 13,000 pounds. The body of the wagon was about twelve feet long, the tongue some ten or twelve feet additional. Plaintiff
On the part of defendant there was evidence tending to show that while the car was approaching the alley at the rate of eight or ten miles an hour, plaintiff drove from the alley immediately in front of the car and so close thereto that the car could not be stopped in time to avert a collision. There was also testimony on the part of defendant to the effect that as soon as the motorman in charge saw the position
The allegations of negligence are failure to sound a warning, violation of the so-called “vigilant watch” ordinance, or “humanitarian doctrine,” and violation of the speed ordinance of the city. Both of these ordinances were introduced in evidence by plaintiff, the so-called “vigilant watch” ordinance providing that the conductor, motorman, or other person in charge of each car should keep a vigilant watch for all vehicles and persons on foot, especially children, either on the track or moving toward it and on the first appearance of danger to such persons or vehicles, the car shall be stopped in the shortest time and space possible, and the “speed ordinance” providing that street cars operated within what is known as the “central district” shall not be propelled at a greater rate of speed than ten miles per-hour. The allegation of negligence based on a failure to sound a warning was taken from the jury by an instruction of the court. Defendant interposed demurrers at the close of the testimony for plaintiff and again at the close of all the testimony in the case, which were overruled and exceptions saved.
The only instruction asked on behalf of plaintiff was as to the measure of damages.
At the instance of defendant the court gave ten instructions. First, that plaintiff was not entitled to recover upon the assignment of negligence involved in failure to sound the gong. It will serve no useful purpose to repeat all of the remaining nine. It is sufficient to say that they placed the case before the jury in the most favorable light possible for defendant. Thus the third told the jury that their verdict must be for defendant, if they found from the evidence that plaintiff was aware of the approach of the car
The fourth told the jury that if they believed that the motorman in charge of the car was keeping a vigilant watch for vehicles approacMng the track and that he stopped the car witMn the shortest time and space possible with the means and appliances at hand, after he saw plaintiff approacMng the track, plaintiff could not recover.
The fifth told the jury that although they might believe from the evidence that the car could have been stopped in time to have averted the collision after the motorman saw, or by the exercise of ordinary care, could have seen plaintiff in a position of danger, and that he failed to stop the car in time to avoid the collision, yet if the jury further believed from the evidence that plaintiff saw the car- approaching before he drove upon the track, and that by stopping Ms team he could have remained off the track and thereby avoided the collision, and that he drove upon the track knowing that the car was approaching and immediately in front of the car, he was not entitled to recover.
The remaimng instructions were equally favorable to defendant. We make no ruling as to the correctness of these instructions.
Of its own motion the court gave an instruction that the burden of proof was upon plaintiff to establish by the preponderance or greater weight of evidence, the facts necessary to a verdict in his favor under the instructions, the court defining burden of proof and preponderance of evidence. The court also gave the usual instruction as to the credibility of witnesses and the number of jurors necessary to concur in a verdict.
Defendant also asked the court to withdraw from the jury the assignment of negligence founded on the speed ordinance.
These were refused, defendant excepting. The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff, and judgment following, defendant has duly perfected its appeal to this court, making three points. First, that the demurrer to the evidence should have been sustained, claiming under this that the failure to sound the gong could not be considered; that the cáse should not have been submitted on the violation of the vigilant watch ordinance or humanitarian doctrine, and that the violation of the speed ordinance would not support a recovery on account of the contributory negligence of plaintiff, as a matter of law. The second and third assignments of' error are to the refusal of the court to give the two instructions last above referred to.
We have before noted that the negligence charged in failing to sound the gong was taken from the jury. As concerning the other two propositions under this first assignment, namely, that the case should not have been submitted on violation of the vigilant watch ordinance or humanitarian doctrine, and on violation of the speed ordinance, it is urged that the testimony will not support a recovery on either of these grounds, because of the contributory negligence of plaintiff, as a matter of law. We are unable to agree with learned counsel for appellant on these propositions. As a matter of course, in considering the evidence in this case, plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of all the evidence which he introduced and to every reasonable inference that the jury can draw from that evidence. There was substantial evidence here, first, that the motorman
The physical facts in evidence are against appellant on the assignment of a violation of the speed ordinance. We have stated the space covered and the facts attendant upon the occurrence. A loaded wagon, weighing 12,000 or 13,000 pounds, and two horses and the driver are thrown completely off of the track and across the street, landed against an iron lamp post, which was broken in the collision, and yet the car ran
Even if it may be said that plaintiff contributed to his hurt by not being sufficiently cautious and careful, this, under an application of the humanitarian doctrine, did not absolve the motorman from looking out for a possible wayfarer and endeavoring to avoid injuring him. The rule as to this is very well stated in a recent decision by the Kansas City Court of Appeals, Peterie v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., 177 Mo. App. 359, 164 S. W. 254. There it is said that the bare knowledge of one driving a wagon onto the track of the approach of a street car could only make the driver guilty of contributory negligence, which can prevent the operation of the humanitarian rule, if, after such negligence became apparent to the motorman, there was no time for him to avoid a collision; the driver’s knowledge of the car’s approach only affecting the humanitarian rule, if such knowledge became apparent to the motorman, in which case he could assume that the driver would not intentionally go into a place of danger on the track.
We see no evidence here of such contributory negligence as would free the employees of defendant from the force of the humanitarian doctrine. Ordinary care did not require plaintiff to constantly look both ways— even if that is possible—when approaching tracks along a street crossing and while upon the track. It is sufficient if, before he attempted to cross, he satisfies himself that in the usual course of things he can cross in' safety; that is, considering the distance from him of an approaching car, knowing his own rate of travel and the lawful rate of travel allowed the car. [Hutchinson v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 161 Mo. 246, l. c. 254 and 257, 61 S. W. 635, 852; Strauchon v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., 232 Mo. 587, l. c. 596, 135 S. W. 14.]
The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.