Manty v. Johnson (In re Johnson)
Manty v. Johnson (In re Johnson)
Opinion of the Court
The Chapter 7 Trustee in the bankruptcy case of Grace M. Johnson appeals from the Order of the Bankruptcy Court holding that a property tax refund is exempt under Minn.Stat. § 550.37, subd. 14, as “government assistance based on need.” For the reasons that follow, we reverse.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Debtor Grace M. Johnson is an 88-year old widow whose only regular source of income is social security. She owns a home valued at $200,000 with approximately $150,000 in equity. She occasionally supplements her income by renting out a bedroom in her home. After she filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy ease, the Chapter 7 Trustee objected to her claimed exemption in a $1,946 real property tax refund under § 550.37, subd. 14 of the Minnesota Statutes as “government assistance based on need.” The Bankruptcy Court overruled the Trustee’s objection and allowed the exemption in the refund in its entirety. The Trustee appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review the Bankruptcy Court’s conclusions of law de novo and its findings of fact for clear error.
DISCUSSION
Bankruptcy debtors in Minnesota may choose either the federal exemptions or the exemptions provided under Minnesota and other federal law.
Subd. 14. Public Assistance. All government assistance based on need, and the earnings or salary of a person who is a recipient of government assistance based on need, shall be exempt from all claims of creditors including any contractual setoff or security interest asserted by a financial institution. For the purposes of this chapter, government assistance based on need includes but is not limited to Minnesota family investment program, general assistance medical care, Supplemental Security Income, medical assistance, Minnesota-Care, payment of Medicare part B premiums or receipt of part D extra help, MFIP diversionary work program, work participation cash benefit, Minnesota supplemental assistance, emergency Minnesota supplemental assistance, general assistance, emergency general assistance, emergency assistance or county crisis funds, energy or fuel assistance, and food support. The salary or earnings of any debtor who is or has been an eligible recipient of government assistance based on need ... shall, upon the debtor’s return to private employment or farming after having been an eligible recipient of government assistance based on need ... be exempt from attachment, garnishment, or levy of execution for a period of six months after the debtor’s return to employment or farming and after all public assistance for which eligibility existed has been terminated .... The burden of establishing that funds are exempt rests upon the debtor....5
As the Trustee points out, this statute does not specifically mention property tax refunds in the list of examples of the types of government assistance which are exempt. However, the list is not exclusive,
When a debtor elects to exempt property pursuant to state statute, courts determine such eligibility by looking to state law.
At the outset, we note, as the Bankruptcy Court did, that in 2009, the Minnesota Legislature substituted the phrase “government assistance based on need” for “relief based on need” in § 550.37, subd. 14.
In In re Tomczyk, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Minnesota held that income tax refunds attributable to the federal Earned Income Credit and Minnesota Working Family Credit were exempt as “relief based on need” under the prior version of § 550.37, subd. 14.
Based in large part on the holding in Tomczyk, the Bankruptcy Court in this case held that the property tax refund at issue here was likewise exempt under § 550.37, subd. 14.
The property tax refund at issue here is authorized by the State of Minnesota Property Tax Refund Act, which is codified at §§ 290A.01-290A.27 (2012) of the Minnesota Statutes (“the Act”). As the Bankruptcy Court noted, the purpose of the Act is expressly stated in the statutory
The Act sets out three ways an individual may be eligible for such a property tax refund.
The Bankruptcy Court held that, despite the fact that these refunds are available to people earning more than $100,000 (and, in the twelve percent increase category, even to people with unlimited income), such refunds are nevertheless “government assistance based on need” within § 550.37, subd. 14.
After the Bankruptcy Court issued its opinion in this case, we addressed a similar issue under Missouri law.
