UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI EASTERN DIVISION WILLIE COX, JR., a/k/a ABBUE-JAH, ) Plaintiff, V. ) No. 4:19-CV-3091 RLW CITY OF CLAYTON, Defendant. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER This matter is before the Court upon the motion of plaintiff Willie Cox, Jr. for leave to proceed in forma pauperis in this civil action. Upon consideration of the motion and the financial information provided in support, the Court concludes that plaintiff is unable to pay the filing fee. The motion will therefore be granted. Additionally, the Court will dismiss the complaint, without prejudice. Legal Standard on Initial Review Under

(e)(2), the Court is required to dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. An action is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact.” Neitzke v. Williams,

(1989). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009). Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw upon judicial

experience and common sense. /d. at 679. The court must assume the veracity of well-pleaded facts, but need not accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” /d. at 678 (citing Twombly,

). This Court must liberally construe complaints filed by laypeople. Estelle v. Gamble,

(1976). This means that “if the essence of an allegation is discernible,” the court should “construe the complaint in a way that permits the layperson’s claim to be considered within the proper legal framework.” Solomon v. Petray,

(8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Stone v. Harry,

(8th Cir. 2004)). However, even pro se complaints must allege facts which, if true, state a claim for relief as a matter of law. Martin v. Aubuchon,

(8th Cir. 1980). Federal courts are not required to assume facts that are not alleged, Stone,

, nor are they required to interpret procedural rules so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel. See McNeil v. United States,

(1993). The Complaint! Plaintiff states he brings this action pursuant to

against the City of Clayton.

' Since September 17, 2019, plaintiff has filed fifteen similar actions in this Court, including this one. See Cox v. Lang, 4:19-cv-02585-NAB (E.D. Mo. Sept. 17, 2019), Cox v. Hulsey, 4:19-cv-02586-JAR (E.D. Mo. Sept. 17, 2019), Cox v. Hartman, No. 4:19-cv-2587 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 17, 2019), Cox v. Anello, 4:19- cv-02588-AGF (E.D. Mo. Sept. 17, 2019), Cox v. Walz, 4:19-cv-02589-SRC (E.D. Mo. Sept. 17, 2019), Cox y. Hulsey, 4:19-cv-02592-SRC (E.D. Mo. Sept. 17, 2019), Cox v. Morrow, 4:19-cv-02593-JAR (E.D. Mo. Sept. 17, 2019), Cox v. Grammer, 4:19-cv-02662-PLC (E.D. Mo. Sept. 30, 2019), Cox v. Crotzer, 4:19-cv-02727-RLW (E.D. Mo. Oct. 7, 2019), Cox v. Dewly, 4:19-cv-02744-JAR (E.D. Mo. Oct. 9, 2019), Cox v. Dodson, 4:19-cv-02748-AGF (E.D. Mo. Oct. 9, 2019), Cox v. Walker, 4:19-cv-02764-RLW (E.D. Mo. Oct. 10, 2019), Cox v. City of University City, Missouri, 4:19-cv-02923-JCH (E.D. Mo. Oct. 28, 2019), Cox v. Brentwood, Missouri, City of, 4:19-cv-03067-PLC (E.D. Mo. Nov. 7, 2019), Cox v. City of Clayton, 4:19-cv-03091-RLW (E.D. Mo. Nov. 12, 2019), Cox v. City of Ferguson, 4:19-cv-03115 JMB (E.D.Mo. Nov. 18, 2019).

Plaintiff alleges in his complaint that he has been issued three different municipal citations from three different officers from the City of Clayton alleging that lights on his vehicle are illegal. He states that the unnamed individuals who have stopped him have not had probable cause to stop him because he believes the lights to be legal.? Plaintiff complains that the ordinance cited to by the police officers “has nothing to do with the lights on my car.” Plaintiff seeks a total of $4.5 million in damages. Discussion A local governing body such as the City of Clayton can be sued directly under § 1983. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York,

(1978). In order to prevail on this type of claim, the plaintiff must establish the municipality’s liability for the alleged conduct. Kelly, 813 F.3d at 1075. Such liability may attach if the constitutional violation “resulted from (1) an official municipal policy, (2) an unofficial custom, or (3) a deliberately indifferent failure to train or supervise.” Mick v. Raines,

(8" Cir. 2018). See also Marsh v. Phelps Cty.,

(8" Cir. 2018) (recognizing “claims challenging an unconstitutional policy or custom, or those based on a theory of inadequate training, which is an extension of the same”). Thus, there are three ways in which plaintiff can prove the liability of the City of Clayton. First, plaintiff can show that the City of Clayton had an unconstitutional policy. “Policy” refers to “official policy, a deliberate choice of a guiding principle or procedure made by the municipal official who has final authority regarding such matters.” Corwin v. City of Independence, Mo.,

(8'" Cir. 2016). See also Russell v. Hennepin Cty.,

, 847 (8" Cir. 2005) (“A policy is a deliberate choice to follow a course of action made In his complaint, plaintiff refers to a separate lawsuit filed in this Court wherein he asserted that he was denied a jury trial in Clayton by St. Louis County Judge Jason Dodson regarding one of the purported violations. See Cox v. Dodson, 4:19-CV2748 AGF (E.D.Mo).

