Kaufold v. CHESTERFIELD VILLAGE GP, LLC

Missouri Court of Appeals
Kaufold v. CHESTERFIELD VILLAGE GP, LLC, 232 S.W.3d 699 (2007)
2007 Mo. App. LEXIS 1267; 2007 WL 2640732
Daniel E. Scott

Kaufold v. CHESTERFIELD VILLAGE GP, LLC

Opinion of the Court

DANIEL E. SCOTT, Judge.

Ón July 16, 2007, this court adopted an opinion in this case. On July 18, 2007, this case was transferred to the Missouri Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 83.03. On August 22, 2007, the Missouri Supreme Court retransferred the case to this court. This court’s original opinion now is readopted.

Plaintiff sued a property owner and management company for his mother’s wrongful death in an apartment fire. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants. This case involves the same defendants, fire, lease form, exculpatory clause, claims, issues, and attorneys as, and was orally argued together with, Milligan v. Chesterfield Village GP, LLC, et al., No. 28179, 232 S.W.3d 683 (Mo.App. S.D. 2007). Our reasoning in Milligan, decided today, applies equally here and *700compels similar results. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment herein for defendant Chesterfield, but reverse the judgment for defendant McCormack and remand plaintiffs claims against that defendant for further proceedings consistent with our opinion in Milligan.

PARRISH, J., concurs. RAHMEYER, P.J., concurs in part and dissents in part.

Concurring in Part

NANCY STEFFEN RAHMEYER, Presiding Judge,

dissenting in part and concurring in part.

For the reasons set forth in my dissent in Milligan v. Chesterfield Village GP, LLC, et al., No. SD28179, 232 S.W.3d 683, 693 (Mo.App. S.D. 2007) I respectfully dissent to the majority’s opinion that Paragraph 27 is unambiguous, but concur in the majority’s opinion that Paragraph 27 does not preclude Plaintiffs claims against McCormack. In light of Lewis v. Snow Creek, Inc., 6 S.W.3d 388 (Mo.App. W.D. 1999) and Alack v. Vic Tanny International of Missouri, Inc., 923 S.W.2d 330, 337 (Mo. banc 1996), I would find Paragraph 27 of the apartment lease to be ambiguous because its general language would include intentional torts and other causes of action which one may never use to exonerate oneself from future liability.

Reference

Full Case Name
Jason KAUFOLD, Appellant, v. CHESTERFIELD VILLAGE GP, LLC, D/B/A Chesterfield Village Apartments, LP, and McCormack Baron Ragan Management Services, Inc., Respondents
Cited By
5 cases
Status
Published