Merriam-Webster defines “public assistance” as “government aid to needy, aged, or disabled persons and to dependent children.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 1005 (11th ed.*218 2012). Random House defines it as “government aid to the poor, disabled, or aged or to dependent children, as financial assistance or food stamps.” The Random House Dictionary of the English Language 1563 (2nd ed. 1987). Oxford Press defines it as “government benefits provided to the needy, usually in the form of cash or vouchers.” New Oxford American Dictionary 1411 (3rd ed. 2010).29
Because the federal child tax credit was available to people with incomes up to $110,000 for married individuals and $75,000 for unmarried individuals — people who we determined cannot be said to be needy — we held that the child tax credit is not a “public assistance benefit” within the meaning of the Missouri statute.
Although Hardy applied Missouri law, courts in Minnesota have similarly used dictionary definitions when a statutory term is not defined.
The Debtor asserts that the refund is, in fact, “based on need.” She points out that the Minnesota Supreme Court has said that “[t]he legislative intent in enacting [the Act] was to shift property tax burdens according to a family’s ability to pay” and that “the overall purpose is equalization, not only economic and social, but geographical.”
To the contrary, as the Minnesota Court of Appeals observed in Bums v. Einess,
Finally, as the Trustee points out, under the language of the statute, if a person has received “government assistance based on need,” then that person’s earnings and salary are also exempt “for a period of six months after the debtor’s return to employment or farming and after all public assistance for which eligibility existed has been terminated.” If the Bankruptcy Court’s interpretation of the statute is correct, then any person (regardless of income) who received a property tax refund under the Act is exempt from collection action by that person’s creditors for six months. We view this as an absurd and unreasonable result which could not have been intended by the Minnesota legislature.
In sum, for the same reasons articulated in In re Hardy, we conclude that the property tax refund at issue here is not “government assistance based on need,”
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Order of the Bankruptcy Court permitting the Debtor’s claimed exemption in her property tax refund as a “government assistance benefit” is REVERSED.
. Addison v. Seaver (In re Seaver), 540 F.3d 805, 809 (8th Cir. 2008); Doeling v. Nessa (In re Nessa), 426 B.R. 312, 314 (8th Cir. BAP 2010).
. Graven v. Fink (In re Graven), 936 F.2d 378, 384-85 (8th Cir. 1991).
. Drenttel v. Jensen-Carter (In re Drenttel), 309 B.R. 320, 322 (8th Cir. BAP 2004).
. See Martin v. Bucher (In re Martin), 297 B.R. 750, 751-52 (8th Cir. BAP 2003) (citing Sholdan v. Dietz, 108 F.3d 886, 887 n. 2 (8th Cir. 1997); 11 U.S.C. §§ 522(d) and 522(b)(2)).
. Minn.Stat. § 550.37, subd. 14.
. See In re Tomczyk, 295 B.R. 894, 896 (Bankr.D.Minn. 2003).
. Mueller v. Buckley (In re Mueller), 215 B.R. 1018, 1022 (8th Cir. BAP 1998).
. Minn.Stat. § 645.16 ("The object of all interpretation and construction of laws is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.”).
. Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1) and (2); see also Guderian v. Olmsted County, 595 N.W.2d 540, 542 (Minn.Ct.App. 1999) ("It is well settled that courts may presume that the legislature does not intend an absurd result.”) (citation omitted).
. In re Tomczyk, 295 B.R. at 896 (citing Andersen v. Ries (In re Andersen), 259 B.R. 687, 690 (8th Cir. BAP 2001); Wallerstedt v. Sosne (In re Wallerstedt), 930 F.2d 630, 631 (8th Cir. 1991)).
. 2009 Minn. Laws c. 31, § 2; Minn. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 31.
. In re Tomczyk, 295 B.R. at 896-97.
. Id. at 896 (citations omitted).
. Id.
. Id.
. Id. (citing Sorenson v. Secretary of Treasury, 475 U.S. 851, 864, 106 S.Ct. 1600, 89 L.Ed.2d 855 (1986)) (emphasis added by the Tomczyk court).
. Minn.Stat. § 290A.02 (“The purpose of this chapter is to provide property tax relief to certain persons who own or rent their homesteads.”).
. See Minn.Stat. § 290A.04.
. Minn.Stat. § 290A.04, subd. 2.
. Id.
. Minn.Stat. § 290A.04, subd. 2a.
. Id.
. Minn.Stat. § 290A.04, subd. 2h.
. Id.
. Accord In re Cheryl Marie Slennes, Case No. 07-50801, Doc. No. 35 (Order Overruling Objections of Trustee and United States of America to Debtor’s Amended Claims of Exemption) (Bankr.D.Minn. Aug. 8, 2008) and Doc. No. 39 (Partial Transcript of Proceedings on August 6, 2008) (holding that a property tax refund was exempt, even though "it may inure to somebody in the middle class.”); In re Kathleen Lorraine Padilla, Case No. 13-32834-KAC {Order) (Bankr.D.Minn. Sept. 16, 2013) (overruling a trustee’s objection to exemption under the property tax refund), appeal docketed, Iannacone v. Padilla, Civ. No. 13-2848-JRT (D.Minn. Oct. 16, 2013).
. Hardy v. Fink (In re Hardy), 503 B.R. 722 (8th Cir. BAP 2013).
. Mo.Rev.Stat. § 513.430.1(10)(a).
. In re Hardy, 503 B.R. at 725 {quoting Lap-ponese v. Carts of Colorado, Inc., 422 S.W.3d, 396, 401 (Mo.Ct.App. 2013)).
. Id.
. Id.
. See, e.g., Amundson v. State, 714 N.W.2d 715, 720 (Minn.App. 2006) (construing the statutory term "retired" according to its "ordinary meaning,” and using the American Heritage Dictionary definition to do so). See also Ries v. Scarlett & Gucciardo, PA (In re Genmar Holdings, Inc.), 496 B.R. 532 (8th Cir. BAP 2013) ("In the absence of a statutory definition or clear contrary legislative intent, statutory terms are given their plain, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning, and we turn to a commonly used dictionary to ascertain a word’s ordinary meaning.”) (internal quotation and bracket marks omitted) (quoting Schumacher v. Cargill Meat Solutions Corp., 515 F.3d 867, 871 (8th Cir. 2008)).
. See Martin v. Bucher (In re Martin), 297 B.R. 750, 752 (8th Cir. BAP 2003) (interpreting Minnesota’s exemption for “employee benefits” and holding that ”[t]he heading of the statute, however, while not part of the statute, may be used to indicate what benefits the Minnesota legislature intended to exempt”); Minnesota Exp., Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 333 N.W.2d 871, 872 (Minn. 1983) ("Although this court is not permitted to consider the caption as part of the statute — Minn. Stat. § 648.36 (1982) [now § 645.49] — the headings are relevant to legislative intent where they were present in the bill during the legislative process.”).
. Nagaraja v. Comm'r of Revenue, 352 N.W.2d 373, 376 (Minn. 1984) (quoting Murphy v. Hiniker, 261 N.W.2d 836 (Minn. 1978)).
. 2011 WL 5829323, at *5 (Minn.Ct.App. Nov. 21, 2011) (not reported) (emphasis added).
. Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1) (in ascertaining the intention of the legislature, the courts may be guided by the presumption that the legislature does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution, or unreasonable).
. Accord Asset Acceptance Corp. v. Hughes, 268 Mich.App. 57, 706 N.W.2d 446, 448-49 (2005) (holding that a homestead property tax credit was not exempt as a public assistance benefit under a Michigan statute because wealthy persons could benefit from it).
Reference
- Full Case Name
- In re Grace Montgomery JOHNSON, Debtor. Nauni Jo Manty, Trustee-Appellant v. Grace Montgomery Johnson, Debtor-Appellee
- Cited By
- 9 cases
- Status
- Published