. On August 1, 1985, the defendants Toney Wayne Brown and Cheri Renee Brown executed two contracts; one for the purchase of a tract of real estate at 11300 Military Club Road (“resi*1003dence") for the sum of $320,000, and the second for the purchase of an adjacent tract of real estate at 11228 Military Club Road (“boarding home”) for the sum of $100,000. These two tracts originally had been listed for sale as one tract, with a total purchase price of $420,000, but that the large tract had been split into two tracts to enable the Browns to obtain separate consumer and commercial financing on the residence and the boarding home, respectively.

.For the relevant provisions of the governing contract as they relate to the forfeiture of the earnest money deposit, see p. 1003 of the text of this memorandum, infra.

. Toney Wayne Brown and Cheri Renee Brown have since had their marriage dissolved.

. Defendant Toney Wayne Brown did not appear. The files and records reflect that an order for service by publication of notice upon Toney was entered on March 7, 1988, and that a notice upon order for service by publication was issued by the court clerk that same day. That notice indicated that Toney had 45 days from and after March 7, 1988, in which to file an answer or other pleading, which time had not expired by the date of this trial.

. The defendant Cheri Renee Brown so testified. There was other testimony, namely that of the defendant Lou M. Wood, which tended to contradict that of the defendant Cheri Renee Brown in this regard. But this court, on the basis of the appearance and demeanor of the respective witnesses, finds the testimony of the defendant Cheri Renee Brown to be credible.

. See Century 21 Al Burack Realtors v. Zigler, 628 S.W.2d 915, 916 (Mo.App. 1982) (“[S]uch a [financing contingency] provision is a condition subsequent to the existence of the contract, [authorities omitted] which, upon the non-occu-rence of the stipulated event, may be raised to avoid the contract and ... to also ground the purchasers’ own claim to the earnest money deposit.”) and Cf. Errante v. Kadean Real Estate Service, Inc., 664 S.W.2d 27, 29 [1] (Mo.App. 1984) ("Absent a satisfaction of this condition [subsequent] on or by the contingency date the contract is no longer operative ... the contract terminated and respondents became entitled to the return of the $2,000 they had paid appellants as earnest money.”).

. This was the testimony of the realtor, Lou M. Wood.

. See In Re Men’s Sportswear, Inc., 834 F.2d 1134, 1137-38 [1] (2nd Cir. 1987), where the Second Circuit held that a party’s, "failure to object to ... assumption of ‘core jurisdiction' at any point in these extensive proceedings before the bankruptcy court and the further failure to object to any part of the appeal process in the district court constitutes consent to final adjudication of this controversy before the bankruptcy court.” See also the cases cited therein. This decision, however, appears to ignore the letter of § 157(b)(3), Title 28, United States Code. After finding evidence of express waiver of right to adjudication before an Article III court, the Supreme Court went on to add that a party’s, "election to forgo his right to proceed in state or federal court on his claim and his decision to seek relief instead in a CFIC reparations proceeding constituted an effective waiver.” (Emphasis added). Commodity Futures Trading Com’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 106 S.Ct. 3245, *10053257, 92 L.Ed.2d 675, 691 (1986). The court further added that the party, "had the option of having the common law counterclaim against him adjudicated in a federal Article III court, but with full knowledge that the [agency] would exercise jurisdiction over that claim, chose to avail himself of the quicker and less expensive procedure Congress had provided him. In such circumstances, it is clear that [the party] effectively agreed to an adjudication by the [agency] of the entire controversy by seeking relief in this alternative form.” (Emphasis added). Id., 478 U.S. at 849, 106 S.Ct. at 3257, 92 L.Ed.2d at 692.

. In such an instance, no relief is granted to any party nor against any party except that one which invokes bankruptcy court jurisdiction. Thus, no party is deprived of any procedural right and no jurisdictional limitation is violated. See, e.g., Matter of Dowell, 82 B.R. 998, 1008 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Mo. 1987), (“[T]he denial of the complaint ... may be loqked upon either as a declination of jurisdiction or as a determination of the merits contrary to the plaintiff ...”).

. See, e.g., Matter of Titan Energy, Inc., 57 B.R. 498 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Mo. 1986), to the following effect:

"The provisions for consent jurisdiction in the bankruptcy court are now undone by the provisions of section 157(b)(3), supra. Otherwise, if bankruptcy court jurisdiction could so easily be founded upon relationship of a contractual right to the bankruptcy estate, the bankruptcy court would have had jurisdiction in the case of Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., supra, itself. Only during the halcyon days of broadened bankruptcy court jurisdiction under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, before its invalidation by the Supreme Court in the Marathon decision, supra, did the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction extend so far. The decisions which are relied upon by the plaintiff to establish the jurisdiction of this court over the bellwether count of the complaint are all from the epoch of time in which section 1471(b) and (c), Title 28, United States Code, still governed the issue of bankruptcy court jurisdiction.

"Even if the first count of the complaint were within bankruptcy court jurisdiction (and, for the foregoing reasons, it is not), it would be taken out of bankruptcy court jurisdiction by its inextricable relationship to the suits between strangers to the estate. In its brief in support of jurisdiction in this action, the plaintiff asserts that, as to the nondebtor defendants, ‘[b]ecause ... [they] have asserted claims which may be within the scope of coverage were the policies found in effect, they are necessary and indispensable parties to the resolution of the existence of the policies themselves.’ Claims between strangers to the bankruptcy estate which relate to matters outside the bankruptcy court jurisdiction cannot be entertained by the bankruptcy court. See, e.g., In re Systems Marketing Consolidated, Ltd., 19 B.R. 519, 8 B.C.D. 1335, 1336 (Bkrtcy.N.D.Ill. 1982), holding that the bankruptcy court does not have jurisdiction of a claim between two strangers to the estate if that claim does not ‘arise in’ the bankruptcy proceedings. This was generally the rule employed even during the effective dates of sections 1471(b) and (c)., supra."

See also 2 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 23.08, p. 534, n. 7 (14th ed. 1977), to the following effect: *1006"Thus consent cannot operate to confer jurisdiction on the bankruptcy court as to a claim asserted by strangers to the proceedings over a matter in no way connected with the administration or distribution of the bankrupt estate."

. As observed above, in notes 3 and 4, supra, the testimony of the defendant Cheri Renee Brown to the effect that all parties understood that the defendants Toney Wayne Brown and Cheri Renee Brown must purchase both properties or neither of them and that due diligence was utilized in attempting to obtain financing is critical to the result here reached.

. See Matter of Richardson, 85 B.R. 1008 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Mo. 1988), to the following effect: "[T]his action appears to demonstrate the inefficacy of the bankruptcy court’s making recommended findings of fact when the material issue to be determined is that of credibility. In those cases, use of the report-and-recommendation process, without the district court’s conducting a new hearing on the issue, appears not only to offend the litigants' rights to an Article III trier of fact, but also to take little or no account of the ineffable character of a credibility determination. It appears that, in most imaginable instances, the district court would have to conduct a de novo hearing prior to making the determination and that, in those instances, the bankruptcy court's meantime offering recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law will have only resulted in delay in rendering the final decision and a duplication of effort between the bankruptcy court and district court.”

. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 68 B.R. 105, 107, n. 3 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Mo. 1986) ("Any question of whether the assignment of such power to the bankruptcy court converts it into an Article III court under the rule of Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 368 U.S. 814, 82 S.Ct. 56, 7 L.Ed.2d 22 (1961), can be obviated in this action by the district court’s treating the decision of the bankruptcy court as recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law and making its own decision on the basis thereof. See In re Waters, 93 F.2d 196, 198 (5th Cir. 1937), to the following effect: "We think that the referee went too far in attempting to decree a cancellation of the mortgage summarily; but, since the evidence was all reported stenographically and went up to the judge along with the documentary proof and was fully considered by the judge, who made his own decree, the case has just had the treatment it would have had if a plenary bill had been filed, been reported on by a master, and then considered by the court. The referee made full findings of fact and conclusions of law, as a master would do, and the appellant elaborately excepted to them as if to a master’s report. We will treat the case as a controversy arising in bankruptcy by intervention and decided by the judge, review of which on appeal as in equity opens up questions of law and fact.’ ’’).

. See note 11, supra.