from among various alternatives by the official or officials responsible...for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in question”). For a policy that is unconstitutional on its face, a plaintiff needs no other evidence than a statement of the policy and its exercise. Szabla v. City of Brooklyn, Minn.,

(8 Cir. 2007). However, when “a policy is constitutional on its face, but it is asserted that a municipality should have done more to prevent constitutional violations by its employees, a plaintiff must establish the existence of a ‘policy’ by demonstrating that the inadequacies were a product of deliberate or conscious choice by the policymakers.” Jd. at 390. Alternatively, plaintiff can establish a claim of liability based on an unconstitutional “custom.” In order to do so, plaintiff must demonstrate: 1) The existence of a continuing, widespread, persistent pattern of unconstitutional misconduct by the governmental entity’s employees; 2) Deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of such conduct by the governmental entity’s policymaking officials after notice to the officials of that misconduct; and 3) That plaintiff was injured by acts pursuant to the governmental entity’s custom, i.e., that the custom was a moving force behind the constitutional violation. Johnson v. Douglas Cty. Med. Dep’t,

(8" Cir. 2013). Finally, plaintiff can assert a municipal liability claim against the City of Clayton by establishing a deliberately indifferent failure to train or supervise. To do so, plaintiff must allege a “pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees.” S.M. v. Lincoln Cty.,

(8 Cir. 2017). A plaintiff does not need to specifically plead the existence of an unconstitutional policy or custom. Crumpley-Patterson v. Trinity Lutheran Hosp.,

, 591 (8" Cir. 2004). However, at a minimum, the complaint must allege facts supporting the proposition that an

unconstitutional policy or custom exists. Doe ex rel. Doe v. Sch. Dist. of City of Norfolk,

, 614 (8" Cir. 2003). Here, there are no facts supporting the proposition that plaintiffs constitutional rights were violated due to an unconstitutional policy or custom. He also fails to present any facts indicating that the City of Clayton failed to train its employees. As such, plaintiffs claims against the City of Brentwood must be dismissed. See Ulrich v. Pope Cty.,

(8™ Cir. 2013) (affirming district court’s dismissal of Monell claim where plaintiff “alleged no facts in his complaint that would demonstrate the existence of a policy or custom” that caused the alleged deprivation of plaintiff's rights). After carefully reading and liberally construing the complaint, the Court concludes that this case should be dismissed at this time pursuant to

(e)(2)(B). Plaintiff obviously prepared the complaint in a careful and thoughtful manner, and he is clear about the claim he wishes to assert against defendant. It is therefore apparent that the problems with the complaint would not be cured by permitting plaintiff to file an amended pleading. Warning as to Abuse of the Litigation Process As noted above, this case is one of 16 interrelated cases that plaintiff has filed in forma pauperis in this Court since September 17, 2019. Plaintiff has repeatedly alleged he is the target of almost constant harassment by law enforcement in different municipalities around the St. Louis Metropolitan area for driving with a light on his vehicle that resembles the one used by police vehicles. Plaintiff asserts that the use of such a light is not illegal and that to be ticketed in the St. Louis Metropolitan area by the different municipal police departments and then prosecuted is a violation of his constitutional rights.

;

As of today’s date, all of plaintiff's prior cases that have been reviewed have been dismissed for one of the reasons set forth in

(e), and the case at bar will be dismissed for such reasons as well. It is well settled in the Eighth Circuit that this Court is “vested with the discretion to impose sanctions upon a party under its inherent disciplinary power.” See Bass v. General Motors Corp.,

(8th Cir. 1998). This includes the discretion to craft and impose sanctions to deter litigants from engaging in “conduct which abuses the judicial process.” Chambers v. NASCO, Inc.,

(1991). These powers stem from “the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.” Jd. (quoting Link v. Wabash R. Co.,

(1962)). In In re Tyler,

(8th Cir. 1988), the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s sua sponte determination that the plaintiff should be limited to filing one lawsuit per month pursuant to certain conditions precedent as a sanction for the litigant’s repeated abuse of the judicial process. The Court recognized that district courts may use their discretion to place reasonable restrictions on a litigant who is found to have abused the judicial process, including providing limitations or conditions upon the filing of future suits. The Court recognized that there is “no constitutional right of access to the courts to prosecute an action that is frivolous or malicious,” and “[f]rivolous, bad faith claims consume a significant amount of judicial resources, diverting the time and energy of the judiciary away from processing good faith claims.” Jd. Here, the Court determines that plaintiff's repeated filing of frivolous and interrelated lawsuits amounts to abuse of the judicial process. Plaintiff is advised that if he continues to abuse the judicial process, the Court may use its discretion to impose reasonable restrictions, including limiting the filing of future suits and restricting his ability to proceed in forma pauperis.

With that in mind, the Court will warn plaintiff that the filing of frivolous lawsuits is an abuse of the litigation process. Plaintiff is advised that if he continues to file such lawsuits the Court may impose restrictions on his ability to file such lawsuits, including the denial of his ability to proceed in forma pauperis or to file such cases in this Court. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this case is DISMISSED without prejudice. A separate order of dismissal will be entered herewith. IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that an appeal from this dismissal would not be taken in good faith. Dated wis BST aay of November, 2019.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE