Foley v. State
Foley v. State
Opinion of the Court
In February 2001, Appellant, Pamela S. Foley, was charged in the Circuit Court of Harrison County with one count of first-degree murder and one count of armed criminal action. Following a May 2001 change of venue to Buchanan County, Appellant entered into a plea agreement with the State under which the State agreed to dismiss the armed criminal action charge and reduce the charge of murder in the
On appeal, Appellant contends that the motion court clearly erred in denying her amended Rule 24.035 motion because the record shows that her plea of guilty to murder in the second degree was not knowing and voluntary. The State agrees that the motion court clearly erred in denying Appellant’s amended motion, but for an entirely different reason: that it did not have jurisdiction to rule on its merits because her original pro se motion was untimely since it was not filed within ninety days of her delivery to the custody of DOC. We agree with the State.
Appellate review .of the motion court’s denial of a Rule 24.035 motion for post-conviction relief is limited to whether the findings, conclusions, and judgment of the motion court are clearly erroneous. Rule 24.035(k). The motion court’s findings and conclusions are clearly erroneous only if, after reviewing the entire record, the appellate court is left with the definite and firm impression that a mistake has been made.
Reynolds v. State, 994 S.W.2d 944, 945 (Mo. banc 1999).
As mentioned supra, Appellant was delivered to the custody of DOC on August 29, 2002, and did not file a direct appeal of the trial court’s judgment of conviction. Thus, she was required to file her initial Rule 24.035 motion for post-conviction relief within 90 days of that date. Rule 2Jp.085(b) (2002);
Here, the motion court failed to address the issué of the timeliness of Appellant’s amended motion, but instead ruled on its merits. However, “[i]f a Rule 24.035 motion is filed out of time, the motion court cannot address the merits of the motion, but must dismiss it, even if the state does not request the court to do so.” Washington v. State, 972 S.W.2d 347, 348 (MoApp. E.D. 1998). The same applies to an appellate court, because “[t]he issue of timeliness is jurisdictional and must be addressed by this court on appeal.” McBride, 65 S.W.3d at 561. In cases
As it had no jurisdiction to consider those claims, the motion court clearly erred in ruling on the merits of Appellant’s amended Rule 24.035 motion. Where the motion court improperly considers the merits of a time-barred Rule 24.035 motion for post-conviction relief, the proper disposition on appeal is to vacate the judgment of the motion court and remand with instructions to dismiss. White v. State, 91 S.W.3d 154, 156-57 (Mo.App. W.D. 2002). Accordingly, we vacate the judgment entered by the motion court and remand with instructions that it dismiss Appellant’s amended motion as untimely.
All concur.
. Effective January 1, 2003, the 90-day period was extended to 180 days. See Rule 24.035(b) (2003). However, Appellant was not entitled to the longer initial filing period since her 90 days under the 2002 version of Rule 24.035(b) had already run by the date the amended Rule 24.035(b) went into effect.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.