UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI EASTERN DIVISION

WILLIE COX, JR., a/k/a ABBUE-JAH, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) No. 4:19-cv-02923-JCH ) CITY OF UNIVERSITY CITY, MISSOURI, ) ) Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER This matter is before the Court on the motion of plaintiff Willie Cox, Jr. for leave to commence this civil action without prepayment of the required filing fee. (Docket No. 2). Additionally, for the reasons discussed below, this action will be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Legal Standard on Initial Review Under

(e)(2), the Court is required to dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To state a claim under

, a plaintiff must demonstrate a plausible claim for relief, which is more than a “mere possibility of misconduct.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw upon judicial experience and common sense.

. The court must “accept as true the facts alleged, but not legal conclusions or threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Barton v. Taber,

(8th Cir. 2016). See also Brown v. Green Tree Servicing LLC,

(8th Cir. 2016) (stating that court must accept factual allegations in complaint as true, but is not required to “accept as true any legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation”). When reviewing a pro se complaint under § 1915(e)(2), the Court must give it the benefit of a liberal construction. Haines v. Kerner,

(1972). A “liberal construction”

means that if the essence of an allegation is discernible, the district court should construe the plaintiff’s complaint in a way that permits his or her claim to be considered within the proper legal framework. Solomon v. Petray,

(8th Cir. 2015). However, even pro se complaints are required to allege facts which, if true, state a claim for relief as a matter of law. Martin v. Aubuchon,

(8th Cir. 1980). See also Stone v. Harry,

(8th Cir. 2004) (stating that federal courts are not required to “assume facts that are not alleged, just because an additional factual allegation would have formed a stronger complaint”). In addition, affording a pro se complaint the benefit of a liberal construction does not mean that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation must be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed

without counsel. See McNeil v. United States,

(1993). The Complaint Petitioner is a pro se litigant who brings this civil action pursuant to

. (Docket No. 1 at 3). He names the City of University City, Missouri, as the sole defendant. The cause of action arises out of a traffic stop that took place in University City.1 He does not provide the date and time the incident occurred. The “Statement of Claim” is best understood if quoted in its entirety: University City Event

I was parked on the [S]hell gas station lot when Mr. Grammer2 pulled alongside of me and gestured that I roll down my windows[.] I did not so he exited his vehicle and tapped on my window and informed me that his [gesture] meant to roll down my window[.] Then he informed me that the lights were illegal and if he saw me driving on the street with the lights on he would issue me a citation. When I drove off the filling station lot Mr. Grammer[,] with another person[,] pulled me over and I informed him that the lights are not illegal in the [S]tate of Missouri and that he was violating my civil rights. I asked him for his first and last name and he said his last name and his number would be on the citation. He then ordered me to sign the citation or I would go to jail. He said, “This is the way we do it around here.”

(Docket No. 1-1). Plaintiff further states that he is a veteran, and that the state government, along with the police, “are holding the citizens hostage.” (Docket No. 1 at 6). He believes that a “powerful and clear message must be sent.” As such, he is seeking $4.5 million in damages. (Docket No. 1 at 5).

1 Since September 17, 2019, plaintiff has filed fifteen similar actions in this Court, including this one. See Cox v. Lang, 4:19-cv-02585-NAB (E.D. Mo. Sept. 17, 2019), Cox v. Hulsey, 4:19-cv-02586-JAR (E.D. Mo. Sept. 17, 2019), Cox v. Hartman, No. 4:19-cv-2587 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 17, 2019), Cox v. Anello, 4:19-cv-02588-AGF (E.D. Mo. Sept. 17, 2019), Cox v. Walz, 4:19-cv-02589-SRC (E.D. Mo. Sept. 17, 2019), Cox v. Hulsey, 4:19-cv-02592-SRC (E.D. Mo. Sept. 17, 2019), Cox v. Morrow, 4:19-cv-02593-JAR (E.D. Mo. Sept. 17, 2019), Cox v. Grammer, 4:19-cv-02662- PLC (E.D. Mo. Sept. 30, 2019), Cox v. Crotzer, 4:19-cv-02727-RLW (E.D. Mo. Oct. 7, 2019), Cox v. Dewly, 4:19- cv-02744-JAR (E.D. Mo. Oct. 9, 2019), Cox v. Dodson, 4:19-cv-02748-AGF (E.D. Mo. Oct. 9, 2019), Cox v. Walker, 4:19-cv-02764-RLW (E.D. Mo. Oct. 10, 2019), Cox v. City of University City, Missouri, 4:19-cv-02923-JCH (E.D. Mo. Oct. 28, 2019), Cox v. Brentwood, Missouri, City of, 4:19-cv-03067-PLC (E.D. Mo. Nov. 7, 2019), and Cox v. City of Clayton, 4:19-cv-03091-RLW (E.D. Mo. Nov. 12, 2019). 2 Mr. Grammer, who is apparently a police officer, was sued by plaintiff in a separate case alleging the exact same facts. See Cox v. Grammer, No. 4:19-cv-2662-PLC (E.D. Mo. Sept. 30, 2019). That is, the “Statement of Claim” in both cases is identical. The case against Mr. Grammer was dismissed without prejudice on November 15, 2019. Discussion Plaintiff brings this pro se civil action pursuant to

, alleging that University City is liable for violating his constitutional rights during a traffic stop. A local governing body such as University City can be sued directly under § 1983. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York,

(1978). In order to prevail

on this type of claim, the plaintiff must establish the municipality’s liability for the alleged conduct. Kelly v. City of Omaha, Neb.,

(8th Cir. 2016). Such liability may attach if the constitutional violation “resulted from (1) an official municipal policy, (2) an unofficial custom, or (3) a deliberately indifferent failure to train or supervise.” Mick v. Raines,

(8th Cir. 2018). See also Marsh v. Phelps Cty.,

(8th Cir. 2018) (recognizing “claims challenging an unconstitutional policy or custom, or those based on a theory of inadequate training, which is an extension of the same”). Thus, there are three avenues by which plaintiff can prove University City’s liability. First, plaintiff can show the existence of an unconstitutional policy. “Policy” refers to

“official policy, a deliberate choice of a guiding principle or procedure made by the municipal official who has final authority regarding such matters.” Corwin v. City of Independence, Mo.,

(8th Cir. 2016). For a policy that is unconstitutional on its face, a plaintiff needs no other evidence than a statement of the policy and its exercise. Szabla v. City of Brooklyn, Minn.,

(8th Cir. 2007). However, when “a policy is constitutional on its face, but it is asserted that a municipality should have done more to prevent constitutional violations by its employees, a plaintiff must establish the existence of a ‘policy’ by demonstrating that the inadequacies were a product of deliberate or conscious choice by the policymakers.”

. “A policy may be either a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by the municipality’s governing body.” Angarita v. St. Louis Cty.,

, 1546 (8th Cir. 1992). Second, plaintiff can establish a claim of liability based on an unconstitutional “custom.” In order to do so, plaintiff must demonstrate: 1) The existence of a continuing, widespread, persistent pattern of unconstitutional misconduct by the governmental entity’s employees;

2) Deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of such conduct by the governmental entity’s policymaking officials after notice to the officials of that misconduct; and

3) That plaintiff was injured by acts pursuant to the governmental entity’s custom, i.e., that the custom was a moving force behind the constitutional violation.

Johnson v. Douglas Cty. Med. Dep’t,

(8th Cir. 2013). Finally, plaintiff can assert a municipal liability claim by establishing a deliberately indifferent failure to train or supervise. To do so, plaintiff must allege a “pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees.” S.M. v. Lincoln Cty.,

(8th Cir. 2017). Plaintiff does not need to specifically plead the existence of an unconstitutional policy or custom. See Crumpley-Patterson v. Trinity Lutheran Hosp.,

, 591 (8th Cir. 2004). However, at a minimum, the complaint must allege facts supporting the proposition that an unconstitutional policy or custom exists. Doe ex rel. Doe v. Sch. Dist. of City of Norfolk,

, 614 (8th Cir. 2003). Here, plaintiff provides absolutely no factual allegations supporting the proposition that an unconstitutional policy or custom exists. He also fails to present any facts that tend to show that his constitutional rights were violated by University City’s failure to train or supervise its employees. Instead, plaintiff’s “Statement of Claim” narrates only a single traffic stop, with no indication that the stop resulted from actions taken by University City itself. Therefore, plaintiff’s claim against University City must be dismissed. See Ulrich v. Pope Cty.,

(8th Cir. 2013) (affirming district court’s dismissal of Monell claim where plaintiff “alleged no facts in his complaint that would demonstrate the existence of a policy or custom” that caused the

alleged deprivation of plaintiff’s rights). Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Docket No. 2) is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to state a claim. A separate order of dismissal will be entered herewith. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that an appeal from this dismissal would not be taken in good faith. Dated this 22nd day of November, 2019.

/s/ Jean C. Hamilton JEAN C. HAMILTON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE